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Abstract 
Defensible space is a contested yet influential approach to designing-out-crime on social 
housing estates. This thesis uses defensible space as the vehicle to explore how movement 
changes concepts; to extend the learning on policy mobility mechanisms; to investigate the 
varied cross-disciplinary nature of evidence use; and to explore the interaction of policy, the 
housing sector and the state.   
Deepening the international policy mobilities narrative, the study traces the 
dispersal/embedding of the concept in Britain since the 1980s by revisiting the operational 
and theoretical account of defensible space proposed by Alice Coleman in the Design 
Improvement Controlled Experiment (DICE). Drawing on interviews with planning and 
architecture practitioners, housing managers and elite policymakers, the thesis explores the 
multiple ways the concept was interpreted and implemented as it circulated from national to 
local level and within three London housing estates, illustrating how the transfer mechanisms 
worked at both a policy and practical level.  
Despite being a concept whose principles continue to underpin design guidance (such as 
Secured by Design), defensible space failed to coalesce into a single formal policy, 
remaining a cluster of associated disputed elements. How these conceptual elements aided 
or hindered transfer and take up is noted by tracking routes to acceptance, the roles of 
formal transfer mechanisms, informal information sharing by transfer agents traversing 
networks, or  practitionersʼ local contextualization of generic guidance.  
The research demonstrates the ongoing resilience and acceptance of defensible space, 
despite biased evaluation, the mismatch of DICE to the politics of the time and the uncertain 
nature of the concept.  By questioning whether positivist scientific theoretical unity is 
achievable in practice, it argues for greater trust in practitioner experience, and proposes a 
looser middle-range approach to theory building for ambiguous concepts such as defensible 
space.   
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Chapter 1: Defensible space and its transfer agents  
Introduction 
This thesis explores the impact of the British geographer Alice Coleman (b.1923), the most 
well-known, almost notorious, proponent of defensible space in Britain.  Other key transfer 
agents for defensible space will be encountered, in particular the American architect and 
planner Oscar Newman (b.1935 d.2004) and Home Office psychologist/criminologist Sheena 
Wilson. But Coleman is the focus for study as she is commonly held to have introduced 
defensible space to the British academic planning and housing community, generating much 
contentious publicity in the process1.  
The day before her 90th birthday, emeritus geography professor Alice Coleman was being 
feted. At the culmination of a University alumni weekend, past geography students (and a 
couple of ex-colleagues) had gathered in the panelled committee room opposite the painted 
chapel in Kingʼs College London (KCL). The deputy head of the geography department made 
a complimentary speech referring to the vast quantity of research funding Coleman had 
brought to the department, to her being KCLʼs first female professor of geography, to her 
energy undertaking the extensive Second Land Use Survey and to the ongoing practical and 
policy impact of her work. He mentioned a paper in International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research (Jacobs and Lees, 2013) on defensible space, Colemanʼs most 
influential area of work, which explored the relationship between the design of housing 
estates, crime and anti-social behaviour. Known as DICE (Design Improvement Controlled 
Experiment) this housing regeneration programme received £50 million of funding from the 
Government led by Margaret Thatcher to test Colemanʼs hypotheses on the impact of design 
on behaviour.  
                                                      
1 Coleman continues to be held up as iconoclastic.  A recent review of Danny Dorlingʼs book All that is 
Solid: The Great Housing Disaster (2014), roundly chides Dorling for overlooking Jacobsʼ, Newmanʼs 
and Colemanʼs work, particularly Colemanʼs critique of pre-1970s council housing. The review 
continues “for Dorling to have ignored these feisty predecessors makes his work questionable” (Bar-
Hillel, 2014, p.46)  
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Coleman graciously accepted these compliments on her contribution to the department and 
the wider geographical field. Responding modestly, she attributed this success to natural 
curiosity, hard work and persistence in adversity. She even alluded to her deafness as a 
career advantage, excluding her from many time-consuming university committees, enabling 
her to concentrate on teaching and research. Coleman recounted sitting in the same room 
thirty years earlier showing graphs from her research to a panel of the Metropolitan Police, 
illustrating how housing design and planning caused social breakdown and fostered criminal 
behaviour. Present then was a sociologist from the Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust, which 
had funded Colemanʼs data collection from blocks of flats in Tower Hamlets and Southwark. 
This large-scale study provided the material for her most influential and widely read book, 
Utopia on Trial (1985a). Earlier he had disagreed with Coleman on the methodological 
direction of her research, wanting her to apply more sociological methods. Coleman recalled:  
“He was there listening and when he saw how enthusiastically the police 
agreed with my findings he stopped trying to make me take a sociological 
route and trusted me to follow a geographical one” (Interview Coleman, 
2013). 
A birthday cake was brought in and before blowing out the candles Coleman counted them, 
announcing with typical quantitative preciseness that the cake was extremely flattering as it 
only had 22 candles.  The laughter continued, as she was surrounded by past students, 
affectionately and fondly praising her academic generosity and personal kindness.   This 
celebration provided a portrait of a respected retired emeritus professor, happily reflecting 
with colleagues on an influential and successful career.  
This portrait was rather different from the impression I had received from my interviews with 
Colemanʼs former colleagues on the DICE project.  
“She's not a woman that warms the cockles of your heart” (Interview 
Sporle, 2011).  
“If you talked to anybody about Alice Coleman at the time, they'd say 
ʻbloody nutterʼ.  Some of them were worse than that saying she verged on 
a Hitlerian perspective of human nature because of her environmental 
determinism” (Interview Stride, 2011). 
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Coleman was clearly very driven. Yet even amongst colleagues who acknowledged that this 
resulted in a difficult and fraught working relationship (the description “a dictator” was 
mentioned), there is also an obvious sense of respect.  
“She was very conscientious, working many, many hours a day, a diligent 
hard worker” (Interview McKeown, 2013).  
Ex-colleagues described her as passionate (both those who agreed and disagreed with her) 
and caring deeply about her work. Yet, as with her work ethic, this passion had 
uncomfortable results.  
“In Alice you have someone who's obviously clearly quite brilliant ... but 
quite strange, obviously an environmental determinist, which is not 
something Iʼd go for.  And so she would make comments and you would 
think, hold on, something's not right there. This is my view…but most 
people felt that with her.  But she was very able.  She was driven.  And 
clearly, a lot of her passion was genuine in terms that she wanted to see a 
change in how people lived and their quality of life” (Interview Stride, 2011). 
 
 “A lovely eccentric lady. Very passionate about what she believed in. My 
only concern as a project manager was that I could contain her” (Interview 
McCarthy, 2011).  
Her drive seems to have derived from a strong conviction and certainty in her own singular 
viewpoint:  
“I'm not decrying what she was doing at all.  But from my perspective, she 
didnʼt set out to persuade, she set out to instruct” (Interview Sporle, 2011).  
“We got along like a house on fire actually.  I admired her theory.  She was 
such a forcible character however, that she alienated so many people who 
all thought they knew better than she did and she wouldn't have any of 
that” (Interview Stanford, 2011).  
So it was with a degree of nervousness that I introduced myself to Alice Coleman at her 
birthday celebration in the summer of 2013, and explained that I was studying the use of 
ʻdefensible spaceʼ in remaking failing housing estates.  
1.1 Defensible space: an unstable concept 
The concept of defensible space sets out to demonstrate the interrelationship between the 
physical design of spaces, social interaction and crime. At its simplest defensible space can 
be defined as space that is overseen and controlled by residents of surrounding buildings; 
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“space over which the occupiers of adjacent buildings can exercise effective supervision and 
control” (Cowan, 2005 p.102). The design of our surroundings is agreed to be a fundamental 
method of demarcating private territory physically or symbolically (Lynch, 1960; Ley, 1974b; 
Sennett, 1986), yet the concept of defensible space is contradictory, tentative and ill-defined. 
Its principles can contradict requirements of environmental legalisation, such as fire 
regulations, and their application is hampered by ambitions for inhabitantsʼ privacy. The 
principles also conflict with urban design ideals such as permeability of spaces and the 
concept is criticised as resulting in fortress-like housing estates and gated communities 
(Minton, 2009).   Despite all this, the concept has proved ambiguous and malleable enough 
to support diverse interdisciplinary interpretations and is a ubiquitous, familiar concept, not 
only with the built environment professionals I interviewed (it has power and resilience of 
meaning with practitioners of all disciplines) but also with residents on the estates I was 
studying.  
The validity of defensible space as a concept has been repeatedly questioned (Hillier, 1973; 
Cozens, Saville et al., 2001, 2005; Hillier and Sahbaz, 2007; Ekblom, 2011). Yet rather than 
completely discrediting it, this continuous critical inquiry has resulted in elaborations of the 
initially simple concept, in an attempt to better explain the perceptible effects.  It is possible 
to trace back through this divergent history to a handful of foundational ideas (ownership, 
surveillance, interaction, territoriality). A striking aspect of this situation has been the 
malleability of the concept of defensible space. It has been promoted as a universal ʻsnake 
oilʼ, before being attacked, refuted and disproved (Interview Riley, 2011).   And yet it remains 
a ʻcommon senseʼ concept, continuing to be used by architects and housing managers, and 
investigated by researchers with just enough agreement on what it constitutes for the idea to 
be applied in a workable way. Popularly the term defensible space appears in newspapers 
as a positive recognisable housing attribute (Economist, 2006; Jenkins, 2010). As with the 
professions, a basic version of defensible space is recognised by the general public. It is this 
slippery ambiguity that is intriguing, as is the way its mutability helps the concept adapt as it 
moves across disciplines, networks and policy domains. This is not to conclude that 
defensible space is inherently unstable or endlessly flexible. Larner and Le Heron (2002) 
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describe how concepts interacting in the world “stabilise (become rationalities, 
metadiscourses, logics) as they are communicated and are instituted as the basis of action” 
(ibid., p.720). Defensible space is a telling example of a concept that is highly durable and 
stable as the basis of certain practical actions yet less successful at retaining its logic when 
removed from this ʻreal worldʼ by being transferred into formal policy.  
The majority of the £50 million Coleman received in 1988 to test her version of defensible 
space was spent on the capital regeneration costs for seven DICE estates in east London, 
Northampton, Lancashire and Manchester.  The proportion invested in research and 
evaluation was an early commitment to evidence-based housing policy. However, despite 
the generous government funding, Colemanʼs relationship with the Department of the 
Environment (the DoE) was far from smooth and the transfer of research understanding into 
influential policy was at best partial. The DICE renewal programme illustrated a fracture in 
the idealised progression of research influencing policy, influencing practice. Crucially, this 
study offered an opportunity for mapping this three-way influence – policy on practice, 
practice on research and research on policy. In each of these three pairings, I explored the 
processes and mechanisms, the relationships (and personalities) involved, to explain the 
resilient strength of defensible space despite fierce criticism.  This re-emergence of 
ambiguous concepts used by urban and housing policy to justify action (and funding) seems 
particularly pertinent now. We are at a point when conviction has replaced evidence in 
policy-making and the shift from national housing standards and (potentially environmentally 
deterministic) design guidance to a more locally based approach to planning and housing 
design is gathering momentum (DCLG, 2012, 2014a; Lord Taylor, 2012; Williams, 2014). 
Equally important was the task of re-examining recent historical solutions to the challenges 
of remaking unpopular post-war housing estates; these challenges have clearly not been 
conclusively solved as ongoing debates over regeneration projects such as the Woodberry 
Down, Aylesbury and Haygate estates show (Chakrabortty and Robinson-Tillett, 2014; Lees, 
In press 2014). It is worrying how little current proposed solutions to the housing crisis refer 
to earlier attempts to rectify failed high density, (modernist) urban housing. In our rush to 
construct more housing are we allowing our prejudiced perceptions of who promoted or 
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devised an idea to blind us to the insights that might be gleaned from them?  Does this bias 
towards simplified solutions of demolition and new-building over more complex processes of 
remaking and repair increase the danger of repeating past mistakes and constructing further 
generations of housing designs which are likely to fail?  
1.2 From theory to evidence-based practice  
Thus far I have very briefly introduced the rise and fall of Colemanʼs influence as her 
academic research encountered the political vagaries of policymaking and the patchy 
practical application of her theories.  This leads to reflection on the spectrum of theorising 
across research policy and planning/housing design practice by examining the disjuncture of 
flows of evidence between these modes of operation.  Evidence-based policy is a familiar 
term and the concept is explored in detail.  But we must remember that all policy is 
fundamentally a call to influence action. So there is an unspoken, underlying intent 
connecting evidence gathering and practical activities, which is why this study extends the 
role of evidence in policymaking to how it is used and operationalised in practice. This study 
was motivated in part by my experience of this gap or discontinuity between the three fields 
during my professional career researching and practising housing design and policymaking, 
which has included practising architecture in the public sector (for London Local Authority 
Architecture departments), in private practice (for Pollard Thomas Edwards Architects), 
undertaking and managing housing research (for the Peabody Trust and Affinity Sutton 
Housing Associations), policy drafting for the GLA and influencing government departments 
as Head of the research team at CABE.  So the section starts with my personal interest in 
this subject and my justification for it as a valid topic for academic geographical study.   
1.2.1 A seminal concept with personal importance  
Nearly 30 years earlier as a young undergraduate, the concept of defensible space had been 
formative to my architectural training.  I retained strong memories of arguments amongst 
architectural staff and students following the publication of Utopia on Trial in 1985.   As one 
of the first spatial debates I was consciously aware of, it awakened a comprehension of the 
extent that architectural design decisions affect peopleʼs lives. I remember being very 
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affected by slides of prize-winning, yet decrepit and run-down brutalist concrete estates 
(probably of the Aylesbury or Peckham estates in London) prompting the realisation that 
architects might have unintentionally made mistakes and that design didnʼt always have the 
benign affects I had assumed. Notes made later during my postgraduate studies include 
those from a lecture on spatial analysis in 1991 where Bill Hillier2 repeated his criticism of 
Colemanʼs work published earlier in his article City of Alice's Dreams (Hillier, 1986a). Hillier 
found Colemanʼs model of the interaction between design and crime, or other undesirable 
behaviours, as far too simplistic. My notes quote Hillier:  “It is insufficient to quantify two 
variables; design features and malaise indictors, unless one is able to discount a third crucial 
factor – social pressures” (Hillier, 1991).  Hillier argued that the significance of designʼs role 
in social breakdown was less straightforward than Coleman portrayed.  
Re-reading articles in the architectural press from this period, I remembered my surprise at 
the strength of the conflicting positions taken, learning directly that differing academic 
interpretations can be argued out in a ferocious way.   More positively, this was an indication 
that architectural theory prompted more significant concerns than mere aesthetic discussion 
and that academic spatial thinking could have direct practical restorative applications rather 
than simply provide a formative role in generating designs. Colemanʼs meme of differentiated 
public and private spaces struck me very strongly and was one I applied throughout my 
architectural practice. The concept of defensible space as well as the dissonance between 
its theory and application was to reappear throughout my professional career as a built 
environment researcher and in my role providing evidence to shape and influence 
policymaking (Phippen and Warwick, 2003; Warwick, 2001; CABE, 2010). Ironically, during 
this study I came to see myself as a very minor transfer agent for defensible space 
principles. 
Grounded in the recent literature on urban geography policy mobilities (reflecting on how 
theory and research shape policy and practice and vice versa) (Freeman, 2012; Peck and 
                                                      
2 Bill Hillier, Professor at the Bartlett, University College London.  
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Theodore, 2010; McCann, 2011a; McCann and Ward, 2012), my research reflects on the 
strengths, weaknesses and often hidden assumptions inherent in the more familiar scrutiny 
of defensible space by disciplines such as criminology, planning or architectural design.  The 
hybrid approaches available to geography reveal the commonalities that explain the 
resilience and usefulness of the concept of defensible space. Geographers are leading the 
debate here, discovering the inadequacy of discussing policy mobilities as an abstract effect, 
yet without exploring how it engages with the daily mundaneness of policy formation, so 
often dominated by the use and misuse of evidence to justify decisions. So I wanted to 
explore defensible space as an example of evidence-based policy-making and its intended 
impact on practical actions. To do this, the thesis needed to dive deeper, examining not only 
how evidence is used in policy and on the ground in practice, but also as the basis of theory.  
1.2.2 Evidence and policy influencing practice  
Colemanʼs positivism underpinned her certainty that good science would easily and 
automatically translate into policy. This evidence-based policy would then in turn influence 
practitionersʼ actions. Her research outlook adhered to positivist tenets3 and as such she 
held any resultant theories to be reliable accounts of scientific observations, which were 
universally replicable and unaffected by any underlying values. Graduating with a degree in 
Geography from Birkbeck in 1947 and taking up a Geography lectureship at KCL in 1948, 
Colemanʼs experience was formed by the emergence of post-war geography as a scientific 
discipline and the dominance of empiricism-positivism-realism. During the 1970s and 1980s, 
Coleman was immersed in geographyʼs quantitative turn and the subsequent struggle over 
the primacy of quantitative or qualitative methodologies. Yet the historical geographical 
critique of positivism has demolished claims for value-free geography (Benhabib, 1985, cited 
in Gregory, 2000, p.577). The impossibility of value-free theories is revealed in the 
antagonism that resulted from Colemanʼs strongly held values differing from those funding or 
                                                      
3 That empirical, scientific observations of the world are possible and truthful accounts of these 
observations can be made. That the truthfulness of these accounts can be evaluated separately from 
any derived theories. That scientific observation is universally repeatable. The empirically verified 
theories arising will assume the status of universal laws which are distinct from questions of value 
(Hoggart, Lees et al., 2002, p.6) 
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using her research, which far exceeded expected tensions between theory and praxis. That 
academia, policy and practice structure the (re)making of urban residential space as different 
“problems” is due in part to the dissimilar value systems they apply. Thus understanding the 
values (typically discounted in the scientific method), the assumptions and the 
preconceptions, with which Coleman and her contemporaries approached the challenges 
they saw on large-scale social housing estates, became central to this thesis. 
This is not to suggest that practice is inherently less reflective, or incapable of constructing 
complex theory than academia, but that there is an alternative practical process of 
operationalising theories. This is an effective but unregarded way for concepts to travel 
around and so worthy of scrutiny. I intend to explore the alternative ways that knowledge 
becomes codified and the ways that ʻcommon sense ideasʼ like defensible space are 
mobilised outside the normal policy and theory routes. 
1.2.3 Practitionersʼ use of evidence: defensible space as a middle range theory  
My later discussion of theory will focus on the academic status given to theoretical 
soundness, but it must not be forgotten that not all involved in the DICE story shared this 
academic outlook.  A characteristic that separates research, policy and practice as distinct 
domains is their expectation of, or engagement with, models, theories and theory building.  
For researchers context-dependency is aligned to a belief in scientific or non-scientific 
methodologies. Practice is often seen as the messy woolly obverse of academic theory. The 
simplified dualisms of theory in academia are helpful for polemic thinking and writing but they 
“inhibit understanding by implying a certain neatness that is rarely found in lived life” 
(Flyvbjerg, 2001, p.49). Policy makers are more concerned with a theoryʼs reliability; its 
relevance and then its repeatability in ʻlived lifeʼ. Policy makers need to consider a spectrum 
of possibilities and situations to understand how a policy/theory might play out in differing 
contexts. Flyvbjerg notes that for policy makers this is a pragmatic case of ʻWill this solution 
work here?ʼ Further, practitionersʼ concerns are with making the right decision in a single 
context, answering this question even more specifically; ʻWhat can I do here, now, in these 
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circumstances? How will this solution work here?ʼ So for practitioners (be they architects, 
planners or housing managers), context-dependency is all encompassing. 
Local context exerts strict limits and constraints on what constitutes the evidence needed for 
good decision-making. Schönʼs famous quote distinguishes between technical-led and 
intuition/experience-led problem definitions and hence the nature of the solutions possible: 
“There is a high, hard ground where practitioners can make effective use of 
research-based theory and technique and there is a swampy lowland 
where situations are confusing ʻmessesʼ incapable of technical solution. 
The difficulty is that the problems of the high ground, however great their 
technical interest, are often relatively unimportant to clients or the large 
society, while in the swamp are the problems of greatest human concern. 
Shall the practitioner stay on the high ground where he can practice 
rigorously, as he understands rigour, but where he is constrained to deal 
with problems of relatively little importance? Or shall he descend to the 
swamp where he can engage with the most important and challenging 
problems if he is willing to forsake technical rigour...There are those who 
choose the swampy lowland. They deliberately involve themselves in the 
messy but crucially important problems and, when asked to describe their 
methods of inquiry, they speak of experience, trial and error, intuition and 
muddling through” (Schön, 1983, pp.42-43).  
As theorists, Alice Coleman and Oscar Newman were locating defensible space on the 
rational, technical ʻhigh groundʼ, whereas practitioners are more likely to recognise it as a 
ʻmessy, lowlandʼ problem: important, but contingent on context and opportunity and not 
responsive to application of strict rigorously-set policy principles.  
Mertonʼs influential notion of ʻmiddle-range theoryʼ is helpful here. Mertonʼs framework 
emerged during the 1950s as a way of providing sociological thinking with the scientific 
rigour required by a scientific discipline4.  Versions of this approach have played out in most 
social sciences, particularly political science, but have influenced spatial disciplines striving 
to link the actions of people in cities to the materiality of the urban built environment, 
including planning and urban geography (Boudon, 1991). The strength of middle-range 
                                                      
4 Merton was also a guiding touchstone for this study because of his interest in the delay between the 
first appearances of ideas and when they begin to have more serious influence. He termed these 
ʻprediscoveriesʼ identifying that many scientific advances were anticipated by these form of discoveries 
that failed to change the thinking of the scientific establishment. Merton asked whether this was 
because the ʻprediscovererʼ lacked status, or the context wasnʼt ready, or an essential connection was 
missed, emphasizing the role of chance connections and serendipity (Sampson, 2010). 
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theory is that it is “not mindless empiricism and not abstract theory or theory about other 
theorists. Merton developed theory about how the world works” (Sampson, 2010, p.72). 
Green and Schweber (2008) characterise the research questions that middle-range theories 
are best suited to explain as those that begin with specific local-level problems, from then 
enquiring into the types of process encountered and to explain the underlying dynamics of 
the problem field. The research is then able to draw on a range of explanatory theories, 
“looking for mechanisms or small discrete processes that might account for what can be 
observed” (ibid, p.651). In this the middle-range theory approach is inherently multi-
disciplinary and eclectic, incorporating the responses and solutions from across disciplines. 
In these circumstances it is understandable how middle-range theory is attractive to 
practitioners. As an approach that focuses on small but generalizable processes, the 
particular and specific, it has a familiar relevance. It seems an achievable goal rather than 
searching fruitlessly for complete universal explanations of the whole world, or being 
distracted by a-theoretical local descriptions.  It meets the need for theories that fill the gap 
between abstract theories and the thick descriptions of empirical reality. Weak, ʻvernacularʼ 
middle-range theories may not explain all observed effects to a degree that they can predict 
outcomes, but they can help us understand what is going on sufficiently to develop a 
plausible narrative. These ʻplausible enoughʼ stories of causality and outcome are the kinds 
of narratives often used to promote or support policy or to justify taking a decision. For 
defensible space, activities such as adding gates, rearranging entrances or subdividing 
lawns may be generalised within generic ʻgood design practiceʼ regardless of any certain 
theoretical explanation. 
1.2.4 Questioning the value of evidence and mechanisms of transfer  
The aim of this thesis was to trace the mobility of the concept of defensible space from its 
landing in the UK into urban/housing research, policy and practice by revisiting the 
operational and theoretical account of defensible space proposed by Alice Coleman in the 
Design Improvement Controlled Experiment (DICE). My research focused on how 
academics, policymakers and professionals involved in DICE each used, popularised and 
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gathered evidence to justify their concept of defensible space.  So although DICE and the 
large-scale quantitative and statistical evaluation that followed it were promoted as highly 
scientific experimental processes, this research was a qualitative study. Through discourse 
analysis of the policy documents and in-depth interviews with the key actors, the varied 
viewpoints of these communities were examined. Despite taking as its subject a concept that 
might be seen to be lacking in sufficient internal validity to be truly considered a theory, 
theory building became a critical frame for consideration. The research also aimed to extend 
the literature on the movement of ideas between policy and practice (as an underdeveloped 
subset of the literature on policy mobilities) and to fill the gap in applying theories of policy 
mobilities as a concrete research method.  
From these concerns I identified three research questions: 
• How was defensible space mobilised into research, policy and practice? 
• Did the way in which it was mobilised affect its impact?  
• What does this mobility of defensible space tell us about how these different 
communities of practice use evidence?  
I trace how alternative physical and social ways of constructing defensible space and the 
kernel of shared principles have been reflected in research (both Colemanʼs DICE and 
Hillierʼs Space Syntax), in housing policy (in the form of funding documents for the Estates 
Action programme) and finally codified into design guidance (the DICE Design Guides, DoE 
documentation and the early versions of Secured by Design).  
1.3 Structuring the narrative 
Chapter One has introduced the concept of defensible space, DICE and explained my 
motivation for pursuing this study. Chapter Two reflects and draws on three bodies of 
literature: critical writings on defensible space, on policy mobilities and on evidence-based 
policy. I comment on and refine these bodies of literature identifying the existing knowledge 
base to build on and framing the epistemological challenges for the research. In the 
discussion of methodology and methods in Chapter Three, I reflect on the thirty-two semi-
structured interviews I conducted, as well as my own engagement and influence on the 
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research process and the hybrid research/analysis framework that emerged.  My 
methodological frame was prompted by Charmazʼs (1995) view that grounded theory 
facilitates construction of “middle-range theories to explain behaviour and processes” (ibid., 
p.28).  Grounded theoryʼs emphasis on understanding before explanation, plus processes of 
theory building arising from immersion in concurrent empirical data gathering and analysis, 
fitted the aspirations and research design for this study, even though constraints to the actual 
research activity led in the end to practical adaptations of this ubiquitous social research 
mode.  
The empirical Chapters Four to Eight describe events spanning from the early 1970s to the 
present5. Each empirical chapter focuses on several episodes within the overall narrative, 
showcasing the views and opinions of different disciplines, from geography, to planning, to 
architecture/urban design, or housing management. Episodes depict one or more transfer 
mechanisms, showing how particular groups favoured certain exchange routes, or how 
clusters of mechanisms combined to facilitate (or inhibit) movement of concepts and learning  
(see Appendix A: Timeline of individualsʼ stories, key events and political/policy context).  
Figure 1.1 Summary timeline of episodes 
 
                                                      
5 The richness of the story has meant excluding entertaining but less relevant episodes which have 
been published elsewhere, for example Colemanʼs encounters with the Prince of Wales (see Jacobs 
and Lees, 2013) or with community architects (see Warwick, Forthcoming, 2014)  
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Building on the dominant conceptualisation of policy mobilities as an international process, 
Chapter Four opens with the movement of the concept of defensible space from the USA to 
the UK during the 1970s and 1980s.  This section introduces three key transfer agents 
stimulating the movement of the concept to two potential receptor sites in English 
Government Departments. I describe Colemanʼs discovery of Newmanʼs principles and her 
appropriation of them as the basis of her study of post-war housing estates, the findings of 
which were published in her book, Utopia on Trial.  There was an extremely varied response 
to Colemanʼs book. Chapter Five records its enthusiastic reception from the public and 
mainstream press while being treated with derision in the academic sphere and by the 
architectural profession. One example describes a housing conference devised to refute 
Colemanʼs opinions. The chapter continues with the tale of Coleman meeting with Margaret 
Thatcher and acquiring the funding to apply her DICE theories in practice.  
Chapter Six explores the implementation of DICE from two viewpoints, academe and 
practice.  It starts with the formation of the research team at KCL and the process of 
choosing sites for the DICE experiment. Two of the selected estates are examined in detail, 
this time concentrating on the micro-practices played out during two major reconstruction 
projects. Finally, I reconsider the transfer mechanisms used, examining the ways that the 
project teams extracted and replicated the lessons learnt from the two selected schemes in 
subsequent projects. The impact of DICE was evaluated during and after its completion and  
Chapter Seven considers the role of social research in policy evaluation.  The extensive, 
expensive, politically charged evaluation undertaken by consultants Price Waterhouse is 
compared to Colemanʼs far more modest, self-funded assessment.  
Chapter Eight contains two narrative strands. It explores the Mozart Estate as a regeneration 
case study with a timeline running beside the main story of DICE.  This example illustrates, 
on a single West London estate, many of the practical, regeneration and evaluation 
challenges described in earlier chapters. The chapter then proceeds to bring the story up to 
date, outlining the legacy of DICE and the ways defensible space has been incorporated into 
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policy and practical technical documents using the rise and imminent demise of Secured by 
Design to illustrate the out-of-phase cycles of policy and practice. 
The concluding chapter reflects on defensible space as ʻhardʼ or ʻsoftʼ theory and how 
practitioners in particular apply experience to make sense of the research and evidence that 
exists.  It is clear that defensible space is a concept with ongoing relevance. Walking around 
regenerated post-war estates, many instances are visible of defensible space principles 
applied during the two decades since DICE. Ground floor flats now have individual front 
doors and fenced-in front and back gardens. Blocks that once would have shared a single 
entrance, opening off an internal courtyard have been reversed to face the street. New 
stair/lift towers have been built to break up long blocks, providing more vertical access points 
and allowing the demolition of high-level walkways. Some of these design alterations appear 
wilful and poorly considered. Yet despite these practical failings, despite the multiple 
academic criticisms and political attempts to stifle and undermine its theoretical basis, 
defensible space continues to remain a durable concept with lasting impact and influence. 
This thesis sets out to trace and understand how and why this mobile, resilient and mutable 
concept survived. 
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Chapter 2: Examining mobile concepts, evidence use and 
values     
Introduction 
 The backdrop for this research are the practical processes of formulating, mobilising and 
operationalising policy and the equally practical process of gathering research evidence in 
different fields. That defensible space can be viewed either from Schönʼs (1983) theoretical 
high ground or from within his less rigorous ʻmessy swampsʼ is less a question of varied 
disciplinary perspectives than an indication of its mobile, mutable, uncertain nature. 
Literature reviews traditionally set out what is known about a subject, but equally importantly, 
what is not understood.  So this Chapter is concerned with the many uncertainties around 
defensible space (for example its inconclusive evidence base, that it is not exclusively about 
crime, or that it is treated as theory despite not adhering to essential criteria for theories), as 
much as the areas of consensus.  Any consensus is only a snapshot, as the numerous 
reviews of the concept show; attempts to incorporate alternative explanations have resulted 
in an ever-expanding definition. Cross-disciplinary interest in the topic adds to this 
definitional expansion and suggests that reinterpretations will continue. The latest, from a 
designing-out-crime standpoint, is Ekblomʼs (2011) deconstruction and re-construction of 
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). So rather than extending this re-
defining process further (risking yet further confusion and over-elaboration) the task of this 
chapter is twofold: firstly to trace the evolution of defensible space and secondly to locate the 
concept against two other bodies of work, the policy mobilities literature and accounts of how 
evidence is used in decision-making (as exemplified in evidence-based policy-making).   
The first section tracks defensible space from a somewhat simplistic, almost naive concept, 
through a gradual process of elaboration into the current multi-faceted, multi-layered version. 
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Contemporary critiques are used to reveal the oppositional and contradictory aspects6 from 
distinct disciplinary perspectives: noting its inherent geographical and spatial foundations, its 
absorption by the architectural and design community and its use by criminologists as a key 
explanatory source. The second section considers policy mobilities and its transfer 
mechanisms, concentrating on how the process of movement shapes the formulation and 
reception of policy ideas. The literature is reviewed for practical research methods to track 
transfer/transformational mechanisms and to provide insights into ways of following the 
spread and take-up of such a mobile, malleable concept as defensible space.  A third section 
reviews the literature on evidence-based policy-making considering the relationship between 
research, policy and practice to locate Colemanʼs academic positivism. This section touches 
on criticisms of the realist explanation of ʻwhat worksʼ in social urban policy interventions and 
Colemanʼs expectations for DICE as an ʻexperimentalʼ approach within the governance drive 
to evaluate policy. While policy mobilities thinking has considered many topics (from the 
movement of healthcare or drug policies, to BIDS or the ʻcreative cityʼ, see McCann and 
Ward 2011) it has not been applied to the concept of defensible  space.  Similarly  the  
evidence-based policy approach  has not explicitly  been used to trace and unpick why only 
some defensible space principles crystallised into policy.  As these three literatures have not 
been combined before their intersection is aided by examining them through the frame of 
power and by considering ideologies of rationality, rational actions and decision-making. In a 
situation of multiple competing rationalities, conflicting viewpoints and a contextualised 
interplay of rationalities/power and politics, this provides an explanation of how certain 
strategies and  views win through.  A final section explores the role of bounded rationality in 
the circulation of ideas and their framing as policies or incorporation into routine regimes of 
practice. This novel insight is necessary to unpack the value-laden positionality of the players 
in the story of defensible spaceʼs travels and to address key participants (particularly 
Colemanʼs) epistemological deterministic bias.  
                                                      
6 I took a strategic decision to include widely published critiques of defensible space in this chapter, 
while the empirical chapters contain the criticisms recounted during interviews or pieced together from 
secondary sources. Similarly, footnotes signpost issues to be discussed in detail in empirical chapters.   
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2.1 Defensible space evolves 
The emergence of defensible space as a concept is far richer and more complex than the 
degree that the design of spaces facilitates or inhibits criminal activity. Most commentators 
agree that defensible space is not solely about crime, nor that it is limited to the design of 
spaces and fences, the physical location of windows, or the layout of streets and 
neighbourhoods. Colemanʼs research focused on the domestic spatial scale, but she 
considered its impact at the broadest social level. Coleman saw the lack of defensible space 
as only one aspect of the disadvantage caused by design; similarly, she saw crime as only 
one indicator of the social malaise she was so concerned about. However while health, 
quality-of-life or wellbeing are also affected by design, crime is a useful place for this chapter 
to start due to the substantial quantity of literature on this relationship. This literature on the 
relationship of design to crime is extensive for historical and theoretical reasons (political 
desires to protect society, explain fluctuating crime rates, promote social policy as a crime 
solution and not least the availability of crime data).   
But most helpful for this research, which set out to explore alternative views of the concept, 
the term defensible space is commonly used by a variety of disciplines. It has been subject 
to much cross-disciplinary scrutiny, not only from criminologists (Taylor 1984; Cozens, 
Saville et al, 2001, 2002, 2004 2005; Reyalds and Elffers 2009), but also urban sociologists 
(Sampson 1997; Wilson 1978, 1980, 1981; Halpern 1995), geographers/criminal 
cartographers  (Herbert 1992; Davidson 1981), human geographers exploring the geography 
of crime (Smith, 1986) and urban designers/architects (Hiller 1973, 1986; Poyner 1983).  Yet 
even within the broad topic of design and crime, Ekblom (2011) is careful to separate 
defensible space as a subset of crime prevention, spawning its own sub-fields such as 
environmental criminology. He defines defence of a space, building, object or person as a 
both a ʻpreparatoryʼ and an ʻoperationalʼ task, with the role of defence and defender as 
further subsets. For a space to be defensible, it requires suitable physical properties, but 
defence equally has social dimensions, depending on the motivations, behaviour and 
capacity of the defender and offender.  
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This chapter refines four key meta-reviews on defensible space:  
• Poynerʼs (1983) book Design against crime: Beyond defensible space, an extensive 
cross-field reassessment following the publication of Newmanʼs (1972) book Defensible 
Space 
• the major review of CPTED  by Cozens, Saville et al. (2005) which establishes a  
ʻcontrolled vocabularyʼ for many of the terms used in later reviews to articulate the 
concept   
• Reynald and Elffersʼ (2009) paper The future of Newman's Defensible Space Theory: 
Linking defensible space and the routine activities of place, and    
• Ekblomʼs (2011) paper Deconstructing CPTED… and reconstructing it for practice, 
knowledge management and research which is an attempt to update CPTED inline with 
developments in design, architecture and crime science.  
In the following section I extend these four by incorporating a geographical view into the 
more familiar crime, planning and urban design views.    
2.1.1 The emergence of the concept from architecture and planning   
The architect/planner Oscar Newmanʼs 1972 study of New York public housing (published as 
Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design7) conceptualized defensible 
space as a combination of spatial and social mechanisms, with the capacity to create 
physical zones of territorial influence, to provide natural surveillance opportunities for 
residents and to positively affect the (often negative) perception of a public housing 
schemeʼs distinctiveness and resultant social or economic stigma. Newman refined this 
definition in his Design Guidelines for Creating Defensible Space as:   
“a residential environment whose physical characteristics—building layout 
and site plan—function to allow inhabitants themselves to become key 
agents in ensuring their security” (Newman, 1976, p.4). 
                                                      
7 The 1972 edition Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design, New York: Macmillan, 
was published in 1973 in Great Britain under the title: Defensible Space: People and Design in the 
Violent City, London: Architectural Press. 
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The geographer David Herbertʼs (1982) tripartite definition of defensible space, précised the 
range of its effects: 
“as a model for residential environments which inhibit crime by creating 
the physical expression of a social fabric that defends itself;   
as a surrogate term for the range of mechanisms – real and symbolic 
barriers, strongly defined areas of influence and improved opportunities 
for surveillance – that combine to bring an environment under the control 
of its residents;  
and as a living environment which can be employed by its inhabitants for 
the enhancement of their own lives, while providing security for their 
neighbours, families and friends” (ibid., p.46). 
Herbertʼs definition neatly summarizes the dichotomy of disciplinary positions on defensible 
space: that of criminology (with its prime objective of inhibiting crime), and of planning/urban 
design (which aligns itself with the final more positive, quality-of-life enhancing aims).  
Spatial perspectives on the relationship of crime and housing have existed since Boothʼs 
nineteenth century maps of poverty and social class in London, Beamesʼ studies of British 
rookeries or Burgessʼ pre-first world war concentric crime model of Chicago.  The locational 
analyses of neighbourhoods established purely spatial patterns of crime, proposing 
environments without behavioural differentiation.  These area-based approaches evolved 
into ecological analysis of the impact of poor housing, poverty and transient populations 
during the 1950s.  These methods still maintained that a particular behavioural setting had 
the power to elicit similar responses from diverse occupants and remained at an aggregate 
inter-urban scale of investigation. It was not until the early 1970s that criminological research 
moved from mapping the location of offenders or offences, to proposing models of  local 
environment as a framework for individual behaviour. More recently, research into the 
geography of the fear of crime describes a subtle and complex sequence of interactions that 
link the design of the physical environment to individualsʼ perceived potential for crime and 
hence to an individualʼs sense of wellbeing (Smith 1986a, 1987, 2003).  
So the basis of defensible space emerges from notions of social interaction and encounter in 
city streets, described for example in Mumfordʼs (1938) The Culture of Cities. It builds on the 
historical work of Wirth, Simmel and other urban sociologists exploring the influence of the 
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form and character of the city, or the interconnectedness of common space on the 
experiences of its inhabitants (Whyte, 1956). By relating image, meaning and legibility to the 
perceptual formulation of place, Lynch (1960) expanded understanding of the physical 
impact of the built environment, transforming how designers and social scientists alike 
perceived urban form.   
Jane Jacobsʼ seminal contribution to the concept of defensible space must be 
acknowledged.  In The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961) Jacobsʼ combination 
of social science and planning theories presented a positive vision of urban living, where 
active street life and numerous social interactions were identified as indicators for successful 
well-designed places.  She noted that more crimes occurred in the accessible but often 
deserted public spaces that characterized modern housing estates, than conventionally 
crowded streets. Poyner (1983) identified Jacobsʼ influence on Newmanʼs version of the 
concept, as did Gehlʼs book Life Between Buildings (1971).  Jacobsʼ other critical legacy was 
a taxonomy of space that shaped social interaction.  Jacobsʼ (1961) succinct definition of the 
three attributes of safe spaces included a plea for the delineation of public and private space. 
“First there must be a clear demarcation between what is public space 
and what is private space. Public and private spaces cannot ooze into 
each other as they do typically in suburban settings or in projects. 
Second there must be eyes on the street: eyes belonging to those we 
might call the natural proprietors of the street. The buildings on a street 
equipped to handle strangers and to ensure the safety of both residents 
and strangers must be orientated to the street.  
And third, the sidewalk must have users on it fairly continuously both to 
add to the number of effective eyes on the street and to induce people in 
buildings along the street to watch the sidewalks in sufficient numbers” 
(ibid., p.35). 
Newmanʼs version of defensible space extended Jacobsʼ two discrete definitions of public 
and private space into four categories; private, semi-private, semi-public and public space.8 
                                                      
8 Newmanʼs classifications are: Interior spaces within flats are private and streets public. Lobbies, 
stairs or shared internal spaces are semi-private spaces and external gardens accessed by a number 
of residents, semi-public. However depending on the design and layout, internal circulation areas can 
be classified as public. Colemanʼs later categories included “confused” space, corresponding to the 
planning term SLOPE - space left over from planning.  
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Figure 2.1 Newman's typology of space 
 
However other studies refute such distinct categories, for example Moran and Dolphin (1986) 
suggest a spectrum of public accessibility between highly and less public space. In his 
influential paper on the infamous Pruitt-Igoe housing project in St Louis, Yancey (1971) found 
that residents easily recognised the difference between private apartment space and public 
shared amenities.  His critique of the estateʼs design identified a lack of semi-public space, 
which he believed housing management professionals considered to be “wasted space”  
(ibid., p.11). But far from being wasteful, he argued that this deficiency resulted in residents 
retreating into private internal spaces. Yancey termed these semi-private areas ʻdefensible 
spaceʼ (ibid., p.17) using the term several years before Newman. Similar to residents 
socializing on their front steps in the North End of Boston described by Jacobs (1961), the 
semi-public space outside family homes “provides the ecological basis around which informal 
networks of friends and relatives may develop” (Yancey, 1971, p.17). These spatial 
relationships impacted on the social networks of residents, with physical designs inhibiting 
occupants from extending their sphere of influence beyond the confines of their individual 
dwellings. 
2.1.2 Newmanʼs conceptualization of defensible space  
Newmanʼs housing research career began during the mid-1960s in St Louis, leading to  
empirical studies undertaken on New York Housing Authority housing estates in Yonkers and 
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the Bronx in 1969, continuing in Chicago in the 1980s and Dayton Ohio until the early 1990s 
(Newman, 1995). The New York study assessed two housing projects, drawing on the New 
York Housing Authority Police crime statistics as well as his own data generated through 
resident interviews and building analysis. One estate with high-rise blocks, Van Dyke, had a 
50% higher crime-rate than Brownsville, which consisted of mid-rise walk-ups.  
Finding higher crime rates in the lifts, stairways and landings of the high-rise apartment 
buildings, Newman argued that the Van Dyke residents felt no personal responsibility for 
communal areas shared by many occupants. Good design and certain physical 
characteristics allowed Brownsville residents to monitor and occupy semi-private spaces, 
ensuring their security. Although intended as practical, applied research, Newmanʼs 
assertions for verifiable scientific methods enhanced the reputation of his work (he 
maintained the study compared identical communities, with constant social characteristics 
and only building forms varied).  However these positivist methodological assertions 
legitimised later scientifically based criticisms of Newmanʼs research.  
Figure 2.2 Newmanʼs sketch of Van Dyke (L) and Brownsville (R), New York 
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Newmanʼs concept of defensible space derived from these studies elaborated on Jacobsʼ 
attributes of safe public spaces. Safe spaces required:  “visibility to witnesses, community 
spirit and being prepared to guard neutral territory, a stream of potential witnesses and 
demarcation of private territory physically and symbolically” (Mawby, 1977, p.171). The 
ʻdimensionsʼ that underpin Newmanʼs concept are: 
• the capacity of the physical environment to create physical zones of territorial influence 
• the capacity of physical design to provide surveillance opportunities for residents and 
their agents 
• the capacity of physical design to influence the perception of a projectʼs uniqueness, 
isolation and stigma, and 
• the influence of geographical juxtaposition with ʻsafe zonesʼ on the security of adjacent 
areas (Newman, 1972, p.50). 
 
These four dimensions of territoriality, natural surveillance, image and milieu interact. The 
latter three function as ʻcomponents of territorialityʼ or ʻmechanisms that facilitate territorialityʼ 
in that their effects provide feedback reinforcing the overarching sense of territoriality 
(Reynald and Elffers, 2009, p.30).  Territoriality has been widely explored in social science 
as both a positive and negative attribute. Cozens, Saville et al. (2005) caution that 
territoriality “is fraught with difficulties associated with definition, interpretation and 
measurement” (ibid.,  p.331).  The broad interpretation ranges from a concept of place-
attachment or social commitment to location, to animal-like defending of ʻturfʼ through 
symbolic or physical acts. Territoriality is enacted across physical scales relating to specific 
spaces, neighbourhoods or national boundaries. Nation scale territoriality is not a concern 
here, but its long historical influence underpins the vernacular understanding of territoriality 
and the urban spatial version retains resonances of warfare and defence. Sennett (1986) 
traced the significant historical social interactions shaping and controlling urban space. 
Control over space can be established in a multitude of ways: physical (individual presence 
inhibiting criminal activity, physical barriers such as fences or walls); symbolic (plants, seats 
or other objects signifying ownership of the space); visual  (ʻbeware of the dogʼ signs); or 
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physiological through fostering feelings of safety. Tactics for imposing control cover a 
spectrum of immediacy from a sense of ownership to ʻproprietary concernʼ and guardianship 
(Cozens, Saville et al., 2005). Yet Hillier (1973) disagreed that territoriality was either a 
“behavioural universal” or the principal explanation of human spatial behaviour. 
To Newman, territoriality arose from interconnected actions; establishing a sense of 
ownership for legitimate users of the space, who in turn imbued areas with visibly legible 
boundaries and encouraged familiarity with neighbours or passers-by.  Identifying who was a 
legitimate ʻuser/inhabitantʼ and how they ʻcontrolʼ a space, is fluid and open to interpretation. 
Ley  (1974b) characterised territoriality as “the absence of anonymity” for rightful inhabitants. 
For Newman, this exclusion of non-inhabitants is directed at strangers by limiting access and 
movement through the estate. The impact of the number/frequency of passers-by is 
complex, with several explanations; many strangers might provide greater anonymity for 
criminals, valuable potential witnesses or positive opportunities for social interaction. These 
nuanced interpretations of control vary at a cultural or individual, household, community level 
as well as a geographical scale (Merry, 1981). Residentsʼ established norms and sense of 
community aid detection and halting of undesirable behaviour. Yet territoriality might include 
factors that jeopardize as well as improve security. The presence of graffiti can symbolically 
control and negatively influence a space, acting as a reminder of intimidation as well as 
neglect.  These contradictory readings become explicit when intervening or designing for 
territoriality. Ekblom (2011) lists the tradeoffs that designers negotiate between aims for 
privacy/ownership or inclusiveness/community, or permeability. Design creativity is needed 
to resolve these compromises, for example see-through barriers that maintain good 
surveillance.  
Surveillance is the second of Newmanʼs dimensions, favouring the use of natural, informal 
surveillance (windows overlooking public spaces, active street frontages) over mechanical 
(CCTVs) or active supervision such as security guards. However even with natural 
surveillance, there are contradictory aspects requiring consequences to be explored. Ground 
floor windows may improve visibility over adjacent spaces, but might also advertise 
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opportunities for burglary and will be worthless if the resident feels exposed, hanging up 
curtains to ensure privacy. Similarly high-level walkways (criticized by Newman and Coleman 
as exposed semi-public space, providing escape routes for offenders) have been shown to 
offer excellent surveillance opportunities for crimes occurring below (Mawby, 1977).  
This suggests two alternative models of natural surveillance.  First, natural surveillance from 
windows, which relies on two recursive activities, initially that residents watch over their own 
(or neighboursʼ) property.  Then, on seeing criminal activity, the occupants must be confident 
that either reporting the incident will elicit a satisfactory police response, or that they 
themselves can safely intervene. This secondary response (by the resident, or police) is 
required to stop crime that is taking place. Yet natural surveillance (or the impression of it) 
can still inhibit and deter crime from occurring by making intruders feel conspicuous. The 
second form of surveillance arises from well-used spaces and familiarity of use, improving 
the desire to defend that space.  These two models interact creating a virtuous circle where 
the increased sense of security generated by encouraging natural surveillance results in 
more frequent use of spaces, which in turn increases surveillance.  
Image is the least well defined but most tangible of Newmanʼs dimensions.  Image results 
from the use of distinctive built forms, materials, or aesthetics with associations to a 
particular social class or lifestyle.  This effect, explored by both urban and social writers 
(Lynch, 1960; Halpern, 1995) encompasses the size and scale of blocks to the selection of 
particularly intuitional or vulnerable materials.  It is, of course, affected by the physical 
condition of the buildings and spaces, by signs of decay, neglect or lack of maintenance. 
Good management, implying careful and contentious ongoing guardianship, is the basis of 
Wilson and Kellingʼs (1982) “Broken Windows” hypothesis which is highly reliant on 
considered and maintainable designs. Image is particularly subject to negative differentiation. 
The image of an estate contributes to attracting or repelling individuals or fostering positive 
or negative subcultures and normative behaviours (expectations of ʻcleaning the front stepʼ 
or well-maintained private gardens can be influenced as strongly by communal culture as the 
design itself). Image appears to be the characteristic least discussed in the criminological 
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and geographical writings - many studies include the impact of built form within their 
definitions of territoriality or the effect of stigmatisation under milieu.   
Milieu is the positive influence of activities perceived as safe (such as police stations or well 
used streets) on adjacent areas. Newmanʼs analysis of it simplistically juxtaposes high and 
low crime areas and as a solution, proposes pepper-potting difficult residents within quiet 
well-behaved neighbourhoods.  Newman ignored the relationship of an estate to the wider 
city scale or the intra-urban social organisation and crime levels.  Limiting the manipulation of 
built form to the block, the estate and neighbourhood, ignores the city level patterns of 
affluence and social cohesion (Hirschfield and Bowers 1997). Understanding what 
constitutes a safe neighbourhood is fundamental to the interpretation of milieu, but there are 
many contradictory views about why one neighbourhood feels safe, another scary. 
The title of Poynerʼs Design Against Crime: Beyond Defensible Space (1983) shows how 
deeply established Newmanʼs approach became in the subsequent decade. Despite doubts 
about his research methods, Poyner conceded that Newmanʼs book convinced many that the 
design of buildings might contribute to increasing levels of crime, acting as a foundation for 
an extensive quantity of research.  Poynerʼs meta-review examined crime-reduction research 
in the decade following the publication of Newmanʼs book. It considered neighbourhood 
planning, residential burglary, wilful damage to public housing, as well as criminal activity on 
streets and city centres, public transport and schools. The majority of the studies were from 
Britain and North America, with a few from France, Australia and New Zealand, covering 
three kinds of literature: theoretical writings, reports of empirical research studies and 
guidance on security design.  
Each kind of literature was targeted at a specific audience of academicians or practitioners.  
Theoretical reviews by criminologists and designers tended to criticize both Newmanʼs 
methodology and construction of predictive theory, leaving a negative impression and 
minimising the lessons relevant to practitioners. As an architect/researcher Poyner was 
sensitive to this, questioning whether architects, planners and others involved in decisions 
about the built environment could be held responsible for the rise in crime. He distinguished 
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between social scientists (including criminologists) who were “primarily concerned with 
scientific statements” and whose findings were presented as predictive descriptions, against 
designers whose recommendations were expressed as the prescriptive actions needed to 
achieve a desired affect (ibid., p.4). More relevant to planning professionals were the 
geographical studies on mapping and distribution of crime. Poyner cited evaluations and 
reports of good empirical research that examined the impact of environmental factors on 
crime levels in a practically pragmatic way. But Poyner found the paucity of conclusive 
findings frustrating when considering future practical applications. Similarly the guidance and 
proposed interventions in the early 1980s, were generic, weak and obvious (ʻfit stronger 
locksʼ, ʻimprove street lightingʼ) with insufficient depth to the evaluation of what actions were 
effective in which situations. 
2.1.3 Colemanʼs operationalization of defensible space   
Newman identified eight specific design variables that contributed to poor defensible space. 
Coleman added to these, deriving a set of measurable criteria to evaluative the design 
failings of individual blocks (Coleman, 1985a) (see Table 2.1). Newman proposed a cluster 
of three variables causing anonymity arising from a large number of neighbours: the size and 
scale of the block and estate, the number of dwellings using the same entrance and the 
numbers of stories per block.  Three variables related to levels of passive surveillance: 
whether grounds and common areas were shared by different families, if  internal corridors 
were enclosed and not openly visible, and the location and form of the entrance (flush 
entrances being preferable to set back or entrances facing away from the street). Two 
negative circulation factors were the presence of multiple alternative escape routes or 
interconnected stairs or lifts. Coleman added further factors: more than one storey per 
dwelling (Coleman felt flats were preferable to maisonettes which tended to accommodate 
families and thus a proxy for children living above ground level). Individual entrances to 
houses/flats were preferable to a single communal entrance. 
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Table 2.1 Newmanʼs and Coleman's negative design variables 
 Coleman's design characteristics Thresholds for harm 
 Size variable  
1* Dwellings per block > 12 
2* Dwellings per entrance > 6 
3* Storeys per block > 3 
4 Flats or maisonettes Maisonettes 
 Circulation variables  
5 Overhead walkways > 0 
6* Interconnected exits > 1 
7* Interconnecting lifts/ stairs > 1 
8* Corridor type /Dwellings per corridor > 4 
 Entrance variables  
9 Entrance type Communal only 
10* Entrance position Facing into estate, distant from street 
11 Doors or apertures Open apertures 
12 Pilotti, garages, shops > 0 
 Features of the grounds  
13 Blocks per site > 1 
14 Access points or perimeter gates > 1 
15 Play areas > 0 
16* Spatial organisation Confused space 
* Newman's' original design variables  (Adapted from Coleman 1985b p.14) 
See also Appendix D for detailed comparison of Newman's and Coleman's design variables 
 
Other variables assessed the spatial organisation of the estate: the number of blocks or 
access points onto the site providing a distinct delineated boundary to prevent trespass. The 
presence of overhead walkways provided potential escape routes.  Finally, a cluster of 
design factors regulated levels of activity: whether blocks were raised up on pilotti or above 
garages (resulting in inactive frontages) or had play areas, which she felt acted as attractors 
for crime and anti-social behaviour. Coleman codified the measurement of these design 
features into indicators with thresholds to devise her design disadvantage score (Coleman, 
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1985a), forming the diagnostic and design basis of the remodelling process dubbed 
ʻColemanisationʼ  by The Architectsʼ Journal (1990). Colemanʼs scoring system underpinned 
DICE, but was also used by others to assess levels of physical incivilities and mental health. 
For example, Birtchnell, Masters and Deahl (1988, quoted in Halpern, 1995) found strong 
associations between an estate design disadvantage score and levels of vandalism and 
residentsʼ depression. Newman developed a similar 100 point scoring system in the 
Defensible Space Guidelines for Yonkers Municipal Housing Authority (Newman, 1976). 
2.1.4 Geographersʼ interpretation of defensible space  
Colemanʼs surveying and quantitative scoring owed much to her geographical tradition of 
spatial analysis while other geographers took Newmanʼs concept in a more human 
geographical direction.  R. N. Davidsonʼs (1981) book Crime and Environment combined 
cartographical criminology (the spatial distribution of crime) with concepts from social 
psychology, particularly fear of crime. His description of defensible space was the basis of a 
comparison of stable urban areas with areas in transition. In The Geography of Crime, 
Herbert (1982) expanded these areas of spatial transition by attempting to classify vulnerable 
urban environments.  His influential study of burgled homes in Swansea tracked the 
interrelationship of physical and social factors increasing exposure to different types of 
offence. He mapped spaces with increasing levels of vulnerability, investigating whether the 
occupants of these susceptible areas could subjectively characterise their homeʼs vulnerable 
qualities (ibid., p.53).  He found that particular design features of a dwelling did increase the 
likelihood of burglary, but that design needed to be considered alongside social values and 
the meaning of space and place. Herbert compared his findings on the design of specific 
residential environments against areal approaches (studies of neighbourhood distribution 
patterns of offences and offenders) that aggregate crime data to reveal patterns of social 
forces, inequality or power. Herbertʼs Swansea study contained a careful critique of 
defensible space, concluding that the causal uncertainty around how it worked had affected 
its incorporation into policy guidance.  Herbert was unconcerned by this, arguing if positive 
effects were noted then ambiguities about the precise way that defensible space acted 
mattered little:  
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“if applications of defensible space ideas and associated social policies 
can improve the quality of life in city neighbourhoods and increase 
feelings of wellbeing, then these are in themselves ample justifications for 
such policies” (ibid., p.110). 
2.1.5 Criminologistsʼ extend defensible space 
One of the most thorough dissections of the concept was by three criminologists whose work 
focused around Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)9. Cozens, Hillier 
et al. (2001) exhaustively reviewed writings on the relationship of the built environment and 
crime, producing a table of key studies related to defensible space published between the 
1970s to 1990s (ibid., pp.153-155). They devised a model with four sequential levels of 
space: defensible space, undefended space, offensible space and indefensible space.  As 
described above, defensible space is capable of being protected and encourages a strong 
ownership response from occupiers (Newman, 1972). Undefended space (Merry, 1981) may 
have defensible space characteristics (well surveyed, overlooked and inhabited) but is not 
actively defended and for some reason does not stimulate positive ownership from residents.  
A third example, offensible space (Atlas, 1991) is still defended, but by ʻothersʼ.  This parallel 
situation occurs where defensible space principles have been applied, but in a corrupted, 
anti-social way. For example, where space has been manipulated to facilitate prohibited 
activities and where the criminals (perhaps drug dealers or gangs) employ surveillance, 
territoriality and spatial image to increase their security against the police.  David Leyʼs 
exploration of gang territory in Philadelphia during the 1970s provides an example of the 
alternative readings of a single area. Leyʼs ethnographic research combined environmental 
psychology and behavioural science methods to show how the identity of spaces reinforces 
the social identity of each group inhabiting them (Ley, 1974a). The spaces contain clues that 
encourage appropriate forms of behaviour, with gang members or residents recognising and 
avoiding dangerous territory.  The last category is indefensible space (Cozens, Hillier et al. 
2001a, 2001b) where, regardless of the physical characteristics, informal social control 
mechanisms have broken down to such an extent that any design features are ineffective. 
                                                      
9 Jeffrey who originally devised the term ʻCrime Prevention Through Environmental Designʼ (CPTED) in 
1971 stated that its principles were largely based on Newmanʼs work (Jeffrey 1999).  
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Cozens, Saville et al. (2005) argue that criminologists are indifferent to defensible space for 
several reasons: they are critical of the poor research methods used by designers/architects; 
their misreading of the theory promotes accusations of environmental determinism; and 
criminologists misunderstand the challenges of implementing design changes. They 
conclude that CPTED is a “self-evident idea” with decades of research merely confirming 
“what many people think is just good, common sense” (ibid., p.344).  More doubtful is how 
the component parts of CPTED work or can be evaluated. Yet critiques tend to find design 
factors to be less effective than other factors (rather than not effective at all) acknowledging 
that there may be other benefits from the design interventions. 
Ekblomʼs (2011) recent review updates CPTEDʼs seven component concepts: territoriality; 
surveillance; image and management/maintenance; defensible space (as a distinct 
component from the former three), as well as target hardening, access control and activity 
support. These core concepts overlap, for example territory is defended by controlling 
access to it, or surveillance influences opportunities for defence.  Ekblom is concerned with 
the fluid definition of these concepts and how this has hindered a consistent understanding 
of the relationships between the terms. He explored the particular definitional weakness 
around territoriality. He highlights practitionersʼ assumptions that they agree on what is 
meant by territoriality, yet how the vague interpretation hinders communication and presents 
“obstacles to cross-disciplinary collaboration” (ibid., p.8). Ekblom traces the genealogy of the 
CPTED schools (Jacobs, 1961; Jeffrey, 1971; Newman, 1972; Wilson and Kelling, 1982) 
seeing its evolution as an accretion of ideas rather than progress towards a synthesized 
whole. The result he suggests, “is a layered, badly stirred mixture rather than a well prepared 
construction with reliably known properties” (Ekblom, 2011, p.10). He catalogues 
fundamental candidate causal properties. These properties interact with other characteristics 
(the site, the general environments, the residents or offenders themselves) to generate 
mechanisms that influence the likelihood of a criminal event.  This list contains properties 
such as how space can contain people, places or objects, or facilitate their movement, 
enclosure, or ʻunderstandabilityʼ (more usually ʻlegibilityʼ in urban design terms). These 
properties extend from the individual (motivational/emotional prompts towards defence or 
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fear), to the interpersonal community interactions or conflict arising from poor boundaries. 
They interconnect with design features to produce good or bad outcomes – so an alley in 
combination with an overlooking window and a well-placed streetlight can ensure non-
criminal behaviour. This notion of assemblage will be picked up in my discussion of policy 
mobilities in the later section. An equally useful insight was Ekblomʼs belief that CPTED 
would benefit from a model not based on direct causality, but one of intermediary outcomes 
related to these interconnected properties, features and mechanisms.  
An unsuccessful search for theoretical rigour is common amongst scholars writing on 
defensible space. In their comprehensive meta-review of the many research studies 
investigating defensible space, Reynald and Elffers (2009) conclude  “much conceptual 
ambiguity still remains, thus overshadowing any successful application of the theory” (ibid., 
p.33). Nonetheless by assuming that defensible space constitutes a theory they applied a 
scientific framework to unpack the concept.  They listed six damaging areas of conceptual 
ambiguity, each supported by research studies and evidence: i) Roundly condemning 
Newmanʼs investigative methods, they criticised him for taking a simplistic universal view of 
how individuals perceive their environment, ignoring social psychological and behavioural 
processes, and ii) neglecting the dynamic and evolutionary nature of crime.  iii) They 
accused Newman of taking an unscientific and methodologically flawed approach, presenting 
only a partial view by excluding social/behavioural processes. iv) Newmanʼs dimensions of 
defensible space could confusingly be applied to both encourage and jeopardize security. v) 
His theory both failed to explain how effects occur and provided vague advice when 
simplified into guidance. vi) The ambiguity resulting from Newmanʼs contradictory empirical 
findings led them to conclude that defensible space was based on “unscientific concepts 
rooted in conjecture and deprived of any rigorous empirical testing” (ibid., p.30).  Reviewing 
Herbertʼs Swansea (1982) study, Reynald and Elffers (2009) interpret him as implying that 
the “contradictory and unresolved arguments” about causality are immaterial if the effects are 
found to be positive and appear to work (ibid., p.32). It may be distaste at Herbertʼs shallow 
logic that alienates academic theorists but by concentrating on the theoretical critiques 
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Reynald and Elffers overlook the extent that defensible space has been applied successfully 
in practice.  
They conclude  “Newmanʼs theory leaves room for varied subjective interpretations” and the 
conflicting empirical evidence seen in subsequent studies arises from each study measuring 
different fragments “of the theory that have been operationalised in very different ways” 
(ibid., p.32). They argue that these studies are evaluating partial aspects of the concept that 
have been applied differently in varying contexts.  I would agree that this partial appropriation 
of fragments only works because defensible space just is not a unified theory, more a cluster 
of associated ideas.  However I would suggest that it is exactly this characteristic flexibility 
and ability to be operationalised in a multitude of ways that has ensured its repeated and 
ongoing application.   
2.1.6 Cross-disciplinary criticism of Newmanʼs concept of defensible space  
The preceding sections have described the contradictory interpretations and partial 
appropriation of Newmanʼs conceptual principles by different disciplines (and later chapters 
will similarly explore the varied response and critiques of Colemanʼs version of the concept),  
but it is helpful to also summarise the cross-disciplinary scientific and methodological 
criticisms of the original research as these will provide background for Colemanʼs later 
ʻscientificʼ attempts to test her theories. Critics implied that Newman manipulatively selected 
which projects to examine (Hillier, 1973; Bottoms, 1974; Mawby, 1977; Merry, 1981). He 
mentions several positive and negative examples of neighbourhoods and projects but only 
talks about a single pair of estates - Van Dyke and Brownsville - in detail while failing to 
demonstrate the comparability of these two projects to other examples. Finding truly ʻpairedʼ 
estates to compare may be impossible (see Chapter Seven) but the differences that 
Newman ignored were ones that influenced his arguments greatly. For example Brownsville 
was completed over a decade earlier than Van Dyke so perhaps further advanced along a 
cycle of popularity or decay (Bottoms, 1974).  Newmanʼs shallow ethnographical summary of 
residents interviews was methodologically weak (Ley, 1974b). When characterising the 
estates as having similar resident populations in terms of income, race, family size, Newman 
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ignored the less favourable reputation of one estate which may have discouraged better-off 
residents and was accused of omitting potentially conflicting or explanatory data; for example 
on income or social class (Hillier, 1973; Mawby, 1977). 
Subsequent researchers identified statistical flaws in Newmanʼs data analysis, questioning 
both the selective use and underplaying of statistics (Bottoms, 1974; Ley, 1974b; Mawby, 
1977).  Newman failed to separate strength of correlation or causation for his proposed 
linkages between crime levels and built form. Newman (and later Coleman) concentrated on 
measuring easily quantifiable effects (Moran and Dolphin, 1986), relying on statistical 
analysis of numerical data (Newman, 1972; Coleman, 1985a). Subsequent defensible space 
research applied more rigorous and in-depth methods (see Merryʼs (1981) detailed 
ethnographical victimisation studies improving on Newmanʼs anecdotal stories, or Cozens, 
Hillier et al.ʼs (2001b) exploration of participantsʼ perceptions).  
Newmanʼs dimensions rely on concepts drawn from across spatial and social fields.  His 
book states his ambition to draw together and incorporate material into an interdisciplinary 
perspective10 and his references are grouped into sections by discipline: environmental form, 
social policy, human territoriality, urban crime, housing and the sociology of the family. 
Reviews of Defensible Space show that his concept provoked a strong response from an 
array of professions.  Yet each sector commended the overall idea, while criticising those 
aspects closest to their own disciplinesʼ view, for example an urban sociologist attacked “the 
kind of sociologizing that is being done by other disciplines” (Baldassare, 1975, p.435). 
Compared to other urban sociology texts reviewed, the sociologist Baldassare (1975) 
considered Defensible Space a methodologically sound study. However he found Newmanʼs 
interpretation of his findings “sociologically naïve, or at least unproven” (ibid., p.435), 
particularly Newmanʼs assertions that a collective identity would emerge to take responsibility 
for residential spaces. Finding Newmanʼs architectural evaluation shallow, the urbanist 
                                                      
10 “We have chosen to direct this work at a rather wide readership. It was initially intended primarily for 
housing developers, architects, city planners and police. But as the scope of the work grew and the 
significance of our findings became more apparent. It was felt that the manuscript should be reworked 
so as to make it more universally available“ (Newman 1972. p xiii).  
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Rayner Banham (1973) favoured the criminological over the urban design analysis: “the non-
architectural part is probably the more fruitful and meaningful of the two” (ibid., p.155). John 
Friedmann (1973), an architectural academic, emphasised the spatial limitations of 
Newmanʼs analysis, arguing the publication was more about peopleʼs behaviour than spatial 
design.  Championing more intuitive approaches, his review contained unsupported 
statements on societyʼs inherent impulses to crime and violence, taking a unenthusiastic 
attitude to evidence gathering: “Why do we need costly scientific studies to prove to us what 
should be self-evident?” (ibid., p.49). Urban regeneration studies criticised the likelihood of 
defensible space to displace crime rather than eliminate it, asking whether it could provide 
sustained and long lasting improvements (Ley, 1974b; Schneider and Kitchen, 2002).  
Responding to this, the main government proponents of defensible space in the US, the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, argued that shifting crime away from areas 
of particular vulnerability made policing an easier task and that waves of defensible space 
strategies should be applied across a city, neighbourhood by neighbourhood (Cisneros, 
1996). 
So from the beginning, defensible space as a concept was disparaged for its framing of 
architectural form by the design professions, its views of human interaction by sociologists, 
its insensitivity to neighbourhood level social forces by geographers and for its crude reading 
of crime by criminologists (such as concentrating on the analysis of offence rates 
independently of offender rates (Bottoms, 1974).  Nonetheless even Newmanʼs most vocal 
critics agreed he was addressing “a serious social problem” (Ley, 1974b, p.157), but that his 
crude interpretation ran “a serious risk of debasing the importance of that theme” (Bottoms, 
1974, p.206). Despite Leyʼs concerns that the significance of the idea was undermined by 
the poor quality of Newmanʼs research, his review of Newmanʼs book in the Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers recommended the exploration of defensible space as 
“an intriguing and socially responsible task for the geographer” (Ley, 1974b, p.158).   
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2.2 Policy mobilities 
The previous section traced the evolution of defensible space and the varied disciplinary 
critical responses. The recent discussion of policy mobilities has followed a similar trajectory, 
culminating in McCann and Wardʼs (2013) call for a “multi–disciplinary conversation about 
the global circulation of policies, one in which geographers are involved alongside other 
disciplines, such as anthropology, history, planning and sociology, as well as political 
science” (ibid., p.2). This broad scrutiny is on-going with a multitude of articles published in 
the fields of policy science, critical policy studies, international relations and geography on 
the adoption and spread of social policy between governments.  So to contain this 
investigation, this section of the literature review concentrates on policy mobilities writings 
that address the methodological challenges to be explored in the subsequent empirical 
chapters, starting with the weaknesses emerging from thinking on policy transfer that 
preceded and stimulated the current geographical interest in “policy assemblages, mobilities 
and mutations” (ibid., p3).  
2.2.1 From policy transfer to policy mobilities  
Stoneʼs (2012) overview portrays a ʻbenign viewʼ of “transfer as a voluntary process 
undertaken by civil servants and politicians seeking to emulate ʻbest practiceʼ” (ibid., p.485) 
and as concerned with the role of agency, choice and logical selection of policy ideas. This 
traditional view of policy transfer described a ʻfree marketʼ for policy, where supply and 
demand actors  (termed by Peck and Theodore (2010) ʻproducer-innovators and consumer-
emulatorsʼ) exchange and select policies based on expected excellence of performance. The 
transfer is simplified to a transitional step in the process, an identifying marker rather than a 
formative exercise in the evolution of the policy. This market view accentuates successful 
transfers, emphasizing replicability based on perceived similarities, or generic criteria, as 
part of the process of deriving ʻbest practiceʼ, or ʻlessons learntʼ to be repeated where similar 
conditions are believed to occur (ibid., p.169).  Underlying is the suggestion of the decay of 
ideas as successful ʻexemplarʼ cities transfer policy and ideas to lesser cities in an imperfect 
process of reproduction (Healey, 2010).  
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Stoneʼs (2012) model allows for opportunities for agreement or ʻconvergenceʼ on broad 
policy objectives, while noting divergence on the mechanisms or transfer modes applied. 
These modes of transfer include: goals or policy ideas; institutions or governance structures; 
regulatory or judicial tools; personnel, consultants or experts; and finally the diffuse category 
of the transfer of ideas and ideologies which act as inputs to the policies that might be 
transferred. She compares “policy transfer entrepreneurs” who excel at the soft transfer of 
these broad diffuse policy ideas, to the hard policy transfer modes of policy tools via official 
bureaucratic routes. Adoption of even the simplest idea is remarkably complex requiring 
deep understanding of the context within which the idea was “articulated, injected and 
accepted” (ibid., p.496).  So it is understandable that modes of transfer remain as high-level 
generic tools for repetition, with the policies themselves only altering to a limited extent.  
McCann (2008) provides several pertinent critiques of policy transfer. Like Stone (2004), he 
argues that policy transfer literature is too focused on state actorsʼ activities and repertory of 
formal ʻhardʼ mechanisms of policy statements. Concentrating on certain modes of transfer 
leads to a reification of typologies and models of transfer rather than a better understanding 
of how they facilitate a deeper analysis of the process. By concentrating on identifying 
mechanisms and transfer agents McCann and Ward (2013) highlight the failure to 
understand how organisational and other context mediates the agency of these players and 
what they can achieve. They warn that researchers should “avoid allowing the models and 
typologies themselves to be reified and to become the objects of debate, rather than 
facilitating analysis of the social processes” (ibid., p.6). McCann (2008) is disappointed by 
the “paucity of detailed critical–geography knowledge of how policy-making works” (ibid., 
p.4). Peck and Theodore (2010) echo this with their call for investigative methods that get 
beneath the skin of actual policy formulation. A final criticism from McCann (2008) arises 
from the narrow definition of globalisation as a mechanism, including how new assemblages 
of experts and new practices of government are used to understand the global relationships 
of urban policy. 
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Yet policy mobilization is not just a trans-national process. Many of the techniques and 
mechanisms considered are those of practice and while international modes of practice are 
well explored (see Rapoport, 2014) this differs critically from working within the constraints of 
smaller-scale local-fields of practice. There is a persistent idealized image of policy transfer 
as a set of models “stabilized and validated (into) an explicit set of rules” to be rationally 
applied in a foreign setting and achieving expected results. It is often acknowledged that this 
“is persistently disrupted by the messy realities of policymaking at the ʻgroundʼ level” (Peck 
and Theodore, 2010, p.170). The relationship of policy to practice is similarly emergent and 
recursive, yet little reference is made in the existing literature to the ʻmessy realitiesʼ of 
practice.  
Peck and Theodoreʼs (2010) discussion of policy mobilities evolution from policy transfer 
summarizes five effects:  i) The inherently political aspect of ideas moving within a shifting 
context of ideological/theoretical positions and the fluctuating dynamics of power 
relationships. ii) This movement arises from, and colours, mechanisms such as social 
connections between particular policymakers and particular sites, leading to the construction 
of ʻfavoured modelsʼ. McCann (2011a) emphasises the promotion of selected models as 
“exemplars giving more priority to some elements of policy over others” (ibid., p.3). These 
favoured models are informative both in their formation and their role as catalysis for policy 
movement or as magnets for support. iii) The interconnected nature of the epistemic, expert 
and practice communities that policy and practice actors are part of reinforces shared views 
of these favoured models. iv) The piecemeal way that policies move, not as comprehensive 
totalities, or ʻcomplete packagesʼ but as elements or versions of the whole prioritises certain 
aspects. v) That unlike a more traditional view of policy transfer, the process of policy 
mobilities is not a linear one of direct imitation and replication, but more complicated and 
reproductive. As the ideas cross, mix and mutate these five effects combine so the multi-
directional nonlinearity is not just a description of the process but the territory that the 
process works through; which itself is multi-dimensional, temporal, evolving, interlocking and 
uneven (Peck and Theodore, 2010, pp.167-168). 
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However these recent assertive academic claims for policy mobilities as a novel, complex, 
non-linear, recursive process in turn prompt a critique of the literature to-date.  Policy 
mobilities can be criticised as a repackaging of existing policy transfer ideas, for its presentist 
concentration on current neo-liberal globalisation and its methodological and practical 
immaturity (Jacobs and Lees 2013).  Questioning whether policy mobilities extends rather 
than merely reworks the ideas behind policy transfer, Stone (2012) cautions that to 
caricature schools of policy analysis into policy convergence, diffusion, transfer and 
translation is another example of blurred sub-fields where “rather than transfer studies or 
diffusion approaches being regarded as a distinct approach, it becomes just one mode of 
evidence-based policy or symptomatic of wider ʻpolicy independencesʼ” (ibid., p.490). 
However much current scholars attempt to distinguish it, policy mobilities could be 
considered as yet another sub-field of [evidence-based] policy-making.  
The policy mobilities and policy transfer literatures often lack a longer-term temporal 
diagnosis. The focus on rapidly changing political contexts and “open ended and politicized 
processes of networking and mutation across shifting social landscapes” invokes notions of 
speedy rational diffusion and best-practice replication (Peck and Theodore, 2010, p.173). 
Contradicting this, Jacobs and Lees (2013) locate Colemanʼs story as a historical 
counterpoint to the presentist emphasis they find in recent policy mobilities scholarship. They 
note the paucity of work on broader urban rationalities other than globalizing neo-liberalism, 
using their reading of defensible spaceʼs international transfer and earlier historical examples 
to show that policy mobilities is not a new phenomenon (ibid., p.1561). Jacobs and Leesʼ 
(2013) account of defensible space on the move is based on three further insights: i) policy 
does not move as a homogenous ʻfully formedʼ piece, but as disaggregated elements (of pre-
policy, sub-policy epistemes or practices). ii) these fragments of knowledge are translated 
into policy only in a context (in–situ). iii) that the relationship between academic research and 
policy is not a simple linear progression of policy appropriating and utilising university 
created research. They argue that the interplay between academic knowledge and policy 
formation is complex, contingent and often controversial.  Developing Jacobs and Leesʼ 
(2013) criticism of the literatureʼs blinkered focus on international policy transfer suggests 
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two further failings.  Often the problem to be addressed by policy is posed in unfamiliar 
terms, alien to the context the policy is moving to, adding to the potential for confusion or 
mis-reading of the problem/solution definition. Yet focusing within a single location is unlikely 
to be simpler. Intra-national policy transfer is as complex and convoluted as international 
(McCann and Ward, 2013). Even within the UK national government, barriers are erected 
against the movement of ideas.  
To date the policy mobilities literature has only vaguely conceptualised how its theories are 
applied in practice.. Methods can be found to trace slippery and disjointed policy fragments 
but there are at least three methodological gaps that this research attempts to address: i) 
Most of the policy mobilities literature looks to examples of successful transfer (Stone, 2004; 
2012; Ward, 2007; McCann, 2011b; Marsh and Evans, 2012). This study examines DICE as 
an unsuccessful transfer, to see which mechanisms failed and why. The question becomes 
not whether defensible space is a fundamentally poor idea (which seems unlikely despite its 
strengths and weaknesses), but its mismatch with policy contexts, or failure due to the 
personalities involved. ii) There is little mention of competing mechanisms for transfer and 
rival means of movement.  In the DICE example multiple practical transfer mechanisms were 
used in combination (transfer via books, press and individuals) via multiple routes and 
following alternative parallel channels. iii) The literature suggests tracing links between 
networks but fails to propose techniques to trace mechanisms that are particularly prolific, or 
circulating across disciplines, or how to assess if the movement is affected by the 
interlocking nature of policy domains.  This thesis attempts to find ways of doing this.  
2.2.2 What constitutes policy?  
A final meta-critique emergent from all the literatures (policy analysis11, political geography, 
policy transfer, policy mobilities etc.) is a definitional one; that the definition of what 
                                                      
11 It is important here to separate the differing intents of policy-making/formation from policy analysis 
and policy evaluation. Policy analysis is limited to questions such as  ʻwill the policy achieve its 
objectivesʼ, whereas policy evaluation is concerned with the implementation of the policy, the process, 
outcomes and longer-term impact. Understanding the mechanisms by which a ʻpolicy might workʼ are 
different from understanding the mechanisms by which a policy might move. 
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constitutes policy is extensive, amorphous and mutable. So (as with Ekblomʼs (2011) 
redefinition of CPTED) a necessary, if obvious, question to resolve is what policy is, or rather 
what is to be considered policy in this case and how does this affect how it moves? McCann 
and Wardʼs (2012) book Mobile Urbanism acknowledges the diversity of “written policies, 
policy models and best practices, policy knowledge, policy response to specific concerns, 
and the sociospatial manifestations of policy work” (ibid., p.42).  The simplistic definition of 
policy as directed decision-making does at least have the advantage of familiarity, 
consensus and a high level of recognition.   Similarly, few would disagree that much policy 
starts out as a plausible initial idea of an intervention that might work in practice to resolve a 
problem12. The process of policy implementation also relies on populist recognition, with 
salient policies being those that fit with a popular view or existing model of interaction. 
Cartwright and Hardie (2012) argue that policy recognition and acceptance are a greater 
indicator of success than replicability or reliability. They believe relevance (rather than 
ʻtrustworthinessʼ) is a safer route to assessing what evidence is needed to choose an 
effective policy.  
Indeed, it is hard to trace something as loosely defined as ʻpolicyʼ (it being both mobile and 
amorphous) let alone gather evidence needed to persuade others of its relevance and 
usefulness.  Helpfully Hogwood and Gunn (1984, cited in Palfrey, Thomas et al. 2012, p.223) 
identify five tangible policy categories.  Policy can be one or all of the following; i) Policy is a 
mission statement, or high-level aspiration for beneficial change. ii) Policy is a set of 
proposals refining these aspirations into a statement of intent (in a national Government 
context a White paper or election manifesto, or elsewhere a proposition document). iii) Policy 
is formal authorisation.  This can be authorised via an informal declaration, or legislation, 
such as Government proposals legitimised by an Act of Parliament13. iv) Policy is a 
programme of activity (a relatively specific sphere of activity accompanied by a ring-fenced 
                                                      
12 The ʻcommon senseʼ model of defensible space is a good example of this. 
13 For example, Margaret Thatcher authorising funding for DICE legitimised it as a housing research 
programme, or the Audit Office incorporating the DICE principles into their reports legitimising them as  
ʻbest practiceʼ. 
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budget). v) Policy as a field of activity, as a process of debate and intercommunication14. 
Hogwood and Gunn emphasise that rather than a single outcome, policy is a cyclical process 
consisting of a continuum of agenda setting, policy formation, decision-making, policy 
implementation, monitoring and elevation, before returning to resetting agendas. A statement 
of intent can be (re)shaped at various stages in this cycle of formulation and implementation, 
so need not be regarded as fixed, permanent or immutable. Thus while it is perhaps 
simplistic to perceive defensible space as a policy per se, there are points in the story 
described in later chapters, where the concept, DICE and Colemanʼs principles conform to 
each of the five descriptions of what constitutes policy.   
So, in a similar way that defensible space cannot be considered a theory (despite exhibiting 
some characteristics of theories) it did not coalesce into a formal policy suitable for the 
replication described in the policy transfer literature.  Nonetheless, following policy mobilities 
thinking and conceptualising it as a framework of ideas or policy fragments, or a cluster of 
concepts allows it to align with the looser definitions of policy. The closeness of alignment 
depends on the fit of each cluster of elements to the temporal cycle of policy mentioned 
above. Jacobs and Leesʼ (2013) category of pre-policy implies that this proto-policy will be 
identified through agenda setting, will progress through the stage of policy formation and 
emerge as a mature policy. Continuing through the policy cycle, the decision-making stage 
often occurs in circumstances of uncertain knowledge. Responding to political expediency, 
but hampered by lack of resources or relevant evidence, many ʻpoliciesʼ are stuck at the level 
of what Gustafasson (1983) refers to as pseudo policy. Here knowledge, especially on the 
preconditions for implementation, is missing (or not available) making the policy hard to carry 
out. His related form symbolic policy, refers to ideas which are proposed with no intention to 
implement them fully. The final stages in the cycle are the practices of policy implementation 
and evaluation before the revised context requires further rounds of agenda setting.  
                                                      
14 One such broad debate is the policy relationship between crime and housing, incorporating 
audiences spanning youth crime prevention to construction professionals.    
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2.2.3 Transfer mechanisms  
Methodologically the policy mobilities literature calls for a careful consideration of the range 
of practical mechanisms used to move and translate policy. The risk is that this becomes a 
disjointed activity that fails to recognise the interconnected influence of multiple techniques  
applied simultaneously. A structuring framework was needed that could incorporate multiple 
mechanisms as they appear or reappear.  Taking a narrative approach helped to make 
sense of these fluid, fragmentary interlocking strands.  In Reading Policy Narratives: 
Beginnings, Middles and Ends, Kaplan (1993) explores narrative forms of interpreting policy 
issues. Fisher and Forester (1993) identify that another advantage of applying the narrative 
structure to policy analysis is greater depth, communicative clarity and persuasiveness:  
“The analyst or planner who can recognise an ʻordering plotʼ that can 
weave through differing - even contradictory - values and events, can 
reach insights and conclusions that might not otherwise be obtained” 
(ibid., p.11). 
 
Applying a narrative approach to policy formation and mobilities, creates an explanatory 
narrative curve of a distinct beginning, middle and end. This contains the messy 
transfer/translation/evolution/mutation to the middle section, allowing the beginning 
ʻoriginatingʼ and end ʻlandingʼ contexts to remain as relatively fixed points. Kaplan (1993) 
also argues that a good indication of ʻnarrative truthʼ is the strength of internal linking and 
connection between the “five core elements of narrative: agent, act, scene, agency and 
purpose (who, what, where, how and why)” (ibid., p.179). So a good indication of  policy 
ʻtruthʼ within the fluidity of policy mobilities would be tracing the links and connections 
between the agents, their actions, the scenes and locations of the social practices of transfer 
and particularly the agency and purpose behind the mobilization.  
The long list of mechanisms (idea brokers, academic papers, international conferences, 
policy tourists, professional networks, site visits, study tours etc etc) can also be sub-divided 
across the five narrative structure elements mentioned by Kaplan (1993). The initial category 
is those who transfer, the individuals that act as agents of transfer.  In fact the key actors in 
this process are routinely referred to as ʻtransfer agentsʼ (Stone, 2004, 2012: McCann, 2010; 
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McCann and Ward, 2011) or  “players in the policy transfer “business” such as consultants, 
advocates, evaluators, gurus, and critics” (Peck and Theodore, 2010), “policy entrepreneurs” 
(Rydin, 2003) “idea brokers” (Smith, 1991) or “mediators” even “policy tourists”:  
“Some more than others, are likely to have their ideas and policies made 
mobile, and they are in turn most likely to stamp their authority on 
emergent urban assemblages/territories” (McCann and Ward 2011, 
p.xxv). 
Peck and Theodore (2012) warn against the tracking of policies as if they were ʻthingsʼ. Thus 
it is helpful to interpret what is moving under the narrative structure, either as the object 
(what is moving) or more appropriately here, the action (what happens).  The ʻobjectsʼ that 
move, the books, academic papers, newspaper articles, policies, have accompanying 
actions: the construction of policy models, the drafting of policy principles, the writing of 
pieces that appear in trade magazines, blogs or websites.  
So again a catalogue of what transfers is far more extensive than policy manifested as 
written policy, funding guidance or evaluations documents. Case studies, stories, travelling 
ideas are all exchanged through the processes of meeting, lecturing, or professional 
exchanges.  The settings or spaces of engagement for these exchanges constitute another 
sub-division in the list of transfer mechanisms - where exchange occurs. Just as ideas 
circulate so do individuals and the theme of being elsewhere to learn and discover novel 
ideas is a common thread.  The purposeful gathering of people at meetings, events or 
conferences, or visits and study tours to exemplar cities, or the sites of successful projects 
locates these activities as a form of intellectual ʻhunter gatheringʼ.  More frivolously, recent 
writing explores the role of international conferences in the rise of ʻpolicy tourismʼ. But to ʻbe 
thereʼ you need to be aware of the opportunity and hence participate in communities or 
networks that facilitate or channel meeting and exchange (McCann and Ward, 2010, p.177). 
How and why this exchange happens requires an examination of structure and agency in 
combination with purpose and it is this motivation that my interviews with the DICE actors 
tried to uncover.  
Despite the literature listing numerous mechanisms, most policy mobilities writings only 
follow one, or at most two, mechanisms.  Figure 2.3 below and Appendix B map the dozen or 
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so mechanism types I identified as being used within DICE showing a far messier and 
interconnected reality than the literature might suggest.  
Figure 2.3 Transfer mechanisms used in DICE  
 
What is also striking here is the number of mechanisms that either merge or combine and 
the range of policy/practice domains that they impact on (planning and building regulations, 
housing management/architecture, professional education/journalism).  
Within this “new ʻgrand narrativeʼ of mobility, fluidity or liquidity” (McCann and Ward, 2011, 
p.xxiii) much of the literature advocates a methodological shift, calling for “more careful 
tracking of the intellectual, policy and practitioner networks”, or “detailed tracings of social 
practices, relations and embeddings” (Larner 2003, pp.510-511). Freedman (2012) argues 
“policy, like the wave, exists only because the elements it is composed of are moving” (ibid., 
p.18), arguing that policy “must change in order to move and it must move in order to exist” 
(ibid., p.20).  If policyʼs intent is to shift, alter (and ideally improve) a situation, then continual 
change, evolution and movement are essential characteristics to recognize and 
acknowledge. Solidifying a policy and the evidence supporting it into a generalized unity is 
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likely to hinder its replicability, pinning it down to one location and one set of circumstances, 
at one point in time:  
“Yet Peck and Theodore are equally convinced of the importance of 
acknowledging the mutability of policies and emphasise the importance of 
recognising that it is not appropriate to follow them as if they were 
identifiable ʻthingsʼ. What they offer however…is an ability to trace power 
rather more clearly and explicitly through the sets of relations associated 
with policy mobility, the translation of policies from one context to another” 
(Cochrane and Ward, 2012, p.8).  
Looking at a ʻpolicyʼ in more than one context highlights how it has changed and that some 
change is inevitable. It also reinforces that the simple appropriation of a policy as “borrowing 
and reuse” is “a fantasy of rational evidence-based policy-making” (Peck and Theodore, 
2012, quoted in Cochrane and Ward, 2012, p.8). In the following section I elaborate on the 
challenges of tracing power and the role that evidence plays within the policy-making  
process. 
2.3 Evidence-based policymaking   
“The rationality of the policy process is shown to be an illusion, a cloak for 
the operation of power” (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p.4). 
With this quote Flyvbjerg dismisses the belief that one can act solely on the basis of 
objective knowledge as naïve, using his experience of the Aalborg project15 as an example of 
how powerful political forces can be used to subvert and overcome a more democratic 
decision making process.  
The literature reviewed here (and later empirical work) demonstrates the extent to which the 
conceptualisation of defensible space is intractably linked into debates on evidence. Taking 
the concept of fluid policy elements from the policy mobilities literature, the preceding section 
has shown that this fragmentary model of defensible space allows it to align with, if not to 
totally conform to, views of policy used in the process of policy-making  and policy-formation.  
                                                      
15 Flyvbjerg used the Aalborg project to explore the intertwined missions of democracy and modernism. 
This thesis is less ambitious; there are echoes of Flyvbjergʼs themes of implementation of power and 
even modernism as it is given form through architecture and planning, but it is his practical 
methodological thoughts on case studies that have been appropriated. The subsequent methodology 
chapter draws heavily on Flyvbjergʼs methodological guidance whereas this section explores his 
broader ideas on the influence of rationality and power on narratives of decision-making.  
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Thus this next section proceeds by considering the history and critical literature on evidence-
based policy, to establish the legitimacy of considering defensible space in the form of the 
DICE project as an example of evidence-based policy.  By examining the critiques of 
evidence-based policy and particularly the relationships of researchers producing evidence 
for policymakers, I establish the constraints and conditions used in later chapters to assess  
Colemanʼs success or failure as an academic geographer endeavouring to influence and 
shape Government policy on housing regeneration and crime.  
Defensible space as an example of evidence-based policy is not a novel idea. In his paper 
Designing-Out-Crime: From Evidence To Action, Cozens (2005) cites ʻdesigning-out-crimeʼ 
(and by default Newmanʼs concept of defensible space which he assigns as the origins of 
designing-out-crime principles) as an instance of evidence-based policy. Here Cozens 
reviews the evidence adopted by the State Government in Western Australia, concluding that 
the time and context-specific nature of designing-out-crime negates positive results arising 
automatically from generalised best practice.  In fact, he argues applying universalised 
versions of designing-out-crime policies indiscriminately may result in highly negative 
outcomes particularly where locally specific successful interventions are naively 
ʻtransplantedʼ to another context. With this Cozens is making a similar argument as much of 
the policy mobilities literature (Ward, 2007; Marsh and Evans, 2012).    
2.3.1 Governments calling for policy relevant research 
Young, Ashby et al. (2002) and Wellsʼ (2007) historical accounts of evidence-based policy 
from the 1950s describe traditional government policy-making  as highly reliant on research 
to inform policy for major programmes of investment in energy or aviation. This technological 
bias existed until the mid-1960s, when the rapid growth in public services required a 
commensurable increase in understanding the nature of social problems (Sanderson, 2002).  
Jones and Seelig (2004) describe the trajectory of applied social policy research within the 
British Government, from its high point in the late 1960s to the decline of its perceived 
effectiveness during the late 1970s and 1980s. They identify concerns over the fate of policy-
orientated research as funding was reduced.  This led to increased reliance on “an 
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ideologically-driven approach to policy formulation, in which the social sciences had little role 
to play” (ibid., p.5) during the Conservative governments of Thatcher and Major and a 
resultant adversarial relationship between social scientists and Whitehall. Since the 1980s 
Governments increasingly favoured independent, impartial technical assessments in an 
attempt to counter suspicions of ideological partiality in the social policy arena (Jacobs and 
Manzi, 2013). The rise of ʻvalue for moneyʼ studies in the 1980s and 1990s indicated a 
quantitative, instrumentalist interest, resulting in policy preoccupied with measurement and 
methodological reliability. This encouraged what Solesbury (2001) termed the utilitarian turn 
in social research during the 1990s and wide scale production of best practice and guidance 
to inform and improve professional practice.  Davies, Nutley et al. (2000) note that during the 
Conservative Government  covering the historical period of DICE, evidence gathering 
became an arms-length activity, with an expansion in the number of external think-tanks 
promoting political agendas through policy research and advocacy. Evidence gathering 
followed a highly politicised model, where the value of research to Government was dictated 
by its strength as ammunition  to support or  scupper opposition  to a pre-determined 
position. 
In contrast to the ʻconviction politicsʼ that characterized the Thatcher and Major 
Governments, Solesbury (2001) identified the early years of Blairʼs Labour Government as 
adopting a “pragmatic, anti-ideological approach to governance focused on the question, 
ʻwhat works?ʼ” (ibid., p1).  Using this emergence of evidence-based policy post-1997 and its 
decline in subsequent Governments to frame my argument could open this thesis up to the 
risk of a presentist reading.  Nonetheless it seems legitimate to apply the concept of 
evidence-based policy to the DICE project despite it being a term that only gained 
widespread currency just as the project itself began to fade, due to its close alignment to 
Colemanʼs own positivist quantitative epistemological position.  So evidence-based policy is 
a helpful way to frame her intent and the temporal lag is a reminder of the slippages and 
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overlaps in how concepts appear and disappear16.  
During 1999 several government papers and documents were published signalling the extent 
that evidence-based policy was a central tool in the Labour administrationʼs agenda to reform 
the practical workings of government, including a report from the Cabinet Office positioning 
research and evidence gathering as a professional managerial activity (Strategic Policy 
Making Team, 1999). This culminated in a influential speech given at an EPSRC conference 
where David Blunkett, then Education Secretary, stated: 
“it should be self-evident that decisions on Government policy ought to be 
informed by sound evidence. Social science research ought to be 
contributing a major part of that evidence base” (Blunkett, 2000, para.2).   
This speech was intended to counter the perception within the civil service of academia as 
inaccessible and irrelevant to practical policy-making. There were pockets within government 
that understood the potential contribution of research to policy-making, for example in 1992 
Gloria Laycock of the Home Office established a social research programme which:   
“set out to address directly the criticisms of research, justified or not, as 
seen by some civil servants. With some notable exceptions, research was 
characterised as always too late, too esoteric, more or less irrelevant to 
the current panic and expensive” (Davies  Nutley et al., 2000, p.236). 
New Labourʼs wholesale appropriation of evidence-based policy is indicated by Blunkettʼs 
rhetoric:  
“This Government has given a clear commitment that we will be guided not 
by dogma but by an open-minded approach to what works and why?” 
(Blunkett, 2000, para.6). 
These two phrases coined by Blunkett, “policy informed by sound evidence” and “being 
guided by what works” are the embodiment of evidence-based policy. They signalled an 
explosion in evidence-based policy initiatives across sectors such as education, social care, 
transport, criminal justice and most relevantly, housing.  Following thirteen years of Labour 
Government, the 2010 Coalition Governmentʼs return to ideologically–led policy forecasted a 
                                                      
16 It is also important to acknowledge that while I was working as a policy/research professional during 
the late 1990s and 2000s the rhetoric and practice of evidence-based policy was a personally formative 
notion.  
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decreased reliance on evidence-based policy.  Nevertheless Jacobs and Manzi (2013) 
detect that evidence-based policyʼs ubiquitous presence across government departments 
has persisted across administrations. They continue to perceive similar instrumental and 
managerial paradigms behind change, particularly within housing policy.  
2.3.2 What constitutes evidence in policy-making 
The Cabinet Office definition of what constitutes evidence for policy formation is extensive 
and inclusive, deriving from an equally broad definition of information.  
“... policy decisions should be based on sound evidence. The raw 
ingredient of evidence is information. Good quality policy making depends 
on high quality information, derived from a variety of sources - expert 
knowledge; existing domestic and international research; existing 
statistics; stakeholder consultation; evaluation of previous policies; new 
research, if appropriate; or secondary sources, including the internet” 
(Strategic Policy Making Team, 1999, p.31).  
Earlier sections in this chapter identified the occasionally conflicted and often confrontational 
relationship between academia and policy professionals and the potential for academic 
influence within the policy debate. The practices of those engaged in policy-making  are 
diverse: from the “banal practices of bureaucrats” (McCann and Ward, 2010), the political 
manoeuvring of elites acting as “patrons or conduits for the realization of policy” or the 
financial expediency of consultants, including “academic researchers being paid to produce 
public or policy relevant knowledge” (Jacobs and Lees, 2013, p.1577).  
Davies (1999) neutrally defined evidence-based policy as an approach that “helps people 
make well-informed decisions about policies, programmes and projects by putting the best 
available evidence from research at the heart of policy development and implementation” 
(ibid., p.7).  Yet as Jacobs and Lees (2013) succinctly conclude, the question of researchʼs 
relevance to policy is related to queries on the basic nature of research, who it is intended 
for, its aims and the process of how it becomes relevant.  They continue  “We should not 
then assume that quality (detailed and rigorous empirical work), socially relevant (an 
unquestioning relevance to the policy realm) geography can (and ought to) influence policy” 
(ibid., p.1577). They use the story of Colemanʼs DICE study to refute the assumption that 
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“research equals evidence” (Duncan, 2005, p.1578).  Above all the relevance of research is 
dictated by the status of its commissioner: 
“Power determines what counts as knowledge, what kind of interpretation 
attains authority as the dominant interpretation” (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p.226). 
Evaluation of what constituted suitable evidence to aid policy-making  was tied to evaluation 
of the policies themselves. A guidance manual produced by the Treasury (1988) for civil 
servants managing research projects was the UK Governmentʼs first official recognition of a 
need to evaluate policies in a systematic way. Shortly after, the DoE team responsible for 
housing research (the Social Research Division) produced a report Policy Evaluation: the 
role of social research (Doig, Littlewood et al., 1992). This referred to Cabinet level 
involvement, showing the value placed by government at the time on evaluation to assist 
policy-making. The DoE report contained a long list of guidelines for undertaking policy 
evaluation. These are a mix of conceptual, “evaluation is never value free and the same data 
can be variously interpreted”; methodological, “both qualitative and quantitative data are 
used in most of the evaluations as the two designs complement each other”; and procedural, 
“evaluation studies should not be embarked upon until policy objectives have been clearly 
estabilshed” (ibid., paraphrased in Palfrey, Thomas, et al. 2012,  p.225)17.  
McFarlane (2010) identified that policy-making favours particular types of learning. The 
Cabinet Office description above implies that while information is the raw ingredient for policy 
decisions, other criteria are used to judge the quality of ʻsound evidenceʼ with explicit/implicit 
barriers to it being considered relevant to policy. New research is low down the list of 
sources (qualified further by the phrase “if appropriate”) well below existing research, or the 
implied first point of reference - expert knowledge. Great emphasis is placed on systematic 
reviews of existing research18.  Revisiting and utilizing existing knowledge is valued above 
                                                      
17 The report records the historic expectations for policy evaluation within the DoE at the point when 
DICE was beginning and by which Colemanʼs work would be judged. 
18 Coleman for all her positivist intent was less systematic in her reviewing of available evidence, 
surprisingly excluded closely related research studies. She makes no mention of Safe Neighbourhoods 
Unit research (SNU,1988, 1993) or any references to CPTED and was extremely dismissive of earlier 
DoE research (Coleman 1985a). 
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generating exploratory investigative novel insights. Government policy-making welcomes 
quantitative, sizable, repeatable studies that build on a careful examination of the current 
knowledge base with policy innovation built on a foundation of findings from earlier studies 
(Blunkett, 2000). Research (rather than solely evidence gathering) implies experimentation, 
and while policy innovation is prevalent, with new thinking eventually becoming routine 
activity, Healey, de Magalhes et al. (2003) suggest that ʻbusiness as usualʼ is the 
mainstream governmental default; “those [experiments] that succeed the best seem to be 
those that can fit within established modes of sectorial organization or existing policy 
networks” questioning “the potential for experiments to shift the discourses and practices of 
the mainstream” (ibid., p.62). 
The literature identifies a number of ways that research can influence policy.  The critical 
reflection is whether these modes of influence are a realistic view of the role research can 
play. Young, Ashby et al. (2002) identify the following models for research and policy 
interaction: i) A knowledge driven model with primacy to the expert  (examples  of this being 
recent expert led policy reviews (Barker, 2004; Harman, 2012)). ii) A problem solving model 
where the expert is closely associated, practically supporting the policy team. iii) An 
enlightenment model where research stands apart from policy-making and new evidence or 
research ideas filter into policy networks and shape policy in complex, indirect ways. 
Research ʻenlightensʼ rather than directs those who influence decision making, meaning that 
“policy is evidence informed rather than evidence-based” (Wells, 2007, p.25). iv) A strategic 
model where decision-makers commission research to delay decision making or make highly 
selective use of research findings to support their own interests or positions.  This is also 
termed a political/tactical model resulting in the politicisation of social science (Palfrey, 
Thomas, et al., 2012). v) An elective affinity model where policy makers are more likely to act 
on research if the findings are in tune with their own pre-existing views and beliefs. vi) A two 
communities model which recognises that policy makers and researchers come from 
different communities and have disparities in terms of language, understanding technical 
issues, incentives, accountability, or time frames. vii) An advocacy coalition model stresses 
the need for collaboration among researchers, policy makers and affected stakeholders 
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through networks. This final idealized situation is the most infrequently seen of these models, 
as evidence is more often used to close down a debate rather than foster collaborative open 
enquiry.  In summary researchers can influence policy makers through sustained interaction, 
particularly by involving decision makers in the research process (Young, Ashby et al. 2002; 
Wells, 2007, p.25). Jacobs and Lees (2013) cite Barnesʼ (2004) analysis of those “sub-
groups of academic geographers whose research effort was incorporated into government 
policy development and research”19, thus recognising that Governmentsʼ views of what 
constitutes policy relevant research is selective and not always aligned to the views of 
academics.  
2.3.3 Critiques of evidence-based policy 
There are two significant critiques of evidence-based policy; that the concentration on ʻwhat 
worksʼ is an impossible aim, and that the simplification of policy analysis to aid the 
generation of policy options is a naive aspiration. Despite the rhetorical power that evidence-
based policy provided the New Labour Government (Robinson and Wells, 2009), Maclennan 
and More (1999) cite a minority of circumstances when evidence has truly shaped policy, 
implying that evidence does not automatically exert effective influence. The conditions they 
identify for evidence to inform or influence policy are: a close alignment to a specific policy 
question, targeting a single government department and a resulting reduction in public 
spending. Maclennan and More note that these conditions rarely apply to housing policy, 
which requires partnership working and cross-department activity, that can seldom be 
delivered at a local scale let alone at a regional or national level.  
 By aspiring for decision-making based on objective transparent criteria, evidence-based 
policy-making claimed to be above and apart from politics. Yet it has been accused of 
ignoring the unavoidable effects of politics, positionality and power (Wells, 2007). The 
ubiquity of political influences that shape policy make this unavoidable and range from the 
                                                      
19 Jacobs and Lees (2013 p.1562) argue that Colemanʼs work, “although quantitative was not 
considered sufficiently so” by Hillier (1986a) and others (Anson, 1986; Ravez 1988). See Chapter Five. 
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practicalities of everyday politics, parliamentary responses to unexpected events, the 
experience/values of policy officials, the lobbying of media/ interest groups and the decisions 
made by Government Ministers. Thus ʻpolitically-based policy-makingʼ (Edwards and Evans, 
2011) is inevitable, inherently based on ideology and argument, and not solely on evidence. 
Jacobs and Manzi (2013) accused the Labour Government of attempting to avoid political or 
ideological scrutiny by using evidence-based policy as a shield to avoid ideological debate, 
to deflect criticisms of public sector reforms and to “gain legitimacy through an appeal to 
technical rationality” (ibid., p.1). They go further, stating that “the primary value of evidence-
based policy for government is a post hoc justification” (ibid., p.4). A second order complaint 
is the extent that evidence can actively contribute to policy formation (evidence-based policy-
making) rather than merely being used to justify a pre-made decision (policy-led evidence 
making). As Flyjvbjerg concludes: “analysis instead of acting as a foundation for intelligent 
policy-making becomes a manipulated instrument of politics” (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p.35).  
Policymaking cannot (even through the application of evidence-based policy approaches) be 
reduced to a simple managerial task, but is one that requires interpretation, iterative 
understanding and reflection. It requires the coordination of complex interactions between a 
multitude of actors, organizations and the state (itself a disparate group of 
actors/organizations with concealed/revealed interests rather than a set of coolly rational 
coordinators). Evidence-based policy is defined and applied dissimilarly in academia and 
policy situations, with varied degrees of rigour and enthusiasm. This grows naturally from the 
task that evidence-based policy sets itself, to draw from, and unify, diverse and uncertain 
knowledge fields, some with well established evidence bases and transmission routes (law, 
medicine), to others that are innovative and by their nature evolving (novel examples include 
global governance, e-government or the regulation of biotechnology (Mulgan, 2003)). These 
knowledge fields have distinct epistemological foundations and evidence-based policy is 
populated by varied theoretical perspectives.  Yet more diversity arises from the individual 
epistemological and ontological bases of the different professions and social science 
disciplines that generate the evidence, arising in unequal validity for the knowledge created 
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(Sanderson, 2002; Wells, 2007).  Hidden by assertions of objective evidence and evaluation, 
these values or issues of positionallity are rarely acknowledged.   
“In short evidence-based policy has led to a proliferation of technical 
specialists and policy entrepreneurs who are increasingly detached from 
value based debates” (Jacobs and Manzi, 2013, p.9).   
 
2.4 Epistemological issues: rationality and determinism    
As the discussion of values, positionality and the use of power to legitimise or discount 
evidence will reappear in all of the following empirical chapters, Flyvbjergʼs (1998) careful 
discussion of the dynamic interplay of rationality and power is an important line of thinking to 
unpack at this point. It is clear that the timing of research input into policy and whether it is 
supported by powerful interests is as important as the quality of the evidence provided. But 
Flyvbjerg argues for a more direct and controlling relationship:   
“Power quite simply produces the knowledge and rationality that is 
conductive to the reality it wants. Conversely power suppresses that 
knowledge and rationality for which it has no use” (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p.36). 
The accepted concept of rationality is that individuals (and governments) generally take 
actions for reasons, even if these are unconscious.  Rationality, then is the exercise of 
reason, to systematically and explicitly think about how things are and how they should be or 
could be. To be rational is to be consistent, coherent and context-neutral. Claims to 
rationality rely on assumptions of what is logical, or favoured ways of thinking, or norms or 
accepted values. This equates closely to the way that evidence-based policy has been 
described in the literature.  However Foucault (1980), Flyvbjerg (1998; 2001), Barnes (2004) 
and others suggest that rationality and what is perceived as rational action are highly context 
dependent. Barnesʼ (2004, p.569) view is that scientific ideas are not linked to “a polished, 
distant, universal rationality”. Rather ideas and the rationality they illustrate are “closely 
tethered to the eccentricities, complex interests, materialities and messiness of lives lived at 
particular times and places” (ibid., p.569). More, a single universal rationality is 
unachievable, there are multiple rationalities leading to multiple ways of thinking, structuring 
logic and deriving conclusions. In addition, each of these rationalities are bounded and 
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constrained in different ways. The historical/technical view of policy-making  described above 
promoted an idealized view that the policy-making  process followed a linear yet cyclical 
model of goal identification, solution formation, solution/option evaluation, selection of ʻbestʼ 
option, implementation then review. This ability to identify all potential impacts, 
consequences and costs of each option before selecting which course to pursue would 
require an impossibly ʻcomprehensive rationalityʼ.  Simon (1957) recognized that this was an 
idealized situation, limited by time, resources and other constraints, resulting in a 
compromise: ʻbounded rationalityʼ. This more closely reflects the realistic search (widely 
recognised in practice) for the ʻgood enough solutionʼ that will ʻsatisficeʼ, that is a solution that 
will satisfy sufficiently (Simon 1957, cited in Palfrey, Thomas et al., p.39)20. 
Thus the problematization of social housing and resultant solutions are defined by both 
multiple assumptions, and dominant yet bounded rationalities. Even with a shared, agreed 
understanding of the problems (a rundown, unpopular housing estate requiring regeneration) 
the remedies favoured by those involved may derive from conflicting or incompatible 
motivations: local councillors motivated by political pressure to participate in a pilot 
programme, local planners wishing to innovate, or the expectations of residents based on 
their former experience of council-led refurbishment projects. Moore (2005) extended this 
through her ʻrationalities approachʼ to New Urbanism. She considered socially constructed 
rationalities which were shaped by the problems they were responding to.  Coherent ways of 
acting emerge in response to these problems, which Moore terms ʻregimes of practiceʼ. 
Mooreʼs examples of ʻsustainabilityʼ and ʻurban renewalʼ are defined by urban decline, loss of 
nature, sprawl and pollution. In the case of DICE,  ʻfailing housing estatesʼ are defined by 
residualised resident populations, concentration of economic and social deprivation, 
technical failures of construction systems, etc. Each of these problematisations have norms 
of conduct, ʻregimes of practiceʼ which are bound up in the identities of the institution, 
organisation or individuals, for example local authority departments, planners, architects and 
                                                      
20 More recently the governmentality literature has suggested that to be ʻrationalʼ is to strive to shape 
and control human behaviour through the machinery not only of formal government power regimes but 
other forms, for example decentralised self-government (see Foucault, 1980). 
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housing managers. So Moore (2005) argues that rationalities are relational, discursive and 
are operationalised within ʻregimes of practiceʼ.  
Section one of this review described several rationality based models that underpin the 
concept of defensible space.  The model of positive territoriality assumes it is rational for 
communities to take possession of the spaces on their estates and to want to exert control 
excluding certain individuals and discouraging poor behaviour. The rational choice model (in 
combination with the routine activity model) is the dominant model for situational crime 
prevention theory (Cornish and Clarke, 1986; Schneider and Kitchen, 2007). The offenderʼs 
assessment of a situation and resultant decisions may be ill-informed, hasty or clouded in 
some way, but beneath is a criminal rationality which is highly influenced by ease of reward, 
balanced against risk of interruption or capture and effort.  
Prompted by Flyvbjerg (2001), this thesis tries to be highly conscious of the competing 
rationalities.  Within defensible space one can note at least four competing rationalities: 
scientific, political, technical and procedural rationalities, each with individual ways of 
systematically thinking through and defining problems, gathering and applying evidence and 
knowledge, even different ways of acting and justifying these actions. Flyvbjergʼs practical 
response to the imposition of rationality (as in these models) or the challenge of multiple 
rationalities is via his notion of ʻvalue-rationalityʼ which seeks to question both the purpose 
and motivations of decision-makers, to uncover and expose the values underpinning their 
beliefs and actions. As an example the model of  ownership and territoriality can be seen as 
a normative position. The position of normative theory “which concerns what ought to be” 
can be set against positivist theory “which concerns what is, was and will be”. These two 
positions have long been intertwined and Chisholm (1978) quotes the often mistaken belief 
that positive theory would lead to normative insights (Chisholm, 1978, cited in Gregory, 2000, 
p.577). The two positions (normative and positive) also neatly summarise the alternative 
readings/interpretations of defensible space by criminologists and designers. The purer 
investigative approach of criminologists is addressing the desire to explain “how things are” 
against designersʼ (and Colemanʼs) desire to envision “how they could or should be”.   
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Significantly, a normative theory should not be adjusted by an appeal to the facts: its internal 
consistency is reliant on disclosure of competing value systems (Lipsey, 1966, cited in 
Gregory, 2000, p.577). Thus, Colemanʼs reversion to claims for the precedence of “common 
sense” to support her position when her scientific or statistical methods were undermined, 
indicates the inadequacy of a solely positivist stance.  
The thesis has also been sensitive to epistemological arguments about how the creation of 
understanding shapes its value and perceived usefulness. Colemanʼs epistemological 
position and her resultant study design is strongly positivist and her scientifically justified  
belief in the power of the built environment to determine social behaviour exposed Coleman 
to repeated accusations of environmental, architectural (or even social) determinism. The 
term ʻarchitectural determinismʼ was first coined by a planner Maurice Broady (1966) and 
used (usually in a pejorative way) to describe an exaggerated belief in the extent that the 
design of an environment could control the way that individuals behave. Markusʼ (1987) 
paper examining government housing guidance analysed texts to expose the hidden 
agendas behind housing policies. He argued that particular care was needed unpacking the 
language of housing discourse and criticism, which I discuss in greater detail in the following 
chapter on the methodological application of discourse analysis.  In addition, Markus also 
pointed out the particular sensitivities within housing research for certain words and implied 
associated ideologies. Markus complained that it was: 
“deemed sufficient to damn a research project or an idea without any 
further analysis of the results or consideration of the methods and theories 
used; ʻdeterministʼ, ʻpositivistʼ and ʻreductionistʼ are common examples 
used to discredit work, often by critics who have but the faintest 
understanding of the philosophical and scientific roots of the words” 
(Markus, 1988, p.10).  
Colemanʼs critics detected deterministic tendencies through her scientific claims for DICE. 
Yet as Jacobs and Lees (2013) point out, Colemanʼs geographical background and the 
debate within the discipline had imbued her with a keen awareness of environmental 
determinism.  She addressed accusations of determinism early on in Utopia on Trial: “We 
are not dealing with determinism…Bad design does not determine anything, but it increases 
the odds against which people have to struggle to preserve civilised standards” (Coleman, 
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1985a, p.83).  Similarly Coleman is clear about the contribution of design being secondary to 
say, the responsibility of good parenting.  
“A badly designed block does not force children to become litter louts or 
vandals, but if the design makes it difficult for parents to supervise them 
and keep away from bad company, it increases their probability of 
behaving anti-socially” (Coleman, 1984, p.351).   
However the moralistic tone of ʻcivilised standardsʼ occurs frequently throughout the book 
and Campkin (2013) argues that it is Colemanʼs “presumption of bad company that is 
deterministic” promoting a stereotyped view of housing estate residents (ibid., p.92).  
Coleman repeatedly claimed that her work was merely probabilistic, brushing off negative 
connotations of determinism.  
“I donʼt think itʼs right to say that determinism is a bad thing. My work is 
not determinist.  It is probabilistic. All this deterministic business, itʼs talk 
about nothing” (Interview Coleman 2010, quoted in Jacobs and Lees, 
2013, p.1571).   
In fact Coleman levels the charge of determinism at her detractors.   In Utopia on Trial she 
branded the DoEʼs support of Radiant City/Garden City principles as environmental 
determinism. She attributes any undesirable behaviour in these types of settlements as an 
inevitable outcome from what she saw as the poor principles and ideological town-planning 
dogma at the heart of Garden Cities:  
“It is sad and surprising that neither the Garden City or Radiant City had 
any scientific background whatsoever...Both were based upon intuitive 
beliefs and prejudices...And made contagious by sincerity, enthusiasm 
and attractive sketches. They were carried into action by such powerful 
propaganda that they have become deeply embedded in our way of 
thinking and are difficult to dislodge” (Coleman, 1985a, pp.6-7). 
But Coleman is equally critical of those planners who reject determinism. She accused DoE 
staff of ʻrenouncingʼ deterministic models as a way of absolving themselves of the 
consequences of their housing designs and shifting the blame to ʻproblem peopleʼ (Coleman, 
1985a, p.19).  Here Colemanʼs simplistic reading of town planning principles (along with her 
cynical reading of the DoE motivation) falls into the trap of conflating spatial versions of 
determinism (architectural or environmental/geographical/climatic) with social engineering. 
David Harvey (1997) writing on urbanism identifies a failing of modernism as “its persistent 
habit of privileging spatial forms over social processes” (ibid., p.2). Harvey counters that the 
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antidote to this spatial determinism is “to understand urbanism as a series of fluid processes 
in a dialectic relationship to the spatial forms which then give rise to forms which in turn 
create them” (ibid., p.3). The task of placemaking then becomes a process of engaging and 
selecting a more “socially just, politically emancipatory, ecologically sane mix of spatial-
temporal production processes” (ibid., p.3).  
Planning and housing disciplines have displayed an instinctive distrust of being classified as 
determinist, without fully understanding what this criticism means (especially design 
disciplines which Markus (1988) suggests have a more uncertain relationship to scientific 
theory). Many would aspire to producing designs that aid Harveyʼs socially just production 
processes, whilst failing to acknowledge the limitations of the tools they have to influence 
and improve society. Till (1998) echoes Harveyʼs suspicion that spatial processes are 
privileged over social ones, referring to Coleman:  
“To promote, say, balcony access over chronic unemployment as the 
cause for social unrest is symptomatic of a determinist approach to 
architecture [that is] extraordinarily misinformed [and] extraordinarily 
dangerous. Misinformed because, in its focus on architecture alone, it 
conveniently overlooks the wider social and political structures that 
contribute to the production and inhabitation of the built environment; 
dangerous because of the political amnesia that it thereby induces” (ibid., 
p.66). 
Conclusion  
The review of these three bodies of literature: defensible space with its inherent spatial and 
geographical basis; recent policy mobilities writing on transfer mechanisms/agents; and 
evidence-based policy-making, has been used to discuss the relationship between research, 
policy and practice. This in turn clarified the understanding needed to address the three 
research questions (see Section 1.2.4). Exploring the evolution of defensible space 
established a working definition of the concept. The policy mobilities literature provided an 
understanding of mobilisation. Despite the criticisms Iʼve presented of this literature I 
concentrated on reviewing ideas of policy transfer/policy mobilities (rather than say research 
mobility), on mobilisation mechanisms and policy impact (particularly how impact related to 
evidence-based policy).   It was helpful to untangle policy impact from definitions of research 
impact or practical impact, as was distinguishing between policy evaluation and policy 
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analysis. And lastly the discussion of evidence-based policy-making established the basis for 
considering the use of evidence.  Each of these aspects was examined to consider the 
different ʻways of doing thingsʼ within ʻregimes of practiceʼ, starting with diverse disciplinary 
takes on defensible space. Reynald and Elffers (2009) reiterate that Newmanʼs version of 
defensible space is still accepted as a foundational concept for conceptualising the impact of 
design on crime: 
“all contemporary approaches and discussions of the crime-design 
relationship use Newmanʼs defensible space theory as a critical point of 
reference” (ibid., p.26).   
And despite Hillierʼs (1986a) persuasive moves to unpick defensible space as theory and 
establish an alternative (and in many ways more theoretically robust) model for this 
relationship, it remains “a theoretical cornerstone” of current crime prevention guidance and 
design advice such as Secured by Design, or Politiekeurmerk Veilig Wonen (the Dutch 
version of Secured by Design) (Reynald and Elffers, 2009, p.27).  
The significance of creating applicable tools for practice is central to evidence-based policyʼs 
concentration on “what works”21, so it is telling that so many rules and codes have emerged 
from the defensible space approach. Rules themselves exist along a spectrum with 
more/less freedom for discretion and more/less hermeneutic interpretation, from regulatory 
legal requirements (Building Regulations or British Standards), through to codes of behaviour 
and protocols (Special Planning Guidance requiring Secured by Design), to best practice, 
rules of thumb and so on. Some of these rules can be applied in an unconscious way. Some 
rules require judgement. An alternative to codifying messy concepts into rules is to rely more 
on thinking and interpretation of principles.  The ʻrules/principlesʼ of defensible space seem 
to sit in an interesting middle ground, consisting of a mix of the easily applicable and those 
requiring more informed interpretation. Hence the relevance of middle-range theory building 
which provides a way for the policy maker or practitioner to structure a diffuse and complex 
                                                      
21 DICEʼs potential popularity in government was as a quantifiable index to aid investment decision-
making. It became less accepted when it became clear that the principles were not automatically 
replicable and still required interpretation and design expertise to successfully apply them. 
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process consisting of guidelines and best practice, certainties and hunches.  Reviewing the 
extensive critiques of Newman and Colemanʼs research revealed that considering defensible 
space a unified all encompassing theory was inherently unrealistic:  “At best defensible 
space theory can only be partial…at worst it may obscure the importance of other factors, 
which may nullify attempts to use the theory to control crime” (Davidson, 1981, p.84).  
Similarly, to try to constrain defensible space within a single conceptualisation of ʻpolicyʼ as 
formal authorisation would unhelpfully obscure the importance of the aspirational, visionary 
and political qualities which are used to justify actions. The policy mobilities and evidence-
based policy literature illuminates these more intangible aspects of the concept, but its 
epistemological value-laden positionality is still overlooked.  The literature uncovered 
evidence-based policyʼs inherent positivism and its privileging of ʻobjectiveʼ evidence. The 
impossibility of this objectivity becomes obvious when the abstractions of academe have to 
engage with the powerful political pressures of policy and the day-to-day constraints of 
practice: “evidence, in itself can not help to resolve conflicts of value in an uncertain world” 
(Parsons, 2002, p.49 paraphrasing Schön, 1973, p.28).  The questions ʻwhose evidence and 
what do they count as evidence?ʼ demonstrate the significance of considering power and 
rationality as embodiments of epistemological position.  
Thus the following empirical chapters seek for examples of both power and rationality in the 
story of DICE. There are multiple occurrences of power within the literature which are 
relevant; defensible space covers the direct power to take ownership of a territory, or the 
indirect power of using the design to empower residents. In policy transfer/mobilities 
literatures the discussions of policy elites are explicitly about power. Policy (in its multiple 
definitions) has the power to select, promote, or give weight to selected evidence.  It also has 
the ability to encourage or demand action or to fund activity. Government has many powers 
beyond legislation: the power to support or to block ideas, to respond or to resist political 
pressures. This should be separated from the historical rise and fall of political parties and 
their ideological positions. It is important for this story to be read against the political 
backdrop of Conservatism and the rise of the New Right during the mid 1980s (see Chapter 
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Five on the political background to the Rehumanising Housing conference), then the rise of 
the New Left in the mid 1990s with the resultant growing enthusiasm for evidence-based 
policy-making and community architecture (see the case study of the Mozart estate in 
Chapter Eight).  In comparison the power of researchers may seem limited; their power is 
definitional, epistemological and intangible. They have to rely on the power to persuade with 
argument not coerce.  And for practitioners, the freedom and opportunities to wield power 
can seem even more variable. Their practical powers are defined within the client/consultant 
relationship, or other professional ethical or contractual obligations.  But this is to overlook 
the power arising from considered action, exerting power (of intent/collective knowledge) 
through the process of design and making decisions on the ground. In addition, Schönʼs 
(1973) reflective practitioner has not only the power to solve problems, but having identified 
successful solutions to circulate these and keep good practice in currency, the vital power of 
phronesis or practical wisdom (Schön, 1973; Flyvbjerg, 2001). 
The expectations for rationality also vary across research, policy and practice in the story 
that follows. This variation is true both in the commonplace meaning of ʻacting rationallyʼ and 
the more relevant meaning of socially constructed rationalities, that is “coherent sets of ways 
of going about doing things” (Moore, 2005, p.312).  Conflicts arise from separate disciplines 
having their own set ways of seeing the world, for establishing shared knowledge/evidence 
bases and hence “doing things”.  The empirical chapters describe various examples of these 
conflicts: where a policymakerʼs view of what constitutes evaluation differs from an 
academicʼs, or the evidence needed for a researcherʼs recommendation for a regeneration 
project differs from the architectʼs. The epistemological basis for these different knowledge 
claims rework any shared rationalities arising from the simple foundational principles of 
defensible space (criminal rationality, rationalities of territoriality or ownership). Discussion of 
these epistemological issues continues in the following methodology chapter, which also (in 
an echo of the evidence-based policy-making  process) sets out what will be considered 
evidence within this thesis.  
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Chapter 3: Research design, methodology and positionality 
Introduction  
In discussing the methods used to gather the empirical data in this thesis, this chapter does 
more than describe the technical ways that data was collected, how interviewees were 
selected or modes of analysis applied. This chapter sets out what constitutes ʻdataʼ in this 
research. It describes the methodological direction and techniques that best address the 
lines of enquiry, as well as the empirical methods employed to combine the diversity of 
primary and secondary data gathered.  Throughout I refer back to the epistemological issues 
identified in the last chapter to show the dual tasks to address: the task of explaining these 
epistemological challenges (Colemanʼs positivism, the positive/negative value given to her 
research by others because of who she was) whilst also reflecting on my own ontological 
and epistemological framework. Using Grounded Theory approaches for thematic analysis, I 
could exploit its flexibility both as a methodological framework and a practical method. In 
addition its proponents describe it as bridge between positivist and interpretive methods 
(Charmaz, 1996, p.30). I also needed a method that could highlight the significance of 
knowledge claims and the way research is valued depending on how it was created, and by 
who. Thus discourse analysis was selected to unpack the recursive relationship between 
individuals, their power relationships with others and the way language was used to make 
their case.  
The terms primary and secondary data are not used to denote significance, merely the 
modes of collection. Primary data collection was by a series of in-depth interviews with 
actors involved in the DICE programme. Historical narratives were gathered from elites, 
practitioners and estate residents and were compared to the contemporary views of current 
Tower Hamlets housing managers and a local Crime Prevention Liaison Officer.  These first-
hand historical and contemporary narratives were triangulated with secondary data 
consisting of a varied mix of written articles, surveys, reports and drawings.  While much of 
this historical material was publicly available (archival articles, formal policy documents) a 
large proportion was taken from grey literature/private archive collections, consisting of 
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project management documents, drawings, unpublished research reports or survey data. 
Some collections of papers were uncovered and examined for the first time since their 
creation. Each of these sources required a particular method, from a brief overview of the 
historical quantitative survey data, to a more detailed discourse analysis of the formal policy 
and guidance documents from the 1970s that provided context for DICE.  The variety of 
material explored necessitated a flexible, eclectic application of relevant theories and 
methods, as it was not clear in advance which analysis method would reveal most from the 
data.   Similarly the uncertain process of discovery, relying on an intuitive judgment of the 
found materialʼs value, required repeated immersion in the data. So an iterative, reflective yet 
systematic and disciplined framework was developed to direct the analysis process. 
This chapter describes the range of approaches undertaken, it considers theoretical and 
practical issues and lists the significant difficulties encountered, showing how these were 
either mitigated or how they shaped the study. It sets out the justification for participant 
selection and the selective case study approach.  It discusses the ethics of researching 
recent historical events involving well-known individuals with outspoken personalities and 
contentious opinions. Keeping in mind Flyvbjergʼs comment that “power defines what counts 
as knowledge and rationality … and ultimately what counts as reality.” (Flyvbjerg, 1998, 
p.27), it considers the position and power, not just of those interviewed but also the power of 
a researcher to uncover buried information, to reopen closed debates, or to represent 
alternative readings of past episodes. Finally I reflect on the experience of undertaking 
research as a mature, experienced researcher closely involved and associated with the 
subject under study.  This integral concern with researcher positionality questions the 
possibility of objective knowledge or rationality, particularly when engaging with research 
areas with an ongoing practical influence as well as policy impact. 
3.1 Intensive research and using case studies 
The nature of the topics and material under investigation suggested an intensive rather than 
extensive research methodology. The research design adhered to Sayerʼs (1984) definition 
of intensive research by exploring the research questions through a small number of cases. 
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Taking a case study approach had high-level methodology implications based on the 
epistemological framework, in addition to the practical ways that data was collected. These 
methodological/practical implications are discussed together. In a similar way the constraints 
of an intensive case study approach impacted on grounded theory to crystallize into a 
workable set of research activities.  Methodologically the investigation posed questions about 
what produced an effect, or what actions agents took in a particular circumstance. It looked 
for substantial connections between relationships, rather than similarities of relationship, and 
looked for a causal explanation of events – even if events were not representative - as 
opposed to searching out descriptive representational generalizations. Finally the case 
studies, networks and interviewees were characterized into causal groups (defined by their 
relationships and interaction) rather than taxonomic ones (derived from a process of listing 
populations or allocating places in a hierarchy).  During the execution of this research 
design, the strengths and weaknesses from the intensive nature of the research emerged. 
These had to be managed during fieldwork and the analysis. In particular, the closeness of 
the relationship of the researcher to interviewees was beneficial in the joint creation of 
knowledge about the subject, but this intense social interaction was clearly not a neutral 
objective process. Similarly the analysis was probing for individual responses arising from 
possibly unique circumstances, yet was using these to question processes of generalisation, 
so required an robust strategy of convergence to reach convincing conclusions.  This is 
where the concept of saturation from grounded theory was helpful. Practical explanations of 
how to recognize theoretical saturation are vague (Charmaz, 1996), so I took it to mean the 
process of repeatedly searching for concepts during data collection, narrowing in to identify 
cases that would explore all properties of a research theme until no new insights could be 
gained.  
The thesis was concerned with the use of case studies at two levels: the methodological 
justification for the selection of case studies as the content (taking a case study approach), 
and the conceptual use of case studies as a transfer mechanism for ideas, knowledge and 
learning.  This latter conceptual use was discussed in the earlier section 2.2.3 on transfer 
mechanisms and led to the mechanism-based model that I devised for analysis.  The 
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primary decision was either to select multiple comparative case studies or a single in-depth 
study.   As will be described later, the story of defensible space in the UK is one with multiple 
interpretations, so my first decision was to concentrate on Colemanʼs interpretation as 
embodied by DICE, referring only where necessary to other versions of the concept. 
However, within this in-depth study of one version of defensible space, there were still 
multiple decisions to be made about what constituted an appropriate ʻcaseʼ for consideration.   
Table 3.1 Types of case explored 
Type of Case/Causal group  Example selected  
Rogers Estate, Tower Hamlets 
Ranwell East Estate, Tower Hamlets 
Regeneration projects  
Mozart Estate, Westminster 
DoE / Price Waterhouse evaluation of DICE Evaluation exercises 
Colemanʼs evaluation of DICE 
Defensible Space (1972) 
Utopia on Trial (1985) 
Publications aiming to challenge 
the status quo 
Rehumanizing Housing (1988) 
 
These eight cases covered a range of disparate forms, as I looked at three London housing 
estates, two evaluation exercises and several publications which aimed to influence thinking 
on housing regeneration. Throughout the research interviewees suggested examples of 
housing estates as potential case studies. But selecting estates as ʻcase sitesʼ only on the 
basis of these surface characteristics was insufficient. To provide comparisons that could 
address the research questions, required careful selection against two levels of logical 
criteria; firstly the characteristics of the cases themselves (age of estate, location, 
regeneration approach applied), and secondly on the degree of freedom these particular 
cases gave to the later processes of theorizing (what did this case illustrate, what type of 
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comparison could it provide?)  To do this I drew closely on Flyvbjergʼs (2006) paper Five 
misunderstandings about case study research22.  
The third of the misunderstandings Flyvbjerg dismantles is the impossibility of generalising 
from single examples.  
“One can often generalise on the basis of a single case and the case 
study may be central to scientific development via generalisation as 
supplement or alternative to other methods. But formal generalisation is 
overvalued as a source of scientific development, whereas the ʻthe force 
of exampleʻ is underestimated” (ibid., p.228). 
He proposes that case studies are useful both in the early stages of research in generating a 
hypothesis, as well as the later steps of hypothesis testing and theory building. Flyvbjerg 
relates this back to his second misunderstanding on the power of the individual case study 
and its contribution to ʻscientific developmentʼ.  Flyvbjergʼs counter arguments are highly 
relevant when considering Colemanʼs scientific reliance on quantitative data, her simplistic 
generalisations about how to apply the DICE principles to different built forms and her one-
dimensional causal expectation for the relationship between design and behaviour. It is also 
significant when considering the importance given to case studies by practitioners and their 
belief in “the force of example”, or when examining claims for ʻevidence-based policyʼ based 
on selective case studies. My focus on the case study approach was a way of exploring the 
risks of this method of generalization. 
Flyvbjerg identifies strategies for selecting cases from within a restricted pool of examples 
that precludes any random or representative sampling. The biggest challenge is choosing a 
single, or very small number of examples, based on their expected information content.  In 
the early stages of research, Flyvberg advises a strategic selection, not of the most typical or 
average case, but those which are “richest in information” as “atypical cases often reveal 
more information because they activate more actors and more basic mechanisms in the 
situation studied” (ibid., p.229). He proposes four strategies: choosing extreme or deviant 
                                                      
22 Flyvbjergʼs first misunderstanding, that general, theoretical (context-independent) knowledge is more 
valuable than concrete, practical (context-dependent) knowledge, is explored in detail in Chapters Six 
and Eight.  
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cases, cases which illustrate maximum variation, critical cases, or paradigmatic cases, each 
to maximise the usefulness of individual examples. 
Figure 3.1 shows how the selection of the case studies for this thesis considered these four 
definitions, as well as Flyvbjergʼs insight that an example may fit several definitions 
simultaneously, allowing multiple perspectives on a single case. 
Figure 3.1 Case study selection strategy 
 
The DICE programme can be seen as a deviant case amongst housing regeneration 
programmes, in that it was especially problematic in several ways. It was an extremely small 
pilot with unprecedented investment, taking an uncompromising experimental approach, 
applying a design-led process that was at odds to normative opinion which then favoured 
management-led interventions.  From an initial review of the whole DICE regeneration 
programme, I selected two case studies, Rogers and Ranwell East estates, which 
demonstrated maximum variation across several physical and social variables. They were 
different in scale, built form, density, severity of the social/crime problems experienced and 
the design solutions proposed. Their shared Local Authority context and easy access to 
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interviewees reinforced their selection. However while these selection criteria were part of 
the initial review, it was only following more detailed investigation that the distinct disparity in 
the success of the projects and the attitudes of the individuals involved at Rogers and 
Ranwell East emerged.  
Flyvbjergʼs (2006) explanation of a critical case is one with strategic significance arising from 
its ability to stimulate generalisation of the kind  “if X is valid for this case, then X is valid for 
all (or many) cases” or alternatively  “if X is not valid in this case then X is not valid for any 
(or only a few cases)” (ibid., p.230).  Thinking about the third key research question: What 
does this mobility of defensible space tell us about how different communities of practice 
(academia, practice and policymakers) use evidence? I initially saw DICE as one of these 
second ʻexclusion by negative proofʼ critical cases amongst examples of evidence-based 
policy research. I thought that if a research project such as DICE was unable to influence 
policy (or transfer successfully) with the extensive amounts of money, time, data and careful 
evaluation expended on it, then this lack of success undermined many of the assumptions 
about the role of research and evidence in evidence based policy. However having traced 
the story of DICE and seen how its progress was affected by political decisions, individual 
rationalities and personal views  - including the conviction that Colemanʼs ideas were so 
flawed that they had absolutely no long term policy value (Inteviews with Wiles, 2011; Riley, 
2011) -  I had to reconsider this claim for critical significance.  DICE was portrayed by many 
interviewees as too problematic and the opinions of it too extreme and deviant from 
contemporaneous regeneration programmes.  It was still possible to generalise about the 
conditions necessary for successful policy transfer, but a stronger message was how these 
conditions were dependent on the status of the participants and could be over turned by 
strength of opinion, or power.   Flyvbjerg (2006) describes a similar situation in his Aalborg 
study where he believed he had uncovered a critical case, but altered this when he realised 
that he was in fact studying an extreme case.  His thoughts went as follows: as rationality 
and urban planning were held in such high esteem by planners in Aalborg, if Flyvbjerg found 
that both rationality and urban planning were too weak to withstand institutional power then 
they would likely be too weak elsewhere in Denmark.  Yet part way through his study, 
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Flyvbjerg decided he had been mistaken, as he found unusually strong examples of both 
rationality and power in Aalborg.  His redefinition of Aalborg as an extreme case and my own 
reclassification of DICE show the extent that a researcher needs to be open to shifts in 
interpretation and not tied down by conceptual frameworks:  
“Good social science is problem driven and not methodology driven in the 
sense that it employs these methods that for a given problematic best 
help answer the research question at hand“ (ibid., p.242). 
So I found it helpful to consider DICE as either a critical or a deviant case, but only in so far 
as these definitions led to useful conclusions.  
Flyvbjerg warns that his fourth typology, a paradigmatic case, is challenging to identify as it 
is hard to establish if a specific case has metaphorical or prototypical value (ibid., p.232) I 
argue later in the thesis that the Mozart Estate regeneration project has some prototypical 
qualities. Although not one of the DICE funded schemes, it acted as a pilot for them.  It has a 
familiar notoriety within the canon of housing regeneration projects (more than DICE 
perhaps), and was frequently referred to during interviews by architects as a symbolic site 
where new ideas had been tried (Interviews with Stanford, 2011, Derbyshire and Hammill, 
2012).  However the Mozartʼs usefulness to this thesis is primarily as a conceptual 
archetype. In one location, it catalogues the spectrum of defensible space theories as they 
were implemented.  
Thinking about generalization, I decided it was important to examine the macro situation 
through the micro. So my analysis combined an intensive small scale approach combining  
Healey’s (2010) advice to scrutinise the micro practices of daily policy and planning 
processes at their most mundane level of implementation, with Flyvbjergʼs (2006) insistence 
to consider the longue durée. The problem of housing estates is played out over the very 
long run. Their design, construction and subsequent regeneration are drawn out over many 
years, with the impact of management and maintenance continuing even longer. The 
symptoms of the problem may shift and solutions evolve over the lifetime of the place 
(promoting intermediate forms of tenure as a solution for affordable housing need or high 
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density design supplanting other urban design solutions) but the underlying problems are 
unlikely to disappear23.  
Occasionally the research method itself set the limits of enquiry before the content was 
explored to its potential saturation (for example preconceptions about what case studies 
entailed, or finding grounded theory as classically applied too reliant on procedural coding 
practices). In this situation, Peck and Theodoreʼs (2012) methodological expansion of 
Burawoyʼs (2009) extended case method into a ʻdistended approachʼ provided inspiration to 
adapt the existing canon of methodological approaches, rather than feel constrained by their 
limits.  Their evolution of Burawoyʼs well-known case study approach was an attempt to give 
“license to an open ended embrace of methodological experimentation and reflexivity” (Peck 
and Theodore, 2012, p.24). They believe this provides the freedom for “road testing 
hunches, hypotheses and theories in reconstruction across cumulative sequence of multi-site 
investigations or ʻexperimentsʼ” (ibid., p.24).  But more than merely applying, confirming or 
ʻtestingʼ the lessons of a case, one should aim “for theoretical extension and reconstruction” 
(ibid., p.25).  Devising a hybrid process that focused on the research questions and 
converged toward a limited number of inferences aided the process of theory building and 
decisions over which material to incorporate or discard.   
3.2 Personalizing grounded theory  
The appeal of applying grounded theory to this rich complex study stems from the apparent 
freedom arising from treating all material as data and from exploring leads suggested by the 
material itself rather than existing theories. Material gathered is both filter and frame for 
study:  
“You begin with an area to study. Then you build your theoretical analysis 
on what you discover is relevant in the actual worlds that you study within 
these areas” (Charmaz, 1996, p.28).  
                                                      
23 This is illustrated by Cooperʼs (Interview 2013) belief that many of the housing issues that were 
explored at the Rehumanising Housing Conference described in Chapter Five are now more intractable 
than when they were being discussed in 1986. 
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“Joint collection, coding and analysis of data is the underlying operation. 
The generation of theory, coupled with the notion of theory as process… 
should blur and intertwine continually from the beginning of an 
investigation to its end” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p.43). 
Many definitions of what constitutes grounded theory have evolved since Glaser and 
Straussʼ ʻdiscoveryʼ of the approach in the 1960s.  For example Charmaz (1996) identifies a 
number of inductive strategies that all grounded theories should have: 
“1) Simultaneous involvement in data collection and analysis; 
2) creation of analytic codes and categories developed from data and not 
by pre-conceived hypotheses; 
3) the development of middle-range theories to explain behaviour and 
process;  
4) memo-making, that is writing analytical notes… as the step between 
coding and writing first drafts of papers:  
5) theoretical sampling, that is sampling for theory construction not for 
representativeness, to check and refine the analysis and emerging 
conceptual categories; 
6) and delay of the literature review” (Charmaz, 1996, p.28).  
 
From this I took to heart Charmazʼs (1996) advice to begin with as few predetermined ideas 
as possible.  Nonetheless, I could not aspire to a theoretical tabular rasa, as my knowledge 
of existing literature, theory and most significantly, prior experience as researcher was 
indispensable in identifying themes and categories. But I heeded the warning that theoretical 
sensitivity was essential so that emergent themes should not be forced to fit the literature or 
pre-existing knowledge. Grounded theory suggests that researchers can become 
theoretically sensitive by immersing themselves in data collected or trying to understand the 
dataʼs significance from the perspective of interviewees. Concurrent data collection and 
analysis encourages data immersion, while interrogating the material gathered in interviews 
in a reflective but open way keeps the participantsʼ viewpoint foremost. Constructing 
categories and themes began at the scale of concrete individual cases (the sites studied and 
themes being tracked) and moved towards a more abstract categorization of concepts. 
Finally, the concepts were used to synthesise relationships within the data and their 
integration into a theoretical framework. This form of inductive, intensive emergent research 
resulted in a rich, complex and broad ranging picture, but one that was potentially open 
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ended. Often completion of a strand of enquiry was defined by the practicalities of research 
(working within limited time resources over an extended period) more than when theoretical 
saturation was reached.  
Thomas and James (2006) are wary of the description of this approach as grounded theory 
because of its concentration on a proscribed method, arguing strongly that it has become a 
mechanical process to follow rather than a theory that can help explain circumstances. The 
overall approach suited the material and how I was investigating it, but as the case studies 
illustrate, rather than following a purely grounded approach in this study, I borrowed and 
adapted, formulating a simplified application.  
Aspects where I simplified Charmazʼs (1996) or Glaser and Straussʼ (1967) versions of 
grounded theory included: exploring my previously held ideas, being less reliant on 
prescriptive coding procedures, or clustering findings onto a few core categories. While I 
avoided coding interviews line-by-line, I did establish lists of ideas and themes. To conform 
to ʻclassicʼ grounded theory, themes must be allowed to emerge from the data applying 
inductive tactics (generalizing from the particular) rather than an ʻoff the shelfʼ deductive 
method (particularising from the general) (Glaster and Strauss, 1967, cited in Palfrey, 
Thomas et al., 2012, p.59).  Similarly as an alternative to the recommendation to delay 
reviewing the literature, I rather moved between differing bodies of literature during the 
research, following what Eisenhardt (1989) terms ʻenfolding the literatureʼ by comparing the 
material I was reviewing with conflicting literatures as well as similar literatures at various 
points. More useful was the grounded theory approach of overlapping data collection and 
analysis, where the data search followed the leads and themes as they emerged.  
Conducting semi-structured, in-depth interviews, with open-ended questions which were 
modified to reflect the emerging themes, meant that my interviews data collection became 
more focused.  Also fruitful was seeing the reiterative process of identifying and classifying 
who was interviewed as a demonstration of theoretical sampling. The evolving classification 
of interviewees and resultant search for those best to talk with established my theoretical 
ideas on the role of epistemic networks against communities of practice (the first form of 
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network being concerned with the generation of knowledge within a specific domain, while 
the second constructed new knowledge through their practical activities). A second example 
of theoretical sampling led to my analysis model based on transfer-mechanisms. The 
mechanism used to communicate ideas about defensible space had been identified as 
significant from the beginning, but it was only as the multiple transfer mechanisms were 
collated and arranged (see Figure 2.3) that the conceptual category of personality emerged 
(the guru/anti-guru theme). As I considered why certain reports, television programmes or 
newspaper articles sparked particularly powerful responses it became apparent that I was 
looking for examples which demonstrated how closely (or not) they were associated to one 
of the key personalities; that the books, media articles, or TV programmes were as much 
about wider opinions of Coleman or Newman as their views about defensible space. 
3.3 Matching methods and material 
3.3.1 Historiography 
The advantage of using archive materials was the relative ease of access and the stability 
and reliability of a view frozen in time, attributable to a particular person. This is in contrast to 
spoken accounts. However each of these advantages are balanced by methodological 
weaknesses. As the thesis was focused on the transfer of ideas from policymakers to 
practitioners, it seemed reasonable to restrict archival sources to those readily accessible to 
both.  Yet to limit the research to only published material might promote a selective view.  So 
the critical breadth was improved by consulting a wide range of secondary documentary 
sources. These materials, which were used to establish the background and develop the 
narrative of DICE, or as the foundation for the case studies, or as preparation for 
interviewing, included;  
• Media articles, both from the architectural and mainstream press, including the press 
cuttings of Coleman's publishers dating from the 1980s to the present. 
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• Contemporary policy documents dating from the 1970s that set the context for DICE 
as well as more recent policy documents to trace the emergence of Colemanʼs ideas 
in subsequent planning, housing design and management guidance.  
• DoE's internal DICE reports. 
• MORI's numerical survey data for the DICE estates and their preliminary reports to 
Price Waterhouse for the DICE project. 
• AEDAS Architectsʼ project documents for the regeneration of the Mozart Estate. 
• A member of the King's College London (KCL) DICE Unitʼs private archive of papers 
and reports. 
• Alice Coleman's own archive of reports prepared for the DoE and others.    
Of this list, only the first two - the media articles and policy documents - were publicly 
available. As discussed later, it is simpler to locate articles in the mainstream media and 
trade press along a critical spectrum as they tend to accentuate the particular attitudes of the 
publishers, or the audience they were addressing.  
An attempt was made to consult national government records in the form of DoE documents 
via negotiated access to the DCLGʼs research library.  Despite being relatively recent, the 
surviving grey unpublished literature here only consists of the departmental reports that were 
not subject to confidentiality restrictions.  Unfortunately the minutes of DICE evaluation 
meetings or other ministerial briefings which may have reviewed the decision-making 
process behind the policy had not been archived24 (Interview Kirby, 2009). A second 
example of selective inclusion was the selection of data for the Price Waterhouse DICE 
evaluation report. In this case I was able to inspect MORIʼs preliminary reports and data 
tables and identify that the published DICE evaluation was a highly curtailed summary, 
omitting several themes worthy of deeper investigation.  
                                                      
24 There are no references to DICE related papers within the National Archive catalogue. Under the 30 
year rule papers on the “difficult to let estates” project, including PEP material dating from 1979 have 
been available since 2006, but any unidentified DICE papers from the late 1980s/1990s would not yet 
be open for viewing.   
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Fortunately, a series of chance encounters opened access to secondary contemporaneous 
grey/personal archives such as the briefs, feasibility studies, drawings and funding 
documents gathered by the architects for the Mozart Estate (the AEDAS archive).  As with 
the private papers of the KCL DICE researcher, these suffered from a common drawback of 
informal archives in that they were highly selective and non-systematic, yet provided a 
candid interpretation of the situation.   Discovering this rich mass of material led to a greater 
understanding of the historical context, but needed the primary interviews to aid its 
interpretation. Each of these archives had been gathered by key actors for specific reasons 
(for example the press cuttings collected by Colemanʼs publishers were gathered to promote 
her book), so I needed to be conscious of what was included or excluded and how this 
distorted my research theme of following the spread of ideas via publicly accessible routes. 
3.3.2 In-depth interviews 
Hoggart, Lees et al. (2002) helpfully articulate intensive primary data collection as in-depth 
interviews that have a heightened level of ʻclose encounterʼ (ibid., p.205).  They highlight the 
need to be acutely aware of the power relationships that occur in intensive research:  “The 
process of place and positioning is intimately interwoven with power dynamics between 
researcher and researched” (ibid., p.230). By using these terms they are referring not only to 
the challenges of identifying and selecting desirable participants to interview, but the ʻplacing 
or positioningʼ of myself as a researcher both to access and to interact closely with those I 
wished to talk with.  This was acutely true in this case, where I was taking advantage of my 
professional networks to access participants and where the nature of the interviews wavered 
from more formal interviews to informal conversations, asides or occasionally even requests 
for consultancy advice. The confusion of these roles was especially pertinent when talking to 
elites with extensive research and interviewing experience.  
The interview schedule of 33 semi-structured interviews was drawn-out over an extended 
period. All interviews were conducted face to face and with permission, digitally recorded. 
Almost 50 hours of interviews were transcribed. In a few instances where recording was not 
possible, notes were written up as soon as possible to avoid loss of data, or 
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misrepresentation of the conversation. An initial scoping interview conducted in May 2009 
with two individuals involved in the DICE evaluation mapped accessibility of other potential 
participants. This was followed by four main interview phases: Summer 2011 (focusing on 
those involved with the DICE projects on site), Winter 2012  (exploratory interviews with 
estate residents), early Spring 2013 (members of the KCL DICE Unit and organizers of the 
Rehumanising Housing conference) and finally during Summer 2013, with Alice Coleman 
herself.  
3.3.4 Searching out interviewees  
The tiny populations and small number of interviews precluded any form of probabilistic 
sampling. Tracing, then accessing individuals associated with a historical event such as 
DICE was always likely to result in a form of convenience sampling.  Yet it was important not 
just to be led by who was still identifiable, but to provide as balanced a view as possible 
across disciplines, organisational type/role and contribution to the DICE history. So rather 
then merely relying on snowballing methods once interviews were underway (where initial 
interviews are asked for others to talk to and so on), I took a more purposeful targeted 
approach. By reviewing press articles and reports I identified an initial list of participants in 
DICE, including the DoE clients and evaluation team. This list was tested in the first scoping 
interviews and was expanded during the interviewing process. Three particularly well placed 
interviewees (Howard, Taper and Cooper) with extensive and well-connected networks, 
proved to be fruitful gatekeepers, unlocking access to a wide number of other interviewees. 
While undertaking other professional activities, I mentioned my research to a wide range of 
individuals working within the architecture, planning and housing professions. On a number 
of occasions, I chanced upon people who had encountered Alice Coleman, who had 
reviewed Utopia on Trial or been associated with DoE or DICE project in some way. These 
serendipitous encounters were followed up by e-mail or more formal interviews.  
I was interested in the way professional and personal networks functioned as transfer 
mechanisms.  During interviews I was often asked “Who else have you spoken with?” As all 
contributors had agreed to be named I could pass on news of former colleagues without 
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breaching ethics principles (and also establish myself within their network).  But this 
accentuated the close-knit network and limited pool of participants I was investigating.  My 
closing interview question of “Who else should I talk to?” expanded the potential interviewee 
list a little, but less than hoped.  
Figure 3.2 Roles of those interviewed 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the roles of those interviewed within two distinct populations; the main 
professional players in the defensible space debate and its practical application and a far 
smaller group of residents living on the estates where the ideas were tried out.   
A handful of exploratory semi-structured interviews and informal conversations during site 
visits were conducted with residents on the Rogers and Ranwell East Estate.  The research 
intent here was threefold: to explore the impact of the DICE works, whether this improvement 
had been sustained and to test the on-going relevance of the concept of defensible space 
with occupants of the homes subject to Colemanʼs changes.  These residentsʼ interviews 
were treated as a form of pilot, identifying the availability of suitable interviewees, the 
strength of their recollections and range of their opinions, while also exploring how to analyse 
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and integrate the interview data from the two distinct populations. With the professionals, the 
limited but targeted sampling strategy described above defined the population boundaries 
and shaped its analysis. I had no ambition to replicate MORI and Price Waterhouseʼs 
extensive, resource-intensive residents surveys and obtain a comprehensively 
representative view of estate residentsʼ opinions. Rather, I used MORIʼs work as a 
springboard by examining the historic data and selecting certain themes and survey 
questions from the 1991 and 1994 surveys to explore further.  In an example of the grounded 
approach these pre-existing themes and categories were redirected or reinforced by the 
leads that emerged from the conversations with residents. Reflecting on this phase of the 
research, it became clear that a thorough examination of residentsʼ perceptions of defensible 
space was beyond the scope of this thesis. Several limitations emerged, which undermined 
my confidence in the potential quality of the data gathered as well as the process of the 
research. Historic photos of the estates and site plans were used to prompt recollections and 
some residents were keen to show me their flats and gardens, pointing out alterations made 
during the DICE process.  However despite the disruptive remodelling, many residentsʼ 
memories of DICE were muted over time. The academic status of the study became a 
sensitive ethical issue, even after explaining that this research was not associated with a 
practical program of building work.  At Ranwell East a large-scale Decent Homes 
refurbishment programme was underway, alongside consultation for other external works 
and it became obvious that residents were more concerned with discussing present and 
future changes to their estate rather than the historical DICE alterations.  
Yet themes and insights did emerge from talking with residents that were highly relevant to 
the three research questions: for example, residentsʼ perceptions of how their views were 
included in the DICE proposals, or comparing Colemanʼs approach to residents consultation 
against the growing interest in tenant engagement within Tower Hamlets. These extracts 
have been included in the thesis where they contribute to the main argument, underlining 
that material from residents interviews was no less significant that those with professionals.  
Appendix F contains lines of enquiry that may not directly address the research questions 
but are worthy of further investigation.  
 - 90 - 
 
The professional populations were broadly divided in two groups. First, those who were 
involved in DICE or academia or architectural regeneration during the 1970s to 1990s, and 
second, those currently working in these fields.  Interestingly there were overlaps in these 
groups, not just over time, from those who continue to practice architecture, or have 
remained working on the same housing estate or have maintained a continuing policy 
involvement in the issues being investigated, but also those who moved between disciplines.  
Some have progressed in careers that now exert significant influence, for example in roles 
as head of the planning inspectorate, Home Office Chief Scientific Advisor, or as the CEO of 
an East London Housing Association. 
The advancing age of some of the participants influenced their willingness and availability, 
with several retiring before I could talk with them.  I was highly reliant on my existing contacts 
within housing research, particularly contacting interviewees who had relocated to France or 
Ireland.  However through the use of these personal introductions, most of those approached 
required little persuasion to meet and only one potential interviewee declined to talk to me. 
The gender balance of the interviewees was unintentionally similar, with an even mix of 
women to men, countering the bias towards more males being involved in 
housing/construction disciplines. Despite being a mature female ʻstudentʼ undertaking the 
historical investigation of a feisty female geographer (both Coleman and Power were 
described in these terms), the impact of gender was not an explicit theme I explored, or 
considered in my role generating this research, although it was an issue that coloured 
several of the responses. While gender provided an unspoken undercurrent (which Jacobs 
and Lees (2013) allude to), a more overt expression of personality mentioned was the 
influence of Colemanʼs strong and forceful character.  
Under these circumstances ethical considerations were at the forefront throughout. The 
ethical issues considered can be divided into two types: those to do with data collection, and 
those associated with the content and subject matter of the study. For the first type, this 
research was in the main ethically straightforward as it did not involve any deception or 
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withholding of information and participants were not subject to any inherent risks of harm as 
a result of taking part.  Questions were posed in a professional work-related context, 
although many participants chose to share biographical details. However the second type of 
ethical issue associated with content and the reporting of participantsʼ occasionally forthright 
and blunt views was more delicate to resolve. All those interviewed signed consent forms, 
agreeing to be identified by name. Access to residents was very dependent on the goodwill 
of the current housing management staff, who asked that residents comments were 
anonymised. However I made the decision not to anonymise quotes from other interviewees, 
for three interrelated reasons. First, the nature of the story means that many actors have 
already been named or quoted in press articles and reports.  Second, in such a small pool of 
participants, any comments would likely to be attributable through context.   And finally it 
seemed unjust that Alice Coleman and perhaps only a few other published authors such as 
Anne Power or Bill Hillier should be named. This might be perceived as concentrating the 
critique on Alice Coleman. Throughout her career she has (often forthrightly) defended her 
opinions and during our conversations openly discussed the impact of this frankness 
required by her maverick viewpoint.  Yet despite this reflective sense of self, her age and 
potential vulnerability to personal criticism was an issue to be considered seriously and 
treated sensitively. 
The rationale for not approaching Coleman until the final stage of interviewing was twofold. 
Initial research on Coleman and her work had been completed by colleagues at KCL during 
2008-2010 (see Jacobs and Lees, 2013).  This consisted of videoed walks though East 
London estates that Coleman had worked on, a couple of recorded interviews and a visit to 
her archive.  Their experience indicated that while there was a mass of material to explore, 
due to her age, face-to-face access to Coleman was likely to be limited to avoid fatiguing her 
physically or exhausting her attention span. It seemed sensible to ration this access, 
approaching her only once the key issues that could not be investigated elsewhere had been 
identified.  Secondly, having interviewed a variety of people who had encountered Coleman 
or worked with her on DICE, it quickly became obvious that she engendered extremely 
strong, but polarized reactions in people. These ranged from a partisan evangelising of her 
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thinking from her disciples, to a cynical dismissal by her critics. There was occasionally 
grudging respect even from those who rejected her views. Thus in an attempt to remain 
objective and open-minded and not being forced to position myself in either the pro- or anti-
Coleman camps, I decided to defer talking to Coleman until after other interviews had been 
completed. This enabled me to reply honestly and neutrally when asked by interviewees (as I 
frequently was) “Well what did you think of her?” 
3.3.4 Interview or conversation? 
Qualitative depth, the potential for collecting rich complex data and flexibility as research 
progressed and understanding of the topic evolved, were the primary reasons for selecting 
face-to-face semi-structured interviews. Given the personal and ethical sensitivity involved, 
all of the interviews within this study were carried out by the researcher. The discursive, (on 
some occasions, rambling) nature of the semi-structured interviews was a way of identifying 
topics and issues that the interviewee felt were most relevant or important. Care was needed 
on the occasions where the researcher was in a more informed position than the interviewee 
not to lead or overly direct the direction of responses.  There were also several interviews 
where the relationship of the researcher/interviewee resulted in a more conversational co-
production of information (such as situations where we had worked together in the past). In 
these cases the discussion often leapt across topics, as novel ideas were suggested and 
explored, hypotheses proposed with speculation flowing from unplanned questions.   
A detailed interview frame was prepared on each occasion, but this was followed in a very 
flexible and fluid way. I encouraged the interviewee to lead the direction of the conversation, 
with questions typified as finding out what interviewees did then/did now, what they know, or 
what they believe. As I was recording multiple viewpoints, questions were devised that were 
sensitive to the double heuristic of reporting remembered situations and intervieweesʼ 
individual perceptions. A few common questions were asked on most occasions, in addition 
to their memories of the context and history of DICE, such as; 
• reflecting on DICEʼs impact on policy and practice, 
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• the strengths or weaknesses of the evaluation process/analysis, what was missing 
from or may have hindered its impact,  
• how their experience with DICE formed/influenced their current thinking about 
defensible space. 
The challenge was framing and asking questions that revealed the links between the actors 
and the movement of ideas. While the questions were devised to take forty minutes to 
complete, unplanned questions or digressions meant the interviews invariably took longer. 
Even in professional settings where only an hour of time had been allocated, most took an 
hour and a half. In one case the two interviewees were so enthused by the discussion that 
they rearranged other meetings and continued talking for three hours. This flexibility 
illustrated the willingness and enthusiasm to participate in the research. Interviewees 
commented that they had enjoyed recalling DICE and sharing their memories.  
The interviews followed a pattern of a briefing stage and an introductory period establishing 
trust. A final debriefing section had two purposes: summarising and recapping the topics 
covered, and giving the interviewee the opportunity to add or redact anything. The prompt 
“Was there any thing else I should have asked?” occasionally restarted the interview.  
Several follow-up interviews were held with key individuals (Alice Coleman in particular) and 
these quickly progressed from initial interviews, to less formal conversations while examining 
archive papers or articles, to e-mail exchanges confirming particular points.  Interviewees 
received transcripts of our conversations, but only a tiny number made adjustments or 
alterations to their recorded texts25.  
The introductory stage was noticeably sensitive, where under the guise of communicating 
clearly the types of information that I wanted to uncover, several other interactions were 
taking place. I needed to rapidly build a rapport with the interviewee, establishing the extent 
of our shared knowledge base and our relative positional status. My own status and role as a 
                                                      
25 Alice Coleman drafted a short paper specifically for me following our first interview titled “The Curse 
of Modernismʼ which expanded on the topics raised in our conversation. Several interviewees read and 
commented on draft chapters they featured in and were often more interested in the views of their 
peers than how they, or their experiences, had been portrayed.  
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researcher was surprisingly fluid and I adopted multiple personas.  With the exception of two 
individuals, all the interviewees were older and more experienced than me. Relying on the 
status and credibility provided by my then role as Head of Research at CABE, or earlier 
years of architectural experience, rather than defining myself as a student researcher aided 
the interaction in a couple of ways.  It provided me the guise of a ʻwork colleagueʼ, thinking 
and engaging with a shared problem in a practical way.  I also experienced few of the 
difficulties often encountered interviewing elites, such as probing beyond “the scripted 
encounters” with articulate and powerful policy actors. I also rarely experienced the tendency 
to rewrite historical contributions or provide “exaggerated accounts of foresight, rationality or 
creative entrepreneurism“, what Peck and Theodore (2012, p.26) term ʻagent inflationʼ. So in 
the main my experience was of candid, non-patronizing exchanges resulting in the 
“purposeful co-production of social data”. 
It helped that I could align to individualʼs interests, both of elites and more prosaic ʻstreet-
levelʼ participants. So with the project manager I established credibility through a detailed 
discussion of costs and programming, with housing managers through drawing on my 
experience liaising with tenants; as well as commiserating with the former Chief Scientific 
Officer on the diplomatic sensitivities of briefing Ministers. Highlighting this shared 
experience was particularly useful with the couple of participants who were uncomfortable 
with the interviewing process. These required sustained encouragement, drawing out 
reflections based on their very practical detailed description of their working practices, 
reassuring them of the relevance of recollections that they considered to be merely gossip. 
This may have resulted in the participant being more at ease and more reflective, but 
possibly inhibited whether I was as sufficiently probing an interviewer.    
The willingness of busy professionals to give time to the research demonstrated its ongoing 
relevance. Several housing professionals brought colleagues along to the interviews. These 
(occasionally unexpected) additional participants altered the conversational dynamic.  This 
took the form of testing how relevant and helpful this study might be to their organisation. In 
exchange for the information I needed for my research, how could I help them in return?  In 
 - 95 - 
most cases this exchange was implied, but on two occasions resulted in a direct request for 
help. In this situation I was non-committal about responding, trying not to confuse 
“professional advice giving” with researcher mode, but the experience illustrated clearly the 
organisationsʼ desire for and need for practical input in this area and the blurring of my 
investigatory researcher and potential professional consultant roles.  
There were occasions when the roles of interviewer and interviewee were reversed.   Several 
times I encountered dismissive attitudes to the study, with the interviewee turning 
interrogator, questioning why was I (as an experienced housing researcher) interested in 
such an ʻold hatʼ, discredited approach such as Colemanʼs version of defensible space?  I 
tried two alternative responses to this: initially deflecting the issues of current relevance by 
mentioning a CABE/Home Office research project on a similar topic (the impact of housing 
layout on crime) which had begun to re-examine several themes covered by Coleman. The 
second, more readily accepted explanation was to refer to my biographical interest in the 
movement of ideas and how having worked as a designer, then a researcher involved in 
policy making I wished to reflect on my own experience in a deeper more theoretical way. 
Presenting this as an exploratory rather than a definitive/influencing study, was surprisingly 
interpreted by one interviewee that the Ph.D. was somehow an inconsequential ʻacademicʼ 
exercise, less practically focused and less practically driven than research projects I had 
worked on professionally. More often it prompted questions about “What was I going to do 
with my findings?” or “How (not if) I was going to use this study to influence housing policy”?  
These questions reinforced that for the interviewees, engagement was important and many 
had concrete expectations in return for their participation in the study. These expectations 
were speculative or reflective or nostalgic, but underlined the intensive, almost personal 
nature of the interactions.  
3.3.5 Discourse analysis  
Discourse analysis was selected over more traditional forms of document or policy analysis 
which Jacobs (2006, p.555) describes as focusing on “uncovering the role of bureaucratic 
modes of organization, practices and techniques, but [being] less good at illuminating the 
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conflicts” particularly those over power or ideology. A method was required that could to 
unpack disputed areas, the nuances of politics, and interpretations of contested evidence 
and conviction.  By using discourse analysis, the aim was to examine not just what was said, 
but also how and why. This required a detailed knowledge and understanding of the 
historical, political, social and above all practical context that produced a particular text or 
discussion. This method appealed to me as a researcher who had practiced in the sector 
being scrutinized. I was familiar with the ʻlinguistic registerʼ and the technical vocabulary 
used, but while this familiarity aided comprehension, it could also obscure objectivity or result 
in a lack of sensitivity to covert assumptions or the normalizing effect of the dominant 
narrative (Jaworski and Coupland, 1999).  There were other practical difficulties in 
operationalising discourse analysis as a method that have been identified by many 
commentators (Jacobs and Manzi, 1996; Lees, 2004; Jacobs, 2006).  I was acutely aware of 
Edwardʼs (2003) warning against discourse analysis that “simply consists of spotting 
features” or textural or interview data that is under-analyzed through over-quotation or 
isolated quotation (Antaki, Billig et al., 2003).  
However while it had problems, discourse analysis seemed a way to delve into the meanings 
embedded in policy and guidance documents and the conversations about them. The study 
concentrated on the first of Leesʼ (2004) two categories of discourse analysis, that of critical 
discourse analysis. This meant following a process that emphasized identifying “the linguistic 
strategies that are deployed by key actors to shape policy” (Fairclough, 1992, p.41). Lees 
(2004) notes a second category of analysis which was also found to be relevant: a more 
Foucauldian process exposing the networks of relationships and the recursive relationship 
between language and power, recognizing the ways that language both shapes and is 
shaped by power relationships.  Jameson (1991) suggests that this approach is particularly 
suited to the type of archival/historical research that was undertaken - looking for terms that 
demonstrated attempts to influence, exert authoritative power, or manipulate a situation. And 
finally by referring to a third approach identified by Jacobs (2006) as deriving from discursive 
psychology (and as precursor to the grounded theory approach), the study focused on 
individual actorsʼ interpretations, particularly in analyzing data gathered from interviews and 
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transcriptions of conversations. For example Colemanʼs use of the term ʻmapsʼ to include 
estate layouts and house floor plans, anchored her in a geographical surveying rationale, 
with mapping as both a process and an outcome (similar to many architects dual use of the 
term ʻdesignʼ). Interviewees either accepted this (and tacitly accepted Colemanʼs reading of 
space) or questioned it as a way of distancing themselves from Colemanʼs interpretation 
(Interviews Hammill and Stanford 2011, McKowen and Silver 2013).  
Technically my analysis applied only the two outer layers of Faircloughʼs (1992) tripartite 
framework from Figure 3.3 below. It did this first by undertaking a broad reading of social 
practices, which Fairclough defines as the study of discourse in relation to wider power 
structures and ideology. This helped to unpack the variation in value and meaning used, for 
example, between the varied professional groups interviewed. Foremost was the insight 
provided by commentators (Jacobs and Manzi, 1996; Lees, 2004) that policy language is 
neither a neutral or objective medium, but more a “political activity in its own right” (Jacobs, 
2006, p.554).  
Figure 3.3 Nested layers of ʻdiscourse analysisʼ 
 
The next step in the analysis was a closer look at the discursive practices, the “analysis of 
the processes in which texts are framed, that is the context in which statements are made 
and fed into other debates” (Fairclough, 1992, p.544 cited in Jacobs, 2006, p.42).  Fairclough 
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here refers to rhetorical strategies such as metaphor, synecdoche26, metonymy27, ethos and 
persuasive forms of argumentative closure.  These may seem too detailed and close a 
reading of the text.  However Rydin (2003) identified the powerful persuasive use of all of 
these tropes in her careful examination of the institutional discourses surrounding 
sustainable planning.  Within environmental planning, Rydin uses these tropes to illustrate 
three contrasting rationalities: a scientific, economic and a communicative rationality. A 
similar explanation is needed of the multiple competing rationalities within DICE described in 
Section 2.4: scientific, political, technical and procedural rationalities each providing their 
own view of problems and possible solutions.  
This thesis is too limited to undertake Faircloughʼs (1992) innermost layer of textual analysis, 
studying the structure of text, vocabulary and the construction of grammar  (lexicon).  This 
detailed textual analysis is a linguistic task, as is the deep structuralist examining of the 
constructions of meaning, the sign systems, the signifier (the linguistic form) and the signified 
(concept). Yet there were exact phrases and a precise vocabulary to be noted and 
considered:  for example the shift in usage from ʻcouncil housing tenantsʼ to ʻresidentsʼ, 
between ʻterritorial controlʼ and ʻcontrol of space and territoryʼ or even ʻmodernismʼ.  The 
precise definitions of these terms vary with discipline, ʻspaceʼ in particular meaning subtly 
dissimilar things to a geographer than an architect. ʻSpaceʼ to an geographer  such as 
Doreen Massey (2002, 2005) is a container for social activity rather than an entity that can 
be constructed, altered and formed through design.  The practices of each discipline can be 
constrained and bounded by the expected meanings of their language.  Architectural 
historian Forty (2000) remarks that the architectural vocabulary has many words describing 
physical form and characteristics (texture, articulation or transparency…..) but far fewer, far 
less precise ones for social qualities (community, urbanity…).  This point is significant to my 
argument because of the emphasis that 20th century architects and planners place on 
                                                      
26   The rhetorical substitution of synedoche does seem relevant here, with crime level standing for the 
condition of society, or the poor physical cleanliness of an estate standing in for social malaise.  
27  Similarly defensible space is often read as a symbol; of informal community control, rather then 
privatized individual ownership.  
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concepts of urbanity and utopianism that they equate to modernism (as a project or process 
of change and re-examination (Berman, 1983)).  In an unpublished paper The Curse of 
Modernism, Coleman herself proposes ʻmodernistʼ as the defining word of the past century, 
noting that it has had both positive and negative outcomes.  However she uses the term 
almost exclusively with negative connotations, calling planning a “bogus modernism” and 
Modern Movement Architecture an “untested foreign hypothesis” (Coleman, 2013a)28. 
Colemanʼs interpretation of ʻmodernismʼ equates and conflates the ʻmodern movementʼ to a 
mere adjective for design, limits its application to a series of design gestures (albeit gestures 
with far reaching social consequences), far from the broader meaning that architects29 might 
give it. Another reason for using discourse analysis was to unpick the nuances within 
Colemanʼs arguments, for example she argued that design disadvantagement was due to 
objectively poor design rather than just inappropriate design. 
 
There are other practical and technical challenges in undertaking this kind of multi-layered 
discourse analysis (see Jacobs, 2006). To counter these and the overarching criticism that 
discourse analysis can be unsystematic and irrelevant with little evidential use, I took care 
with the following issues: I tried to contextualize and connect texts to ideas of individual 
influence and wider social practices and to make the analysis sensitive to inequalities and 
power relationships, to ideologies and agendas.  Indeed, it was this duality of applications 
that made discourse analysis a suitable technique for exploring the disparity of viewpoints 
between academics, practitioners and politicians. In fact Rosenberg (1998, cited in Jacobs 
and Manzi, 1996) suggests that the process of policymaking itself can be understood as a 
                                                      
28It is worth quoting Colemanʼs introductory paragraph to illustrate the strength of her derision of 
Modernism, Modern Movement architecture and the motivations of those promoting non-scientific 
modes of advancement:  
“If I had to summarize the nature of the 20th Century in only one word, I should choose ʻmodernistʼ - a 
pervading sprit of pride in our modern ability to create new advances beyond all our previous evolution. 
But the constructive achievements were accompanied by destructive ones. The former were based on 
patient scientific quests for hard evidence, jettisoning false concepts to aim for something better. The 
latter were the proud products of imagination, presented as desirable ideas but actually pursued for the 
kudos, gain and power of those who dreamed them up” (Coleman, 2013a, p.1). 
29 Such as interviewees John Thompson, Patrick Hammill or Ben Darbyshire. 
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form of discourse analysis. Colebach (2006, cited in Freeman, 2012, p.19) emphasises the 
reliance of policymaking on “a continuing process of articulation” both formulating policy 
ideas and communicating them. He stresses how the repetition, reiteration, inclusion or 
exclusion of concepts is fundamental to their legitimization or denial.  Newman (2006, cited 
in Freeman, 2012, p.18) argues that it is these rehearsals and repetitions that establish “new 
discursive articulations” which illustrate “new orderings of power”  that occur within the 
policymaking dialogue.  
Discourse analysis then, was used as a technique for paying close attention to the evolution 
and translation of concepts, not only as an informative methodological mode, but also as a 
conceptual bridge between practice and the mechanisms of transfer. Discourse analysis 
could not be undertaken as a detached abstract activity, but had to be grounded in the 
textual and contextual understanding of daily practice:  
“By the same token, translation ʻadds practiceʼ to discourse theory. This 
means no longer treating practice as the object of policy, but as its 
subject; that is by interrogating more closely the practices of policy 
making, themselves to think about and ask after what it is that policy 
makers do when they go to work” (Freeman, 2012, p.19).  
Freeman (2012) reminds us that the practical and functional codification of all this discussion 
into written documents can have contradictory outcomes, “in being written down, committed 
to paper, a policy concept is both fixed and made mobile” (ibid, p.14). The documents that 
are formulated and remain from these interactions, are the traces of the meetings, like 
archeological artefacts that require a new interpretive story to be woven around them. 
Reformulation and restating is necessary as the idea passes from one context to another. 
The past meetings and even the documents themselves will always be imperfect records, so 
in each new situation the message is remade again, as it is interpreted into action. Yet the 
practical experience of policymaking is more than this linear set of formal interactions and 
meetings, it is the continuous messy discussions, the random connections, the exchanges 
that go on around and in parallel to the main thrust of the discourse. The white noise of these 
parallel exchanges can obscure and distract. The emergence and survival of a particular 
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message is reliant on what Freeman (2012) terms the iterative relationship that reinforces or 
obliterates a signal like the reverberation of a waveform:  
“Policy emerged not simply in the interaction of a meeting, but in the 
interaction between meetings; not in the immediacy of the text but in the 
intertext – and then in the iterative relationship between interaction and 
intertext. Call this reverberation” (ibid, p.18). 
The depth of the reading and analysis needs to be finely judged not just to the form of the 
text, the context, but with reference to the intended utility of the analysis: 
“If a ʻnormalʼ understanding of policy discourse is at issue, then a ʻnormalʼ 
but more reflective reading of that discourse is the appropriate research 
technique” (Rydin, 2003, p.183). 
Thus as a practical technique discourse analysis can sometimes surf the crests, sometimes 
dive beneath the surface of the dialogue and written words. 
In the main, the thesis applied discourse analysis to publicly available, written documents. 
This was not that the spoken word was considered insignificant, or not worthy of detailed 
examination, as my careful transcription and analysis of many hours of interviews showed. 
But piecing together the narrative depended on many ʻlostʼ spoken interchanges.  Some of 
these meetings (consultation meetings with estate residents, the debate at the 
Rehumanising Housing Conference, the sessions of the DICE evaluation steering board, or 
even the momentous meeting between Coleman and Thatcher) may have been recorded in 
minutes, but are now unavailable. Some of these events have been translated into 
documents (site visits into the 40 DICE reports for example), but what is striking discussing 
these reports with interviewees is what was excluded as much as what was written. An 
example of this process of exclusion occurred in the writing of the DICE report on the 
Preston Estate. One of the KCLʼs DICE researchers remembers drafting a passage about 
“big fat worms eating childrensʼ discarded lunches”. Coleman expunged this phrase: 
“Writing the DICE Reports was almost painting by numbers, report writing 
by numbers. The introduction was [gesture to show writing] and the 
scores before and the scores after [gesture to show writing], but you 
couldnʼt put, ʻwe didʼ, it was ʻthe, it was doneʼ…….  And the ideas of fat 
worms and children with dirty faces were written out of the script; there 
was no individual colour allowed in the reports” (Interview McKeown, 
2013). 
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This formulaic, mechanistic, neutral delivery could signify the constraints of academic 
scientific writing, or equally the constraints of time and resources arising from the need to 
deliver a large number of reports very rapidly to the DoE, but is quite a way from the emotive 
language found in Colemanʼs Utopia on Trial.  
3.4 Beyond a triangulation of facts  
At its simplest triangulation can be seen as the process of bringing together data gathered in 
more than one way from varied sources by applying complementary methods. There was the 
practical triangulation of “facts” between documents, cross-referencing and checking archive 
material against intervieweesʼ memories.  But the purpose of triangulation is not limited to 
verification, but also to add richness, depth and breadth of understanding (GSRU,  2011). 
The research process was complicated by amassing data consecutively not sequentially and 
I used repeated thematic frames (such as becoming an expert practitioner, codification of 
experience into heuristics/rules, listening to residents views, or the value of visual surveys) to 
bridge between the collections of material or interview data.  There was the triangulation of 
methods, so archival materials were subject to historiographic scrutiny as well as discourse 
analysis looking for terms and phrases (the use of ʻUtopianʻ tropes, or puns on Mozart in 
newspaper headlines). There was also an attempt at a deeper level of theoretical 
triangulation, where I aimed for theoretical saturation and narrowing towards a convergent 
strategy of enquiry with each method adding insight (Hoggart, Lees et.al., 2002, p.69). As my 
findings coalesced around themes and I established corroboration of the narrative strands, 
my confidence in the conclusions reached increased. 
3.4.1 Unravelling narratives 
The mix of material required disaggregating, for example using the interviews with historical 
participants to unpack and understand texts published during the DICE period.  These 
processes helped build the timelines and develop the narrative - confirming or clarifying 
inconsistencies in the stories Iʼd heard, identifying if these should be considered as 
contradictions, or multiple versions of the truth. My concern with what should be discarded or 
retained within this version of the story was indicative of what could be considered evidence 
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for this study. Much social science, particularly qualitative research, is about strength of 
argument, not proof, and devising a sufficiently straightforward account of the story was the 
first step towards this. But it was important to move beyond constructing merely a historically 
legitimate narrative. While establishing the historical narrative and constructing the timeline, I 
was reassured by Flyvbjergʼs (1998) advice, “narratology before epistemology” (ibid., p.7) 
and his certainty that emerging with a complex, thick, story which was hard to summarise, is 
not always a failing, but an indication that the researcher has uncovered a rich problematic.   
In addition to the task of unraveling and tying down the broken strands of the historical 
narrative, I needed to speculate on ways that these strands and stories could be knitted 
together into alternative formations30. Jacobs (2012) highlights how the retrospective 
challenges of tracking down and piecing together a plausible history overshadow the task of 
formulating other interpretations:  
“The inability for current urban policy mobility work to see these other 
destinies is in part a methodological problem. Although urban policy 
mobility scholarship claims to ʻfollow the policyʼ (Peck and Theodore, 
2010), essentially through techniques of policy review and key player 
interviews, it is more often a method of joining the dots. By that I mean 
instances of a policy presence are discerned and then a back story of 
connection, translation and arrival is charted” (Jacobs, 2012, p.419). 
 
The primary task from the interviews was establishing a balanced narrative that 
encompassed all the views and perspectives gathered and to divide this continuous 
(occasionally parallel track) story into a series of discrete episodes which explored the 
mechanism and themes under consideration.  These episodes were used as a method to 
deal with the narrative complexity. This was a recursive process, switching between 
episodes and themes, referring back to and drawing on the material itself to identify each 
theme, whilst simultaneously clustering and categorizing responses. Another specific 
methodological challenge to using grounded theory in this case was the requirement of the 
                                                      
30 The timeline (Appendix A) shows how alternative formulations could be constructed, perhaps reading 
an individualʼs career progression, or strands of research interest within the Home Office, or chains of 
interrelated conferences and meetings, or the shifting waves of political power. 
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researcher to go into the study with an open mind, allowing themes to ʻemergeʼ from the data 
gathered. As discussed earlier my background and former experience made approaching the 
material in a neutral way extremely hard. Flyvbjerg (1998) reminds us that “grounded theory 
[is] understood as theory inductively founded on concrete phenomenology” (ibid., p.226) 
legitimizing the subjective experience of both the interviewees and my own experience.  
After transcribing the interview recordings, codification and analysis was undertaken by 
hand, rather than using qualitative analysis software. Following Rydinʼs (2003) 
recommendation I applied a close reading of transcripts rather than a computerized coding 
process (or the line-by line coding recommended by grounded theory), to cut down on the 
somewhat mechanical, time consuming process of coding which she rightly feels can limit 
time for reflection and analysis. However a disciplined and structured approach was taken to 
highlighting key ideas, or even the repetition of certain words within the transcripts. I also 
noted varying degrees of certainty in replies, or language traits or pauses that suggested 
doubts about the views expressed. I kept a research diary in the form of text comments 
attached to each transcript, which recorded questions, connections, links and clarifications I 
needed to pursue.  
The interview and archival data was combined and considered within a particular episode, 
clustering actors who had either directly participated or commented on that period and 
drawing on illustrative quotes from the interviews and from the secondary material. The data 
was also reviewed in relation to the various communities of practice/discipline groups 
identified. Disparities that emerged when discussing the same topic were compared (for 
example responses to common questions such as  “What would your definition of defensible 
space have been then? And now?”  
The analysis process was not a discrete phase that began on completion of interviews, but 
was an ongoing, progressive, iterative procedure from the start.  The incremental nature of 
the analysis gave an indication of where the informative boundaries of the subject area were 
to be found. Reaching saturation with a topic was not just a reflection of repetition of stories, 
but familiarity of how the material might fit in the analysis frame.  I followed a similar 
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approach with documents and archival material.  The sheer volume of material reinforced a 
selective but incremental coverage of topics (for example through the selection of particular 
estates as case studies). Here again the practice within grounded theory of identifying a 
theoretical ʻsamplingʼ frame rather than a statistical one enabled a breadth of coverage that 
flowed from the emerging themes (Hoggart, Lees and Davis, 2002, p.137).   The empirical 
chapters follow the historical arc of the narrative, with themes introduced and reintroduced as 
necessary. This forms a larger framework which incorporated emerging insights from 
interviews and reviewed documents. 
3.4.2 Reflections on risks and research positioning   
Discourse analysis provided depth to other elements of the analysis. Yet to address 
concerns that discourse analysis only inadequately captures the complex process of policy, it 
was combined with other qualitative and ethnographic techniques to provide a sufficiently 
complete perspective. The discourse analysis applied to the transcripts tended to identify 
thematic concerns emerging through interviewees repeated use of words or phrases, or 
delving deeper beneath the surface tone of the encounter.  These tonal differences were 
coloured by my research positioning.  For example one session which was experienced as a 
rapid creative exchange of ideas leaping from topic to topic, once transcribed and analyzed 
proved shallow and less insightful than expected. Care was taken, however, to ensure that 
the individual voices of those interviewed were maintained throughout the analysis and 
writing.  Each empirical chapter was written to preserve the conversational style and 
personality of those quoted within them.   
As an interviewer, I had to tread a fine line between recording intervieweesʼ views and 
perceptions and being drawn into a discussion that might influence or challenge their beliefs. 
Kaplan (1993) identifies this challenge, but as a tool for verification:  
“Policy analysts and planners use stories in similar ways to represent 
reality and test their versions of the truth. As in a courtroom, the dialectic 
interplay between two competing stories is often a useful form for 
evaluating the consistency of internal story elements and the likely truth of 
the story” (ibid., p.179). 
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 The hardest task was accurately locating dates of events, and I was alert for historical 
impossibilities or contradictions.  This applied not just to events but to recollections that were 
readjusted with hindsight.31 To aid this I devised a detailed timeline, which included dates in 
post for Secretaries of State, Housing Ministers and notable housing policy initiatives (See 
Appendix A). Listening to the interviewees, I tried not to contradict directly, even when I was 
in a position to confidently counter particular statements. However this is not to imply that I 
accepted intervieweeʼs words unequivocally. I did allow myself to gently question perceived 
inconsistencies, either to probe for confirmation of the fact (“Was so and soʼs involvement 
possible at this date?”) or for the rationale behind their opinions.  This was to demonstrate 
that I was listening carefully and attentively to what was being said. 
There was a degree of repetition of stories and narratives, either reconfirming or presenting a 
different viewpoint on the same incident. This verification, or reinterpretation, of events was 
critical amongst such contested historical subject matter. Towards the end of the data-
gathering period, having spent four years immersed in the subject, I was conscious that I had 
a more holistic overview of events and needed to construct a multi-perspective 
representation incorporating each facet, while being careful not to contaminate each 
intervieweeʼs partial picture. Several other potential methodological threats to the validity of 
the research were identified and in each case a strategy devised to try to mitigate the impact.   
Methodological risks were identified at three points in the process: first those arising from 
framing the study and setting the research questions, second, those associated with 
gathering data and finally reaching conclusions from the data gathered.  
The methods section above describes the challenges and risks of gathering data, both the 
process of gaining access to suitable individuals, avoiding bias in selecting participants and 
uncovering pertinent views. To summarise, each of the methods described in this chapter 
has been adopted in a way that is attentive to the possibility of research bias. There were the 
                                                      
31 For example one intervieweeʼs use of  phrases  such as  “Cleaner, safer, greener”, social capital and 
permeability showed his conceptualization of neighbourhoods and spatial interaction was strongly 
tinted by urban design concepts that emerged since the new millennium, a decade after working on 
DICE. 
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usual concerns over the trustworthiness of the research and the reliance on the memories 
and perceptions of those interviewed. On the whole interviewees seemed to be presenting 
their viewpoint honestly, with little hedging. Any inaccuracies or inconsistencies tended to 
arise from contradictory readings of a situation or vagueness about historical events.  
This leaves risk concerning analysis and reaching conclusions from the data. Research bias 
may become established through the researcher selecting findings based on preconceptions 
or existing theories, or that resonate with their own views. This was addressed by imposing a 
threefold systematic research process. This triangulated theories pre-proposed in the 
literature against those that emerged during the research. It also recorded discarded cul-de-
sacs or negative cases and most critically, reinforced periods of reflection on the degree that 
I was influencing the findings. This process of interactive interviewing, data collection and 
interpretation used was particularly open to my value laden positionality as both a 
practitioner and policy influencer. 
This continual awareness of my personal engagement with the material presented a different 
order of risk to the threat of poor interpretation of the findings. This required a more 
procedural process providing an evidence trail of how interpretations and conclusions were 
reached, starting with initial ideas arising from conversations or prompts from colleagues or 
supervisors, through notes made during and on transcribing interviews and while inspecting 
archives. Reviewing my research notebooks (a mix of practical to-do tasks and speculative 
jottings) was a frustrating process, as they were full of enticing, cryptic, unfinished 
conjectures and un-mined ideas for future exploration. Whether this can be considered 
sufficient mitigation for theoretical concerns over failing to consider alternative explanations 
will be demonstrated in the coherence of the arguments made in this thesis. The number and 
richness of these un-pursued themes was as distracting as it was enticing, but I was 
reassured that following a consistent process along the selected explanatory paths would 
reach credible and legitimate conclusions. Ultimately there may be other plausible 
explanations or conclusions that could be reached from the data Iʼve gathered, but I have 
confidence in the methodological process I have followed. This feeling of reliance on a 
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structured methodological process to maintain confidence in the outcomes was particularly 
pertinent during the analysis process.   
Conclusion 
This chapter has described the types and sources of data used in the subsequent empirical 
chapters, how these primary and secondary sources were identified and uncovered and what 
I considered to constitute relevant evidence for my thesis arguments.  It discussed the 
practical processes of qualitative research, the selection of relevant appropriate 
methodological techniques and how these were combined to provide a wide-reaching yet 
consistent plan of enquiry.  It explained how they were combined into an internally coherent 
hybrid analytical framework. This methodology depended on a combination of approaches 
with a triangulation of the data methods as well as data sources with my ontological reading 
of grounded theory as a partial process leading to case studies (Flyvbjerg, 2006) and the 
process of building theories from this research (Eisenhardt, 1989). This led to Thomas and 
Jamesʼ (2006) defense of narratives and their call to be unapologetic about interpretations 
that offer ʻmerelyʼ narrative. I noted how practical challenges were overcome ensuring that 
the material gathered had both internal and external validity and was as complete and 
accurate a representation as possible of the varied opinions obtained. 
I speculated on the practice of conducting interviews, the patterns of introduction, rituals for 
establishing credibility and reinforcing interactions needed to establish open and candid 
communication. Comparing the targeted approaches suitable for articulate elites, to those 
approaches needed to encourage occasionally unwilling interviewees, revealed much about 
the chameleon task of the interviewer.  By recognizing that as a researcher I was mutable, 
fluctuating between an assortment of roles to play, I reflected on the impact of personality 
and positionality on the research. Did it make any difference how I presented myself? How 
did this influence the parallel process of understanding how those participating in the 
research presented and represented their views? How did this accentuate the challenges of 
multiple viewpoints, opinions and ultimately multiple versions of reality and what ethical 
restraints did this place on the study?  
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I adhered to several of Flyvbjergʼs (2006) recommendations on case study research (for 
example selecting cases with maximum variation and seeing DICE as a deviant case of 
regeneration policy). Initial concerns about the intensive nature of case study research, and 
whether studying a small number of cases drawn from potentially unique and unusual 
circumstances, would be sufficiently rich and informative about more general cases, proved 
to be unfounded.  In fact, as more and more information, differing viewpoints and 
contradictory opinions were gathered there was a sense of being overwhelmed by the messy 
complexity.  So many multi-faceted, intertwined but diverging, stories were being told. I was 
concerned that too many intriguing strands and possibly irrelevant themes were surfacing, 
pulling in too many directions, suggesting too many ways of joining the dots, that it would be 
impossible to weave them into a manageable comprehensive picture.  
It was helpful at this point to return to the initial research questions and reassuring to find that 
they still constituted a logical route for enquiry.  It was also essential to have confidence in 
the relevance and validity of each individual method and the theoretical clarity of each step to 
be followed, even if the final outcome seemed uncertain.  The exploratory process of mixing 
methods (although not in the way that a more traditional ʻmixed methodsʼ approach might) 
was about selecting how deeply or far to pursue each approach relating each element of 
data or research question.  For example the mode of ʻdiscourse analysisʼ applied to 
dissecting interview transcripts varied from the process of reviewing and analyzing the 
language used in a Local Authority guidance note on Secured by Design.  
Overall, the research design adhered to Cresswellʼs (2003) recommendations for combining 
qualitative techniques. His advice was to focus the attention on the research problem while 
being pluralistic in the attempt to derive knowledge about the problem, to be transparent 
about the theoretical lens being applied, while being open to different world-views and 
diverse assumptions and to respond to the context (social, historical and political) in which 
the research was currently happening as well as to recognize how this might be a 
significantly different context from the period under investigation. These qualitative and open 
methodological approaches became theoretical ways of distancing this study from 
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Colemanʼs scientific positivist stance.   By applying techniques which traced local actions as 
a response to a specific set of circumstances, l Iooked for causal explanations, searching out 
why these actions were taken on these particular occasions. And my attempt to avoid 
representational, generalised, idealised summaries of these actions were all ways of 
ensuring a post-positivist, value-led enquiry.   
The following empirical chapters tell the story of the introduction of defensible space to the 
UK, setting out the sequence of events as it progressed though the policy arena, resulting in 
the DICE regeneration programme. It gives accounts of the practical implementation of 
Colemanʼs version of defensible space on three housing estates in London, concluding with 
the cautionary tale of the DICE programmeʼs evaluation. The narration is interspersed with 
commentary and brief theory sections, enabling me both to honestly retell and reflect the 
views of those interviewed, while offering a critical analysis on what occurred.  
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Chapter 4: Defensible Space ʻtravelsʼ to and lands in the UK 
Introduction 
The first empirical chapter concentrates on the role of three transfer agents, their 
personalities and ability to exploit varied modes of transfer, such as media appearances or 
polemical books/manifestos (as opposed to anonymised formal research reports) as 
channels of communication.   This chapter opens with the response to Oscar Newmanʼs 
(1972) book Defensible Space which brought the concept to the UK. Contrasting the positive 
public reception to the book in America, to the less enthusiastic welcome from British 
academic and policy audiences, highlights not just varied national cultural expectations but 
also professional and disciplinary ones.  The initiating transfer agent, Newman was highly 
skilled at publicising his ideas through a range of media, illustrating how communication 
mechanisms worked together to facilitate the international transfer of the concept. Yet 
receptiveness to Newmanʼs work in Britain was significantly shaped by the contemporary 
concerns about crime, which were less about violent crime or burglary than vandalism.  
A second transfer agent, the researcher Sheena Wilson, acted as a primary go-between, 
ferrying Newmanʼs ideas from New York to the Home Office (HO) where she worked. 
Wilsonʼs subsequent research into vandalism on unpopular estates aimed to test the 
relevance of Newmanʼs ideas in the British context. As I argue that the freedom to adjust or 
align depends on how the relocated policy meshes with local conditions, this section includes 
an overview of English housing policy and research from the 1970s/1980s establishing the 
context that the concept of defensible space was moving to. Having completed her initial 
research, Wilson moved from the HO to the DoE, carrying her ideas with her.  I suggest that 
this had significant influence on embedding the notion of defensible space within the housing 
policy/research landscape of the time.  
The third transfer agent is Alice Coleman and the story continues with Jacobs and Leesʼ 
(2013) account of Coleman stumbling across a copy of Newmanʼs book while on sabbatical 
in Canada. Having read it and become convinced of its policy relevance to the UK, Coleman 
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brought a copy home and tried to persuade the DoE that it contained the answer to their 
problems of urban decline. The DoEʼs response was unreceptive and dismissive. However 
this unenthusiastic rejection spurred Coleman on to undertake her own version of Newmanʼs 
research to demonstrate its usefulness and applicability to English housing. Coleman did this 
through operationalising Newmanʼs design variables, as the basis of her Design 
Disadvantage in Housing study. Determined to pursue this investigation, Coleman started 
this research without funding or access to crime data and this chapter concludes with her 
successfully gaining the resources and data to finish this ambitious large-scale undertaking 
and writing Utopia on Trial.  
In this chapter I add to Jacobs and Leesʼ (2013) explanation of this moment of international 
transfer by looking backwards and forwards in time, from Newman and Wilsonʼs encounter in 
the late 1970s to Newman and Colemanʼs eventual meeting just prior to the publication of 
Utopia on Trial in the mid-1980s. I also extend their version of this story of “non-linear 
reproduction” through an in-depth consideration of the interaction of personality and the 
“political medium” that Jacobs and Lees describe (ibid., p.1577). They only concentrate on a 
single transfer agent, Coleman, whereas I have identified two others playing variations of this 
role. Newman is clearly one of Stoneʼs (2004) ʻsoftʼ policy transfer entrepreneurs facilitating a 
broad diffusion across disciplines and networks, whereas Wilson can be seen as part of the 
ʻhardʼ policy transfer bureaucracy. Coleman however is a more ambiguous, complex 
example. She was not fully aligned to the hard academic/policy transfer vector (evidenced by 
her problematical relationship to both Kingʼs College London32 and her sponsoring 
government departments). While displaying the essential entrepreneurial characteristics of 
ambitious self-belief, persistently pursuing her ideas in the face of powerful critiques and ably 
broadcasting them via a host of communication modes, Coleman never achieved long-term 
success in that her version of the concept may have been heard, but her message was not 
fully heeded.  
                                                      
32 The relationship with her academic colleagues was difficult due to both her gender and her 
conservative politics within a left/liberal department. 
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The literature review described many versions of transfer agents  (Rydin, 2003; Peck and 
Theodore, 2010; McCann and Ward, 2011; Stone, 2012).  To date, accounts have tended to 
consider the role of official agencies in such processes; that is, bureaucrats, politicians and 
government experts. However, the agents of lesson-drawing and policy transfer cover a 
broader collection of individuals, networks and organizations (Stone, 2004). While this 
chapter concentrates on three transfer agents (Newman, Wilson and Coleman), others will 
be introduced in this and subsequent chapters, drawing on interviews with individuals with 
varying responsibility for transferring and promoting the concept. Some of these agents 
physically moved between (government) organisations or (housing) networks: Wilson moving 
between Government departments, the civil servant John Harvey33 repositioning as a 
private-sector consultant for Price Waterhouse, or Steve Stride, advancing through 
professional housing roles from neighbourhood manager for the Rogers Estate, before 
becoming CEO of Poplar HARCA and President of the Chartered Institute of Housing. By 
referring to them as transfer agents my analysis follows McCann and Ward (2011) and Stone 
(2012) by concentrating more on their ability to transport and communicate the concept, than 
their agency  to move. This raises the question of which is stronger, the agency of individuals 
or the organisation that they are associated with? The study was dominated by strong 
personalities (often with emphatically held opinions) so it is a story of individualsʼ views as 
much as the positions promoted by their organisations. Yet it would be simplistic to assume 
they acted with complete freedom and I was also interested in their roles as representative 
figures for the notion of defensible space and as cultural intermediaries in the transmission of 
the idea. 
4.1 Oscar Newman lands in the UK 
When Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design (1972) was published, 
Newman received a great deal of attention from the American press and television media. It 
was extremely accessible, illustrated by artfully composed photos and sketches, his 
                                                      
33 John Harvey was initially Head of the Estate Action Team at the DoE and commissioned the DICE 
study from Alice Coleman. 
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appealing narrative style presenting the idea in a comprehensible, inviting manner to an 
academic and lay audience.  The American architecture profession reacted positively to the 
publication, linking it back to the utopian ideas of Mumford, Lynch and other architectural 
writers (Friedmann, 1973). As Wilson commented, defensible space “had a good brand, had 
a good name, it had everything going for it” (Interview Wilson, 2012) and the concept moved 
rapidly across the Atlantic. Newmanʼs book was republished in Britain under the title 
Defensible Space: People and Design in the Violent City (1973).34 
Figure 4.1 Defensible Space, American and UK editions 
 
Newman publicised his ideas via a UK book tour and lectures. One, at the University of 
Sheffield, was attended by Rob Mawby then Lecturer in Criminology, working on the 
Sheffield Study on Urban Social Structure and Crime.  During this trip, Newman visited 
                                                      
34 The alternative subtitles to Newmanʼs book in American and British editions is not commented on by 
any reviewers. The British version does make the link between behaviour and design clearer, however 
could also be read as an allusion to the perceived greater violence of American cities. The cover 
picture is far more melodramatic.    
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several British housing schemes analysing them according to his theory (Mawby, 1977).  
Newman presented his findings from these visits at a conference in London titled 
Architecture, Planning and Urban Crime held in December 1974. This was organised by 
NACRO (National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders) with the Royal 
Institute of British Architects and the Royal Town Planning Institute. Mawby reported that this 
appearance prompted demands for a replication of Newman's New York study in Britain 
(Ash, Burbidge, et al., 1975). However overall Mawby was dismissive of architectsʼ and 
plannersʼ understanding of crime citing the DoE researcher Mike Burbidgeʼs “rather 
inadequate contribution to the NACRO conference compared for example with [criminologist] 
Baldwinʼs more detailed analysis” (Mawby, 1977, p.178).  Mawby includes Newman in this 
category of inexperienced architecture/planners condemning his crude research technique 
and selective reporting.  “It is not sufficient to cite an advantageous factor and ignore a 
disadvantageous one” (ibid., p.177). Mawby re-examined his Sheffield study data in the light 
of Newmanʼs theory and found little evidence in the gathered crime data to support the 
theory that high-rise flats were more prone to crime. However he was more supportive of 
Newmanʼs explanation for the increased tendency to report witnessed crimes, which echoing 
Jane Jacobʼs (1961) “eyes on the street”, appeared to be affected by how much residents 
believed they were living in a high crime area.  Mawby complains that “ʼcrimeʼ as described 
in Defensible Space is invariably an emotive concept, graphically illustrated by such terms as 
ʻvandalismʼ or ʻmuggingʼ” and called for a cooler more objective discussion of offenders, 
offence rates and possible causality (Mawby, 1977, p.175). Newman reduced ʻthe criminalʼ to 
a social stereotype, an inveterate and perpetual lawbreaker (Campkin, 2013). 
Despite these attacks Newmanʼs ideas spread extensively through the UK and in 1978 
Wilson noted that defensible space had “become common currency amongst housing 
managers, architects and even tenants” (Wilson, 1978b, p.674). The book was popularly 
reviewed in national and local newspapers. An article in a Sheffield local paper, titled High 
Rise Flats are Nurseries of Crime uncritically reported Newman's figures, accepting without 
question the reliability of the data but also that the findings were transferable to the British 
context (Brown, 1974). The architectural press was far less favourable. The extensive US 
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press machine behind the publication had generated high expectations but the architectural 
reviewer in Building Design magazine found it a disappointing book providing few new 
insights.  The review exudes a sense of British superiority: “the intolerable situation of crime 
and violence in America is taken at face value…The rather extreme problems of public 
housing in America” (Building Design, 1973, p.8), complaining that Newman expected 
architecture to solve “problems of a political nature” (ibid., p.8). Other dismissive 
comparisons were made, for example in The Architectural Journal, Colin Wardʼs brief review 
of Defensible Space is published alongside an extended, favourable review of his own 
publication Vandalism (Ward, 1973a). An architect, planner, writer and anarchist, Wardʼs 
initial suspicion that Newman was “propagating a crudely deterministic approach to urban 
design; architecture as a branch of police science” was defused by Newman calling for 
greater resident participation (ibid., p.1243). Yet the accusations of determinism are 
commonly repeated, with even the supportive Wilson reporting that Newmanʼs ideas were 
considered a “novel and contentious brand of architectural determinism” (Wilson, 1978a, 
p.674).  
This sense of discomfort can be attributed to the book exposing serious weaknesses in the 
built environment professionʼs understanding of the impact of building design.  Bill Hillier35, 
writing in the RIBA Journal argued that the book was: 
“really about the crisis in our knowledge of the relationships between the 
forms of artificial space we create and the social behaviour that goes on in it 
– knowledge that architects take as their stock in trade in order to design 
anything. In other words Defensible Space is a bad book about a very 
important subject” (Hillier, 1973, p.543). 
Some of Newmanʼs critics saw his promotion of defensible space as a social ʻmovementʼ 
rather than a robustly applied theoretical framework.  “Newmanʼs writing style is predisposed 
to political oratory rather than serious scientific endeavour” (Mawby, 1977, p.169). Reviews 
such as this, exhibited a degree of professional elitism, considering Newmanʼs presentation 
of the concept better suited to addressing a general, less knowledgeable audience rather 
                                                      
35 Bill Hillier then at the Bartlett University College London, but writing for the RIBA Intelligence Unit.  
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than well-informed professionals.  As his television appearances show, Newman consciously 
presented his principles in a persuasive, appealing manner. This deliberate salesmanship 
echoes other descriptions of transfer agents as policy brokers or entrepreneurs (Rydin, 2003; 
Peck and Theodore, 2010): 
“He was an unusual figure, quite charismatic. He wasnʼt like a social 
worker who was really committed to people, he just had this theory that he 
sold. He was more like a businessman selling the defensible space 
concept.  He was successful. He was travelling abroad a lot. He was 
almost like a social entrepreneur” (Interview Wilson, 2012).   
Figure 4.2 Oscar Newman 
 
4.1.1 Selling the idea of defensible space 
A 1974 BBC Horizon program “The Writing on the Wall”, introduced Newmanʼs ideas to a 
wider British public (Mansfield, 1974). Newmanʼs professorial role is cited to establish his 
expert credibility, while he was filmed either at his office desk, overlooking dramatic New 
York skylines, or photogenically striding around disreputable estates in a sweeping long 
black coat.  Newmanʼs showmanship was notable (Interview Wilson, 2012) and the 
programme had a theatrical quality.  It opened with images of the poor conditions in New 
York housing projects (as well as of Pruitt-Igoe in St Louis) comparing crime statistics in New 
York to British ones, reinforcing perceptions that US crime problems were worse than in UK. 
Pictures of a poorly maintained housing block followed, where it was “catastrophically clear” 
that the physical design should be blamed; the ugly entrance ways, “these cells called 
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elevators” and an outside play area described as a “cage for children”.   But in a suitably tele-
visual shock, the narrator announced “This isnʼt New York – this is England”. The Aylesbury 
Estate in London was not actually named as this location, but could easily be identified from 
a section filmed of Newman walking through the streets surrounding the estate.  He 
described the estateʼs recently completed, grey white mass as a “creature from another 
world”, its long horizontal concrete blocks towering above the neighbouring terraced houses 
and blocking off the surrounding streets.  
Interviews with unhappy American and British residents voice similar complaints. Newman is 
filmed chatting with a group of old ladies who explain how much they enjoy living on their 
estate. He uses this as evidence that tower blocks can successfully house elderly residents 
without crime recommending against mixing families and older populations. The 
programmeʼs focus repeatedly returns to children: film clips of poorly designed, neglected 
play areas, children playing unsupervised in unsafe locations36.  Newmanʼs proposed 
solutions are a mix of careful allocation of residents, external design interventions to 
blocks/spaces and greater use of surveillance technology, particularly CCTV and intercoms. 
Throughout the program Newman rarely mentions defensible space, but talks about the 
“definition of space” and those “who overlook the space”.  
The programme struck an odd balance between supported evidence and unsupported 
assertion, with Newman disingenuously describing the children filmed as the first generation 
of British children to grow up in high-rise homes. As the first tower blocks were constructed in 
England immediately after the second World War, there had been at least two decades of 
young inhabitants, potentially into a second generation. Tellingly, Newman attributes an 
inevitable progression from vandalism to more serious crime.  “Thereʼs no clear evidence in 
England on vandalism, but one wonders will these children grow up to be criminals?”  
(Newman in Mansfield, 1974). This may have been dramatic emphasis for the programmeʼs 
                                                      
36 Watching the programme now, its concentration on young pre-teen children,  ignoring older youths, 
seems nostalgic and naively dated.  One clip on the Aylesbury, of a group of children running up and 
down access ramps and jumping over railings, illustrates the lost freedom for this age group.  
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finale, but was an understatement of the research understanding and level of policy interest 
in the issue of vandalism in Britain. Newmanʼs photos of the housing projectsʼ vandalized 
entrances, lifts and lobbies, were a highly recognisable feature to British architects, planners 
and housing officers, who easily transposed them to their own experience of social housing.  
One chapter of Poynerʼs widely quoted book Design Against Crime (1983) discusses 
vandalism within public housing. Here Poyner explored the British fixation on vandalism, 
complaining that despite the widespread attention, it was too often dismissed as a minor 
example of anti-social behaviour rather than a crime with serious impact. He forcefully 
reiterated the variation between America and Britain during the 1970s. In Britain more than a 
third of all housing was within the public sector, whereas less than 3% of North American 
housing was managed by the state, the majority of which was perceived to be problem 
projects, subject to the most extreme forms of crime. Yet this difference was narrowing and 
both incidence and fear of crime was increasing at unprecedented rates (Poyner, 1983). The 
positive legacy of Bevanʼs post war public sector housing program still coloured views of 
public housing with only a minority being perceived as ʻdifficult to letʼ estates.  Yet while 
British housing estates had far lower actual crime rates than in America, the degree of public 
concern about vandalism was extremely high. There was extensive debate on the issue in 
the mainstream and the professional press amongst writers such as Laurie Taylor and Colin 
Ward (McKean, 1973; Taylor, 1973; Ward, 1973b; Downes, 1974). The research 
establishment made use of this mis-perception citing the visible indications of damage to 
justify further investigation, even if the vandalism consisted of numerous trivial incidents. An 
illustrated Design Council guide Designing Against Vandalism (Sykes, 1979) gathered 
together research summaries by Wilson and others setting out practical lessons for Local 
Authorities and housing managers (Wilson, 1979).  
Newmanʼs lack of awareness of the emerging British evidence, the DoE research into 
vandalism (Burbidge, 1973) and the evidence gathering beginning at the HO (Sturman and 
Wilson, 1976) can be read as a failed example of transferability, or the inability to construct a 
shared knowledge base due to closed or disconnected epistemic networks. The focus of 
epistemic networks on creating knowledge across a specific domain and establishing robust 
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and mutually accepted claims can result in overly inwardly-looking groups (Rydin, 2003; 
Cooper, 2006).   But to be fair to Newman, competitive barriers existed between academic 
and professional networks in America and the UK. Likewise the Government research 
teams, while exploring the same topics and participating in similar networks, did so with 
differing policy drivers and hence had a tendency towards siloed working.  However a few 
years later Newman was to meet and discuss vandalism and crime prevention with British 
government researcher Sheena Wilson, a specialist in the subject.  
To understand that this was a meeting between researchers from very different research 
cultures and political backgrounds, this section explores the state of British research at the 
time, including studies of residentsʼ satisfaction with housing estates, explaining the British 
concern with vandalism over other forms of crime. It sets out the wider housing policy context 
during the period, reinforcing that DICE was not a unique approach to urban housing 
regeneration and the emergent status given to evidence in policy making. It investigates the 
initial alignment of Newmanʼs concept to this established research and policy context within 
two possible ʻreceptor landing sitesʼ within Government departments, the Department of the 
Environment and the Home Office.  
4.1.2 Early evidence on housing and vandalism  
The DoEʼs housing research section dated from the mid-1960s. During his period as Minister 
for Housing and Local Government, Richard Crossman writes in his diaries of walking 
around his departmental empire and coming across a ʻcentre of excellenceʼ, a small left-wing 
group of thinkers which was the Social Research Division (SRD) later under the direction of 
Judith Littlewood, to become the Social Research Branch (SRB) (Crossman, 1975; Interview 
Taper, 2013). The remit of SRD was more overly engaged with political policy formation than 
the group of architects within the Housing Development Directorate (HDD). While both 
commissioned and undertook housing research, HDD was responsible for devising technical 
housing guidelines and Building Bulletins including the highly influential Design Bulletin 25 
The estate outside the dwelling; reactions of residents to aspects of housing layout 
(Reynolds, Nicholson, et al., 1972).  
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This was the first of several bulletins dealing with the ʻproblems encounteredʼ with public 
housing and was based on a 1967 quantitative survey of residents in six medium-density 
Local Authority housing estates in London and Sheffield built since 1960. The study found 
that housewivesʼ overall satisfaction with living on the estates shaped their views of the 
estatesʼ appearance.  This overall satisfaction was a composite made up of satisfaction with 
the landlord (maintenance regimes, response to repairs and ability to deal with social 
annoyances) combined with the layout of the estate and the spaciousness of green areas. 
The seven variables most strongly influencing satisfaction were: appearance of the estate, 
the dwelling, maintenance standards, opportunities to move, problem play areas, the view 
from the flat and vandalism. Additional significant variables related to the concept of 
defensible space included private space, too many people, blocks being too large. Many of 
the principles that Newman and Coleman would raise later as potential problem areas had 
been identified in this earlier research. Surprisingly, height above the ground was found to 
have no impact on housewives satisfaction with their home.  Space for childrenʼs play was 
highlighted as a significant area of concern, regardless of the quantity or design of play areas 
provided.  The authors surmised this dissatisfaction was caused by maternal concern for 
childrensʼ safety and supervision. Yet the authors observed children playing alone 
throughout the estates and that most spaces, whether intended for childrenʼs activities or not, 
provided opportunities for play.  
About a quarter of residents surveyed were unsatisfied with maintenance and over half felt 
that vandalism was a problem. This was attributed to insufficient staff being available to 
supervise the estate, especially preventing children “spoiling the place” and making it “dirty, 
with litter all around” (ibid., p.21).  Vandalism, which was classified as damage to property as 
well as general ʻuntidinessʼ, was perceived as a widespread problem. Complaints covered 
damage to lifts and telephone boxes, uprooting of trees and flowers, breaking milkbottles or 
windows and noisy teenagers, but graffiti was not a major concern.  The discussion identified 
that damage was seen less as wilful destruction than the result of childrensʼ thoughtless 
behaviour taking short cuts across flowerbeds or dropping litter. Interestingly more 
complaints were made about the estates with the smallest number of reported occurrences, 
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suggesting that it was the contrast with the overall appearance of the estate being noticed. 
These views that vandalism was a social problem as much as a physical one contradicted 
Newmanʼs opinion that poor design led inevitably to intentional damage. 
4.2 Sheena Wilson links Newman and Coleman 
The second influential transfer agent for defensible space is the Home Office (HO) 
researcher, Sheena Wilson, who brought Newmanʼs ideas to the attention of a wide policy 
audience playing a critical role communicating ideas between the HO and the DoE.  Wilson 
trained as a psychologist and studied criminology before joining the HO Research Unit in 
1971 at a point when it was ceasing psychology based studies and beginning to explore 
socio-economic motivations for crime; moving away from the deep seated idea that there 
was a criminal ʻtypeʼ, to one where much crime was opportunistic.  This alternative 
opportunistic model of crime opened up ideas of crime prevention, where police advice and 
good design practice could intervene directly in the mechanics of crime reduction (Mayhew, 
Clarke, et al., 1976). In parallel with the DoE, the HO began to take a growing interest in 
vandalism as an example of opportunistic crime. Wilsonʼs early research set out to 
investigate the causes of vandalism on housing estates (Sturman and Wilson, 1976). She 
notes that while the study was as quantitative as possible for the time, it was in fact rather 
primitive:  
“We tried in a very scientific way to set up a sample of different types of 
buildings in different areas. We used regression analysis on one of these 
really big computers, but we couldnʼt control for the background of the 
people because it was too hard – for one there was no computerized 
information. I literally went through housing records kept on index cards in 
each housing department” (Interview Wilson 2012).  
In Utopia on Trial Coleman is highly critical of Sturman and Wilsonʼs research especially their 
finding that one socio-economic factor - child density - exerted a stronger influence than 
design on levels of vandalism.  Wilson wrote that only if child density were under control 
would design “exert a differentiating influence” (Sturman and Wilson, 1976, p.17).  Indeed 
Coleman singles out Wilsonʼs later work and accuses her of misunderstanding Newmanʼs 
premise:  
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“There are other examples of how people think they have mastered the gist 
of Oscar Newmanʼs findings but are actually mis-interpreting 
them…Sheena Wilson jumped not only to the wrong conclusion that design 
cannot reduce crime, but also the more profound generalisation that it 
cannot cause it” (Coleman, 1985a, p.129).  
Coleman is referring to Wilsonʼs example from the regeneration of Liverpoolʼs Angela Street 
estate. A ground floor area of the estate fenced off to form ʻsemi-public spaceʼ was soon 
vandalized. Wilson interpreted the speed of this damage as indicating that it was a response 
to the process of regeneration, not the design. The example also illustrated the ambiguity in 
the classification of spaces.  Wilson refers to the vandalized garden as ʻsemi-private spaceʼ 
while Coleman argued that the fenced off area was ʻconfused spaceʼ, as the garden was not 
visible from windows of upper flats. So the areas Wilson considered semi-private, Coleman 
considered semi-public, demonstrating Ekblomʼs (2011) definitional inconstancies for the 
way that spaces were perceived and defined. 
4.2.1 The HO learning from HUD37 
In 1977 Wilson travelled to America and spent a day with Newman looking at housing 
projects in the Bronx, accompanied by a police escort. Two points struck her; the extreme 
levels of poverty and vandalism occurring in parts of New York compared to Britain (the post-
war decline and Cityʼs bankruptcy in the 1970s triggered a deteriorating urban environment, 
particularly in public housing areas) and that the manner in which improvements were 
implemented affected the sustainable long-term success of the changes.   
“These streets were really dangerous, it was like Armageddon, riddled with 
potholes, there were burnt out cars, fire hydrants flowing, Iʼve never seen 
such social desolation…We were looking at a 3rd generation permanent 
underclass, unemployed young guys with no teeth and on drugs, sitting 
round in stairwells accosting people for money. Back then in the UK we 
were tackling something very different: the housing design of places like 
Hulme, industrial system building combined with limited housing 
management, social inadequacies and the sheer density of children.” 
(Interview Wilson, 2012). 
Wilson and Newman revisited Clason Point Gardens and Markham Gardens, two estates 
featured in Defensible Space.  The improvements to Clason Point Gardens had relied on 
                                                      
37 US Department of Housing and Development (HUD) 
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engaging and working with existing residents. To test the impact of this community 
involvement, Newman carried out the alterations at Markham Gardens in a more traditional 
authority way, with workmen appearing unannounced and erecting fences.  Residents did 
not respond well to the imposition of these unexpected new barriers and the new 
landscaping had suffered substantial damage as a consequence. Writing about the visit 
Wilson recalls “the style with which physical improvements were implemented was more 
important that the measures themselves” (Wilson, 1978a, p.674).   
Wilson would later argue that some of the criticisms directed at Newmanʼs theories were 
unfair. Refurbishment schemes with a too literal application of his principles were found to 
continue to have vandalism problems. Local Authorities who had simplistically altered the 
design of estate layouts without improving their management services were disappointed at 
the lack of territoriality or pride of place their changes generated.  She felt that it was the 
process of testing the concept of defensible space that led the DoE to a more robust belief in 
the importance of non-design factors. 
“Ironically it was speculation inspired by defensible space which eventually 
led to a clearer understanding of the non-design factors contributing to the 
success of housing schemes…The inconsistency of the evidence implied 
that design should never be considered independently of social and 
management factors” (Wilson, 1978a, p.674).  
Coleman writes that Wilsonʼs research for the HO was “intended to refute Newmanʼs thesis” 
(Coleman, 1985a, p.16). But Colemanʼs view that she was the only promoter of Newman, 
defending him against systematic discrediting by a government research establishment is 
unfounded, as Wilson cites Newman as a principal influence, clearly stating that she aimed 
to explore the relevance of Newmanʼs ideas in Britain. Wilsonʼs study had modest aims. 
Rather than establishing a unified comprehensive theory for causes of vandalism, it set out 
to track the varied levels of damage across a large sample of inner London estates and see 
if these variations might be explained by their layout and design.  
Poynerʼs (1983) view of Wilsonʼs research is far more balanced than Colemanʼs. Wilsonʼs 
(1980) study looked at all estates with more than 100 homes in two inner London Boroughs. 
This consisted of 285 blocks, over half of which were four or five storey gallery or balcony 
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access blocks or nine storey slab blocks. The remainder were lower walk-up blocks, towers 
and a few terraces of houses. Following Newman, a similar set of characteristics were 
assessed: the height and size of blocks, the number of shared entrances and through routes, 
a classification of spaces into private, semi-private, semi-public and public. These were 
compared to Local Authority housing repair records and tenancy agreements to provide a 
figure for child density. Newman had used the New York City Housing Authority Police 
Department crime records, a comprehensive and centralized source.  But the records Wilson 
was interested in were scattered, none were computerized requiring her to look though the 
paper repair chits or tenants index cards held by each housing department. Wilson 
undertook a visual survey, characterising the blocks and observing levels of vandalism. 
These relatively subjective observational measures aggregated all forms of damage (number 
of walls written on, smashed windows, damaged rubbish bins) as a composite block score 
against a four-point scale (from 1, minimal or no damage, 2, a few panes broken or some 
graffiti, 3, more than a few panes broken and considerable graffiti and 4, extensive boarding 
up, breakage and graffiti).   
The study analyzed where damage occurred; in public or private spaces, to ground floor flats 
or above (lower ones were more likely to have broken windows) or to empty/occupied 
homes. There appeared to be little defensible space in the estates studied.  The number of 
voids on an estate proved a good indicator for decline, with more dwellings vandalised when 
empty. But the most significant factor identified was child density. Wilson describes how she 
stumbled across the number of children per household as a critical variable and how in 
retrospect had suitable records been available she would have broken this down into a more 
sensitive indicator of the density of boys between 14 and 18, as the density of boys 
demonstrated the clearest correlation to levels of vandalism (Interview Wilson, 2012). Yet the 
relationship was complicated and leading to Wilsonʼs tentative threshold of child density, with 
more than three children per ten dwellings signifying ʻhigh child densityʼ blocks.  In ʻhigh child 
densityʼ blocks, most design typologies were found to be equally vulnerable.  Where there 
were fewer children, rates of damage were influenced more by design factors, such as open, 
ungated entrances (Wilson, 1980). 
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4.2.2 The English housing policy context 
The literature review questioned the prospects for research informing or shaping policy, 
characterising the 1970s and 1980s as a low point in social scientistsʼ influence prior to the 
resurgence of evidence use under the rise of evidence-based policy-making (Sanderson 
2002; Jones and Seelig, 2004). However the diagram below (adapted from Hall, Murie, et al., 
2004, p.16) showing key English housing and regeneration programmes and selected 
research would suggest that the DoE during this period was a relatively fertile location to 
conduct studies that led to programmes of direct intervention.  
Figure 4.3 summarises four points relevant to this thesis and the context for DICE.  First, that 
investment available via the main housing programmes from the Housing Investment 
Programme (HIP) through the Priority Estates Project (PEP), Estates Action (EA) until DICE, 
was constrained to individual estates. Second, that there was a shift in emphasis from 
housing-led to non-housing-led regeneration policy in the early 1990s, just as DICE was 
beginning. The later phases of stock transfer-led regeneration, Housing Action Trusts (HATs) 
and Large Scale Voluntary Transfers (LSVTs) centred on the extensive transfer of multiple 
housing estates into local management, ALMOs, or Housing Associations. Area policies 
such as the City Challenge Fund, Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) or New Deal for 
Communities (NDC), pooled budgets across policy areas and funded social and physical 
solutions for whole neighbourhoods.  
 
 Figure 4.3 Key English regeneration and housing programmes since 1979 
(Adapted from Hall, Murie, et al., 2004, Fig 1.3, p.16 and, Wilcox and Perry, 2014, Table 67a, p.178)  
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 It was not until the Housing Market Renewal projects at the beginning of twenty-first century 
that intervention refocused on solely physical interventions. Third, there was extreme 
variation in the relative scales of investment, numbers of homes affected by each of the 
programmes and the differing periods of evaluation of these projects. The DICE evaluations 
although lengthy, were far shorter than the evaluation of PEP.  Finally even within the DoE, 
separate directorates, with differing remits, undertook research.   
Wilsonʼs research for the HO had been prompted by a DoE paper for the Housing 
Development Directorate (HDD) Vandalism; a constructive approach (Burbidge, 1973). 
Having completed this study, Wilson moved to the DoE in 1978 to collaborate with Mike 
Burbidge (then the HDDʼs lead researcher) on a far larger study An Investigation of Difficult 
to Let Housing: Case studies of pre-war estates (Burbidge, Kirby, et al. 1980). The major 
outcome of the ʻdifficult to letʼ study was the DoEʼs Priority Estates Project (PEP) an 
influential and far-reaching housing programme. Starting in 1979, PEP assessed 30 large 
estates (not only estates of high-rise flats, but also Radburn layouts and traditional pre-war 
cottage layouts. In conclusion, the PEP study: 
“spelt out the design failure of large modern estates and underlined the 
need for compensatory management if flatted estates were to work. 
Coupled with design aberrations, the decline of localised housing 
management and the concentration of desperate households within 
unpopular estates were both direct causes of disintegration” (Power, 1985, 
p.524).   
The council estatesʼ bad reputations resulted from a combination of many aspects; poor 
design, poor management, as well as anti-social behaviour arising from the specific social 
problems of the families living there (Power, 1984a; 1984b; 1985; Interview Wilson, 2012).  
The Priority Estates Project (PEP) provided a unique learning opportunity bringing together 
housing and crime researchers including Anne Power38 whose research for PEP provided 
the material for her PhD thesis (1985), The development of unpopular council housing 
estates and attempted remedies 1895-1984. PEP was perceived as a ʻlive experimentʼ, to 
                                                      
38 Anne Power, then an early career academic at LSE. Her academic rivalry with Coleman is explored 
in Chapter Five.  
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demonstrate the importance of effective localised management approaches in the 
regeneration of run down estates. The essence of the PEP was establishing a local 
management office undertaking landlordʼs tasks, caretaking activities and giving the tenants 
the opportunity to exercise control over their homes and neighbourhood. While reduction of 
crime and vandalism werenʼt the main focus of the PEP model, these were seen as 
important goals.  
Between 1987 and 1993 the HO conducted a study into the impact of PEP on crime and 
community life39. The summary of the final report identified PEP as promoting four means of 
crime prevention, notably with defensible space at the start of the list: 
“i) creating better dwelling security and more ʻdefensible spaceʼ; 
ii) halting the spiral of deterioration, tackling vandalism, caretaking, 
cleaning up the estate, thereby reducing the ʻsigns of disorderʼ and fear of 
crime and signifying that the estate is well cared for; 
iii) investing in the estate so that residents will develop a positive view and 
thus a greater stake in their community and a greater expectation of law-
abiding behaviour; 
iv) increasing  informal community control over crime both through 
increased surveillance and supervision by residents and housing officials 
and facilitating the development of a set of norms and expectations against 
offending on the estate” (Foster and Hope, 1993, p. vi).  
Hope and Dowds (1987) proposed a model (Figure 4.4) which attempted to explain how the 
PEP interventions increased residentsʼ informal control over their estates and might 
positively reduce crime and incivilities.  Residentsʼ collective commitment to the estate, 
arising from greater concern for its physical conditions and standards of social conduct, 
would be influenced by their positive or negative ʻcodingʼ of the estate and individual sense 
of community, territoriality, fear of crime and satisfaction with the estate.   
The findings from the initial 20 PEP estates were highly positive with most of the estates 
improving rapidly.  The evaluation studies by DoE and Power at LSE, established a powerful 
                                                      
39The HO published the first British Crime Survey (BSC) in 1982 as an attempt to uncover the mass of 
unrecorded crime (of the 11 million crimes estimated to have occurred in 1981, only 3 million were 
reported) but also the impact of fear of crime.  The condition of the physical surroundings was a key 
contributor to this (Smith, 1987) and the BCS found that vandalism was the most commonly 
experienced crime and equally the most unreported (Minton, 2009). 
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and widely used body of best practice for delivering housing services and involving tenants 
in the day-to-day running of their estates such as the PEP Guide to Local Housing 
Management (Power, 1987).  
Figure 4.4 Priority Estates Project crime model 
 
The reputation enhancing delivery of policy-influencing research by the DoEʼs SRD/HDD 
housing directorates throughout the 1980s was in contrast to the perception of the 
Departmentʼs Inner Cities Directorate.  Despite the urban programmes that the Inner Cities 
Directorate had been running for several years, this team was belittled for its apparent lack 
of impact in the wake of the inner city riots in Brixton and Tottenham in 1983.  The shock of 
the riots prompted a call for a more locally based approach to housing and regeneration 
policy. The PEP, based on local housing offices and residentsʼ involvement, seemed a tailor 
made approach.  Yet PEP was not felt to be progressing far or fast enough and in 1985 
Michael Heseltine and the Housing Minister at the time Sir George Young, set up the Urban 
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Housing Renewal Unit  (UHRU) to intervene in housing directly. UHRU initially concentrated 
on urban housing authorities, with the remit to identify failing, unpopular estates and to 
devise a targeted funding programme to address their intense problems.  Sir George Young 
found the title ʻUrban Housing Renewal Unitʼ an unwieldy mouthful and the name of the team 
and programme was rapidly changed to Estates Action (EA). By 1987 their remit was 
enlarged to include all housing authorities across England rather than just ʻproblemʼ inner 
city estates.  Schemes were funded with money diverted from the existing Housing 
Investment Programme (HIP).  This was not initially popular with council housing delivery 
teams who were also unhappy with the requirement to diversify tenure. The Treasury felt that 
pilots were needed for the first physical improvement grants, before any large-scale funds 
could be allocated. After much negotiation, an initial £15 million was released with 
agreement that further money would be top-sliced from the HIP programme. A similar 
process of top-slicing bids was later repeated for the DICE program (Interview Harvey, 
2009)40.  
4.2.3 Government departments operationalising defensible space  
Newmanʼs New York research was funded by a broad range of public institutions, the New 
York City Housing Authority, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), as 
well as the National Institute of Law Enforcement and the US Department of Justice, under 
the US Interagency Urban Initiatives Anti-Crimes programme, showing that by 1980 North 
American government departments were working together on the issue of housing and 
crime.  The situation in the UK was less joined-up, with responsibility for physical crime 
prevention confusingly spread across several departments. So while the HO had started to 
popularize a more situational crime prevention approach across national government, 
practical activities to reduce crimes were still being addressed in a fragmented way. For 
example the Department of Transport was responsible for physical design interventions such 
as the closure of footpaths at the rear of houses though the mechanism of Gating Orders 
                                                      
40 The total EA budget rapidly grew from £45M pa in 1986/87 to £180M pa by 1989/1990 (Hall, Murie et 
al. 2004) so the £50M spent on DICE between 1989 and 1994 was a significant proportion.  
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under section 129A of the Highways Act 1980.   One HO situational response focused on 
practical local interventions was the creation in 1978 of NACROʼs Crime Prevention Unit, 
later expanded in 1981 by the formation of the Safe Neighbourhoods Unit  (SNU). Initially 
funded by the GLC, SNU operated within London Boroughs until becoming a national 
organization in 1990 (Shaftoe, 2004).  During the early 1980s the SNU worked with local 
authorities undertaking local estate level crime audits and promoting tenant management 
and community safety though estate design, use of wardens and CCTV (SNU, 2009).  
Between 1981 and 1986 it ran projects on 18 London estates, several of which Coleman 
evaluated for Utopia on Trial including Ranwell East in Bow (SNU, 1988). 
It is not clear if Newman ever directly approached either of the British government 
departments with his research, although he shared platforms with DoE and HO researchers 
at conferences. And while the research from these two departments complemented each 
other, it is telling that it was not until much later (following SNUʼs (1993) review of crime on 
council estates or the HO evaluation of the impact of the PEP on crime (Foster and Hope, 
1993)) that collaborative work in this area occurred. At this point in time Wilson (with the 
external stimulus of Newman) can be seen as a key transfer agent transferring knowledge 
between the two departments.  Wilson moved from the HO to the DoE in 1979 looking for 
more opportunity to explore rounded, practical, responses to the housing problems she had 
encountered. She was highly influential, shaping DoE thinking about vandalism, crime and 
interventions on housing estates and setting the foundations for the PEP. She characterizes 
the DoE as being more interested in applicable solutions than the HO, but less able to 
produce robust research:  
“The focus moved from crime to public housing because there were so 
many difficulties.  The whole inner urban research and the criminological 
research [at that time] was all about causes and blame.  Then it moved to 
tackling, not solving; solvingʼs top-down but tacklingʼs bottom-up. 
Defensible space was about imposing solutions, whereas the process 
youʼre describing [community architecture/resident engagement] is about 
trying out a whole lot of different things but ultimately trying to get a bit of 
responsibility over to members of the community rather than coming in 
from outside with solutions. There is no such thing as a solution” (Interview 
Wilson, 2012). 
 - 133 - 
So despite the extensive investigations and evidence gathering, there was a sense that a 
universally applicable top-down solution was unfeasible. 
However Wilson (directly echoing Colemanʼs denigration of the DoE in Utopia on Trial) was 
quite critical of the ability of Government researchers to deliver ʻuseful researchʼ:  
“I can tell you, moving from being a criminologist with the HO to being a 
social researcher for the DoE, the DoE is full of people like Alice Coleman, 
who use hundreds of thousands of pounds of public money to do academic 
research, where they bit off more than they could chew, they didnʼt know 
how to analyze it properly and they certainly couldnʼt move from the 
analysis to policy. Government research offices were littered with people 
like that” (Interview Wilson, 2012). 
Wilson dated the increasing desire for policy to rapidly distil practical measures from 
academic research as starting in the early 1980s, a clear fore runner of evidence-based 
policy-making. Wilson identified a further inability of Government departments to understand 
the constraints of implementing their policy on the ground:  
“You had these incredibly literate civil servants being asked to get their 
hands dirty in something they didnʼt understand at all. They were amenable 
to the idea, but they hadnʼt any idea what to do. I mean they werenʼt 
community activists at all, they were mandarins” (Interview Wilson, 2012). 
She distinguished between academics theorising about residents, from community  
ʻagitatorsʼ and the lack at the time of ʻprofessional intermediariesʼ who could take theoretical 
ideas and shape them into ways of working. She welcomed this new class of professionals 
specialising in community engagement as stimulating essential innovation in knowledge 
transfer. Wilsonʼs views here are based on her own experiences attempting to establish a 
Tenants Association on a difficult to let estate on Swindon, aiming to apply her research 
findings in practice. Comparing herself unfavourably to other more grass roots organisers41 
she attributes this failure to a mixture of personal and political naiveté: 
“The Tenants Association was riddled with factions and I probably wasnʼt 
charismatic enough…My background was academia so I was too analytical 
                                                      
41 Wilson recalled Anne Power as an example of a motivating organizer. A tenants newsletter circa 
1976 contained a cartoon (drawn by the Head of Housing at Islington Council, Bill Murray) portraying 
Anne Power as Joan of Arc mobilising an army of residents (Interviews Wilson, 2012 and Taper, 2013). 
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and not hands on enough...I wasnʼt a social activist” (Interview Wilson, 
2012). 
She felt her most useful contribution was enabling busy housing managers, fire-fighting daily 
tasks, to explore ideas and alternative solutions.  Wilson left the DoE in 1984 and was 
working on the Swindon estate improvement scheme when Utopia on Trial was published. 
Despite Wilson being one of the leading governmental researchers associated with estates 
regeneration and defensible space, having publicised academic papers, press articles and 
HO guidance during the period that Coleman was surveying her London estates, she and 
Coleman never met or discussed their respective positions.   
4.3 Alice Coleman brings defensible space to the British Government 
The third transfer agent is Coleman herself, an academic aspiring  to influence both policy 
and practice. Unlike the other two she was not part of established practitioner or 
policymaking networks. So her transfer mechanisms, while similar to Newmanʼs (personal 
interactions and a polemical book) were initially unsuccessful at attracting her target 
governmental audience.  
Jacobs and Lees (2013) describe Colemanʼs serendipitous discovery of Newmanʼs 
Defensible Space. In 1976 Coleman was invited to spend a year as visiting lecturer at the 
University of Western Ontario undertaking field surveys of neglected urban wastelands 
measuring what she termed “dying inner city syndrome” (Coleman, 1980). While on this 
sabbatical Coleman chanced across Newmanʼs book in the University bookshop (Jacobs 
and Lees, 2013, p.1565). Newmanʼs discussion of urban deterioration and his proposed 
solutions struck a chord with Coleman, as similar to the ʻland use deteriorationʼ she had 
noticed in British cities during her Second Land Use Survey. Believing that Newmanʼs 
concept provided a potential solution to ʻproblem estatesʼ she determined to recommend it to 
the DoE. 
Coleman made an initial attempt to contact the DoE in late 1976, convinced they would be 
interested in Newmanʼs ideas.  She was disappointed that her suggestions received an 
unenthusiastic hearing;   
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“I read Oscar Newmanʼs book when I was working in Canada, I came home 
with the idea that the Department of the Environment would want to know 
this.  But they said, No, thatʼs an American problem.  There wasnʼt a care 
about it here and thatʼs why I thought I should map something to find out if it 
did.  Thatʼs how I started doing the work in England.  Then, of course, it got 
me hooked and I wrote the book [Utopia on Trial]” (Interview Coleman 
201342). 
The DoE was unconvinced about Newmanʼs research for three reasons: firstly, their belief he 
was addressing a particularly American problem, occurring on a tiny proportion of publicly 
provided housing which notoriously concentrated a disaffected underclass. The scale and 
intensity of issues being dealt with in the UK was completely different. Secondly, doubt over 
Newmanʼs simplistic model of causality. Coleman characterised the DoEʼs explanatory 
model as expecting that: 
“the cure should be socio-economic.  I thought how many years have we had 
child allowance, how many years have we had the dole, how many years 
have we had this welfare?  The socio-economic things were in place all the 
time, but they never had any effect – quite the reverse sometimes” (Interview 
Coleman, 2013).  
However it is unlikely that the DoE felt the problem (or the solution) was solely attributable to 
a single cause, “all socio-economic” as Coleman claims. There was already a strong 
suspicion of environmental determinism within the Department as an explanatory framework. 
From the evidence gathered for the Design Bulletin No 25 (1972) the DoE believed they had 
a robust model to explain the balance of physical and social causes of residents satisfaction. 
This included design, vandalism and maintenance as well as non-environmental aspects 
such as a desire to move away from the estate. Variables that that did not relate to this 
estate satisfaction model were mostly the socio-economic characteristics of the households 
(employment, rent/income level, number of children) and their previous housing experiences, 
amongst other social aspects such as participation in Tenants Associations (ibid., p.27).43  
                                                      
42 Coleman reported this encounter with the DoE in very similar terms when interviewed by Jacobs and 
Lees in 2008 (see Jacobs and Lees, 2013, p. 1567),  repeating her words from Utopia on Trial 
(Coleman 1985a, p. 16)  
43 Excluding these socio-economic characteristics from a model of estate satisfaction would seem 
surprising (if not highly questionable) today.  Subsequent research into factors such as levels of 
residents involvement (Cole, 1996) negative impacts of unemployment and resultant extended periods 
of high occupation (Livingston, et al. 2008) or the wellbeing derived from participation in communal 
activities (Fujiwara, 2013) might have on satisfaction with housing has substantially advanced 
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Based on this the DoE argued for the value of well designed surroundings contributing to 
successful estates in a report setting standards for the external residential environment 
(DoE, 1976). It is clear from these research reports and subsequent Housing Building 
Bulletins that the DoE had great confidence in the design guidance that they were publishing 
to provide a suitable and thriving environment.   And thirdly, the DoE were aware that 
researchers in the HO were already considering Newmanʼs findings as part of their own 
research into designs that discouraged vandalism.  The DoEʼs own report Vandalism, A 
Constructive Approach (Burbidge, 1973) had identified typologies of vandalism and 
proposed a mix of design and lettings approaches to reduce its occurrence.  
4.3.1 Coleman gathers her evidence  
Yet Coleman was undeterred by the DoEʼs dismissal and in 1977 set out to gather the 
evidence that she felt would prove the relevance of Newmanʼs ideas.  This would consist of 
an extensive large-scale mapping exercise she called the ʻDesign Disadvantage in Housingʼ 
project.  Coleman initially selected Tower Hamlets and Southwark, the two London Boroughs 
containing the largest number of post-war blocks of flats. Coleman had become interested in 
Tower Hamlets during her Second Land Use Survey. Colemanʼs maps for this distinguished 
between derelict land created during the Second World War and that arising from 
subsequent slum clearance (Coleman, 1980).   In Tower Hamlets Coleman found six times 
as much unbuilt land arising from the post-war demolition programme as from bomb 
damage. She felt that while rebuilding had removed unsanitary housing and reduced overall 
housing density, it had also increased overcrowding in the new modernist blocks (Coleman, 
1980; 2013a; 2013b). This is indicative of how, unlike Newman or Wilson, she approached 
the issue of housing from a land-use mapping and geographical survey direction. The study 
expanded to cover 27 estates across London (Southwark, Camden, Westminster, 
Wandsworth, Tower Hamlets and Lambeth, a total of over 4,099 blocks of flats and acting as 
                                                                                                                                                        
understanding of how these factors contribute. Some of these shifts can be explained looking at 
changes in during the period (see Tunstall and Coulter, 2006). However this thesis has endeavoured to 
carefully set down the contemporaneous position, based on the knowledge base and evidence 
available to the DoE at the time that the reports were published.   
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controls, another 4,172 houses across the London Boroughs and in Blackbird Leys in 
Oxford44. 
Coleman began her ambitious survey without funding in place, but quickly identified a source 
of support.  As dissemination of the Second Land Use Survey, the Joseph Rowntree 
Memorial Trust had provided Coleman with a loan to publish the maps of the Yorkshire area. 
This loan was to be repaid as and when the maps were sold. Soon after starting the Design 
Disadvantage in Housing Survey, Coleman forwarded two pages of preliminary findings to 
the Trust. They responded enthusiastically and on the basis of a single face-to-face meeting 
agreed to fund the work. Despite the substantial sum Coleman requested (£199,000 over 
five years) it was unflinchingly granted.  However her two Joseph Rowntree contacts retired 
and their replacement, a sociologist, was less certain about the approach Coleman had 
taken, preferring greater use of residentsʼ interviews. Coleman replied to his concerns with a 
letter setting out the benefits of taking a geographical approach rather than applying 
sociological methods.  The research manager was interested, but wanted to have a meeting 
jointly with police to discuss the validity of Colemanʼs findings. This led to a meeting in the 
Council Chamber at KCL (described in Chapter One) where Coleman presented her trend 
lines of design disadvantage features against proportion of blocks suffering abuse of various 
kinds (Coleman, 1980; 2013a; 2013d). 
The nature of the evidence Coleman gathered and the  techniques she used to present her 
arguments, were dictated not only by her own epistemological and disciplinary leanings, but 
more prosaic limitations. Unlike Newmanʼs or Wilsonʼs research, Coleman made minimal use 
of locational crime figures. Coleman was aware of this shortcoming (Jacobs and Lees, 2013) 
blaming Michael Heseltine45 who had returned to the post of Environment Secretary in 1990: 
                                                      
44 The apparent anomaly of including Blackbird Leys as an estate outside London arose as a case of 
opportunist data gathering as one of the KCL survey team moved into a home nearby (Interview 
Coleman, 2013).  
45 Secretary of State for Environment May 1979 – January 1983 and November 1990 – April 1992. 
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“and she [Thatcher] was out. And old Heseltine confiscated the money 
sheʼd promised and told the police not to give me the crime figures so I 
was never able to write it up properly.” (Interview Coleman, 2013) 
However following the KCL meeting with Joseph Rowntree and the Metropolitan police, 
Coleman approached the Chief Police Commissioner Sir Kenneth Newman, who provided 
her with crime figures for six London police divisions.  Coleman analysed this data and in 
February 1985 presented a report to the Metropolitan Police. The analysis compared crime 
data to the design assessments and measurement of ʻsocial malaiseʼ for the Carter Street 
neighbourhood in Southwark (surveyed by the KCL Land Use Research Unit in 1980).  This 
report contains initial versions of the crime trend lines that are used to illustrate Utopia on 
Trial.  
From this brief analysis Coleman derived a hierarchy of crimes and taboos, with the weakest 
taboo against littering most easily broken, followed by graffiti then more serious abuses. 
Anticipating Wilson and Kellingʼs (1982) broken windows theory, Coleman observed that 
vandalism and other abuses were more likely to occur where both littering and graffiti had a 
foothold. Analysing the data collected for the design disadvantagment study, Coleman found 
this pattern repeated for each of her design variables.  
Figure 4.5 Colemanʼs trend lines for social malaise and crime 
 
 - 139 - 
4.3.2 Utopia on Trial as a practical manifesto 
Coleman had some success presenting these findings face-to-face  but  needed a way to 
communicate them to a wider audience and so began drafting a book. Utopia on Trial 
(1985a) was written in the form of a courtroom trial, with suspect design features and 
Colemanʼs evidence ʻcross-examinedʼ.  Markus and Cameronʼs (2002) history of influential 
planning/architectural documents criticised the manifestos that litter architectural theory for 
relying too heavily on rhetorical authority, not engaging in a critical dialogue or making little 
reference to other texts. These manifestoes are not explicitly political, but more usually de-
contextural propaganda and self-promotion. Newmanʼs Defensible Space fits this description 
closely and while Colemanʼs publications are more academic and dry in style than 
Newmanʼs well-illustrated books, the general account is easily recognizable in Utopia on 
Trial46.  
Figure 4.6 Alice Coleman 
 
                                                      
46 The architectural communityʼs consciousness that it can be easily swayed by persuasive polemic or 
a resonant phrase is another reason for the professionʼs lingering discomfort with the book. 
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The chapter Utopia Accused dismissively condemned post-war housing as failed utopias  
and criticised authoritarian and paternalistic planners within the Ministry of Housing, Local 
Government and DoE, while promoting “design modification as an important new weapon in 
the fight against crime” (ibid., p16). The final chapter Summing up was a diatribe against 
DoE researchers as “reluctant to open their collective mind to evidence related to design” 
(ibid., p.181). It continued with a scathing attack on civil servants masquerading as 
researchers who unlike true researchers are not “dedicated to truth as their highest 
allegiance” but “have an interest in influencing policies and people, an activity that requires 
quite different mental attitudes from research” (ibid., pp.181-182). Utopia on Trial referred 
infrequently to other research, except for Colemanʼs admiringly description of Newmanʼs 
work as “the most scientific research to date” describing it as “a brilliant concept, quite 
independent in its origin and approach” (ibid., p.13). Acknowledging the mixed reception his 
book received she highlighted the support for the ideas from housing officers, police and 
other on-the-ground practitioners. Coleman claimed that any backlash was stirred up by 
those responsible for the construction of the failing blocks of flats.  Regardless of poor 
reviews or academic criticism Coleman retained complete confidence in Newmanʼs research 
which:  
“proved that the relationship was not merely associative but also causal, in 
that if worst values of the designs were changed to better ones, local crime 
rates fell, although they were rising everywhere else” (Coleman and Cross, 
1995, p.145).  
However this statement could also be interpreted as reinforcing her own position and 
findings.   
While Coleman was writing Utopia on Trial, she and Newman met in New York to discuss 
the basic principles behind defensible space, meeting again at KCL to talk though Colemanʼs 
early findings. Newman had mixed compliments for Colemanʼs work:  
“Alice had the concept of defensible space down rather well before she 
arrived. What she had difficulty with were the objective physical measures” 
(Newman quoted in Heck, 1987, p.30). 
Newman considered that these difficulties with calibration of measurements lead to a lack of 
robust data on ʻsocial malaiseʼ.   
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“Utopia on Trial does not pay sufficient attention to social factors interacting with 
physical causes of housing dysfunction. The thing I missed was the fit between 
building type and family type” (ibid, p.30).  
Newman uses this criticism to reiterate his own consideration of social factors, claiming that 
he carefully identified not that the built form of the high-rise was a un-liveable form, only that 
it was unsuitable for low-income families.  
“I see high rises as quite suitable for the elderly, or for working couples, or 
for singles …. Alice doesnʼt make that distinction” (ibid, p.31). 
Conclusion 
Recounting this initial international journey of defensible space shows it to be a travelling 
concept. There are familiar parallels between the vocabulary used to describe policy mobility 
emerging from earlier conceptualisations of policy transfer to descriptions of defensible 
space.  “In contrast with the orthodox literature on policy transfer, the governing metaphors 
in critical policy studies are not those of transit and transaction, but of mobility and mutation” 
(Peck and Theodore, 2010, p.170).  Rather than a straight forward transitional transfer this 
chapter describes a story of  “a complexity of open systems, full of conflict and contradictions 
and interaction with ʻagency energyʼ” (Healey, 2010). Defensible space has been shown to 
have a mutating mobility. This slippery mutability appears to be a defining characteristic of 
defensible space. Yet considering defensible space as an inherently unstable or flexible 
concept is not automatically a negative characteristic. As later chapters show, it is this 
adaptability and looseness of interpretation that has ensured its resilience in practice. 
However if this is the case why were the initial attempts of international transfer into policy 
only partially successful?  Why was it not able to mutate to fit itself to the available policy 
shaped hole? Particularly as so many of the mechanism and techniques for suitable transfer 
identified by commentators (eg Ward 2006; McCann 2010; 2011; Peck and Theodore 2010) 
such as books, academic papers, research evidence, conference discussions, were evident. 
Defensible spaceʼs journey from the US to the UK reinforces my criticisms of policy mobilities 
literature. Essentially, the reading of the problem to be solved by defensible space were 
fundamentally different between America and Britain. It counters the presumption that a pre-
packaged policy concept exists, waiting identification of a suitable landing site to be 
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transferred.  Individual participantsʼ interpretation of the context and how the bundle of 
defensible space  ʻpolicyʼ concepts might adapt to fit are diverse and possibly contradictory. 
It illustrates that multiple practical transfer mechanisms were used (books, press, television 
programmes or individuals), via multiple routes and alternative channels to reach the varied 
audiences in the range of situations with potential to take up the ideas. These overlapping, 
interweaving international movements continue with equally complex intra-national transfers. 
Both Wilsonʼs HO study and Colemanʼs design disadvantage research can be read as 
attempts to ʻnaturaliseʼ or adapt Newmanʼs research into a National Government milieu. The 
nature of the organisational, political and personal barriers that are erected between two 
central Government departments are duplicated and multiplied at regional and local 
Government levels. However Colemanʼs initial failure as a carrying agent bringing defensible 
space to the DoE was due to a series of reasons. The misalignment of the concept to the 
receptor context, which needed fertile locations for the ideas to take root; a receptive landing 
site was missing. This hostile environment arose partly because the suitable DoE niche was 
already filled with a ʻfavoured modelʼ arising from the Priority Estates Project. Colemanʼs 
outspoken rant against DoE mandarins is likely to have reinforced these organisational 
barriers and biases. And finally in line with Peck and Theodoreʼs (2010) accusations of 
academics having insufficient experience of the messy ʻground levelʼ realities of policy 
making, Coleman, unlike Wilson, had little insight into the practice of policy-making. 
Jacobs and Lees (2013) state that “scientific inquiry undertaken in the context of the 
academy was central to how defensible space both travelled across the Atlantic and entered 
the public policy of Thatcherʼs Conservative government.” (ibid, p.1560). Iʼd disagree in that 
this mis-assigns the importance of the academy, I would argue instead that this chapter 
shows that the movement of the concept at this point is better seen as an example of 
mobility through institutional or practice-led inquiry.  It utilized mechanisms such as individual 
encounters, site visits, newspaper articles and TV programmes, which while they are used 
within the academic sphere, are often discounted as popularist. It was only despite the 
constraints of the academy  (Colemanʼs initial failure to obtain academic funding for her 
research however scientifically grounded or presented) plus the bureaucratic institutional 
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opposition of the DoE (the artificial competition and un-transparent comparison between the 
PEP research and DICE) that the initial transfer occurred. So to limit this to an academic 
view of ʻtruthʼ obtained via ʻscholarshipʼ is to neglect the ways that defensible space did 
travel and take hold.  While Coleman undertook pragmatic research in the “extra-academic 
realm”, Jacobs and Lees argue that she was engaged with the “wrong brand of public 
geography” and hence was out of step with the changes and shifts within academic practice 
and thought (ibid., p.1565).  
This chapter has revolved around three main transfer agents, showing how their ability to 
translate the concept was accentuated by their individual character traits. The literature 
review identified a range of transfer agent roles within the ʻpolicy transfer businessʼ; the 
consultant, advocates, evaluators, as well as critics. Even disparaging reviews can help 
sustain interest in and proliferate an idea. Most commonly these are thought of as Larner 
and Lauriesʼ (2010) ʻcharismatic individualsʼ. However unlike Newman, it is hard to fit 
Coleman into this stereotype of the persuasive, convincing guru.  
“She had none of the charisma of Oscar Newman; he was very 
authoritative figure, very articulate, and he was very clever, but he didnʼt 
have this personal agenda of being angry about anything. He was just a 
problem solver” (Interview Wilson, 2012).  
Indeed, Barry Sandford, an architect who worked closely with Coleman, recognised that his 
complementary skills were needed to win over clients and residents to Colemanʼs idea of 
defensible space:  
“She wasn't just prickly with residents, she was prickly with the council and 
with everybody.  She was a very forceful woman.  I admired her greatly, 
thatʼs why we got on. I was sent in as a sort of politician to try and placate 
people. To show them design after design, show them how wonderful it 
was all going to be, which I did somewhat cynically, but I nevertheless did 
it, because that was my job.  I sell and I design and I sell. Sometimes you 
believe what youʼre selling and sometimes you donʼt.  But I do believe in 
defensible space” (Interview Stanford, 2011). 
But even these positive and negative aspects of personality are subject to the specifics of 
context and relationships. The following chapter describes how Colemanʼs determination to 
continue regardless was recognised by Margaret Thatcher. What was perceived by some as 
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inflexibility (even megalomania) appeared, in the context of these two single-minded women, 
as focused resolve: 
“How she managed to persuade Thatcher, I donʼt know.  I can only assume, 
because I've done a couple of rounds with Mrs. Thatcher on a couple of 
occasions, there was some kind of rivalry between them, almost a dare.  ʻIt 
can't be done!ʼ ʻI can show you how it can be done!ʼ” (Interview Sporle, 
2011). 
So the case of Coleman can be used to add the ʻanti-guruʼ to the typologies of transfer 
agents. An individual who, however unlikely and despite their shortcomings, has the 
determination to promote and mobilize concepts. This reinforces the use of the term 
ʻmobilizeʼ under McCann and Wardʼs (2011) reading  “in the sense that people, frequently 
working in institutions, mobilize objects and ideas to serve particular interests and particular 
material consequences” (ibid., p.xxiv). Colemanʼs individual interests may have clashed with 
the DoEʼs, but her very presence as a counterfactual acted as a prompt and spur to their 
own research activities.  
There are later points in the story that show that Colemanʼs ideas were aided by this 
academic consensus on scientific approaches  (her encounter with Margaret Thatcher is 
one) and equally where the scientific apparatus of the academy was used to dismantle her 
arguments (the Rehumanizing Housing Conference).  Yet the initial stages of the transfer - 
the transatlantic crossing - were still reliant on more populist routes that circumvented the 
limits of academic transfer at the time.  This is highly visible in the way her book Utopia on 
Trial was framed and marketed.  Colemanʼs encounter with the Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, the Rehumanizing Housing Conference and her book Utopia on Trial are all 
explored as transfer mechanisms in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 5: The Response to Utopia on Trial  
Introduction  
“The academic standing of a text is an uncertain guide to its social and 
political impact. The substantial, largely favourable reception given to 
Colemanʼs ideas is rooted in their resonance with notions and 
understandings which are widely prevailing. Her pronouncements on 
housing feed off and are amplified by the prevailing New Right ideology 
which they echo” (Lipman and Harris, 1988, p.182). 
This chapter explores three themes from Lipman and Harrisʼ quote. It unpacks the varied 
reception to Utopia on Trial  (1985a) within academic, political and professional circles and 
amongst a lay audience.  It questions whether any positive resonance was due to Colemanʼs 
ideas, or the mechanisms promoting them. And finally it considers the impact of Colemanʼs 
own politics and how this reflected the aspirations of high-level politicians, while irritating and 
alienating policy-level civil servants and conflicting with the normative liberal/socialist politics 
of many housing professionals.  
Having completed her design disadvantagement research and drafted Utopia on Trial 
Coleman initially found dissemination of her findings difficult, beyond a few formal academic 
lectures. Looking to the immense popularity, reach and impact of Newmansʼ (1972) 
Defensible Space, Coleman wished to reach a wider audience. This chapter opens with the 
setting up of a publishing house who selected her manuscript as a controversial and 
revolutionary text. In the light of her publishersʼ desire that the text should appeal to readers 
of all political positions, I consider the balance of interest for Colemanʼs ideas across the 
political spectrum, from new–right journals to liberal broadsheets. I discuss the process of 
establishing Colemanʼs media personality as the principal transfer agent for defensible space 
and the media use of housing academic Anne Power as a sometime ally, or more often a 
foil, for Colemanʼs views.  
The hostile response from the architectural press and civil servants within the DoE was in 
contrast to an Audit Commission report on council housing where her findings were accepted 
and incorporated wholesale.  Next the 1987 Rehumanizing Housing Conference is explored. 
Growing out of a series of academic papers refuting Colemanʼs position, this conference 
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illustrates the process of academic research entering the sphere of practice described earlier 
in Chapter Two. The event was identified by an attendee as a “crystallisation moment”, a 
critical juncture in mobilizing the housing professionʼs resistance to the rise of New Right 
ideology during the 1980s (Interview Cooper, 2013). The chapter follows this direct 
politicised assault on Coleman as a symbol of neo-liberalism, with her process of courting 
and gaining support from the Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.  
5.1 Publishing and promoting Utopia on Trial  
The publication of Utopia on Trial (1985a) as a paperback was as fortuitous as Coleman 
chancing across Newmanʼs (1972) book Defensible Space. Utopia on Trial was the first 
publication from a new (and short lived) publishing house, Hilary Shipman Ltd. Despite 
having a weighty and authoritative name, the publishing house in fact consisted of a 
partnership of two: an accountant and, pertinently, a former journalist. Their intent from the 
start was to publish radical books, that were serious and intellectually rigorous yet accessible 
to a lay audience, with the central ambition of questioning accepted views; as they termed it 
“exploding sacred cows” (Macaskill, 1985, para.1).  
Coleman had publicised her research findings through traditional academic mechanisms and 
routes. A lecture in May 1983 jointly hosted by the Royal Geographical Society (RGS) and 
the Architectural Association was published in The Geographical Journal the following year. 
Under the collective title Trouble in Utopia, Colemanʼs (1984) paper Design influences in 
blocks of flats was accompanied by a paper from Anne Power Rescuing unpopular council 
estates though local management (1984b). This was the first occasion that Alice Coleman 
and Anne Power were paired, each promoting alternative solutions to failing council run 
estates, either physical modification or local management. Power recognized the cycles of 
regeneration and decline, arguing for constant nurturing and investment in an estate in 
contrast to Colemanʼs faith in enduring one-off design improvements: 
“Anne Power was very good at going and talking to tenants and 
persuading them to behave better. I donʼt know for how long.  But, I took 
design because, it was land use for a start and was permanent until 
somebody actually changed it” (Interview Coleman, 2013). 
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There was limited mainstream newspaper interest in the research. In April 1984, Coleman 
was interviewed in the Daily Telegraph (Edmunds, 1984). Here she discussed the Second 
Land Use Study and the lack of public funds to support the Kingʼs Land Use Research Unit. 
She linked 18 (sic) design factors to the levels of dirt, litter and degradation and crime to be 
found on some estates. Hilary Macaskill (the journalist partner of Hilary Shipman Ltd) read 
the article in the Daily Telegraph and despite knowing nothing about the topic, was intrigued 
by the forthright argument and noting that Coleman was looking for a publisher, approached 
her. Coleman was struggling to find an academic publisher prepared to produce a low-cost 
edition and the idea of a first paperback edition priced at less than £8 was appealing 
(Interview Macaskill, 2013)47. 
The publishersʼ stance challenging accepted conventions also suited Coleman and despite 
being from opposite ends of the political spectrum the editorial relationship was productive. 
Macaskill remembers an intense but collaborative editorial process prior to the publication of 
the first edition in May 1985. The title was a rare area of disagreement. Macaskill thought the 
title while catchy, was insufficiently precise, believing any portrayal of urban housing estates 
as utopian was implausible (Interview Macaskill, 2013). However the title proved timely, 
catching the mood of the moment. In an interview titled We were all wets when we were 
building Utopia (Davie, 1984)48 Sir Hugh Casson had framed post-war housing as a utopian 
socialist experiment, positioning himself as anti-Thatcherite. Utopia on Trialʼs structure as an 
accusative trial proved equally attention catching. Article titles frequently used wordplay (for 
example Coleman's utopia goes on trial (Architectsʼ Journal, 1985a) or It's hell for tenants in 
the bureaucrats' utopia (Davie, 1986)), raising associations with justice, equality, objective 
                                                      
47 Surprisingly Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust (JRMT), having awarded such a generous grant for 
the research, did not fund publicising the findings. However, it was only when the JRMT became the 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation in 1988 that they began to place greater emphasis on dissemination, 
starting to publish findings of funded studies.  Coleman recalled that she was visiting China when 
JRMT wanted to publish the study and was unable to produce a suitable summary (Interview Coleman, 
2013). 
48 During the Thatcher government, the term ʻwetsʼ was applied to opponents of her more hard-line, 
monetarist polices, or policies reducing the regulatory power of the state.   
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fairness and reasoned argued debate.  Coleman claimed that her intent was not to be openly 
or personally critical.  
“Iʼve never really been intending to criticise people.  I just thought ʻThis is 
an interesting subject and this is what I foundʼ. But of course, it [Utopia on 
Trial] does criticise, so Iʼm a whistle blower by default.  And they donʼt like 
it.  Iʼm not surprised” (Interview Coleman, 2013). 
Yet several interviewees describe the text as opinionated polemic, a “rant against 
modernism” (Interview Wiles, 2011) and sections of the book contain tirades against not only 
civil servants in government departments, but individual named researchers. Macaskill 
disagrees with this allegation, claiming the tone was  “not immediately antagonistic” and 
reading the accusations against the DoE as “robust confrontation” (Interview Macaskill, 
2013). Conceding that they had capitalized on the politics of the moment, as editors, 
Macaskill aimed for as fair-minded and factual representation of the findings as possible, 
wanting the text to be accepted by readers regardless of their political complexion. 
“Her political views are not our views …. What we had to make sure was 
that the book was not taken as a political tract. In fact, there was no 
problem about that with Alice, because her politics are ingrained in her but 
what she wanted to do was get the substance of her research, her 
findings across to the world. So it wasnʼt an issue. She wasnʼt trying to 
make political statements. She was political, obviously, but we wanted to 
make sure that it was accessible, that thatʼs what she wanted, for 
everybody to be able to read it“ (Interview Macaskill, 2013). 
Despite targeting a lay audience it was not an easy book for a tiny publisher to promote. 
Initial routine pre-publication approaches resulted in subdued interest from bookshops. 
However this rapidly altered after a successful press splash two weeks before publication. 
Two short articles appeared in the Observer and Sunday Telegraph on April 28th. Then a 
long piece by Christopher Booker in the Daily Mail on 30th April described the “remarkable” 
research “lucidly and humanly presented by Miss Coleman” (Booker, 1985, para.11).  
Another skeptic of establishment positions, Booker was supportive of Colemanʼs ideas as 
they reinforced his own opinions stated in a BBC (1979) documentary City of Towers, that 
huge concrete housing estates were “the greatest social disaster in Britain since the war” 
(ibid., para.3). Bookerʼs main thrust and final critical point however, was a warning against 
the dangers of central bureaucracy (particularly the DoE), who discounted what he saw as 
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“irrefutable conclusions”; ignoring criticisms of their policies or actions. The Daily Mail article 
resulted in a flurry of media activity. Macaskill had immense confidence in Colemanʼs ability 
to put her case, to weather the interviews and to “sail through it all”. She describes Coleman 
as their “secret weapon” in publicizing the book describing her as “absolutely doughty”, 
certain in her facts, with a “mass of thorough observation” to combat the arguments against 
her. Her publishers would have been daunted if Coleman had not been “so fearless” 
(Interview Macaskill, 2013).  Their cuttings archive shows the press coverage was extensive, 
with 98 pieces alone listed in the first nine months post publication and many more 
subsequently (Macaskill, 1986). Interviews and reviews appeared in disparate national and 
international journals; from The Times Higher Education Supplement, The Spectator, New 
Society, The Glasgow Herald, The Australian Adelaide Review, Cosmopolitan, The Lady, 
Good Housekeeping, to The Field. Some of this can be explained by the mediaʼs tendency to 
recycle and magnify interest in a marketable commodity, but there was widespread interest 
and demand for a quote from the geographer Alice Coleman.  
There was also competition across other broadcast media. Three Radio Four programmes, 
World at One, Today and Womanʼs Hour wanted to interview Coleman but each demanded 
exclusivity. Coleman appeared on Womenʼs Hour. There was equal rivalry in the contest for 
television news coverage (Macaskill, 1985). Thames Television News filmed a first report, 
then the BBC planned to broadcast a debate between Anne Power49 and Alice Coleman on 
Newsnight on the day of publication. During the week preceding publication, the number of 
newspaper articles increased and Breakfast Time TV as well as TV-AM impatiently 
requested interviews (Interview Macaskill, 2013). The paperback edition of Utopia on Trial 
was an immediate commercial success, with a reprint within three months. The revised 
edition of Utopia on Trial, published in 1990, book-ended the  three year lifespan of Hilary 
Shipman Ltd as their first and last book, but is the only publication that they continue to 
publish (Interview Macaskill, 2013). 
                                                      
49 Anne Power submitted her PhD thesis to the LSE just two months later in July 1985. In it she refers 
to both Newman and Coleman, citing Colemanʼs (1984) paper Trouble in Utopia: Design Influences in 
Blocks of Flats and including Utopia on Trial in a couple of footnotes and once in the main text. 
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5.2 Reactions to Utopia on Trial  
5.2.1 Politically balanced press, but suspicion from the professions  
The mainstream press of all political persuasions was enthusiastic. Even Martin Pawley, the 
architectural critic of the Guardian, not an obvious supporter of the free market beliefs 
expressed, gave the book a balanced reading, gently chiding Coleman for ignoring the 
impact of the sale of desirable council houses and extensive cuts in public housing 
expenditure on the estates that sheʼd studied (Pawley, 1985). The wider media coverage 
continued, with an ITV World in Action programme called Designed for Living broadcast in 
November 1985 (Building Design, 1985b) discussing Utopia on Trial and the growing 
popularity of community architecture, showing Coleman and the community Architect John 
Thompson50 walking around Lea View Estate in Hackney (Interview Coleman, 2013).  
Coleman undertook a round of book signings promoting Utopia on Trial, including at The 
Alternative Bookshop, Covent Garden shortly before its closure in 1985. Coleman was 
photographed with Chris Tame, director of the free market civil liberties think-tank, the 
Libertarian Alliance.  
Figure 5.1 Alice Coleman's Libertarian Alliance book signing  
 
A review of Utopia on Trial in the Alternative Bookshopʼs Broadsheet (1985) makes their 
appreciation of Colemanʼs neo-liberal political position very clear. Echoing Colemanʼs views 
                                                      
50 John Thompson then Architect / Director at Hunt Thompson Associates. 
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on modernist architecture, the broadsheet characterises the Modern movement as “not 
merely similar to Socialism, but different faces of the same collectivist catastrophe” (ibid., 
p.1).  
Comparing Coleman to Jane Jacobs, who they describe as “no party line, classic liberal or 
libertarian, more a lady of the soft centre”, praising Jacobsʼ (1961) classicThe Death and Life 
of Great American Cities the review continues; 
“It is hard to think of a book that has done more good and less harm, so 
for us Britains to say that Alice Coleman may be our Jane Jacobs is the 
highest praise there is” (ibid., p.1). 
Coleman had in fact sent a copy of Utopia on Trial to Jane Jacobs in Canada and received a 
letter of enthusiastic praise in return: 
“Your book is just terrific. It is the kind of guide that is needed, literally, all 
over the world! … I hope your book becomes widely read and used as it 
needs to be – which is tremendously. Iʼll try to see that word of it gets 
around here” (Jacobs, 1986, p.1).  
Here being Toronto where, as Jacobs continued, a problem housing project was successfully 
being replaced with small-scale infill houses or small apartment blocks. Jacobs concluded her 
letter with a complaint over battling the funding authorities over what they felt was an out-
moded approach. Accusations that Colemanʼs work was similarly old fashioned and 
insufficiently modern were to reappear.  
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Figure 5.2 Letter from  Jane Jacobs to Alice Coleman 
 
 
The architectural press initially followed the national newspapersʼ lead promoting Utopia on 
Trial, with several articles authored by Coleman. A four-page spread in the most read 
architectural weekly broadsheet, Building Design (BD) (Coleman, 1985b) was followed by an 
extract of the chapter on the Mozart estate in the monthly RIBA journal (Coleman, 1985c).  
However, in contrast to how Coleman was feted in the mainstream press, as with Newman, 
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the response in architectural and housing publications was less warm, with the professions 
annoyed by the temerity of a geographer advising them on how to rectify their designs.  
There were mentions of Utopia on Trial in the architecture and planning press, becoming 
more critical throughout the autumn of 1985 (Armstrong, 1985; Building Design, 1985a; 
1985c).  A report on Westminster Councilʼs plans to implement Colemanʼs recommendations 
on the Mozart estate antagonistically described Coleman as “arch-critic of housing estate 
design and heroine of the current municipal war against architects” (Architectʼs Journal, 
1985a, p.8). A review of Utopia on Trial titled Polemic with statistics appeared in BD in 
October 1985, claiming that Colemanʼs research and recommendations were so lacking in 
credibility that they created hostility to her cause and obscured the important discussion of 
how to improve estates (Ash, 1985).  By the time that Coleman presented her research at 
the RIBA in January 1986 the architectural professionʼs response was openly hostile. In an 
article titled Alice in Blunderland Coleman was sarcastically described as an urban 
geographer “radiating old-fashioned common sense” (Gorst, 1986, p.2), implying that she 
had little understanding of contemporary architectural thought.  The report of the lecture in 
The Architectsʼ Journal (AJ) (1986a) describes the audience as “largely skeptical” with 
Coleman remaining steadfast against challenges from the floor, when exceptions to her rules 
on walkways, large blocks, or confused space were cited from “every corner of the hall” 
(ibid., p.25). In response to Colemanʼs lecture, Byron Mikellides, an environmental 
psychologist at Oxford Polytechnic, raised the concern that social deprivation and poverty 
were stronger explanatory factors for patterns of behaviour on certain estates. Both articles 
derisively quote Coleman as irritably responding to the idea that socio-economic factors 
were more relevant. “ʼPoverty and unemploymentʼ she almost shouted ʻare not as strong an 
influence on behaviour as designʼ” (Gorst, 1986, p.2; Architectsʼ Journal, 1986a).  
One explanation for Colemanʼs lack of popularity amongst architects was that her analysis 
was myopically founded on her dislike (and mis-understanding) of Modernism as a specific 
architectural style.  Her sweeping anti-Modernist judgments conflate crimes such as drug 
taking onto design to an extent that seems ridiculous; 
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“The defective designs are all fundamental features of the architectural 
fashion known as the Modern Movement and since its introduction into 
Britain the crime rate has multiplied enormously, with particular 
concentration in the worst designed estates. For examples, drug problems 
were rare in the 1980s but now are commonplace where certain design 
and layout features exist“ (Coleman and Cross, 1995, pp.146-147).  
Coleman was promoting what architects perceived as outmoded ideas of housing design 
and historically discredited deterministic views. Yet confusingly her rejection not just of 
modernism as a style, but modernism as a formative concept and her call to return to the 
social values of the past as well as the housing designs of the past, was being presented as 
a symbol of Thatcherʼs revolutionary ideas for housing. The effects of this overt political 
association on the popularity (or not) of Colemanʼs ideas with certain groups are explored 
below.   
5.2.2 Academics unpicking the “science” of Colemanʼs work. 
As much as Colemanʼs environmental determinism and anti-Modernism antagonized the 
architectural profession, her conviction that design was more significant than any other 
explanatory factors was equally disparaged by academic colleagues.  In addition the 
academic critiques identified technical weaknesses: methodological and statistical failings 
and ignoring social and economic variables. Her research findings were uninformed by 
contemporary housing and policy context to an extent that her practical recommendations 
lacked plausibility.  
Colemanʼs lack of statistical sophistication and failure to control for background variables 
was widely criticized (Hillier, 1986a; Smith, 1986; Halpern, 1995). Repeating his earlier 
(1973) dismantling of Newmanʼs statistical methods, Bill Hillier (1986a) unpicked Colemanʼs 
use of correlation and trend lines in his article City of Alice's Dreams: 
“Her method of quantification of malaise is flawed, her correlations largely 
illusory and her attempt to test for social factors desultory” (ibid, p.39).  
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Figure 5.3 Bill Hillier 
 
Hillierʼs piece was one of a series of articles in The Architectural Journal (AJ) professing a 
balanced examination of Colemanʼs theories51.  Brian Ansonʼs52 (1986) contribution derided 
the  “pseudo-scientific edifice” assembled by environmental determinists of whom Coleman 
was chief protagonist.  Both speculate on what a ʻColemanisedʼ estate might be like, 
concerned that ʻterritorialisingʼ blocks would result in greater segregation without addressing 
the root causes of the decline in inner-city housing. They wished to expose the failings in 
Colemanʼs methods as a counterbalance to the extensive publicity Utopia on Trial had 
received and the resultant risks of implementation based on false arguments. Colemanʻs 
(1986b) reply to their criticisms was detailed, addressing each statistical point and in return 
rebutting Hillierʼs own calculations. Coleman concluded by brushing off the vociferous 
criticisms as inaccurate “academic games”, still confident in the warm welcome her work had 
received from frontline housing staff.  However a fourth article in the AJ from a London 
                                                      
51 The articles illustrate that Utopia on Trial had rapidly become ubiquitous since publication, yet by 
promoting these ʻvery personal viewsʼ the AJ was able to reinforce the views of Colemanʼs critics while 
appearing to be neutral. “No conference, seminar or meeting at No 10 Downing Street on ʻcrime and 
designʼ has been quite the same since the publication of Alice Colemanʼs book Utopia on Trial, which 
has been instrumental in bringing the subject to the forefront of ministerial attention. Critics of her 
research findings and proposals are regularly silenced by Colemanʼs claims on the scientific quality of 
her research work. Bill Hillier, reader in architecture at the Bartlett, puts Colemanʼs science on trial” 
(Hillier, 1986, p.39). 
52 Brian Anson, former Greater London Council architect, then community activist and planning advisor 
for Planning Aid. 
 - 156 - 
Borough of Hackney Housing official in turn responding to Coleman, showed that many of 
this workforce remained unconvinced that the proposed remedies could resolve the complex 
housing and social problems they encountered (Heaven, 1986). 
Colemanʼs geographical research methods seemed outdated and crude (Ash, 1985) when 
her simplistic visual coding/mapping of the space around blocks were compared to Hillierʼs 
detailed spatial analysis techniques. Colemanʼs lack of familiarity with housing management 
regimes was shown through her failure to consider either who might be responsible for 
dropping the litter, or the caretaking processes expected to tidy up her indicators of social 
malaise. She counted only the presence of litter, but not where it occurred; and failed to 
consider the incidence of litter per dwelling, or per number of people using a space, or by 
child density.  Marion Roberts saw Colemanʼs indicators not as a “barometer of breakdown 
in society” but “as a breakdown in municipal housekeeping” (Roberts, 1988, p.123).  Alison 
Ravetz (1986) argued that beneath the “apparently clear and ʻscientificʼ surface” (ibid p. 279) 
Coleman was vague about essential issues: the morphology of the blocks surveyed, how the 
form of houses might differ as much as flats, construction defects, the variations in adjacent 
streets or the relationship of the estate to the wider neighbourhood. This vagueness 
extended to practical design matters and the mechanics of housing policy. Colemanʼs 
research condemned design features that architects were no longer incorporating in the 
homes and estates they were now building and even her complaints against the Housing 
Development Directorate at the DoE were out of date as it had been disbanded in 1982 (Ash, 
1985).  
As an academic specializing in social policy, Paul Spicker (1987) called for caution in 
deriving any policy initiatives based on Colemanʼs interpretation of her data. Spickerʼs 
detailed paper pointed out the multiple statistical problems with Colemanʼs methods, for 
example her design variables not being independent and failing to control for the interactive 
influence of factors.  He argued that the presence of children or pensioners might explain the 
outcomes as much as design. There were other crucial omissions: overlooking the impact of 
tenure, housing allocation policy, the sale of council properties or increasing numbers of 
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owner-occupiers on estates. He rejected two of her recommendations (build no more flats 
and abandon recent design layouts) as unsupported by her evidence and argued that the 
third recommendation for design modifications would be a waste of resources that could 
more usefully be allocated to alleviating tenantsʼ poverty:  
“Colemanʼs dismissal of the influence of poverty is based on an unsound 
method and an inadequate theoretical analysis. Her recommendations for 
policy are in consequence a diversion from the real needs and issues” 
(Spicker, 1987, p.283). 
This warning to policy-makers looking for easily applied solutions and a ready made 
programme to implement is repeated by Ravetz:  
“Coleman offers, instead, a ʻscientific proofʼ of causal links between 
design and deviant behaviours with a consequent and foolproof 
programme for design remedy. It is understandable that to a fast reader, 
particularly if he or she is a distracted official or committee member 
looking for solutions to problem estates, the book should seem a model of 
clarity. But it is in fact a classic instance of a study that is not what it 
seems and its head on, pragmatic approach and abundance of figures 
and graphs actually mask a considerable degree of confusion” (Ravetz, 
1988, p.155).  
Similarly the housing geographer Susan Smith, having dismantled Colemanʼs scientific tests 
and the accuracy of her ʻfair and unbiasedʼ evidence concluded that there were risks in the 
oversimplified solutions presented:  
“She has done nothing to clarify our understanding of relationships 
between dwelling design and the quality of life, and her recommendations 
are dangerous in offering politicians and planners an over-simplistic, yet 
superficially appealing, panacea for the complex social problems of urban 
communities in an ailing economy” (Smith, 1986, p.246). 
5.2.3 A mixed response within Government  
The appeal to Government looking for such a panacea is obvious, yet an article describing 
Coleman as persona non grata at the DoE (Bar-Hillel, 1986b) documented the Departmentʼs 
ambivalence to her views. Unsurprisingly considering her comments about them in Utopia on 
Trial, Colemanʼs relationship with the DoE civil servants was not constructive.  
“She had been so rude about the Social Research Division and Housing 
Development Directorate. They were at loggerheads.  Battle lines were 
drawn” (Interview Harvey, 2009). 
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This distrust progressed up the civil service. After a “dusty response from ministers” when 
Utopia on Trial appeared (Bar-Hillel, 1986b), a tentative acceptance at the higher-level was 
hastened by the riots in Brixton and Broadwater Farm during the autumn of 1985. These 
disturbances prompted a conference on crime prevention, organized by the Institute of 
Housing in March 1986 and reported in New Society, The Guardian as well as the 
construction press (Ardill, 1986; Building Design, 1986b; New Society, 1986).  Coleman ran 
a workshop at the conference and Sir George Young, then Junior Environment Minister, was 
the keynote speaker. Young reiterated that the Urban Housing Renewal Unit at the DoE did 
not accept that signs of social breakdown such as scattered rubbish, graffiti and vandalism 
had a simple causal relationship with design. For Colemanʼs recommendations to have 
practical benefit they needed to be accompanied by better management (Ardill, 1986). 
John Harvey, Head of the Estate Action Team at the DoE, recalled the depth of the 
bitterness against Coleman. 
“You couldn't mention the name Alice Coleman to any of them because 
she was anathema.  I couldnʼt understand this. I came in one day and 
said, ʻI was at a conference and I met this woman Alice Colemanʼ. And 
they said ʻWhat!ʼ  And Iʼd told her what we were doing, and they said ʻYou 
shouldnʼt have said a word to herʼ. ʻWhatʼs going on?ʼ They said ʻYouʼve 
read the book?ʼ and I said ʻNo what book?ʼ ʻUtopia on Trialʼ. So I read it 
and I thought this was interesting stuff.  Then they said ʻHave you read the 
PEP research? No? Read that DoE reportʼ. It was the Mike Burbidge53 
commission, which says there were five factors at play in rundown 
estates.  One was the location, one was design, one was the economic 
profile of people, one was the remote unresponsive management and 
finally, resident involvement” (Interview Harvey, 2009). 
Harveyʼs surprise at the personal hostility and his openness to Colemanʼs ideas was not 
shared by his colleagues.  Coleman (1986a) complained openly in the AJ and planning 
journals of the opposition that her findings had met within the department, with the AJ 
reporting there was greater interest in Colemanʼs work within the Home Office than the DoE 
(Heck, 1987). 
                                                      
53 Mike Burbidge, then lead housing researcher Housing Development Directorate at the DoE.  
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Other government organisations took greater notice of her findings. In March 1986 the Audit 
Commission published a report Managing the Crisis in Council Housing (1986). The report 
justified the use of the overworked term ʻcrisisʼ by referring to the large proportion of 
substandard council-owned dwellings in England. Blaming design faults such as flat roofs, 
deck access, non-traditional construction methods, even ʻthe wrong type of housingʼ, it 
attributed the high numbers of ʻdifficult to letʼ estates (estimated by the Commission as up to 
30% of some Local Authoritiesʼ stock) to these failings.  The list continued with more familiar 
failings: shortage of rental housing, increasing homelessness, unrealistic rent pricing and 
weak management control.  
The report criticised design standards that favoured speed and quantity before quality, 
particularly combined with technical problems arising from system building. But the 
Commissionʼs complaints extended beyond the impact on health caused by structural 
defects or inadequate heating systems to more social problems:  
“The high-rise, deck access, ʻconcrete jungleʼ estates have seemingly bred 
crime, vandalism and loneliness in many authorities” (Audit Commission, 
1986, p.34). 
The report called on housing authorities to “be aware of the lessons to be drawn from the 
design mistakes of the past” (ibid., p.34) and to refurbish run-down estates, to correct (or at 
least to avoid) these historic errors in future. It directly recommended Colemanʼs findings, 
summarizing her refurbishment principles and reprinting the graph of Design 
Disadvantagement score against types of crime from Utopia on Trial.  In an example of the 
elective affinity model of research (Young, Ashbey et al., 2002) successfully influencing 
policy by reinforcing policy makersʼ existing beliefs, the report concluded with a statement 
that Colemanʼs recommendations corresponded closely to those reached by experienced 
members of the Commission. The report proposed: 
“that general application of these recommendations will benefit both tenants 
and ratepayers. At minimum, Utopia on Trial should be read by all 
concerned with the management of local housing; and all housing 
authorities should submit all improvement schemes to careful evaluation in 
light of these well researched recommendations” (ibid., 1986, p.37). 
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This statement proved to be the highpoint of governmental commendation of Colemanʼs 
version of defensible space principles.   
5.3 The 1987 Rehumanizing Housing conference 
5.3.1 Housing as an intractable problem and the fight back against determinism 
In February 1987, a group of 75 researchers, housing managers, architects, town planners 
and community activists gathered in London for a conference titled Rehumanizing Housing.  
They aimed to fundamentally reconsider housing practice and research.  But while the 
conference theme was apparently improving housing research, there was in fact, a lightly 
hidden critical undercurrent. Nearly every paper either referred directly to Coleman, her 
writing or to other judgmental articles such as Hillierʼs (1986a) City of Aliceʼs Dreams. So the 
conferenceʼs significance in academic terms should be offset against its role as a vehicle to 
focus criticisms of Coleman (Lowenfeld, 2008).  One attendee, the researcher Ian Cooper, 
recalls the conference as an event unlike others he participated in. Despite having done little 
housing research, he attended it because of the “constellation of people who were gathered 
together” (Interview Cooper, 2013).  Yet it was not a mainstream event, independent of 
academic, government or private sector sponsorship.  Even its location in the Whitechapel 
Art Gallery referred to a legacy of alternative intellectual thinking and education, emphasizing 
the conference organizersʼ countervailing, independent view. 
The conference was framed as a new look at the contemporary crisis in local authority inner-
city housing stock. One theme was the intransigent problems that inundated housing. Poor 
housing was associated with a host of issues: poor health, vandalism, homelessness, even 
civil unrest.  These were countered by a long list of housing initiatives, including 
ʻdecentralized, locally controlled management regimesʼ, ʻresident involvementʼ,  ʻcommunity 
architectureʼ, ʻparticipatory designʼ or better economic opportunities (Markus, 1988, p.2).   
But the complexity, magnitude and unyieldingness of the task seemed daunting and a 
considerable question hanging over the debate was the possibility of definitive ʻsolutionsʼ at 
all. Cooper characterized several of the authors as “non-resolutionists” in that they 
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considered these problems were to be managed, not to be resolved or solved (Interview 
Cooper, 2013).   For example Mike Jenksʼ paper Housing problems and the dangers of 
certainty expounded on the fallacy of “single or simple or once-and-for-all solutions” (Jenks, 
1988). 
One of the conference conveners, Tom Woolley located the conference in the front line of 
the struggle against environmental behaviorism. Similar debates within the social sciences, 
particularly between sociology and architecture, had been common during the 1970s and 
1980s where most architecture schools had employed social scientists in their teaching staff, 
but by the mid 1980s these embedded posts had declined rapidly.  Recalling the strong body 
of intellectual effort gathered to ʻdebunkʼ the architectural determinism movement, when 
interviewed Woolley sighed, continuing “and Alice Coleman then comes along and just 
revives it” (Interview Woolley, 2013).  Cooper used even more militaristic terms for this 
struggle, describing the  “rear guard action being made against determinism” and theorists 
still “fighting the same battles” a decade after Newman (Interview Cooper, 2013).  Cooper 
identified the conference as a “point of flux”, a period where the world within which housing 
researchers were operating was altering, where the work most of them wanted to do was 
becoming less fashionable and less favoured by funding. Woolley puts this more strongly:  
“The line-up here is essentially the last-ditch stand of people working 
within architecture education trying to wave the flag of responsible social 
sciences as it applies to architecture. And after that we never showed that 
character again!” (Interview Woolley, 2013). 
So the conference was a reaction both against the revival of architectural determinism as 
personified by Coleman and her belief in simplistic one-off design interventions as a long-
term solution.  Cooper also articulated the opportunistic way that Coleman and her work was 
used to signify a wider threat. The conference:     
“became a crystallisation moment because it was so easy to demonise 
Alice. You could see here a kind of coherence, of people coming together 
around a demonised figure. In that sense, she was a kind of 
representative totem. We recognised that the political landscape was 
changing in ways we didnʼt like, but that was very diffuse. But she was a 
concretised representation of everything that we thought was going 
wrong. And not only that, she was patently wrong and I think– this is a 
very large claim – we [the conveners of the Rehumanizing Housing 
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conference] thought that if only we could point out how wrong she was, 
that there might be some victory, that this might reverse this underlying 
malaise that we could see developing - the rise of the right” (Interview 
Cooper, 2013). 
Woolley contended that architectsʼ criticism was (and still is) too often personality based and 
fails to emerge beyond a simplistic oppositional liking or loathing, with limited reflection. This 
conference aimed for a more academic and reasoned level of debate. To facilitate this, 
papers were circulated beforehand and rather than formal presentations, speakers and 
participants discussed them together (Interview Woolley, 2013). However despite this 
attempt at academic, depersonalized critique, most papers were extremely disparaging of 
Colemanʼs politics, not just her research. Several of the authors, Anson (1986), Hillier 
(1986a; 1986b) and Ravetz (1986) had already published highly critical articles. 
Nevertheless, this perhaps supports their aspiration for objectivity, as any overt intention for 
the character assassination of an unpopular academic would have been undermined by 
circulating papers in advance. Discussions were recorded and while the tapes are no longer 
available, they were used to revise the fourteen papers gathered together into an academic 
book in 1988.  
The published papers (Teymur et al., 1988) covered diverse topics: housing space 
standards, practical and formal architectural issues, community-based interventions and 
housing policy. Woolley described the speakers as an “unholy alliance” of thought and 
experience. While all of the papers used practical examples to strengthen the connection 
between practice and reflection, the fifteen authorsʼ backgrounds varied. The majority 
claimed academic affiliation as an umbrella term54; yet there was only partial attempt to 
move beyond the academic/epistemological community. Only four authors considered 
themselves practicing architects, one working for a local authority Direct Labour 
Organisation. Contributors took aspects of Colemanʼs argument and used them to explore 
their own beliefs. Malpass (1988) and Jenks (1988) discussed the return to conservative 
Victorian values and the free market via suburban housing designs, Roberts (1988) the 
                                                      
54 These academic roles varied from emeritus professor, chair of architecture, senior lecturers, to an 
early career academic working as a local authority research officer. 
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negative consequences of failures in ʻmunicipal housekeepingʼ. Others were more openly 
critical of Coleman. Markus (1988) cites Newmanʼs and Colemanʼs work as examples of 
ideological, fashionable, yet empirically flawed, research studies and the essential roles of 
critique in testing the rigour of housing research. Hillerʼs (1988) seminal paper Against 
Enclosure, uses axial mapping of movement through the Marquess Estate in Islington, 
tracking the location of building entrances and burglaries in an alternative model to positive 
territoriality; proposing that the more segregated a home, the more vulnerable to crime it is.   
Ravetzʼs (1988) detailed critique of Colemanʼs statistical methods noted her lack of attention 
to tenure and historical influence in UK housing.  The book concludes with Lipman and 
Harrisʼ (1988) openly scathing attack on Coleman, Dystopian aesthetics – a refusal from 
ʻnowhereʼ. 
5.3.2 Colemanʼs response to the conference 
One striking impression from the book is the extent that Coleman is present through her 
absence. She did not attend the conference and had no opportunity to make her case, 
defending her views. This resulted in a less balanced debate than the earlier Newsnight 
dispute with Anne Power, or at lectures and Cooper recalls:  
“there were those who spoke from her position because there was really 
overt antagonism, which isnʼt so clear from the book” (Interview Cooper, 
2013).  
Woolley confirmed that while Coleman wasnʼt at the event her supporters were: 
“somebody who turned up at the conference and really had a go at us on 
the basis that Alice Coleman was next to Jesus and who were we to dare 
to criticise such a wonderful person? We definitely felt like we were putting 
our heads above the parapet” (Interview Woolley, 2013). 
When the book was published, the AJ asked both Anne Power and Alice Coleman to 
respond. Again the pairing was set up as adversarial, expecting two opposing views. 
Powerʼs review supported the general sentiment of the book and conference, that policies 
and practices needed to change to achieve more humane housing. Greater influence should 
be given to the powerless, alienated and ignored individuals living in social housing: “Rented 
housing to suit the customers rather than the politicians, professionals and bureaucrats 
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whose needs and views tend to dominate” (Power, 1986, p.30). Tellingly Powerʼs housing 
occupiers are no longer council tenants, or even residents, but ʻcustomersʼ, with an un-
acknowledged reflection of Colemanʼs belief in the oppressive impacts of bureaucratic 
domination.   
Despite a shared distrust of top-down Government interventions, Power considered 
Rehumanising Housing as presenting a powerful case for rejecting the link between design 
and social problems.  She stressed the essential role of good management, citing the 
multifaceted role of caretakers, not just as cleaners, but undertaking the informal repair and 
policing responsibilities on estates. The tone of Powerʼs piece was measured, warning 
against “carping antagonism, blind certainties and above all expensive design prescriptions” 
(ibid., p.30). But she was unable to resist a veiled reference to Colemanʼs research methods. 
Power concluded that design modification had “gladiator-like protagonists” who were not 
providing suitably holistic answers; and until this was understood researchers would 
“continue to generate research grants to count KitKat and crisp wrappings” (ibid, pp.30-31). 
Figure 5.4 Anne Power 
 
More combatively, Colemanʼs response launched into a point-by-point, page-by-page 
rebuttal of the criticisms directed at her. She countered each of the points against her, with 
varying degrees of ridicule. Dismissing Lipman and Harrisʼ paper as “42 abusive items 
including self-contradictory charges of positivism and negativism, or naivety and 
ingenuousness found compatible with ruthless manipulation” (1986b, p.31), she accuses her 
critics of lacking intellectual thoroughness. Her assailantsʼ thinking is “emotive”, Roberts 
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“seems confused”.   Hillier is accused not just of “fabricating charges” about her aims, but 
devising the “bogus arithmetic” and Ravetz of promoting false assumptions about Colemanʼs 
data.  This is overly harsh as Ravetz (1988) in fact concludes her careful statistical criticism 
of Colemanʼs methods with the measured suggestion that the truth probably lies somewhere 
between the extremes of data interpretation.  
Coleman accused the bookʼs editors of being blinkered by their political views, unjustly 
seeing her work as an attack on socialism. She criticised the book as myopic “suffering from 
being too much a product of like minds and not the wider debate it claims to be.” (Coleman, 
1986b, p.30)  Following Powerʼs more general review, her brusque replies read more as an 
angry personal spat than a balanced academic argument. This must have thrilled the AJʼs 
publishers and Macaskill who welcomed the disputatious nature of the reviews and articles 
as good publicity (Interview Macaskill, 2013).  
5.3.3 More correspondence than variance  
Interestingly overlooked at the conference was how ambiguously defined concepts, such as 
defensible space, provided a springboard for individualsʼ own interpretation. Comparing 
Newmanʼs, Colemanʼs, Powerʼs and even Hillierʼs practical advice for the design of mass 
housing, many of their individual recommendations are less disparate than the vociferous 
discussion and the antagonistic opposition would lead one to expect (See Appendix D). 
There are fundamental differences in their theorizing of how space is perceived. For example 
Hillierʼs serious, substantiated concerns over isolated estates disconnected from the street 
layout (Hillier, 1988) leads to his and Powerʼs opposition to Colemanʼs recommendation of 
separation of blocks from their surroundings and enclosed spaces. Power attributed social 
ghettoisation to this spatial segregation (Power, 1998) and in Against Enclosure Hillier 
argued that locally enclosed urban spaces can encourage a greater vulnerability to crime, 
“even though we commonly think of them as ʻdefensibleʼ” (Hillier, 1988, p.69).  However as a 
basic list of design criteria to be avoided many of the recommendations of the four theorists 
are not mutually exclusive, nor particularly novel. The knowledge that the scale and density 
of large blocks can overwhelm individuals, or that secluded areas should be avoided, have 
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long been part of designersʼ toolkits. Hillierʼs advice to avoid spaces too small to have 
entrances paralleled Colemanʼs call for individual front doors to all ground floor homes. 
Similarly to Newman, Colemanʼs principles supported Powerʼs suggestion that too many high 
level corridors and landings dilute the numbers of people at ground level, reducing social 
contact. 
It was the certainty with which each of these academics promoted their position as 
unconditional absolutes that was appealing to policy-makers searching for reliable evidence 
on ʻwhat worksʼ. If this evidence happens to be in tune with the prevailing political direction, 
all the better:  
“Positivism and certainties appear to characterize many conflicting claims. 
When these certainties coincide with political belief and dogma, as 
happened to a large degree in the 1980s, the brew is a potent one for 
public sector housing” (Jenks, 1988, p.53).  
So a critical constraint on the transfer of policies and ideas is their fit to the political direction 
of the time. Yet for those communities of practice implementing the policies in a practical 
attempt to improve housing, this political fit to funders or other Local Government regimes 
was more significant than any theoretical inconsistencies of the concepts.  This is explored 
further in Chapters Six and Eight.   
The impermanence of apparently vitriolic academic disagreements is illustrated by looking 
forward a decade. In November 1998 Bill Hillier presented a paper on cul-de-sacs and crime 
to a Home Office conference (Hillier and Shu, 2000). This was reported in Building Design 
(1998) with an editorial titled Coleman canʼt cut the mustard contradicting the “long-
fashionable theories of defensible space” (ibid., p.7).  The article led to an fiery exchange of 
letters from readers (Bar-Hillel, 1998; Randall, 1998; Scott, 1998), one calling for an 
immediate apology to Alice Coleman for mis-representing her research as pro-cul-de-sac.  
This debate continued in The Guardian (Glancy, 1998) until Hillier, again interviewed in BD, 
opined that Coleman had been influenced by SpaceSyntax, but that the details of the dispute 
had moved on.  Coleman, he claimed: 
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“said Oscar Newman was right inside the housing estates and we 
[SpaceSyntax] were right in the streets. Itʼs a long time since we had any 
disagreements with Alice Coleman” (Hillier reported in BD, 1998, p.6)55.  
Hillier had earlier stated his “great sympathy for what she is trying to say with her evidence”, 
his concern being that no conclusion could be drawn from her work because of its 
methodological flaws (Hillier, 1986b, p.14), and now openly acknowledged their convergence 
of opinions as the evidence for and against defensible space was explored further. 
5.4 Catching Margaret Thatcherʼs eye 
5.4.1 Dealing with housing of last resort 
During the 1980s perceptions of council housing were polarized by Margaret Thatcherʼs 
ʻright to buyʼ scheme, conceived just months after her election and resulting in the sale of 
over 1.34 million council homes in the first decade after it was enacted in October 1980 (CIH, 
2013). Proving extremely popular amongst voters, the initiative rapidly siphoned off the more 
desirable council properties (Meek, 2014). Yet even with substantial discounts, homes on 
unpopular estates were hard to sell, influenced by an estateʼs poor reputation, or high levels 
of crime and vandalism. Simultaneously the press covered stories of deprived, unstable 
populations living in neglected, poorly maintained inner-city estates and dramatized housing 
related events such as the Broadwater Farm riots.  This concentration on the extremes (the 
best and the worst of social housing) aided the decline in the perceptions of council run 
housing, reinforcing a simplistic division of housing into ʻbadʼ public sector and ʻgoodʼ private 
ownership (Malpass, 1988; Heaven, 1986). Bevanʼs post war ambition that council housing 
should be of a calibre to be the housing choice for all, had declined to a situation where the 
public housing sector had become the preserve of ʻproblemʼ families. Local authorities were 
left with a housing stock tainted by the view that council housing was for those with no other 
                                                      
55 Bill Hillier described his initial meeting with Alice Coleman at KCL discussing her design 
disadvantagement survey data as convivial and he was pleased to be mentioned in Utopia 
on Trial.  He assured me that any apparent animosity was not personal and that he “only did 
a hatchet job because heʼd been asked to by the DoE”.  In fact, after reading Against 
Enclosure (1987), Coleman had called Hillier up agreeing with every word.  Hillier considered 
them now the “best of friends” (Hillier, Personal communication, 2006) 
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option, or those too poor to buy out of it.  Solutions were needed to dramatically transform 
unpopular estates, if only to maintain sufficient desirable, sellable properties for the Prime 
Ministerʼs flagship ʻright to buyʼ policy. 
Following the mixed governmental reception of Utopia on Trial, Coleman proactively set out 
to attract the attention of those in sufficiently powerful positions to promote her research. 
Macaskill recalled Coleman indiscriminately contacting all the political parties and was 
prepared to talk to anyone who she felt might provide support (Interview Macaskill, 2013). 
Coleman (1986b) recalled that other than a conversation with Jeff Rooker, then shadow 
housing minister, Labour were indifferent to her advances. But as Utopia on Trial became 
widely known Coleman was asked to speak at several party conferences including the Green 
Party and the Social and Liberal Democrats (Interview Coleman, 2013). In 1986 Coleman 
spoke to a fringe group at the Conservative Partyʼs Spring Conference in Bournemouth. This 
session was attended by Hartley Booth, advisor to Margaret Thatcher, who was sufficiently 
impressed by Coleman to buy a copy of her book.  She was also invited for a short meeting 
with Sir Keith Joseph, then Secretary of State for Education and Science, where they 
discussed her crime graphs.  Jacobs and Lees (2013) report that Sir Joseph was clearly 
impressed with her and as well as ʻalertingʼ the cabinet to her work, he was reported in the 
Geographical Magazine stating how much he admired the work of both Alice Coleman and 
Peter Hall56 (Anon, 1985a). 
Coleman wrote directly to Margaret Thatcher on 18 December 1987, asking for a meeting. 
Her timing was apt, as during 1987 the Prime Minister had invited housing experts to 
Downing Street to discuss crime prevention and housing design (Heck, 1987).  In January 
1988, Coleman visited Downing Street for a half hour meeting with Thatcher and two 
advisors, one of whom was William Waldegrave (briefly Minister for Housing and Planning 
between 1987-1988). Jacobs and Lees (2013) describe how successful this encounter was. 
Coleman was very impressed with Thatcherʼs business-like grasp of the material under 
                                                      
56 Sir Peter Hall, planning academic at UCL.  
 - 169 - 
discussion (Guest, 1990). Thatcher was well briefed on Utopia on Trial in that she was 
asking for clarification rather than instruction.  “She [Thatcher] had read the book, she knew 
what it was about and she was asking supplementary questions” (Interview Coleman 2008 
quoted in Jacobs and Lees, 2013, p.1574).  The two women made an immediate connection, 
grounded as Jacobs and Lees (2013) point out, on their shared belief in scientific facts as 
the basis for policy. Jacobs and Lees identify the importance of Coleman sketching a graph 
in the air to illustrate her argument as a persuasive moment. Thatcher grasped the intent 
immediately and convinced by Colemanʼs explanation, asked her what further help she 
needed. Coleman asked for money to support five years of practical trials into design 
improvement.  Thatcher agreed on the spot, asking when Coleman could leave her post at 
Kingʼs College London and start as advisor either at the Home Office or DoE (ibid., 2013). 
Coleman felt that finally her research was prompting action. “Two days later I got a letter 
from her, telling me to see Nicholas Ridley, the Environment Secretary. From then on it was 
in the bag, just a matter of waiting” (Guest, 1990, p.20).  
However this positive response from Margaret Thatcher was not the ʻopen sesameʼ that it 
seemed.  Thatcher may have recognised that her imposition of Coleman and her ideas in a 
top-down way was likely to be unpopular and contrary to the DoEʼs established routes for 
deriving and testing research questions.  
“I went further than the DoE in believing that the design of estates was 
critical to their success in reducing the amount of crime. I was a great 
admirer of the works of Professor Alice Coleman and I made her an 
advisor to the DoE, to their dismay” (Thatcher, 1993, p.605 in Jacobs and 
Lees, 2013, p.1575). 
This high level endorsement ensured that authorization proceeded rapidly. John Harvey 
remembers the urgency for the DoE to act:   
“I got a phone call one day from the Secretary of Stateʼs office, ʻOh 
Professor Alice Coleman is here with the Minister [Nicholas Ridley], can 
you come up?ʼ  She was coming out from the Minister. ʻThank you for 
coming in to see me. . . and John, you can take the Professor Coleman 
and explain to her how we're going to run this…..Iʼll fill you in later. But just 
go run after her.ʼ  Coleman said ʻRight, itʼs been decided that Iʼm running 
this project, and Iʼll need £150 million.ʼ So they had this plan and she [Mrs 
Thatcher] said ʻAlice Coleman needs the money because it's such an 
important social experiment, we must test it and see if it works, it's going 
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to have a huge impact and we've got to see if it works.ʼ  So she [Coleman] 
said ʻHow much does it cost to renovate an estate, say a typical 1000 
dwelling estate?ʼ ʻOh you know £10 million.ʼ ʻWe need to have 10 of 
these.ʼ  So we're looking at £100 million or whatever. Figures plucked out 
of the air!  So I was told to find £150 million for her and the idea was it 
would come out of the Estate Action budget” (Interview Harvey, 2009). 
The Estate Action budget was then £350 million annually (Power, 1998) and so it is 
unsurprising that the £150 million was scaled down to a still substantial £50 million towards 
what became know as the DICE project. Housing Improvement Programme (HIP) allocations 
allowed Boroughs to borrow money from the Estates Action fund, in a form of credit 
allocation. This was not what Coleman had expected, as sheʼd hoped to have control over a 
capital sum, to allocate to architects and builders as she chose. Harvey had to explain the 
procedure to her.  
“In the end, she said, ʻIf thatʼs the best you can do. I think I'll complain to 
No 10 . . . reneging on the agreement.ʼ I said I was trying to do things in 
the way it works, through the system. But eventually she agreed” (Interview 
Harvey, 2009).  
David Riley, who managed the DICE project for the DoE reinforced the distrust that the civil 
servants had for ideas being foisted upon them.  
“I donʼt know how she got access to these people, but she did.  I think it 
was pertinent that it [DICE] would have been killed off had it come up the 
usual way.  The evidence wasnʼt strong enough to warrant that level of 
investment.  I think it was £80 million as I remember and that might have 
been scaled back from her original ambitions” (Interview Riley, 2011) 
Paul Wiles57, who was involved in assessing the DICE initiative also identified that in addition 
to the increased resentment and rancour within the department, such highly politicised 
support could result in unrealistic expectations.  
“You might think it's wonderful if you catch the attention of somebody like 
Mrs. Thatcher.  But actually what you do is create expectations that are 
almost impossible to fulfil.  So what people were looking for from DICE was a 
reduction in crime that was probably not credible even if she'd been right, 
because she'd built this up as if this was going to solve the crime problem” 
(Interview Wiles, 2011). 
                                                      
57 Paul Wiles, then Professor of Criminology at the University of Sheffield.  
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Both Wiles and Jenks complained of politicians “jumping to simple conclusions” (Jenks, 
1988; Interview Wiles, 2011). The political drive for reliable, immediate, large-scale solutions 
to contemporary housing problems and the extent that this inevitable politicization distorted 
objective scientific or academic debate has been demonstrated by the route taken to obtain 
funding for DICE:  
“I think the attraction for the Minister and Margaret Thatcher was that 
DICE was an universal remedy that would solve anything. Maybe with a 
touch of snake oil in that” (Interview Riley, 2011). 
It is a crude political caricature that Ministers donʼt care how or why an intervention works, as 
long as it is seen to make a positive difference. Yet these close to the workings of policy-
making recognise the truth in Flybvjergʼs observation that: 
“analysis instead of acting as a foundation for intelligent policy making 
becomes a manipulated instrument of politics” (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p.35).  
This acknowledges the misappropriation of evidence and analytical critiques, but also that 
initiatives require political alignment to gain practical traction. So having finally accessed 
funding through circuitous political routes, DICE was going to be judged not against 
Colemanʼs objective scientific terms but the highly critical, distrustful expectations of civil 
servants within the DoE. The inevitability of politics shaping policy-making is well known 
(Edwards and Evans, 2011) but this chapter shows the extent that even mobilizing the 
concept of defensible space was highly politicised at personal, organizational as well as 
party political levels. Chapter Seven describes how the evaluation of the DICE initiative took 
on a similar political flavour.  
5.4.2 Agents and mechanisms for transfer across networks 
Chapter Two contained a diagram (Figure 2.3) of the overlapping/interconnected transfer 
mechanisms tracked during this research (see Appendix B). The empirical findings 
discussed suggest that while some transfer mechanisms could work alone, others needed to 
work as an assemblage, or required a second mechanism to activate them.  So, for example, 
ideas contained in Utopia on Trial were widely and successfully propagated through the 
press and media, but to very different effect to the discussion of the same ideas at the 
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Rehumanizing Housing Conference where the book worked in combination with the gathered 
individual positions of the authors and participants. Utopia on Trial here acted as a catalyst 
for those at the conference enabling the dispersed practical and theoretical ideas about 
housing to coalesce around an idea of the New Right as a political threat to public housing 
provision. As Markus notes Utopia on Trial  “turned out to be a useful peg upon which to 
hang a much wider debate about housing research” (Markus, 1988, p.11). The 
Rehumanizing Housing Conference was also an example of the text of Utopia on Trial acting 
as a substitute for Coleman. Her ʻanti-guruʼ transfer agent presence was symbolically 
represented, the text acting as a ʻboundary objectʼ that passed between 
academic/epistemological and practitioner networks. Jacobs and Lees (2013) also 
categorize Colemanʼs graphs of ʻabuses compared to design featuresʼ as another form of 
ʻboundary objectʼ, not only appearing as the persuasive transfer mechanisms in her 
meetings with Joseph and Thatcher, but used as iconic summaries of her research; at the 
meeting with the Metropolitan police, reprinted in the Audit Commission report, in press 
articles, even in the architectural press where inclusion of scientific illustrations are rare 
(Hillier, 1986b) and as lecture slides. At one RIBA lecture   
“graph after graph was presented, each showing those lines rising to the 
right…. houses on stilts, places that arenʼt overlooked, the number of 
dwellings per block, the number of dwellings per entrance…. In all cases 
the graphs showed that the more factors there were, the more problems 
were found” (Gorst, 1986, p.2). 
The apparent simplicity of these graphs was one of the key academic contentions laboriously 
unpicked in Hillier and Colemanʼs extensive correspondence on what could be inferred from 
the steepness of trend lines, or interpreting the shapes of curves (Coleman, 1986c; Hillier, 
1986b).   
My analysis based on transfer mechanisms is a novel alternative explanation to more 
common discipline or role based models for why some elements of the concept transferred 
and others did not. The unexpected populist success of the book and resultant extensive 
media coverage exemplifies the pressʼ repetitive circulatory mechanisms that privilege 
contentious and interest-generating concepts to promote newspaper sales. It shows the 
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extent that this constructed media exercise acted to fossilize support for or against Coleman 
and polarized opinions about her study. It was possible to be aware of Utopia on Trial and to 
have formed strong opinions on it via the architectural press without actually having read the 
book.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the spectrum of reactions (from enthusiastic to 
antagonistic) to the concept of defensible space as it embedded and spread within the UK 
was influenced as much by the mechanisms used to promote it as resonance of the ideas 
themselves.  I have explored the range of transfer mechanisms used to mobilize the 
concept: book, academic papers, events where individual transfer agents introduced and 
positioned their version of the concept. The power of these individual encounters is 
illustrated through Colemanʼs persuasive meeting with the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, 
who in turn imposed their shared ʻscientificʼ account of defensible space on the civil servants 
at the DoE.   
An important task was considering the effect of Colemanʼs politics on how her research was 
received and whether it unlocked access to funding and support. In fact it was a barrier to be 
overcome, as whilst it possibly eased her access to influential supporters in Government 
(Waldegrave, Joseph and ultimately Thatcher), in general her politics set her apart from and 
alienated the communities of practice who were discussing and potentially implementing her 
work. Lipman and Harrisʼ opening quote highlighted the political positioning of the 
Rehumanising Housing conference which was an unusually intense conflict of right and left. 
Colemanʼs explicit and oppositional politicization was shocking and confronted the normative 
liberal/socialist political position of many housing professionals58.  
                                                      
58 The continual pairing and comparisons to Anne Power since the early 1980s, (including Colemanʼs 
reference to Powerʼs work in  Utopia on Trial, 1985a, p.164) accentuated Colemanʼs alignment to the 
right.  “Anne Power was better looking, more dynamic, younger more socially minded. She worked at 
the LSE which then implied a socialist politics – not a tough conservative” (Interview McKeown, 2013). 
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The architecture profession in particular found it difficult to articulate their confusion to this 
overt politicisation.  The architectural researcher Ian Cooper remembers “it was difficult to 
talk about politics in schools of architecture and associated research journals of the time”. 
Thinking about the attendees at the conference he continued “and whatʼs even more 
unbelievable is that this was probably the most politicised group of people around at the 
time” (Interview Cooper, 2013). Cooper and several other conference conveners and 
contributors, were at the time members of the New Architecture Movement59, to the 
alternative left of the architectural profession. So while he found it refreshing to reconsider 
the conference as a historical alternative to the current neoliberal framing that most housing 
professionals now take as the status quo, re-reading the papers, Cooper felt that the 
personal attacks overwhelmed any deeply considered political debate. 
Many of the criticisms of Coleman went beyond an objective critique of her work. Several 
harsh attacks seemed to be founded on a personal dislike of her and her politics. Yet 
Coleman herself could be just as outspoken and critical of her detractors and appears to 
have brushed off the personal nature of the arguments. Her publisher Hilary Macaskill was 
aware of the Rehumanising Housing conference being set up to refute Utopia on Trial but 
believed that “Alice was fine about it” (Interview Macaskill, 2013). Coleman was (and is) a 
fixedly political individual, her right of centre, free-market opinions colouring her views on 
most topics, from education, crime to planning. She remains determinedly anti-any form of 
government control, continuing to condemn what she sees as unnecessary planning 
bureaucracy (Coleman, 2013a; 2013b). In Macaskillʼs view Colemanʼs drive to gather 
support and publicity to widen the reach of her research was above politics and overcame 
her personal views (Interview Macaskill, 2013).  Even while Coleman was courting the 
Conservatives, she was still prepared to talk with the Labour party about her work, despite 
their unresponsiveness and Colemanʼs own (2013b) criticism of Labourʼs nationalization 
policies.  One can question whether Labourʼs indifference was due to Coleman being tainted 
                                                      
59 Operating between 1975 and the mid 1980s NAM provided an outspoken critique of normative 
professional architectural structures. See 
http://www.spatialagency.net/database/new.architecture.movement.nam. 
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by the Conservativesʼ support, or whether her ideas were at odds with their housing policy 
direction.  Coleman herself believed that she was able to maintain this apolitical stance.  
Talking to a reporter about DoE officials in 1990, she carefully pointed out that following the 
reprint of Utopia on Trial and the DICE project, DoE Civil Servants were now very helpful.  
“Some did prevent me from seeing John Patten when he was Minister- but 
theyʼve retired now. I am not politically orientated – you have to keep 
politics out of things especially when talking to tenants. We are doing this 
to improve their lives” (Guest, 1990, p.20). 
Colemanʼs insistence that her work was above politics or at least above the political 
machinations of policy-making may have been merely the pose of an ʻunworldly academicʼ 
as she astutely balanced politics throughout the media dissemination of Utopia on Trial, even 
referring to the campaign to obtain funding for DICE as ʻthe Thatcher projectʼ (Jacobs and 
Lees, 2013, p.1572). And Colemanʼs opinion of DoE officials also thawed slightly following 
the agreement to fund DICE. In the revised 1990 edition of Utopia on Trial   Coleman 
mellowed her critique of the DoEʼs ʻdesign misguidanceʼ, rewording her concluding chapter 
to attribute blame more broadly.  The DoE were no longer the “king-pin of Britainʼs housing 
problems industry” (Coleman, 1985a, p.183), with the accusations now passed on to 
planners and the industry more generally;  “Britainʼs great housing/planning problems 
industry, have been manufacturing the problems they are supposed to be solving” (Coleman, 
1990, p.184). 
This chapter has demonstrated the complex ways that the concept of defensible space was 
mobilized, from the dissemination of a publication to a broad audience catching the mood 
and the politics of the time. Wenger (1998) describes how a concept must be reified or an 
“idea adopted by a community before it can shape practice in significant ways” (ibid, p.92). 
This process of reifying continued with converting the abstract concept of defensible space, 
into the operationalised design disadvantagement score, which in turn was translated into a 
trial that would physically transform the appearance and functioning of inhabited estates. So 
the concept of defensible space had to move beyond theoretical arguments about 
conceptual underpinnings, or political desire for a ʻsolutionʼ into practical actions that would 
impact on residentsʼ lives. The following chapter looks at how these very local political 
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negotiations were played out in practice as Colemanʼs DICE principles were applied to two 
estates in East London.   
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Chapter 6: Implementing defensible space on the DICE 
estates 
 Introduction  
“DICE was not about bricks but about politics” (Interview McKeown, 2013).  
The preceding chapter showed how insightful this quote is, with superior political will 
prevailing over the pragmatic expectations and regeneration aims prevalent within the 
Department of the Environment (DoE). This chapter now concentrates on the physical bricks 
and mortar changes, as Colemanʼs vision of defensible space was applied to existing 
housing estates. It explores the practical constraints of translating policy into action.  
Having acquired the support of the Prime Minister and the promise of extensive funding for 
her DICE project, Coleman immediately began to establish a DICE Unit at Kingʼs College 
London (KCL) with the unusual hybrid mix of research and practical architectural skills 
required for such a complex study. The process for selecting estates to ʻDICEʼ is described 
in detail as this apparently practical procedure of identification reveals much about the 
implicit expectations of the programme. It exposes the constraints of bounded rationality and 
constrained knowledge (over locations, compromised decisions, or the consequences of 
Colemanʼs theories) and the differing perceptions of the construction practitioners and 
academics. Colemanʼs ʻscientificʼ methodology imposed a selection bias which impacted on 
the likelihood of the schemesʼ success or the objective evaluation of the outcomes. I 
compare two of the seven DICE projects, the Rogers Estate, Bethnal Green and Ranwell 
East Estate, Bow. These estates varied in physical form and tellingly, the institutional 
character of the teams involved. However, their close proximity within Tower Hamlets 
simplified aspects of the comparison and continued Colemanʼs investigative focus on the 
Borough begun during her research for Utopia on Trial.  
The conditions of the estates prior to being DICE-ed are outlined briefly, less as a 
benchmark for the final outcomes, but to illustrate three criticisms of defensible space as a 
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driver for regeneration: first that physical condition is not a reliable indication of the wider 
cycles of regeneration and decline and hence the relative opportunities for long-term 
improvement; second, the fluctuating interrelationship of an estate to its neighbourhood; and 
third, that defensible space principles are insufficiently sensitive to an individualʼs 
perceptions and expectations in relation to territoriality or norms or behaviour.  
The physical changes to the blocks are described to show how they supported DICE 
principles.  I discuss the difficulties contextualizing these generic DICE principles into the 
unique design requirements of each scheme.  I reflect on the pragmatic constraints of 
construction projects on site, for example where changes of personnel disrupted the 
decision-making processes. This explores the role and influence of the academically based 
KCL DICE Unit devising design proposals and acting as an additional consultant on the 
regeneration team for each scheme. 
The chapter concludes by considering housing practitionersʼ preferred transfer mechanisms, 
in particular the failure of formal techniques such as evaluation reports. In practice objective 
ʻevidenceʼ has less status than a ʻbest practiceʼ case study or more social mechanisms (the 
trust in or credibility of the individual passing on the concept, or recognition or perceived 
utility of the idea) to transfer and communicate ʻwhat worksʼ.   This was reinforced during my 
fieldwork, as the process of interviewing morphed into story telling and gossiping.   So this 
chapter contains many direct quotes from interviewees, enabling them to present the 
ʻevidenceʼ they value and trust on defensible space in their own words. 
6.1 Coleman establishes a DICE Unit  
Coleman had requested five years of funding for her project. This was an extremely short 
period of time for a single major regeneration scheme, let alone for her initial target of nine 
estates.  The sense of urgency which flavoured Colemanʼs conversation with Margaret 
Thatcher in January 1988 dissipated amongst the machinery of departmental bureaucracy 
and the practicalities of establishing a hypothecated budget for the project. Despite Coleman 
advertising for DICE team members as soon as she was confident that funding would be 
available, it took a year from this meeting for the KCL DICE Unit to form and a further 11 
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months before the DoE officially started the project in November 1989 (Price Waterhouse, 
1997a, p.1).  
Initially the DICE team consisted of Coleman, a couple of geography researchers from KCL, 
a housing consultant, architect Mary McKeown and three postgraduate students60.  In 1991, 
architect Peter Silver replaced McKeown and the team was joined by an ex-policewoman 
and an ex-army officer with the task of directing operations. The team, which was notably 
light on construction experience, was supplemented with various part-time students from the 
Geography Department.  Coleman was confident she could fill the planning role in the team 
but supplementary architectural skills were required. McKeown had been working as an 
architect in the maintenance department of the Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE). 
Completing her training in 1972 prior to the publication of Newmanʼs book Defensible space, 
she was unaware of the arguments over determinism, but was familiar with the government 
research on reducing crime in housing, as it was relevant to her work refurbishing bomb-
damaged estates. Coleman visited Belfast in the autumn of 1985 and undertook a DICE 
survey of the infamous Divis Flats. She returned in 1986 and gave a public lecture (Bar-
Hillel, 1986b) which McKeown attended, later reading Utopia on Trial.  She  “felt that Utopia 
on Trial put into rational tabular form much of what we felt was wrong and needed to be 
fixed” (Interview McKeown, 2013). When she was shown a job advert in the Daily 
Telegraph61 for a research post working for Coleman in London, she applied with 
enthusiasm. McKeown was appointed and transferred from a practical sphere to a research 
one: 
“Iʼd left a desk where I was dealing with tenants and damp, and arrived in 
a hornetsʼ nest of academia” (Interview McKeown, 2013). 
                                                      
60 The DICE reports named ten members of the Unit including David Cross, Mary McKeown and Peter 
Silver. None of the researchers who worked on the Utopia on Trial study were involved, although David 
Cross was the longest serving, having worked with Alice Coleman since the mid 1980s. 
61 The advertʼs location played an odd significance to McKeownʼs recruitment. During the interview 
Coleman asked which paper she read, probing for class and political alignment.  McKeown believed 
that her NIHE background made it hard for Coleman to categorize her politics in simple left and right 
terms (Interview McKeown, 2013).  
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The architect Peter Silver had a similarly practical housing background. Having worked for 
the housing co-operative Solon, he graduated from the Architectural Association, before 
being employed as a research assistant on DICE.  Again, despite studying architecture 
during the late 1980s, Silver was unfamiliar with the controversy around Utopia on Trial. His 
first task on joining the Unit was to read Colemanʼs and Newmanʼs books (Interview Silver 
2013). 
6.1.1 Selecting the estates to be DICE-ed 
Within Colemanʼs positivist epistemological framework, having formulated a hypothesis the 
next step in a scientific experiment would be a careful selection of its subjects of study 
(Hoggart, Lees et al., 2002). This selection of objects for evaluation or study is itself a form of 
evaluation (Palfrey, Thomas et al., 2012). Choosing the DICE estates however, was a 
drawn-out process; inviting Local Authorities to submit potential estates to the DoE, followed 
by an initial assessment survey, leading to design proposals, culminating in a consultative 
referendum with estate residents, before a decision was made on the estateʼs inclusion in 
the study. Each of these steps required the academic experimental model to engage with 
Schönʼs (1983) messy ʻswampy lowlandsʼ of real world problems; the competitive scramble 
for capital funding, the exploratory creativity needed for feasibility designs and not least the 
frustrations of resident engagement. As part of the annual application for Housing 
Investment Programme (HIP) funds, interested Local Authorities were invited to bid to 
participate in DICE. The bid form made clear that suggested schemes would be assessed on 
ʻmeritʼ, the community diversity and potential for tenant involvement. Discussions with the 
DoE explained the funding constraints and Colemanʼs strict experimental plan (Interview 
Harvey, 2009)62.  
Over 40 estates were surveyed with 33 DICE Disadvantagement Reports written in an 
intensive thirty-five month period between early 1989 and November 1991. During her two 
years at the Unit, McKeown worked on 14 reports describing the process dictated by 
                                                      
62 John Harvey, Head of the DoE Estate Action Team 
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Coleman as formulaic; “Painting by numbers!  It wasnʼt that we were dumb, it was the 
format” (Interview McKeown, 2013). Because of the compressed timeframe, the small team 
was concurrently visiting potential sites, undertaking surveys and data collection, holding 
“endless” meetings with residents, architects and Local Authority representatives, alongside 
drafting the reports.  There was an uneven geographical spread of sites. Of the 31 DICE 
Disadvantagement Reports with identified locations, half were in Greater London. Outside 
London, large conurbations such as Birmingham and Manchester each proposed two or 
three potential sites, with individual estates scatted across the Midlands and further north 
across Tyneside. At least five of the London estates evaluated were in Tower Hamlets 
(noticeably the largest cluster), with others mainly in central urban boroughs. Four of the 
estates measured in Utopia on Trial were revisited including the Mozart Estate in 
Westminster.  
Data collection visits were intense, rapid events, spending a single day walking the estates. 
There was a rigorous process for completing the ʻdesign and abuseʼ survey.  Using a pre-
coded proforma each block or house on the estate was assessed. The presence of litter 
scored one negative point if it was “Clean or Casual” and two if it was “Dirty and Decayed”.  
No visible litter received an abuse score of zero and was marked as within acceptable 
thresholds. There was no space on the data collection form to note unanticipated 
circumstances, explain context or add comments. Following Colemanʼs geographical 
mapping background, site plans were marked-up with pre-selected colour pencils classifying 
the space according to its privacy or public accessibility.  By the end of 1992 the Unit had 
produced a comprehensive survey manual, with classification conventions for spaces similar 
to the instructions for the Second Land Use Survey63 (Silver, 1995). Yet McKeownʼs 
impression was that potential suitability was assimilated by one short walk across the estate: 
                                                      
63 The geographical/architectural divide in terminology emerged here. Silver referred to these as colour-
coded maps rather than site plans. McKeown recalled that Coleman “called everything a map where, 
for us [Architects] it would be a site plan. Even the drawing of a house was a map” (Interviews 
McKeown and Silver, 2013).  
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“Perhaps she got the plans of the estate in advance. But she almost 
already knew whether it was possible; whether this estate was going to be 
a DICE estate or a control estate or what she was going to do, how the 
scores could be reduced” (Interview McKeown, 2013). 
From the completed survey sheets a ʻbeforeʼ Design Disadvantage Score was calculated for 
the estate. Design changes were proposed and the Design Disadvantage Score re-
calculated.  A DICE Disadvantagement Report was drafted to brief consultants and as a 
resident consultation document prior to the referendum.  The standard report template 
consisted of an account of the DICE design principles, analysis of the design features and 
abuse surveys and colour-coded before and after site plans. Proposed sub-division of blocks 
and design changes were outlined, linked to hoped-for improvements, however the KCL 
DICE Unit did not write a specification or cost the alterations. In practice the Unit only 
devised a brief for the scheme, but Coleman was adamant that this was non-negotiable. The 
design improvements were presented to Local Authority councillors, staff and at tenantsʼ 
meetings where residents voted on whether to accept the proposals.  If a majority agreed to 
the scheme, Coleman would submit their estate to the DoE for inclusion. “The final selection 
was carried out in consultation with Professor Coleman” (Price Waterhouse, 1997a, p.8).    
Once accepted into the DICE project, the Local Authority was responsible for commissioning 
fully costed designs and condition surveys to assess the practicality of the DICE proposals 
and other necessary maintenance to the building fabric. Following these, the Local Authority 
had to commit to spend any additional funds needed for repairs, installation of communal 
heating systems, pitched roofs, or new street lighting which were not eligible under the DoE 
funding.  The scheme would then be submitted to the Local Authority planning committee 
and to the DoE for approval to proceed to working drawings stage.  In Silverʼs opinion, 
gaining the co-operation of the statutory authorities was as great a challenge as gaining the 
acceptance of residents:  
“Planning officers were going to have to sanction increased densities, fire 
officers were going to have to weigh the reduced likelihood of arson 
against a relaxation in the means of escape, housing departments were 
going to have to produce complex decanting programmes and often 
provide temporary re-housing; it was after all essential for the experiment 
that the original residents either remained or returned at the completion of 
the works” (Silver, 1995, p.6). 
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However Tower Hamlets Planning Department made no objections to the proposed 
alterations on Rogers, despite their radical nature, an indication of the amount of political 
pressure being exerted on the planning team to enable the funded scheme to go ahead 
(Interview Stride, 2011). 
The perceived need (or not) for early stage feasibility design studies demonstrates the 
research project requirements versus the practicalities of a large-scale housing 
refurbishment scheme. Feasibility design studies are used not only to verify costs, or an 
optionʼs functional plausibility, but as part of the iterative testing of design solutions, based 
on an articulation of the problems to be addressed. For Coleman, this exploratory design 
stage was a waste of time, as the design was arrived at by following the DICE principles 
(Interview McKeown, 2013).  Of the seven DICE projects only Ranwell East had a separate 
feasibility design stage.  
The decisive criterion for site selection was Colemanʼs perception of the extent that the 
Design Disadvantagement Score could be reduced.  
“Aliceʼs target was to reduce the DICE defects from say 14 to 5. Alice 
would walk around an estate and guess the score might be a 13 but we 
can only get it down to a 10 so we wonʼt do it” (Interview McKeown, 2013). 
This was not an exact process but other subjective factors influenced the decision such as 
Colemanʼs view on whether she could work with the Local Authority or if residents were 
prepared to be “DICE-ed”. Unlike typical consultative meetings with residents discussing 
design alternatives Colemanʼs meetings were framed as presentations of the DICE 
recommendations with the refurbishment opportunity as a stark take-it-or-leave it offer.  
“All the residents' meetings I attended, were not residents' meetings like I 
used to have at Solon, where everyone's voice had to be heard and 
everyone had an opinion.  Those were; ʻWe are going to give you some 
information. This is our research.ʼ And that's why a lot of early discussions 
were whether the residents were going to take it on? ʻIf you say yes, then 
you go with it. You can say no. You don't have to be DICE-edʼ” (Interview 
Silver 2013).  
Colemanʼs inflexible theoretical approach inevitably overrode tenants wishes:  
“There was nearly always a fight between Alice and the residents, about 
what they wanted and what she was prepared to give them. If it didn't fit 
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the theory she wouldnʼt allow them that.  From an experimental point of 
view, she was right. If youʼre going to test a theory, then test just the 
theory” (Interview Wiles, 2011). 
There was a degree of compulsion exerted by Local Authorities keen to receive the money, 
but there were a number of selection meetings where residents were unenthusiastic. At the 
Rogers Estate 74% of residents voted for the works. Interviewed by Building Magazine, the 
chairman of the Rogersʼ residents association explained he had not voted for the DICE 
proposals as he believed there had been insufficient tenant involvement in the designs 
(Guest, 1990). Ranwell West and Ranwell Close (a 1938 courtyard block on the northern 
edge of Ranwell East), both voted not to be included (Interview Smith, 2011). The proportion 
of tenants voting in favour of the works at Ranwell East was higher at 86%, however the 
scheme was highly unpopular with a vocal minority of the residents which Coleman dubbed 
“aggressive opposition from a few militants” (Coleman and Silver, 1995?a, p.3).  
There were also suggestions of a political tint to those selected.   
“What was wrong about DICE was she [Coleman] was poacher and game 
keeper, she set the rules and the Local Authority couldnʼt say anything. If 
they did she wouldnʼt work with them. Conservatives wouldnʼt work with 
her64, Lib Dem councils might, but Alice wouldnʼt work with Labour 
councils” (Interview McKeown, 2013). 
Nonetheless this selection strategy appears to have been successful in that those Authorities 
chosen were reported as being extremely supportive (Interview Silver, 2013).  If this 
enthusiasm resulted from receiving additional refurbishment grants, the awards caused 
resentment within Boroughs not selected. As the funding for DICE was provided in the form 
of Supplementary Credit Approvals top-sliced from the Estate Action Programme, reducing 
the overall annual Estate Action budget available for non-DICE bids, there was detailed 
discussion and justification of the allocations within the DoE (Municipal Journal, 1990; 
Interview Harvey, 2011). The KCL DICE Unit reported to a shifting cast of DoE staff. 
McKeown mentioned the hostility within the DoE,  who she felt had already written DICE off, 
                                                      
64 This view is countered by the long and mostly positive working relationship Coleman had with the 
Conservative led Borough of Westminster while working on the Mozart Estate.  
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and by the end of 1990 had lost patience with Coleman and were pushing for construction to 
start:   
“It was obvious that the DoE simply wanted to get things on site. ʻPlease 
start because weʼve got to do an evaluation of this before we cap it. Youʼre 
the architect, get it pushed through.ʼ Alice was being more and more 
intransigent by that stage. She was working hard on the update of her book. 
They were appealing to me but, there was only Alice who had the right. It 
was her project.  There was no one else who could say; ʻI think we should 
run with thisʼ.  In fact the one day I suggested something [to start with 
routine maintenance rather than DICE works] she threw the pencil down the 
table at me” (Interview McKeown, 2013). 
David Riley65 recalled that all the selected estates felt unwelcoming (Interview Riley, 2011). 
Earlier DoE regeneration programmes such as Priority Estates had already targeted the 
most problematic estates. Stride remembered that both the Rogers and Ranwell East 
“weren't the worst in the borough”, but both “had the signs of serious dysfunctionalism” which 
could have eventually led to their demolition (Interview Stride, 2011). Several interviewees 
reinforced that the selected DICE estates were not those experiencing the poorest 
conditions, or most extreme deprivation but with the greatest potential to change (Interviews 
Riley and Sanford, 2011, McKeown and Silver, 2013). So the DICE assessment contained 
an element of comparison to neighbouring estates as well as its current condition. 
Comparing ʻnot the worst estatesʼ was a less useful criteria than choosing estates on a 
similar trajectory. For example, there might be more comparability between two estates in 
poor, but relatively stable condition than to one which was starting to decline rapidly. This 
relative position along a cycle of decline and regeneration influenced not only the selection 
process, but also the validity of Colemanʼs testing of her proposals. The existing social and 
economic trajectory dictated whether her interventions provided a temporary halt (a sticking 
plaster) to inevitable decline or a longer-term reversal. Ranwell East had already received 
several rounds of regeneration investment and had been the site of two Safe 
Neighbourhoods Unit (SNU) improvement projects between 1981 and 1986. Compared to 
the highly problematic estates surrounding it such as Lefevre Walk, Ranwell East was at the 
time perceived to be in an acceptable state and an “upcoming area” (Interview Smith, 2011). 
                                                      
65 David Riley managed the research project for DICE at the DoE. 
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Smith believed that Lefevre Walk was discounted from DICE for two reasons: it was due to 
be transferred into the Bow Housing Action Trust (HAT) and so could access alternative 
funding, and its physical and social failings were more pronounced. 
“Ranwell East had its problems but not too big problems. If you do a 
scheme like that here, which doesnʼt have as many problems as Lefevre, 
then people would point and say; ʻOh, look the problems have gone awayʼ. 
The problems havenʼt actually gone away, itʼs just there werenʼt as many” 
(Interview Smith, 2011).  
6.2 Two examples of DICE-ed estates 
6.2.1 Tower Hamlets as a site of innovation  
While each of the seven DICE estates would have been worthwhile to examine, Section 3.1 
explained the rationale for selecting the Rogers and nearby Ranwell East Estates in Tower 
Hamlets as case studies (see Figure 6.1). Their morphological diversity illustrated the 
application of the DICE principles at opposing scales and complexity while sharing similar 
geographical urban conditions (see Figure 6.2). 
Figure 6.1 Colemanʼs surveyed estates  
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Figure 6.2  DICE estates in Tower Hamlets  
 
Coleman writes in Utopia on Trial that in the 1980s, Tower Hamlets and Southwark were the 
two London Boroughs that contained the most council flats (Coleman, 1985a). Tower 
Hamlets in inner East London had a reputation for housing poor and underprivileged 
communities in close proximity to the high-income wealth generating employment areas of 
The City and Docklands, and experiencing extreme levels of housing demand across the 
income scale.  At the time of DICE many of the estates had not been refurbished since 
construction, with the Council lacking resources to improve the neglected housing stock.  
Despite targeted state funding across subsequent governments, in 2000 it still ranked as the 
most deprived Local Authority in England. Nonetheless in the late 1980s Tower Hamlets 
became notable for applying innovative forms of neighbourhood management. When the 
Liberal Democrats took control of Tower Hamlets Council in 1986 they initiated a radical 
process of restructuring and decentralisation with both management and decision-making 
devolved to a semi-autonomous neighbourhood level. In a precursor to the current localism 
agenda, they established seven neighbourhood management areas each delivering a 
comprehensive housing service from a Neighbourhood Office. Of the seven neighbourhoods, 
Bethnal Green, Isle of Dogs, Bow and Globe Town were notably more successful than 
Stepney, Wapping or Poplar (Hall, Murie et al., 2004). Unusually for a local authority, this 
local leadership structure successfully established a culture that fostered new ideas and 
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fresh approaches to housing management and attracted innovative-minded staff. One of 
these was Steve Stride, the neighbourhood manager for Globe Town Neighbourhood in 
Bethnal Green. 
Yet innovation required funding. As the national economy recovered following the recession 
of the 1970s, more government funding for housing and regeneration became available. 
However this money was funnelled into targeted programmes which required particular 
expertise to identify and access (Hall, Murie et al., 2004; Wilcox and Perry, 2014).  Katrin 
Sporle66 recalled; 
“This was an era where people were used to competing for pots of money. 
There was a skills base in Local Authorities to look and compete for money. 
The investment wasnʼt going to come through any other source….It's a very 
funny thing for Local Authorities to say ʻmy estate is the worstʼ.  But they put 
the estates forward on the basis that there was genuine need and that 
getting this kind of money was going to be well worthwhile.  They were also 
going to benefit from the evidence base that we would provide them.  So 
that would inform their own policies” (Interview Sporle, 2011). 
Stride  felt that the neighbourhood culture of innovation was a factor attracting DICE to Globe 
Town, but that competition for money was fierce.  The nearby Boroughs of Islington and 
Newham devised equally innovative housing interventions as Tower Hamlets. Stride recalled 
that bids needed to stand out, and was open about his policy of pursuing any sources of 
regeneration money available, even when their objectives were not entirely aligned (Guest, 
1990; Interview Stride, 2011). 
“Ironically that meant that if you were innovative and you knew how to 
catch the agenda that they [the DoE] were dictating and you could link up 
with people like Anne Power, who had their ear, you could get money and 
Estate Action….. I was always on the lookout.  Whatever the money was, 
I was going to get it.  And Globe Town got an unbelievable amount of 
money.  DICE comes along, we hear about Alice Coleman and we think, 
slightly strange.  I am not an advocate of environment determinism and 
clearly she was.  And obviously I met with her and she gave me... she put 
a shiver up my spine in one sense” (Interview Stride, 2011). 
                                                      
66 Katrin Sporle, one of the Price Waterhouse evaluators. 
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Sam McCarthy67 echoed Strideʼs views on the competitive drive to secure funding for estates 
without asking “too many questions” (Interview with McCarthy, 2011).  
6.2.2 Rogers Estate: Pre-DICE 
Constructed in 1949, Rogers Estate was the smallest and oldest of the seven DICE 
schemes. 124 flats were split between two well-defined five-storey ʻUʼ shaped blocks68. Flats 
were accessed from long open decks. Entrances to communal stairs were dark, doorless 
and tucked away out of sight. The site was relatively shallow and open, with large ungated 
grassed areas leading uninterrupted from the street up to the windows of ground floor flats. 
In the bid submitted to the DoE nominating Rogers, the estate is unsurprisingly painted in 
unflattering terms, portraying it as a deserving case for investment:  
“The Estate suffers from a number of endemic problems common to many 
inner city environments, namely litter, waste tipping, vandalism, graffiti 
and crime. All of these worse than average for the locality and all 
contributing to an atmosphere of environmental degradation and social 
malaise” (Price Waterhouse, 1995, p.19).  
While the problems listed are typical, the use of ʻsocial malaiseʼ as a phrase is telling, as it 
strongly echoes Colemanʼs terminology in Utopia on Trial.  McCarthy softened this 
description, attributing the general air of tired neglect to a widely prevalent lack of 
maintenance. Rogers was in a bad, but not unusual, condition: 
“It was typical of a number of estates within Globe Town. It was very 
rundown, thereʼd been a lack of expenditure on it. The amount of funding 
that the Council and the neighbourhoods had just wasnʼt enough to 
sustain the buildings. And also the fact is you get used to a design and 
think it works and then you donʼt realise itʼs not working until something 
like DICE comes along. You know, a lot of communal buildings, rat runs, 
there was no defensible space, there were cut-throughs on the estate. 
And so it was in a very rundown condition and in need of attention” 
(Interview McCarthy, 2011).  
 
                                                      
67 Sam  McCarthy was project manager coordinating the delivery of the Rogers scheme.  
68 Both Newman and Coleman cite the size and height of individual blocks as significant variables. But 
Newmanʼs definition of large estates ranged between 750 to 1000 homes and his threshold for high 
rise seven or more storeys. While far smaller than any studied by Newman, Ranwell East was the 
largest of the seven DICE estates and Rogers the smallest. 
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Figure 6.3 Rogers Estate: Pre-DICE 
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Figure 6.4 Rogers Estate site plans: Pre- and Post-DICE 
 
Unsurprisingly this poor environment meant evaluative surveys undertaken by MORI found 
the Rogers Estate was not particularly popular amongst residents (Price Waterhouse, 1995).  
However residents made clear at consultation sessions that they wanted to stay.  
The KCL DICE team identified design defects such as too many homes per block or per 
entrance, with high numbers of people sharing the common areas creating a sense of 
anonymity. In Utopia on Trial, the mean Design Disadvantagement Score for all the Tower 
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Hamlets homes had been assessed at 8.3, slightly greater than those in Southwark, but that 
Tower Hamlets had a substantially worse ʻabuseʼ score.  
Table 6.1 Design disadvantagement and abuse scores in Utopia on Trial   
Area Mean Design 
Disadvantagement 
score (out of 15) 
Mean Abuse score 
(out of 8) 
Blackbird Leys  4.5 0.9 
Southwark 8.0 2.5 
Tower Hamlets 8.3 3.7 
Total of 4099 blocks 8.1 3.0 
(Adapted from Coleman, 1985a, p.149) 
By 1989 Coleman had altered the abuse score scale to a score out of 16. When surveyed 
pre-DICE both scores for Rogers were far higher than the Borough average, with the 
average Design Disadvantagement Score for the Rogers estate at 11.569 and the abuse 
score measured as 12. 
“Such scores inevitably spell social breakdown, so DICE proposed 
changes to remodel the defects in ways that would render them harmless. 
The final average [following remedial work] would have been 1.5, but a 
last-minute fiat by councilors raised it to 2.4.” (Coleman and Silver, 
1995?a) 
Changes were proposed at the scale of the site, to communal areas, and for the redesign of 
individual homes. The site was cut in half by a short road creating two distinct bounded 
ʻisland sitesʼ redirecting pedestrians, particularly school children, around the estate.  Ground 
floor flats were re-orientated with new front doors opening onto gardens with waist-height 
brick walls facing the street.  Car parking was removed from the North courtyard, which was 
divided up into individual back gardens. A terrace of eight new bungalows were built fronting 
Globe Road, completing the street frontage. The new gardens abutted back-to-back avoiding 
                                                      
69 The preciseness of the Design Disadvantagement Scores (DDS) mentioned (particularly any 
weighted average score) should be treated with caution. Colemanʼs own reports quote an inconsistent 
range of scores. For example Rogers is cited as having a Pre-DICE DDS of 11. 5 or 11.6 and an 
intended DDS of 1.5 or 2.4, or Ranwell East a pre-DICE DDS of 11.8 or 11.9. (Coleman and Cross, 
1994; Coleman and Silver, 1995?a, 1995?b) 
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alleys. On the smaller South block the open courtyard was kept for parking but ground floor 
flats were given a front garden buffer zone. A long–term North block resident whose ground 
floor flat overlooked Scepter Road (he termed it the ʻthe backʼ of the estate) recalled the 
earlier movement and use patterns through the communal spaces facing on to Globe Road; 
“You could drive in one side and out the other. Kids played in the front 
[Globe Road]. There was no play space but kids played there, everyone 
was out there” (Interview Rogers Resident A, 2011). 
He still associated the old ʻfront spaceʼ as a collective shared space and was dissatisfied 
with the experience of living facing a street, complaining that before the ʻflats turned back-to-
frontʼ he used to know everyone, but not now.  
This is highly pertinent as Colemanʼs aim was to reduce anonymity and foster a sense of 
community by decreasing the density of occupation of shared spaces.  Less people 
circulating on each corridor and entrance would enable better recognition of intruders.  So 
the blocks were split internally into smaller sub-blocks, cutting access balconies so that they 
served only one or two dwellings. Nine new entrances were formed and four additional lift 
towers built with well-lit, glazed entrance doors. All entrances faced onto roads to encourage 
surveillance.  In addition to the DICE works the Local Authority took the opportunity to carry 
out other repairs and improvements. These consisted of adding a pitched roof, installing 
double-glazing and new heating systems, as well as replacement kitchens and bathrooms. 
The DoE and Coleman were reluctant to fund the new roof as it was not critical to the DICE 
experiment.  But it was felt to be essential to resolve damp and condensation problems in 
top flats and a 50% contribution was negotiated (Guest, 1993).  
Overall the DICE contract costs for Rogers were £3.5M. This had reportedly reduced 
dramatically by a million pounds from the tender stage budget of £4.5M (Guest, 1990; 
Warman, 1991). McCarthy attributed the saving to competitiveness rather than the market 
downturn, although Warman ascribed it to compulsory competitive tendering (CCT)70. The 
                                                      
70 CCT was a Thatcherite market innovation introduced in the 1980 London Government Planning and 
Land Act when it covered highways, building maintenance and minor building works. Subsequent Acts 
 - 194 - 
Price Waterhouse evaluation focused on the value for money aspects of the programme, yet 
this remarkable cost saving was not mentioned. McCarthy regarded the Rogers scheme 
delivery for £3.5M as good value and that he “got a lot done for that amount” (Interview 
McCarthy, 2011). See Appendix E for cost summary.  
6.2.3 Ranwell East Estate: Pre-DICE 
Ranwell East Estate was a distinct but rambling estate, covering an area of five and three 
quarter hectares with internal roads, paths and green spaces separated from the 
surrounding street network. Constructed in 1974 it provided 474 homes within 21 four and 
six storey slab blocks, 14 of which were linked by overhead walkways.  The blocks had 
maze-like internal corridors interconnecting all the homes.  Any entrance could lead to all 
other exits via the walkways and lift/stair towers. The enclosed spine corridors were dark and 
unobserved by either homes or outside spaces. Each block had a distinct individual layout 
caused by a wide variety of flat or maisonette plans. Six of the blocks were designated for 
elderly residents, but the overall unit mix of mainly single-bed flats and maisonettes was 
misaligned to Tower Hamlets housing policy, which aimed to allocate houses to families. In 
addition the maisonettes suffered from poor sound insulation. 
For the Ranwell East DICE scheme, the Local Authority relied less on external consultants 
than at Rogers, forming a team from existing council staff and at least five temporary 
architects. Michelle Smith was administrator for the project team, eventually returning to 
Ranwell East in her current role as housing manager. Smith remembers the local area as 
rundown and Ranwell East as a harsh “concrete jungle”, despite being well looked after by 
residents (Interview Smith, 2011).  The public spaces were bland unfenced expenses of 
grass with little planting. One central space contained a childrensʼ play area above the roof 
                                                                                                                                                        
extended this framework to cover most local government services and by the early 1990s, Globe Town 
Neighbourhood would have contracted out cleaning and maintenance, using CCT for technical services 
such as surveying and architecture, but still be maintaining aspects of housing management under 
their control. 
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of a large underground carpark.  There were complaints that the communal refuse bins were 
too small and overflowing with rubbish71.   
Figure 6.5 Ranwell East Estate: Pre-DICE 
 
Unsurprisingly, due to the extensive post second-world-war residential construction in the 
borough, Tower Hamlets had a large number of estates with either walkways or high-rise 
towers typical of 1970s design. The Ranwell East blocks were joined by link bridges at first, 
second and fourth floor levels. Smith identified these as areas where groups of youths 
congregated, who were reported as causing disturbances and muggings (Interview Smith, 
2011). Coleman identified this as Ranwell Eastʼs worst defect: 
“The complex was a maze of escape routes for hooligans and criminals 
and because anyone could go through all other blocks, tenants could not 
get to know everyone frequenting their territory and a spirit of anonymity 
and alienation prevailed” (Coleman and Silver, 1995?a).  
                                                      
71 Although one of Colemanʼs key abuse indicators was litter the DICE principles did not address the 
problems of refuse stores or chutes in mass housing.   
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 Figure 6.6 Ranwell East Estate site plan: Pre-DICE 
 
 
Figure 6.7 Ranwell East Estate site plan: Post-DICE 
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Figure 6.8 Walkways at Ranwell East Estate 
 
Ranwell East was one of 18 estates where the Safe Neighbourhoods Unit (SNU) ran 
practical crime reduction projects between 1981 and 1986. Their 1988 report records two 
design problems: a significant lack of security to individual blocks and poor heating resulting 
in very high bills. Both were accentuated by inadequate cleaning and an unresponsive repair 
service. SNU identified two main crime and anti-social behaviour issues to address: 
vandalism and noise nuisance. SNU recorded high child densities and suggested that anti-
social behaviour was aggravated by the lack of social and play facilities. The number of 
children on both estates exceeded Wilsonʼs (1980) recommended threshold for child density, 
which she linked to high levels of vandalism. But both estates also had large numbers of 
elderly residents and it was this mix of young and old which exaggerated the generational 
conflict. Youths congregating was a frequent complaint at both Rogers and Ranwell East 
(see Appendix F for a discussion of residents demographics including child densities before 
and after DICE). These population characteristics will have had a practical impact on factors 
affecting the application of defensible space principles, such as density of occupation, likely 
presence during the day to provide ʻnatural surveillanceʼ, or whether someone was likely to 
intervene if they see criminal or anti-social behaviour.  SNU were disappointed with the lack 
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of sustained impact from their interventions which consisted of deploying youth workers and 
small scale security improvements; “despite being one of the Unitʼs earliest projects, it is the 
one in which least progress has been made” (SNU, 1988, p.25). 
Coleman had surveyed the estate for Utopia on Trial noting its notoriety as a failing estate. 
Her assessment visit in 1988 identified an average design disadvantagement score of 11.9  
placing it amongst the worst 10% that Coleman had surveyed (Coleman and Naylor, 1993?). 
Substantial alteration would be necessary to reduce this score and the proposals made by 
the KCL DICE Unit were extensive.  Costing over £18M in 1991 the Ranwell East DICE 
works were the largest estate improvement contract in the country at that time (Interview 
Silver, 1995) and the scale and complexity of the scheme resulted in the highest cost per 
unit of all seven DICE schemes. It was also one of the more sensitive selections, having 
already received substantial improvement grants.  
The scheme demolished the walkways and three link blocks so no interconnecting entrances 
remained. Full-length external balconies were installed at first and third floor level of the 
larger blocks, doubling as a secondary means of escape for upper floors. The gaps left by 
the demolished slab blocks and underused garages were infilled with 108 new traditional 
terraced houses.  Pre- and post-DICE the overall number of homes remained similar, but 
funding the new housing proved problematic. DICE funding paid for 234 new-build houses 
across the seven schemes, but there was a waning of DoE support for these which Coleman 
attributed to the removal of Thatcherʼs personal support after her resignation (Coleman and 
Silver, 1995?a).   
In fact Thatcherʼs housing policy was one of the barriers to the construction of new housing. 
By the mid 1990s Councils were unable to retain funds received from right-to-buy and were: 
“saddled with a housing policy which didnʼt allow them to build houses. 
Alice just couldnʼt understand, building a house is very different to putting 
up a fence” (Interview Stride, 2011).  
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New housing could be paid for by HIP but was to be run and managed by a housing 
association such as Old Ford which later took ownership of the Ranwell East72, so the KCL 
DICE Unit had little practical involvement in the specification of the new housing (Interview 
McKeown, 2013).  Coleman used the construction of new houses not only to increase the 
type of housing she believed to be most beneficial, but also to remove ʻconfusedʼ public 
green spaces or amenities  such as vandalised play areas she perceived as undesirable. 
These included the residentsʼ social club which was appropriated for a site office and estate 
office (Interview Smith, 2011). Removing the social club was welcomed by some residents 
(Interview Ranwell East Residents A, and B, 2011). But the failure to reinstate play areas 
was unpopular; “they didnʼt accommodate the kids at all when planning DICE” (Interview 
Smith, 2011) with post-DICE photographs of children playing amongst cars parked in the 
new streets (Price Waterhouse, 1997).  
The KCL DICE team had suggested removing the upper floors of several blocks, leaving 
ground floor maisonettes as ʻquasi-housesʼ, but existing structural defects made demolition 
and replacement with new build houses a cheaper option.  Within the retained blocks the 
upper floors were sub-divided in two ways. Stair towers broke up the four-story blocks (two 
stacked maisonettes) forming sub-blocks of four to eight homes. The top floor maisonettes 
on the higher blocks required lifts as well as stairs and as costs only allowed one lift per 
block, these has to serve the whole upper floor, often above Colemanʼs ideal threshold of six 
homes per corridor. As with the Rogers Estate, some internal modernization was undertaken 
in parallel with DICE. Replacement central heating systems were installed, along with new 
kitchens and bathrooms and UPVC windows.  
Site layout changes were made to channel traffic and pedestrians in front of homes. The 
existing stub roads were extended to connect to a narrow, new road winding north/south 
                                                      
72 This shift is illustrated by Local Authority housing completions falling from 30,422 in 1985 to 1,535 in 
1997, while Housing Association home completions increased from 13,648 in 1985 to 28,357 in 1997 
(DoE/DCLG Housing stats/Live tables quoted in Wilcox and Perry, 2014, Table 192, p.114)  
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through the estate73. However several former pedestrian desire lines were blocked by the 
incorporation of semi-public space into individual gardens. The reworking of the estateʼs 
layout, re-orientating flats so front doors overlooked the new roads, plus inserting new 
entrance stair towers resulted in extremely complicated and confusing house numbering. 
One block had three road addresses, with unsequentially numbered flats. An attempt to 
reallocate numbers in 1993 only made matters worse (Interview Smith, 2011). Housing staff 
mentioned other unforeseen negative consequences, requiring later adaptation: erecting 
metal screens on the fire escape balconies to prevent unwanted access and preserve 
privacy and rectifying sound penetration from the modified ventilation. Coleman had resisted 
any relaxation of the DICE principles to meet fire regulations and when the resulting loose 
interpretation of the regulations was discovered they had to be retro-fitted with acceptable 
solutions.  
6.2.1 Physical or symbolic deterrents 
Coleman disliked door entry phones, which she described as “a siege exercise, accepting 
the criminal presence and trying to keep it out” (Bar-Hillel, 1986a, p.17), arguing that suitably 
designed entrances were a sufficient deterrent so made them irrelevant. The DICE 
adaptations at Rogersʼ resulted in sixteen entrances, a substantial number for two small 
housing blocks. However following pressure from residents, entry phones were installed 
(Price Waterhouse, 1995). The current estate managers complained about the excessive 
number of entry controls required and the disproportionate maintenance burden they had 
inherited (Interview Choudrey, 2011). 
At Ranwell East, Coleman argued for the removal of the existing door entry phones: 
“Unfortunately, that didnʼt work, because no sooner did the new stairwells 
go up with the doors removed, than youths on the estate would 
congregate on the stairwells once again, which is what obviously the 
project wanted to get rid of. So the door entry systems did go back” 
(Interview Smith, 2011). 
                                                      
73 One of the new roads was named Alice Lane. 
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A Building Magazine article describes this removal of existing entry phones as illogical, 
noting that the Council replaced them two years after DICE completed (Spring, 1997). 
Despite this reinstallation in response to tenantsʼ demands, the housing managers 
interviewed were sympathetic to the significance Coleman placed on symbolic over physical 
thresholds (Interviews Smith and Williams, 2011). 
6.2.5 Responding to residents concerns  
The Boroughʼs restructuring and creation of local neighbourhoods coincided with an 
increased interest in tenant consultation.  However the commitment to consultation appears 
to have varied between the two estates. A great deal of tenant consultation was undertaken 
on the Rogers estate with door to door surveys as well as open forum meetings. Stride 
described as the prototype for the approach his team still aims for; “the consultation was the 
forerunner of where we are today and it was really quite extensive”: 
“It was going to be a big change to the residents. This just going in and 
doing new windows and a bit of landscaping, we were changing the whole 
of the design, the layout of the blocks. We were splitting friends up…So 
the old makeup, the dynamics of the block were being changed, which for 
some residents was a big problem, but quickly settled down once it was in 
place. They got used to it. Many of them understood the principles behind 
it, what was trying to be achieved, because obviously theyʼd been 
screaming and shouting prior to that about the problems that they were 
encountering and we were saying we can alleviate these problems” 
(Interview Stride, 2011).  
McCarthy also recalled residentsʼ concern that the greater privacy would turn into isolation. 
Residents believed that shortening balconies to access two to three flats would mean them 
being cut off from their neighbours (Interview McCarthy, 2011). This anecdote of a tenant 
having to exit the block and re-enter to visit an old person in an adjacent flat was repeated in 
the mainstream press (The Times and Daily Express), as well as architectural publications 
(Warman, 1991; Kaniuk, 1991; Guest, 1993). Rogers residents were concerned about being 
displaced or moved away, but as with most DICE estates there was no decanting during the 
remodeling. This may have been an effect of Colemanʼs ambition for DICE to be a controlled 
experiment requiring the resident population to remain unchanged, but is more likely to be a 
result of improved housing practices and that the costs and disruption involved by large 
scale decanting programmes had made them unpopular with Local Authorities.  
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Coleman attended the initial meeting where tenants voted on participation, but few other 
consultation events which Stride reported were “an operational matter” and that Coleman did 
not value community empowerment as “part of the experiment” “Wherever possible we kept 
her away from residents” (Interview Stride, 2011). Similarly staff on Ranwell East recalled 
Colemanʼs attitude as less ʻengagingʼ than ʻinformingʼ residents (Interview Smith, 2011). 
Ranwell East Residents were more involved during the works, with a steering group made up 
of leaseholders and residents meeting with the contractors every fortnight, but residentsʼ 
memories of the consultation process show they were less content with the process and 
outcomes;  
“There were leaflets saying what was going to happen and a woman who did 
consultation. But they didnʼt consider what weʼd already done. Weʼd paved 
the garden and the scaffolding cracked them…  Weʼd already done the brick 
wall and they put in another wall. It was all very stressful.  If weʼd been 
around more in the day maybe itʼd have been better. Maureen used to go to 
meetings but it was typical, loads of people shouting, mayhem. Youʼd have to 
go to have your say even if they didnʼt listen. Some people were pleased with 
the result, those whoʼd moved from the tower into the houses.  Maureen used 
to talk with the contracts manager. Heʼd say yes to anything to keep you 
quiet. But something happened and he was moved off and there was another 
person so nothing came of it” (Interview Ranwell East Residents B and C, 
2011). 
 6.2.6 The impact of personnel changes on knowledge sharing  
Coleman closely monitored the site works, ensuring adherence to her specified changes. 
She was scathing about architectsʼ inability to interpret her principles, “I do have to be firm. 
One particular architect on a different project [not Rogers] kept changing my plans and Iʼm 
afraid I had to shout at him - I was told later he was quite scared” (Guest, 1990, p.21). 
However the DICE consultancy leaflets are far more complementary, praising the architects 
for the Rogers, Kingsthorp and Bennett Street schemes by name (Coleman and Silver, 
1995?a).  In some cases, Coleman sought to implement her version of defensible space 
beyond the agreed programme. At Rogers, community architects Hunt Thompson 
Associates were quickly replaced by Stanford Eatwell Partners, when it became apparent 
that Thompson and Coleman (who knew each other having appeared on television together 
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in 198574) were agreeing alterations beyond the scope of the project (Interview McCarthy, 
2011). Following this rearrangement the construction contract ran smoothly. 
Ranwell East though, suffered from a more significant series of personnel changes. In 1994, 
towards the end of the programme, The Observer reported an investigation by Scotland 
Yardʼs Fraud Squad into accusations of maladministration of a tender for design work in 
Tower Hamlets75. Uncovering this earlier professional impropriety resulted in the removal of 
the contract manager (Interview Smith, 2011). However, the selected designersʼ contract had 
already been terminated when Coleman saw their proposed plans. In her opinion “they 
werenʼt up to the job, that was obvious” (Dodd, 1994, p.6). This resulted in the scheme being 
designed by temporary architecture staff employed by the council.  
This incident may seem an entertaining but irrelevant ʻlocal government waste of public 
fundsʼ scandal, with an investigation instigated by an incoming Labour housing committee, to 
blacken the reputation of their Liberal Democrat predecessorsʼ decisions (Interview Williams, 
2011).  It does, however, illustrate several relevant points that distinguish academic from 
professional practice. It is not unexpected that the KCL DICE Unit did not have the skills or 
capacity to undertake a feasibility study for a £18M refurbishment, but it illustrates the 
vagueness around the KCL Unitʼs role as ʻresearchʼ consultants. Codes of professional 
ethics for design/construction are justifiably different from researchersʼ codes of ethics but 
the KCL DICE Unit should have obtained Professional Indemnity Insurance to cover any 
negative consequences of the advice they were providing. Similarly the disparity of 
investigation required to inform academic research against practical implementation is 
                                                      
74 See Jacobs and Lees (2013) for a description of the Estate tour that Coleman and Thompson 
arranged for the Prince of Wales in 1986. 
75 In September 1989, a design consultancy had won the tender for the Ranwell East feasibility study. 
Because of its size it was the only DICE scheme where a full feasibility study was commissioned 
independent of the KCL DICE unit. The ʻfeasibility studyʼ evolved into a design commission. Councilors 
awarded the work on the advice of council officers despite the tender price being dramatically below 
that of their competitors. A further £1.5M of work was awarded without tendering a month later. 
McKeown had become concerned about the architectsʼ appointment on discovering that under the 
guise of pressure to proceed rapidly, the Tower Hamletsʼ officer had not followed RIBA codes of 
practice, but selected a personal contact rather than follow strict council procurement procedures 
(Interview McKeown, 2013). 
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obvious, however the blurring of academic practice into commercial/professional activities 
required an understanding of multiple forms of ʻgood practiceʼ particularly where it was 
impacting on highly procedural activities such as public sector procurement. Both the 
research and construction projects suffered from similar constraints, such as the time and 
delivery pressures from within London Borough of Tower Hamlets as well as the DoE. But 
whereas construction project management is founded on dealing with these types of 
challenges, the less onerous financial penalties or consequences found in research resulted 
in a tension between the two communities of practice.  And, finally it is an example of 
Colemanʼs significant power and influence achieving the design consultants dismissal from 
the job. It is not clear whether the poor original architects or the change of staff can explain 
the arbitrary and off-kilter design decisions visible on the estate. Unsurprisingly this incident 
is not referred to in any of Colemanʼs publications nor mentioned in the Price Waterhouse 
evaluation (and is rightly excluded from their assessment of value for money). And yet it is 
the kind of messy real world problem that should be discussed in the more rigorous form of 
evaluation suggested by the SNU framework (see Chapter Seven) or a transparent 
examination of ʻwhat worksʼ in policy terms. Thinking of informal social mechanisms of 
dissemination, this is also the kind of event gossiped about by architects, quantity surveyors 
or Local Authority housing staff. So is likely to have contributed to shaping the narrative of 
Ranwell East as an [un]successful regeneration case study. 
Figure 6.9 Construction of Alice Lane 
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6.3 Outcomes post DICE  
Colemanʼs list of predicted outcomes from the remodelled estates was extensive and 
ambitious (Price Waterhouse 1997). I have not attempted to re-examine in detail outputs 
related to the mass of data collected at the time, such as decreased estate management 
costs, resident turnover, or reported crime.  I have however collated the change in 
Colemanʼs main indicators, her design disadvantage and abuse scores.  
Table 6.2 Design disadvantagement and abuse scores for Rogers76 and Ranwell East 
Estates: Pre- and Post-DICE 
 
(Adapted from Coleman and Cross, 1994; Coleman, Cross and Silver, 1994)  
These scores were used to select sites, as predictive design tools and as assessment 
mechanism for the schemes.   As such they measure and record the extent that the physical 
blocks were remodelled. Whether these changes led to Colemanʼs predicted effects is more 
questionable.  So this section considers several more diffuse outcomes, based on the 
professionalsʼ perceptions of the schemes. Most of the outcomes are non-monetary: more 
                                                      
76 Coleman noted the high pre-DICE abuse scores at Rogers as indicative of “other forms of social 
breakdown” and blamed the worsening abuse scores in the 2nd post-DICE survey on the shallow 
forecourts that collected litter. Alternative explanations, the unpredictability of litter as a measure 
particularly for a site with a shop on the corner on route to a nearby school were not considered.   
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attention for Globe Town Neighbourhood, establishing an experienced team, or gathering 
knowledge and learning about defensible space. Nonetheless a handful of significant 
outcomes were financial; receiving more funding than usual for refurbishment, for these and 
other projects. 
6.3.1 Rogers Estate: Post DICE 
Chapter Seven will describe the evaluation findings in detail. The Price Waterhouse 
evaluation attributed the reduction of crime levels on the Rogers Estate after the DICE 
project to the general gentrification of the wider area rather than the works themselves.  Yet 
those involved in the Globe Town Neighbourhood team stressed the contribution made by 
their improved local management of the neighbourhood (Interview Wright, 2011)77. As a 
controlled experiment, Coleman and Price Waterhouse attempted to separate out the impact 
of a single initiative, to isolate and measure one amongst a range of complex interconnecting 
activities and changes (Harrison, 2000); whereas Stride and his team saw the works to 
Rogers as a small part of the jigsaw of improvements to be made in the neighbourhood they 
were responsible for.  Whether this improvement could be sustained was also uncertain. 
Revisiting the Rogers estate, McCarthy spoke with a original resident of the bungalows, 
reporting “she loves it, she absolutely loves it.” Nonetheless his professional assessment of 
the long-term upkeep was less positive, with lack of funding limiting maintenance of a 
reasonable standard (Interview McCarthy, 2011). One resident, still annoyed about the 
revised parking and the consultation process, bitterly recalled; “the only thing I got from the 
works was a back garden” (Interview Rogers Resident A, 2011), implying that any benefits 
had been outweighed by the fuss.  
Discussing the need for continued investment to maintain housing estates Sporle suggested 
that funding allocation was self-reinforcing for many housing or urban policies.  That is, 
reinforcing the ability to align with the aspirations of funding regimes and so attract attention 
and money, highlighted further what needed to be done: 
                                                      
77 Kevin Wright was the property services manager for Globe Town Neighbourhood. 
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“The outcome of having a DICE project was that you got investment and 
you got attention.  My experience of housing estates is that it doesn't 
matter how good or bad the design, although of course ʻpoor designʼ will 
make it worse much quicker, the fact is that if you donʼt invest and if you 
donʼt give people attention, it's going to go wrong.  So in a way, Alice 
Colemanʼs approach was an entirely appropriate approach, because there 
were all these bloody awful estates that something had to be done about.  
If nobody is going to let you have money unless you can tick certain 




Figure 6.10 Rogers Estate: Post-DICE  
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The Globe Town team also used the DICE project to justify the need for increased levels of 
Estates Action funding for subsequent projects:  
“Earlier we did a straightforward Estate Action improvement, which at the 
time  people went, wow!  But once we were doing DICE and then moved 
onto Greenways after that, we were able to say to Estate Action, look 
anything after DICE we need to do at that level. So we were able to use it 
to get higher funding….And they didn't give us it all, but they definitely 
upped the figures” (Interview Stride, 2011). 
Not only was Stride proficient at attracting grant funding, he was adept at publicizing his 
achievements and attracting attention. The newly completed Rogers Estate, visibly improved 
and easily accessible from Westminster was a powerful good practice case study, a 
showcase for urban regeneration and a transfer mechanism for spreading the concept of 
defensible space. 
“George Young78 loved it.  He came down and brought hundreds of civil 
servants down, loads of times. There was him and me at the front walking 
                                                      
78 Sir George Young then Minister of Housing and Planning 
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round Rogers with about 200 civil servants.  We had coach loads.  He 
loved Bow Town anyway..So it's surprising he [George Young] didn't 
make sure it [the DICE evaluation] got out there. He saw us as a model 
and loved us” (Interview Stride, 2011).  
6.3.2 Ranwell East Estate: Post DICE 
As with the Rogersʼ resident, gaining private external space was valued by the Ranwell East 
occupants:  
“The best thing about DICE was they closed the landings and we got extra bit 
of garden” (Interview Ranwell East Resident B, 2011). 
Even when residents noticed the reduced public space, they were not critical of this change: 
“Thereʼs less open public space. It is much denser but to be honest thereʼs 
less vandalism and less congregating” (Interview Ranwell East Residents 
A, 2011)  
Contemporary opinions on the outcomes at Ranwell East varied. Some were not particularly 
favourable: “Ranwell Eastʼs tawdry, 1980s spec-built image that will date as quickly as did 
the estateʼs original 1960s vintage housing” (Spring, 1997, p.50: Guest, 1993).  However 
three years after completion of the scheme,  interviewed for Building, Michelle Smith 
reported:  
“Itʼs definitely a nicer place to live. Before the whole layout and feel of the 
estate was dull and dingy and people were moving out. Now, groups of 
residents sit in their gardens or on their balconies in summer and have 
drinks together. Thereʼs a community spirit slowly growing up” (Spring, 
1997, p.50). 
Figure 6.11 Ranwell East Estate: Post-DICE  
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6.3.3 Transferring the DICE legacy to other estates 
All the Rogers project team interviewed described DICE as an influential period in their lives 
and that this unique experience had supplied insights and practical lessons which they 
continued to apply (Interviews McCarthy, Stride and Wright, 2011):   
“It was very, very difficult to secure money of that ilk, three or four or five 
million pounds worth of money to do Estate Action programmes. Our 
capital programme up to that time was pretty low-level stuff, very much 
scratching the surface of estate renewal. A new roof, windows, doors but 
nothing that was able to transform a complete estate. DICE was definitely 
a one off opportunity to be honest with you. Something we wanted to 
migrate to other estates but that wasnʼt going to be possible. That doesnʼt 
mean we didnʼt take the ideology behind Rogers with us” (Interview Stride, 
2011).  
McCarthy described the experience of the DICE project as “totally changing my thinking”. 
“Theyʼre [the defensible space principles] taken for granted now really, 
and our design briefs automatically take them as first principles really 
now” (Interview McCarthy, 2011). 
Prior to the scheme some participants only had a basic understanding of defensible space.  
Yet both Stride and McCarthy described the process of ʻbreaking up the blocksʻ as predating 
Colemanʼs principles.  Stride remembered as a junior estate officer in 1981, persuading the 
repairs maintenance contractor to erect fences across balconies to reduce their length and 
“break the box up” (Interview Stride, 2011). 
McCarthy was so confident with the transferability of the DICE principlesʼ positive impact, 
that by mid 1993 he was planning to implement the best aspects, spending £6.5M of Estate 
Action funding to apply DICE principles to nearby Bethnal Green Estate.  In retrospect he 
ranked creating private front gardens as the simplest, most wide-spread and successfully 
repeated feature. In addition to Colemanʼs claims for the improved territoriality and 
neighbourliness it was inexpensive and had an additional benefit of reducing Local Authority 
costs of upkeep for communal grassed areas (Interview McCarthy, 2011).  Stride identified 
three other DICE legacy projects; Bancroft, Leopold and Burdett Estates in Poplar. He recalls 
that Burdett was most closely a DICE scheme which ʻbroke the whole estate upʼ but at a high 
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cost of £55,000 a unit at 1998 prices, now over £100,000 a unit. Few subsequent Estates 
Action projects were as generously supported, so the DICE elements replicated tended to be 
the cheaper ones: erecting fences, better lighting of public areas and only providing 
additional stairs to upper floors where this could be achieved cost effectively (Interview 
Stride, 2011). Those ideas that could be replicated more easily became widespread. These 
were mixed with familiar ideas like ʻbreaking up the boxʼ or reducing circulation as well as 
interventions such as removing refuse chutes that were additional to the DICE principles. 
These design changes mutated and were adjusted to fit the new sites, cross-fertilizing with 
other improvements that the team wanted to apply.  
Asked which aspects of the DICE scheme they would reapply, the current Ranwell East 
housing manager described a ʻshopping list of ideas to tryʼ: 
“Weʼd do bits and pieces.  One of the things weʼve recognised quite 
quickly is there is not one solution, that what we mean by defensible 
space will vary from area to area. Our recognition is that it has to be 
treated by a block and by an estate type solution” (Interview Williams, 
2011).  
Williams is more outspoken about those elements they would not repeat. He questioned the 
use of high level-fencing that was recommended automatically as “turning it into Colditz”, 
regardless of particular boundary requirements in specific locations.  Williams also identified 
poorly maintained private gardens as a challenge (Interview Williams, 2011). Colemanʼs urge 
to build additional houses on every parcel of public green space, increasing site densities, 
limited the future adaptability of the estates. Once communal space has been transferred 
over to private ownership there is little chance of reversing this. 
This reinforces my hypothesis that the concept of defensible space moved not as a whole, 
but as a cluster of concepts. Peck and Theodore (2012) identified that a process of 
fragmentation prioritizes certain aspects (those that practitioners see to work). By breaking 
the concept of defensible space, (and of DICE) into manageable/relevant elements and 
applying only those aspects that are felt to be useful to the context that they worked in, each 
practitioner devised their own version of defensible space.   Thus defensible space has been 
shown to function not as comprehensive theory, only at the level of a cluster of interacting 
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ideas. Finally this clustering of fragmented concepts also reinforces how DICE fits to 
Hogwood and Gunnʼs (1984) characterization of policy as multi-faceted and mutable (see 
Chapter Two). At some point in the story DICE conforms to each of their five categories with 
each policy fragment achieving differing degrees of embeddedness.  
Table 6.3  DICE conforming to multiple definitions of policy 
Policy as -   How did DICE conform to this classification of policy? 
- aspiration, or a mission 
statement 
DICE (alongside PEP and other regeneration or crime 
reduction policies) aimed to improve residentsʼ lives, and 
reduce levels of crime. 
- a set of proposals 
 
Utopia on Trial as manifesto, or the DICE 
Disadvantagement Reports setting out the  DICE 
principles for the design of flats and housing.  
- formal authorisation that 
legitimises proposals 
Margaret Thatcher authorising funds to be provided for 
DICE.  
The inclusion of the DICE principles in the Audit 
Commission report (1986) or British Standards (BSI 1986; 
2000) (see Chapter Eight)  
- a programme DoEʼs ring-fenced funding for the DICE programme 
- as process or field of 
activity 
 
Defensible space resisting a fixed, permanent or 
immutable formation with the DICE principles being 
reshaped during their implementation across different 
estates.  
 
Recognizing and reapplying the lessons learnt on DICE, required reflection on what had 
been learnt.  Schön believed designers/practitioners take spontaneous and intuitive actions, 
then continuously revise these in response to feedback.  Learning is a series of incremental 
steps with pauses for reflection, with practitioners operating through a continual process of 
self-adjustment (Schön, 1983).  An objective and unbiased evaluation can act as a catalyst 
for this reflective activity (Palfrey, Thomas et al., 2012). However as the following Chapter 
will show, the evaluations of DICE were neither objective nor unbiased.  
The project team at Rogers was unaware of the DICE evaluation when the report was 
published in 1997:   
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“We never really had anyone come back and look at it. Even within the 
Council there was a lack of knowledge flow between departments or 
neighbourhood areas. I didnʼt know much about the Ranwell scheme, to 
be honest, I knew where it was, but not more. Rogers started before 
Ranwell which ran on for a number of years but there was very little 
publicity about the success or otherwise, or information on value from 
sources such as Council Audits” (Interview Wright, 2011). 
 
Wright attributes this to organisational decentralisation as well as the perceived lack of 
significance of formal knowledge transfer at the time. Other staff either had no recollection of 
the evaluations (Interviews McCarthy and Stride, 2011), or echoed Wrightʼs perception that 
the scheme had not undergone ʻproper evaluationʼ (Interview Stanford, 2011).  
Conclusion 
This chapter has concentrated on the micro-practices and decisions made within these two 
case studies. Both case studies prompted insights into related, but less significant themes 
and Appendix F sketches out material warranting further investigation. Examples were 
chosen that informed the three key research questions: how ʻdefensible spaceʼ as an idea 
was mobilized into practice; how its mobilizing mechanisms affected the successful transfer 
and application on the two sites; and what practitioners recognized and used as ʻevidenceʼ. It 
is clear that these daily micro-practices were as important in the overall successful 
embedding of the concept or implementation of a policy as the large scale moves.  
Ekblom (2011) emphasises the central role of mechanisms and context in the transferability 
of good practice. Rather than a universal version of ʻwhat worksʼ, he suggests we should 
consider “innovation based on generic and generative principles, distilled from site-specific 
mechanisms” (ibid., p.10). This Chapter has exposed both formal and informal mechanisms 
(Thatcherite housing policy, DoE funding regimes, the DICE reports, face-to-face meetings 
with residents, Colemanʼs personal interventions with other participants and so on.)  Site-
specific mechanisms emerge to address the local challenges.  Where one mechanism fails, 
another may compensate. So in Tower Hamlets, the loss of institutional knowledge through 
poor record keeping, or lack of feedback loops, placed greater emphasis on the continuous 
individual presence of particular staff. This meant that the recommendations of Mark Jones 
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who was the Architectural Liaison Officer at Ranwell East throughout DICE carried great 
weight. ʻBest practiceʼ case studies have been shown to be a very powerful transfer 
mechanism. The recommendations included in the DoEʼs evaluation were irrelevant to the 
Rogers team as they were unaware of the report as a transfer device. Stride was able to 
publicize Rogers as ʻsuccessful good practiceʼ  but I have shown that there is as much to 
learn (if not more) from the failure at Ranwell East.  
Many of the examples discussed in this chapter reinforce the impossibility of testing an urban 
policy with any experimental rigour. DICE was not operating in a policy vacuum and the 
projectʼs aims were influenced by/interacted with other housing or economic policies of the 
time as well as the urban fabric it set out to improve.  Some constraints were intangible 
(tendering policies affecting management or repairs services, or the policies funding new 
housing) others physical (structural defects, or existing road layouts). The recurring example 
of Colemanʼs rejection of entry phones as diluting the symbolic sense of ownership illustrates 
the conflict between her abstract theoretical position, residentsʼ wishes and the practical 
experience of housing staff79. To practitioners such as McKeown, with experience in 
management and maintenance of large housing estates, the DICE principles failed to get to 
the causes of the physical deterioration on the estates, let alone beginning to address the 
social problems.  She questioned the ethics of not addressing basic refurbishment issues:  
“I looked at the DICE estates with windows falling out and wondered what 
we were doing just changing the outside spaces.  I had a maintenance 
background, used to surveying for dampness and rot. I could see that the 
problems werenʼt going to be solved with some fences” (Inteview with 
McKeown, 2013). 
Occasionally practical experience won out, as the practitioners rejected Colemanʼs ideas 
regardless of the evidence she presented.  
                                                      
79 This was a contrary position for Coleman to take. Around 1984/5 she had added a 16th DICE 
principle, recommending glazed doors over open door apertures.  The security technology of the time, 
entry keypads or key fobs was basic and easy to vandalise.  Despite this entryphones (and CCTV) 
were high on residentsʼ lists of desired improvements. 
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I argued in Chapter Four for the importance of a suitable ʻlanding siteʼ for policies or new 
ideas. This chapter shows that these suitable conditions can be very localized. Tower 
Hamlets at the neighbourhood scale may have proved a favourable experimentation site, but 
more successful outcomes occurred at Rogers than Ranwell East.  Interviewees also agreed 
that the Rogers alterations had a more positive and lasting impact not only compared to 
Ranwell but on other regeneration projects (Interviews Jones, Stride and Wright, 2011). One 
obvious explanation may be the size and spatial arrangement of the estate. The compact 
scale of the Rogers and its less diverse and intense social problems (Price Waterhouse, 
1996), meant that a smaller variety of design changes were implemented.  However, I would 
argue that the success was due more to the people involved in Rogers, their keenness for 
innovation, willingness to absorb new ideas and the ways that they applied Colemanʼs 
principles. This openness to innovation was occasionally stronger than their commitment to 
DICE. This enabled the team to cut and paste those aspects that suited them, or they felt 
would work; for example the Globe Town Neighbourhood teamʼs desire for resident 
consultation was a stronger driver than Colemanʼs ʻtelling residentsʼ resulting in a very 
inclusive consultation process; or pragmatically retrofitting door entry phones once 
Colemanʼs involvement on site was ended.  
In contrast at Ranwell East, due to the reallocation of the design contract and use of 
temporary architects, there was no established design delivery team. These and other 
factors conspired so that the designs seemed half-baked, appearing to have applied the 
DICE rules rigidly and unquestioningly – with uncomfortable contrived results and an 
insufficient specificity of response to the variety of flat types, differing block sizes and forms 
that Ranwell East estate contained. The regeneration of the Mozart Estate (comparable in 
size to Ranwell East) described in Chapter Eight, used an equally broad palate of responses, 
but each adaptation varied slightly over each phase and adjusted depending on how the 
previous designs had been received. The Rogers team was also able to reuse the most 
successful ideas, reapplying them both on the control estates, but also subsequently on the 
large-scale schemes for Poplar HARCA, suggesting that the scale of an estate is not a 
definitive explanatory factor. 
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This chapter has described the processes and outcomes from practicing DICE on two 
estates and started to consider the questions “What works?” “Where?” and “At what scale?” 
The following chapter will explore this in far greater depth by discussing two evaluations of 
the DICE initiative: the Price Waterhouse evaluation (which was highly cautious about which 
elements of the DICE programme were successful) and to Alice Colemanʼs own more 
favourable evaluation.  Just as policy evaluation cannot be limited to asking “What works?” 
but must address the alternative “Why didnʼt this work here?” these two assessments will be 
scrutinized for what they say, and critically what they omit to say, about the DICE project. 
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Chapter 7: Evaluating DICE 
Introduction 
Just as Chapters Five and Six showed that politics was central to the funding and  
implementation of DICE, the assessment of its success was an equally politicised activity. 
One consequence of the supremacy of political authority was the distortion of the evaluative 
process, as Flyvbjerg wryly noted: 
“The result seems predetermined and the evaluations…become more ritual 
than real” (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p.15). 
This chapter considers two varied evaluations of DICE. It establishes the perspective on 
policy and performance evaluation within the DoE in the early 1990s. Building on Judith 
Littlewoodʼs80 1992 report Policy Evaluation: the role of social research (Doig, Littlewood et 
al., 1992) the DoE research group began to undertake widespread evaluation of policy as 
part of the public sector quest for effectiveness, efficiency and economy. One example was 
DoE commissioning an evidence review and evaluative framework for crime reduction 
initiatives from the Safe Neighbourhoods Unit (SNU) (1993). This advised on the forms of 
evidence required for a fair and robust evaluation of a policy intervention.  
The chapter continues with the highly-charged politicised selection of consultants Price 
Waterhouse to oversee the DICE evaluation. Chapter Five described the DoEʼs resistance to 
DICE and from the outset it appears the evaluation was intended to suppress Colemanʼs 
ideas. With no acceptable way to curtail the project without directly countermanding the 
personal authorization of the Prime Minister, the tortuous relationship between the evaluation 
team, the DICE Unit and the DoE continued until the Prime Minister left office. The ambitious 
quasi-experimental evaluation design devised by Price Waterhouse resulted in an 
increasingly convoluted process of data collection and analysis to address the practical 
                                                      
80 Littlewood was then Head of the DoEʼs Research Division. 
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challenges of urban policy research. The reportʼs key findings are summarised, but in the 
light of various omissions I speculate on what the report actually represents.    
Next, I describe Colemanʼs far more modest evaluation.  The relative resources and costs of 
the two are compared, considering the process of professional consultancy against 
academic evaluation. The chapter concludes with the subdued launch of the Price 
Waterhouse report in 1997 and how this indicated its irrelevancy to the DoEʼs opinion of the 
programme. As the civil servant responsible recalled “DICE was just a little bubble that got 
punctured” (Interview Riley, 2011). 
7.1 The Safe Neighbourhoods Unit meta-analysis  
In 1993 the DoE published a significant and comprehensive evidence review Crime 
Prevention on Council Estates. Commissioned from the Safe Neighbourhoods Unit (SNU) 
under the supervision of DoE research manager David Riley, it gathered examples of crime 
reduction interventions in housing estates. These were categorized as: design-led, 
management-led, security-led, social development-led or policing-led interventions.  A 
section titled Urban design and deviance, describes Newmanʼs pioneering New York 
research, Utopia on Trial and the redevelopment of the Mozart Estate. DICE is included as a 
design-led example and various case studies of PEP and EA funded schemes are included 
in the sections on estate based/management-led and estate improvement sections (SNU 
1993).  
The reportʼs tone was pessimistic, acknowledging that despite extensive practical crime 
prevention activity throughout the 1980s, crime rates continued to rise into the 1990s81.  
There were reservations over the quality of information available, use of guarded vocabulary  
(“appears”, “seems”) and cautious caveats about evidence which  “does not allow for 
judgments one way or the other” (ibid., p.3) with long sections on the “scope of the report 
                                                      
81 The British Crime Survey 1984 identified three high risk residential areas; inner city high status non-
family areas (rich homes/privately owned buildings in multiple occupation), inner city multi-racial areas 
and the poorest council estates (BCS, 1984, cited in SNU, 1993, p.8) 
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and its limitations” (ibid., p.2). A (self-evident) conclusion is that assessing the effectiveness 
of a crime prevention scheme hinges on the validity of observersʼ interpretations (ibid., p.3).  
Yet these observers rarely include the full range of community stakeholders, or undertake 
what commentators such as Patton would consider “utilization-focused evaluation”, that is, 
focusing on “how real people in the real world apply evaluation findings and experience the 
evaluation process” (Patton 2002, p.2 cited in Palfrey, Thomas et al. 2012, p.49). The report 
referred to the experience of living in an area suggesting that residents must be the ultimate 
judges of the success, or not, of crime reduction schemes. Crime prevention is only one 
aspect of a residentʼs quality of life and one of many aims of estate regeneration schemes. 
Nonetheless, it can dominate thinking, particularly amongst (design or evaluation) 
professionals and it is misleading not to incorporate judgments of the community on this 
issue. 
Pertinent to this thesis, the report proposed a framework for evaluating crime prevention 
initiatives (SNU, 1993, pp.31-32). Conceding that evaluations can be expensive (in time and 
resources) SNU argued that when constrained costs preclude a fully comprehensive 
evaluation, applying a consistent rigorous basic framework becomes more essential to 
highlight the boundaries and limitations of an evaluationʼs findings and provide credible 
explanations. The framework suggests four forms of evidence are required: i) evidence that 
crime had actually reduced, in addition to residents thinking the problem had reduced; ii) 
evidence that the initiative was responsible for any alterations; iii) evidence of which 
individual measures accounted for any changes; and iv) evidence of the permanence and 
replicability of the effects. As one DoE civil servant, David Riley, managed both the SNU 
review and DICE evaluation it is justifiable to read across these objectives and expectations 
from one project to the other. Thus later in this chapter, I assess both of the DICE 
evaluations against this SNU framework, assessing the strength or weakness of the 
evidence each provides. 
The SNU meta-analysis highlighted difficulties identifying which factors contributed to 
success. They noted that successful schemes share common elements with less successful 
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ones. Referring to the opportunistic model of crime which focuses on individuals rather than 
societal causes (Herbert, 1982; Kitchen and Schneider, 2005) the report notes that initiatives 
may have applied certain approaches not because of their proven efficacy but merely 
because they were fashionable;  
“This reflects the existence of a kind of orthodoxy of approach, a general 
acceptance of a particular model of crime prevention, which emerged in the 
late 1970s and 1980s and which meant that many initiatives have adhered to 
or at least paid lip service to certain ideas or principles such as multi-agency 
working or resident consultation” (SNU 1993, p.3).  
 
The authors were disappointed to identify only eight design-led evaluations  (including the 
SNUʼs own appraisal of the Mozart Estate remodelling - see Chapter Eight). Given this lack 
of evaluative evidence, they were surprised by the number of expensive remodelling projects 
that “at least partly” followed design-led principles. In response, the SNU were looking to the 
Price Waterhouse DICE evaluation to clarify the value of design interventions. SNU 
anticipated that the DICE evaluation, which was publicly announced in a 1991 newspaper 
article (Baillieu, 1991b), would provide definitive explanations: 
“It is hoped that the Department of the Environmentʼs Design Improvement 
Controlled Experiment currently underway settles at least some of the 
arguments about the impact and cost effectiveness of design measures” 
(SNU 1993, p.103). 
There is another reference to the DICE evaluation in the penultimate concluding paragraph, 
where SNU argues for evaluation becoming a condition of funding, to foster greater 
collaboration between practitioners and researchers. This added to the weight of expectation 
for DICE to be thoroughly and honestly evaluated (ibid., p.165).  
7.2 The DoEʼs (Price Waterhouse) Evaluation 
It was imperative for the DoE to demonstrate the impact of its £50M investment, with 
Colemanʼs funding conditional on her participation in an impartial evaluation. The DICE 
evaluation was to be an independent, in-depth assessment of the impact, costs and benefits 
of the initiative.  It became a complicated, costly exercise combining data gathered from 
multiple sources, such as police and social services, as well as large-scale longitudinal 
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surveys of estate residents. David Riley, the Government client, was a social research 
specialist having worked at the Home Office (HO) before moving to the DoE. At the time of 
DICE, he was a relatively junior civil servant, but progressed rapidly managing significant 
joint Department evaluations including the SNU report (1993) and PEP evaluation (Foster 
and Hope, 1993)82. Evaluation of some form was a typical expectation for most publicly 
funded programmes (Wells, 2007), and co-operating with the evaluators was a precondition 
of selected Local Authorities receiving DICE funding. Yet Riley felt Coleman agreed to the 
evaluation “very dismissively without any intention of paying attention to it” (Interview Riley, 
2011). Rileyʼs original involvement was commenting on early correspondence between Alice 
Coleman and Sir George Young.  He felt that Colemanʼs evidence for such design-led 
interventions was rather weak. This led to the Head of Division for Research, Judith 
Littlewood, advising the DoE Permanent Under Secretary Terry Heiser that the proposed 
research was inappropriate. Riley summarised his briefing to Littlewood as “basically say, 
you do it over my dead body but if you do it then itʼs got to be properly evaluated” (Interview 
Riley, 2011). The DoEʼs lack of confidence in Colemanʼs ideas even prior to the evaluation 
was mentioned by several interviewees (Interviews Riley, Sporle and Wiles, 2011).  
“It was nonsense to start with.  You knew perfectly well what the evidence 
would be. Our concern was to cover all the bases so we couldnʼt be 
accused of overlooking something. It seemed such an improbable 
mechanism to produce any benefit, especially since you managed to piss 
the tenants off enormously in the process” (Interview Riley, 2011). 
One of the Price Waterhouse evaluators, Katrin Sporle, reinforced that a key concern was 
that such an iconoclastic concept might proliferate and “to ensure that Coleman could not run 
away with public money and start doing this all over the place” (Interview Sporle, 2011). This 
appears to have been an unintended consequence of Coleman establishing the KCL DICE 
Consultancy Unit and trialing the DICE approach on the Mozart Estate.  Despite describing 
DICE as a full-scale pilot, the DoE did not intend it as a trial run for extensive roll out.  
                                                      
82 On leaving the DoE, Riley built a career around evaluative research, later becoming Head of 
Profession for Government Social Research and then Chief Social Researcher at the HSE. 
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“I donʼt think there were discussions about the longer term future of these 
kinds of interventions, because they're quite expensive.  I donʼt think 
anyone was anticipating the benefits would be commensurate with the 
amount of investment” (Interview Riley, 2011). 
As Chapter Five showed, Colemanʼs derogatory comments about the DoE in Utopia on Trial 
and the poor fit of her proposals alongside other regeneration approaches being promoted 
added to the suspicion of DICE within the Department. This negative DoE view of Colemanʼs 
work may not have been communicated formally to the evaluation team, yet Sporle recalls 
that they were aware of the projectʼs origins with the Prime Minister as well as the 
departmental political tensions surrounding it. They were also aware, via John Harvey, of 
how enthusiastically Local Authorities were applying for the DICE funding and the hostility 
this caused within the Estate Action team (Interview Sporle, 2011).  Thus the expectation 
from the outset was to contain Colemanʼs recommendations, rather than objectively test or 
verify them.  
7.2.1 Evaluatorsʼ personalities, expertise and bias 
In June 1989, having commissioned Colemanʼs research, John Harvey moved from the DoE 
to Price Waterhouse Management Consultants. Acting as a ʻtransfer agentʼ, he passed on 
his knowledge of the projectʼs background and the policy context into this commercial setting 
Once there, Harvey helped a young project manager, Katrine Sporle, draft the tender 
proposal for the DICE evaluation. Price Waterhouse competed for the tender, were 
appointed, and brought together a sizeable team of evaluators. Given the long timeframe for 
the project and the nature and degree of staff turnover of private consultancy, the number of 
evaluators involved in the project and listed in the report is not unusual (Price Waterhouse, 
1997a). Sporle led the day-to-day project management of the evaluation until she left to 
become Director of Administration at Basingstoke and Deane Borough Council in 199283. 
Residentsʼ surveys and physical mapping of estates were subcontracted out to the market 
research firm, MORI.   
                                                      
83 In 1994 Sporle became Chief Executive at Basingstoke and Deane Borough Council, before 
becoming Chief Executive of the Planning Inspectorate for England and Wales in 2003. 
 - 224 - 
Forming a steering group was a sensitive first step in shaping the evaluation, with Coleman 
an essential member to secure her agreement to the evaluation design and outcome 
measures. Riley remembers cannily selecting the steering group members: 
“I was mindful of Alice Colemanʼs rather slippery use of stats.  So I invited 
an eminent statistician. Not letting her wriggle off the hook as it were. It had 
to be open and transparent and done in her presence. Having this steering 
group with independent experts on it turned out to be the right way forward.  
She did cavil at a number of the findings, but they were validated by 
independent experts” (Interview Riley, 2011). 
These experts were: a statistician, Sir David Cox from Nuffield college; Tim Hope, a 
criminologist and “astute methodologist” from Keele University84, Chief Inspector Brian 
Hewitt of the Stafford Crime Prevention Centre and Paul Wiles, then Professor of 
Criminology at Sheffield University. Representatives from the DoE, Department of Health 
and the HO also contributed. Professor Wiles, who later spent nine years as the chief 
scientific adviser at the HO, becoming chief government social scientist in 2007, was a 
particularly combative and outspoken critic of the DICE programme and Colemanʼs research 
from the start.  Nonetheless, the evaluators appreciated his expertise, finding him “a 
marvellously knowledgeable expert, able and sensible” (Interview Sporle, 2011).  
Coleman was displeased with the set up for the evaluation.  An article in Building Design 
sensationally described her as “seething” at the imposition of Price Waterhouse as external 
monitors for the programme (Baillieu, 1991b).  Coleman was suspicious of the reportʼs 
impartiality as its authorship was attributed to John Harvey. Coleman fumed “We will do it, it 
will be a great success; they [Price Waterhouse] will write it up and say it is a great failure“ 
(ibid., p.1).  Harvey later relocated within Price Waterhouse to minimise conflicts of interests 
and accusations of bias arising from his involvement evaluating a project that he had 
commissioned.  However he still retained a significant role in the project liaising with 
Coleman on behalf of the evaluators:    
“Poor John, every week heʼd take Alice down to The Savoy for afternoon 
tea. Go and bloody buy her tea. That was his job.  He was the kind of man 
                                                      
84 Also an evaluator of the PEP (see Foster and Hope, 1993). 
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whose maiden aunts loved him, so he was dispatched to do that while we 
tried to get on top of what on earth was going on” (Interview Wiles, 2011). 
In the early 1990s there were weaker civil service/governmental mechanisms for assessing 
the progress and continuing relevance of research studies. The first Treasury guidance on 
appraisal and evaluation of programmes was published in 1988 (HM Treasury, 1988).  This 
was eventually replaced by the Treasury Green Book (2003), which promoted economic 
evaluation and a few minor non-monetary approaches. In parallel, the Treasury published 
The Magenta Book (Government Social Research Unit, 2003), a practical guide to action 
research and evaluation techniques. Thus formal guidance on integrating evaluation into 
government level decision-making was relatively slow to evolve, although it had been an 
implicit element of policy-making for several decades (Doig, Littlewood at al. 1992; Strategic 
Policy Making Team, 1999).  However there were powerful drivers for participants to 
continue with the initiative, regardless of their opinions of it.  
“We went on for months and months because we had to. It was one of 
those situations where Price Waterhouse werenʼt going to blow the whistle 
on it, they were making a fortune out of it.  Later on, there were some 
mechanisms that might have got you out of that.  In other words, if one 
year in to DICE, somebody was in the position to go to the Minister and 
say ʻthis is barking frankly, weʼre throwing money at this and itʼs not going 
to workʼ, then the whole thing might have been derailed. David Riley was a 
fairly junior research officer at that stage, was managing it.  Judith 
[Littlewood] was quite influential but there were many other things that she 
was trying to do.  In any case, the problem with Judith is that everybody 
knew that she was a great supporter of an alternative answer to this 
problem [PEP] and that kind of discounted the advice she was giving if she 
werenʼt careful.  The fact was everybody was bloody terrified of the Prime 
Minister” (Interview Wiles, 2011).  
Despite the steering groupʼs opinion that the DICE refurbishment schemes were unlikely to 
achieve their intended aims, scoping continued to select potential estates and define the 
evaluation process.  Designing a suitable evaluation methodology was itself challenging. The 
basic design was to collect information at two points: prior to start on site, returning a year 
after completion of the works. Similarly analysis was planned on two levels: first, analyzing 
the impact on an individual estate relative to its own neighbourhood (comparing each estate 
with its local control estates); second, a comparison of the overall pattern of outcomes 
against a pool of all the control estates. Yet even with these multiple comparisons, assessing 
the altered DICE estates against control estates was a poor evaluation design rather than a 
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more randomized selection. Finding suitable matches might be possible for one or two 
variables, but these might not prove to be the significant factors. This simplistic matched 
evaluation design controlled poorly for bias, particularly as one selected variable was an 
arbitrary geographical one, such as all the controls being from the same Local Authority. As 
Chapter Six showed, one Local Authority may have very different management structures at 
a neighbourhood level, restricting the pool of comparators to that neighbourhood. The title 
ʻDesign Improvement Controlled Experimentʼ (DICE) illustrates Colemanʼs aspiration for a 
pseudo-scientific comparative approach, dictating both the use of estate controls and 
controlling for as many variables as possible (Interview Coleman, 2013). However as 
Chapter Six showed, her selection of potential estates was based on a preconceived idea of 
the extent that they could demonstrate the success of her DICE principles. As such the trial 
was the antithesis of a randomized controlled trial (RCT), commonly considered the gold 
standard of trustworthy evidence. Recent Government evaluation guidance favours the use 
of RCTs (Government Social Research Unit, 2011), but Cartwright and Hardie (2012) raise 
three serious criticisms relevant to DICE: There can be very few RCTs in social and urban 
policy as it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to randomize selection at an area level; 
RCTs are vulnerable as diversity across a single variable can undermine the whole 
experimental design85; and it is impossible to control for variations other than for the 
variables being evaluated86. In the face of these practical difficulties, limiting policy 
evaluation to RCTs would be paralyzing, ignoring the mass of qualitative, subjective 
evidence that good practitioners rely on in the field (Palfrey, Thomas et al., 2012). So while 
the DICE evaluation relied on control estates, it could not aspire to the rigid experimental 
criteria of RTCʼs, merely more natural controls arising from pre-existing groups (such as the 
existing populations present on housing estates) resulting in a ʻquasi-experimental designʼ.  
By the 1990s this use of experimental-control design was generally considered unsuitable to 
investigate social groups in a community setting (ibid., p.209). Thus the Price Waterhouse 
                                                      
85 Particularly if this variable is a diverse as the ʻdesignʼ features Coleman was tracking. 
86 Such as a Local Authorityʼs tenant allocation policy. 
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approach was little more than a structured case study comparison, particularly as Colemanʼs 
influence choosing which estates to remodel negated any suggestion of a rigorous selection.   
“So purity of experimental design was almost impossible, given Alice was 
in charge of the actual implementation and choosing the areas sheʼs going 
to implement it in. You had the whole thing contaminated right from the 
beginning” (Interview Wiles, 2011). 
Riley was very concerned about the inherent weaknesses of the experimental design and 
the increasing complexity of the analysis attempting to control for the many variables, that 
emerged in response (Interview Riley, 2011).  For both evaluation design and analysis, the 
aim is simplicity:  
“A good experimental design is a simple one, not complex. Itʼs the same as 
statistical analysis.  If you have to do all sorts of fancy statistics, you've got 
bad data.  If youʼve got really good data, good strong experimental design, 
the stats are easy.  You only get into fancy modelling and stats when your 
basic design is not very good” (Interview Wiles, 2011). 
Price Waterhouseʼs original tender recommended a single control for each of the five DICE 
estates evaluated. However they found it impossible to identify a single closely 
corresponding site nearby and Riley insisted that there should be three controls for each of 
the evaluation sites. The control selection process was based on matching design features, 
aiming first for a similar block form (regardless of estate size) plus a very rough match of 
socio-economic classification of the residents. The increased number of controls added 
substantially to the costs and undermined the analysis in other ways; for example, MORI 
undertook 1200 interviews with residents from control estates and only 800 on the five DICE 
ones, spending a greater proportion of their fees on the controls (Interview Taper, 2013). 
Local Authorities agreed not to undertake major improvements other than normal 
maintenance, on the controls between 1991 and 1995, so that environmental conditions 
remained unchanged.  Local Authorities were not held to this as two of the Globe Town 
control estates had improvements in parallel to DICE; Greenways Estate which received 
£6.5M and Wellington Estate £13M from the last round of the Estate Action programme in 
1993/94  (HC Deb, 2002).  
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7.2.2 Too much data, too broad-brush findings  
Riley described Colemanʼs measurement parameters (graffiti, cigarette butts and litter) as 
“rather trivial” (Interview Riley, 2011).  While these might act as diagnostic indicators, he felt 
trying to measure the impact of building design changes with such inconsequential outcome 
measures was ineffectual, particularly when the project was interested in crime, fear of crime 
and social behaviour. Colemanʼs measures would not be sufficiently explanatory of any 
benefits, so the evaluation needed to cover a greater range of behavioural and attitudinal 
variables (Interview Riley, 2011). 
One weakness of defensible space as a concept and Colemanʼs application of it in practice, 
was the breadth of influence she claimed for it. The Price Waterhouse analysis tried to 
identify effects against eight broadly defined areas of impact and gathered data for all these 
areas: 
• Crime and incivilities  (which included locational analysis of crime incidents as well as 
fear of crime and incivilities), 
• Housing management (assessing resident satisfaction with management and repairs),   
• Social fabric and community (which included indicators for social control, such as the 
presence of strangers on the estate), 
• Upbringing and control of children (based on parents awareness of their childʼs activities 
and locations for play),  
• Socio-economic conditions, 
• Health of residents, 
• Environmental conditions (This most closely echoes Colemanʼs measures but assessed 
the extent (not only presence) of graffiti, litter and damage and also residentsʼ general 
satisfaction with the environment),  
• Desirability of the estates (which included satisfaction with the dwelling as well as its 
surrounding area). 
Applying a more sophisticated mapping approach than either the Design Disadvantagement 
study, or the DICE reports, the evaluation recorded the location of anti-social behaviour and 
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criminal incidents, as well as Colemanʼs graffiti or littering variables. However, in a pre-GIS, 
pre-computer era, the techniques used were basic, with data collated as coloured stars stuck 
onto large-scale drawings, sellotaped to A1 sheets of paper.  
“We had to send mappers out. Every part of the estate had a number 
attached to it. When we asked an interviewee, ʻWhat had happened to you 
on the estate?ʼ They had to say precisely where on the estate it happened 
to them and the interviewers had to record on the questionnaire these 
numbers, so that everything had to be taken down. So not only were the 
dog turds themselves subject to quality control; size and density but 
everything that happened anywhere was assigned to these location 
numbers.  What would we do with all this data?  It was madness” 
(Interview Taper, 2009). 
None of this spatial investigation was used in the final report and it appeared to play little part 
in the analysis. There was consensus amongst the evaluation team that too much data and 
information was collected, with much of it unused (Interviews Sporle, 2011, Taper, 2009, 
Riley, 2011): 
“I suppose the number of issues covered in the evaluation were probably 
more than strictly necessary.  But it was belt and braces.  Thereʼd got to be 
no stone left unexamined.  I think genuinely there was interest in 
unintended benefits.  Because a lot of money had been spent on these 
estates.  They did look different afterwards.  There may have been issues 
that werenʼt predicted by Coleman that were genuine outcomes of the 
intervention” (Interview Riley, 2011). 
This extensive body of data gathered by Price Waterhouse was analyzed and modelled in a 
variety of ways and finally presented under two themes: the impact of DICE on individual 
estates and a value for money assessment. The report supplied a detailed evaluation of five 
estates with calculations of a wide range of variables reporting on both monetary and non-
monetary outcomes and the long-term sustainability of the effects.   
  
 - 230 - 
Figure 7.1  Evaluation themes used by Price Waterhouse 
 
Sporle recalled Riley as an exacting client who “micromanaged the micromanagement of the 
project” (Interview Sporle, 2011) to ensure the evaluation met his rigorous research 
standards:  
“Because this had its provenance in the Prime Minister, whatever you said, 
you had to be very sure of yourself. It was David Riley being ahead of his 
time saying, ʻWhatever the conclusions are, they have to be evidence-
basedʼ” (Interview Sporle, 2011). 
The evaluation report listed the objectives of the DICE programme: 
“In particular the evaluation assessed the extent to which the wide range of 
objectives predicted by Professor Coleman to flow from the remodelling of 
poorly-designed design estates were actually achieved.  These were expected 
to include; 
• substantial reductions in maintenance costs,  
• easier and more efficient estate management as a result of fewer 
complaints, 
• easier and cheaper estate management through a lower tenant turnover 
rate,  
• reductions in rent loss as a result of shorter vacancy periods and more 
satisfied residents,  
• up to 90% reduction in crime,  
• improvement in childrenʼs behaviour and improvements in the physical 
and mental health of residents” (Price Waterhouse, 1997a, p.2) 
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McKeown recognized the majority of these objectives (with the exception of the immense 
predicted reduction in crime) but doubted they were Colemanʼs drivers to the extent 
attributed in the report. McKeown recalls that hypotheses such as more efficient estate 
management resulting in fewer complaints or reducing repairs and maintenance expenditure, 
were discussed during selection visits, but she felt these were not considered significantly 
subsequently (Interview McKeown, 2013). While Coleman argued that her interest was in 
wider social interaction, not solely crime or ASB  (Interview Coleman, 2013), Sporle also 
recalled Colemanʼs expectations as more straightforward.  
“I didn't think Alice was claiming health improvements.  I think it was David 
Riley who insisted that health was an offshoot of reduction in crime and 
fear of crime.  I think some of her concepts were blown up into something 
different, because of the difficulty of actually coming to a decision of what 
had made an impact and what hadn't. So every time we said ʻwell, we'll do 
a before and after survey with the residents and ask them whether or not 
they feel betterʼ, David Riley would say ʻand how are you going to measure 
that and how are you going to isolate that from gravity?ʼ So actually thatʼs 
why the research took on a life of its own, because you not only had to 
measure outcomes, you had to measure what might be the potential 
impact on the outcomes.  So Iʼm not sure it was Alice. I think she may well 
have said that it could make people feel better.  But I donʼt think she was 
being scientific to the nth degree in terms of the actual impact.  She dealt 
much more in generalities, the sort of common sense approach that she 
and Margaret Thatcher would have had, which is if that if youʼve reduced 
crime then, yes, life is going to be better” (Interview Sporle, 2011).  
Price Waterhouse had access to local crime data provided by the police, but this proved 
problematic to interpret, with no consistent effects found across the five DICE estates. The 
most reliable crime reduction impacts were found on the Ranwell East and the Nottingham 
estates.  This was similar for experienced incidents or witnessed crimes and incivilities. Fear 
of crime had also reduced on Ranwell East. Areal affects caused by changes in crime levels 
in the surrounding areas confused the picture, with the evaluation stating that the crime 
reduction analysis:   
“was least supportive of the Rogers Estate results, suggesting a particular 
local effect involving a general improvement of the whole locality” (Price 
Waterhouse, 1997a, p.69). 
While the analysis for social control (considering indicators such as ease of being able to 
identify strangers) revealed considerable variation with no clear pattern emerging, there was 
slight evidence of improvements in community control occurring on almost all the estates. 
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The exception, having a negative effect on levels of social control, was found at Ranwell 
East Estate, suggesting that the design changes had increased permeability and numbers of 
non-residents accessing the site (ibid., p.71).  
This inconclusive pattern of findings and the struggle to interpret localized crime levels is not 
unusual. There is a widely held view that crime can only be managed not reduced 
permanently (Schneider and Kitchen, 2007; SNU, 1993). There is a need for repeated 
interventions, over long timeframes to achieve a sustained impact.  Favouring Sampsonʼs 
(1997) model of community collective efficacy as an explanation for the slow process of 
building informal community control, Wiles described his subsequent experience with crime 
reduction projects. A crime reduction campaign may be unsuccessfully implemented on an 
estate, failing immediately. However a repeat project in the same location a couple of years 
later, might succeed as participants built on their earlier experience of failure and learned 
how to exploit interventions. Alternatively, Wiles described schemes where a significant 
crime reduction was measured immediately after a physical intervention. This can be 
attributed not to any alteration in the building other then the process of decanting the 
resident population, disturbing the (anti)social networks before reintroducing tenants 
(Interview Wiles, 2011). 
7.2.3 Cautiously worded outcomes 
Five estates, each with three controls were assessed pre- and post- refurbishment between 
1991 and 199587. The following two years were spent analyzing the considerable quantity of 
information gathered, resulting in a short final report and even shorter research summary, 
published in 1997.   
A frequent criticism  of regeneration projects is that interventions have only short-term effects 
not long-term permanent improvement (Palfrey, Thomas et al., 2012). SNU (1993) provide 
                                                      
87 The five of the seven DICE estates evaluated were Rogers and Ranwell East in Tower Hamlets, 
Kingsthorpe Close, Nottingham, Avenham Estate, Preston and Bennett Street, Manchester. Nazareth 
in Birmingham and Durham in Sandwell were excluded but for no clear reason other than cost and 
programming.  
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six explanations for the transient nature of any changes: A time-limited project will have 
targeted, fixed resources that may be withdrawn later; A very local project may have little 
influence on wider socio-economic circumstances; Local interventions are not always able to 
influence the way borough-level or national agencies deliver services; A project might 
receive special services (such as additional neighbourhood policing) which later return to 
normal levels; Successful but novel methods are not always disseminated within 
organizations beyond the initial project and transfer of positive lessons are affected by staff 
turnover; Projects aiming to empower and educate local people often only minimally engage 
with residents and hence achieve less sustained impacts than hoped. The Price Waterhouse 
report failed to account for these wider explanatory factors, overlooking operation changes in 
Local Authority agencies, such as reduced levels of grounds maintenance, frequency of 
police patrols or altered allocation/tenure policies. It also ignored broader economic and 
social changes, such as the right to buy discussed in Chapter Four.  A re-evaluation a year 
after the completion of building works, as for DICE, would pick up the immediate and 
significant outcomes. But gathering a more representative, informative picture of sustained 
impacts would ideally require a delay of at least 36 months or more to indicate any 
permanence (SNU 1993, p.157).  
Both monetary and non-monetary aspects were assessed, but despite the breadth of data 
gathered on non-monetary aspects (community instability, social behaviour, actual crime, 
fear of crime, tenant perceptions and satisfaction), greater prominence was given to the 
more easily measurable economic factors. The DICE programme was reported as costing 
somewhere between £50M and £43M for the research and the capital funding of the seven 
projects (Building Design, 1988; Price Waterhouse, 1997a). This £50M covered capital 
funding for the seven projects, architects, consultants and Local Authoritiesʼ fees (see 
Appendix E). The KCL Unit calculated unit costs for each of the projects that appear 
adequate, but not overly generous to cover capital costs with the proportion of each Local 
Authorityʼs contributions varying (Coleman and Silver 1995?a, 1995?b, 1995?c). These costs 
differ slightly from those reported by Price Waterhouse (1997b), but the overall costs roughly 
correspond, with inconsistencies due to the inclusion/exclusion of professional fees, or  mis-
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allocation of payment between new construction/non-DICE refurbishment works  (Local 
Authorities contributions paid for many of the new infill houses as well as additional works 
such as new roofs).  
Even the longer Price Waterhouse report (1997b) fails to communicate a  rounded picture of 
the estates or the experiences of their inhabitants. Riley felt that the tenantsʼ views were 
overlooked and would have liked to incorporate more qualitative analysis (Interview Riley, 
2011).  Findings from hour-long, 40 page interviews with thousands of residents were 
compressed down to a mere six pages (Interview Taper, 2013). But more critically, the report 
lacks the depth of material and basic facts that would be needed to interest either policy 
makers or practitioners, enticing them to replicate the ideas. In contrast, the DICE 
consultancy leaflets were written as enticing, extremely positive case studies (Coleman and 
Silver 1995?a; 1995?b).   
The final Price Waterhouse report contains surprising errors; unsophisticated site plans 
lacked essential information (North points or scales). Photos are poorly located and 
uninformative, are mis-attributed to incorrect estates or blatantly not matching the post-
scheme plan. All these indicate a lack of care given to the final editing of the report: 
“It was a fairly sketchy summary report. It doesnʼt stand up.  Itʼs not a piece of 
science.  My test when I worked in government was that any research, any 
evaluation report that was published, that wasnʼt capable of being published in 
a major peer review scientific journal, shouldnʼt be published. Now Iʼm not sure 
that the final report for DICE would have met that standard, but I think it was 
because by then we were all fed up with the whole thing.  I think we just 
agreed ʻoh for Godʼs sake lets just write a reportʼ” (Interview Wiles, 2011).  
Any evaluative discourse needs to convince its intended audience that its recommendations 
have weight derived from a credible, authoritative source. In Utopia on Trial, despite using 
the rhetorical structure of accused, evidence and conclusion, Colemanʼs tone is personal and 
accusative, haphazardly targeting individuals, government departments, industry practice or 
blaming the nature of bureaucracy itself.   Yet there is a flamboyant energy and bravado to 
her accusations, reminiscent of a barrister in eloquent persuasive flow. In comparison (and 
continuing the courtroom metaphor), the Price Waterhouse report can be read as the 
defence response, taking a more impersonal, definitive tone. There is little individual agency 
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behind it, deferring to the department as a voice of authority. The material is presented as 
self evident, consensual truth.  It is focused, responding only to points it can address and 
ignoring intriguing diversions.  Much of this bland tone was intentional, to discredit 
Colemanʼs findings (Interview Riley, 2011). The executive summary was a measured and 
carefully worded rejection of Colemanʼs methods and claims.  
“None of the DICE schemes can be judged to have been effective in meeting 
the (admittedly ambitious) objectives set for it by Professor Coleman. 
Compared with the early Estate Action schemes (the most relevant policy 
alternative), the evaluation suggests that DICE was not a more successful 
regeneration initiative (nor, at best does it appear to have been markedly less 
successful)” (Price Waterhouse, 1997a, p.1). 
Asked whether it was a difficult task to craft a credible, rigorous evaluation of concepts he 
had little faith in, Riley disagreed: 
“The language was ʻthis was a really silly idea and we evaluated it thoroughly 
and showed that it was a silly ideaʼ.  I think the best thing was to have covered 
all the bases. The evaluation was ʻrespectedʼ, not the claims that were being 
made for intervention. It was brushed under the carpet” (Interview Riley, 
2011). 
7.3 A muted reception to the Price Waterhouse Evaluation 
The DoE coasted through the mechanics of the reportʼs launch. The report appeared on the 
DoE website, but none of the interviewees remember any dissemination activities or publicity 
(Interview Wiles, 2011).  A defensive press release was prepared but was an unnecessary 
precaution as the press reception was subdued, due in part to the guarded way the report 
was written.  
“We thought when it came out that she [Coleman] was going to explode and 
we were told ʻHave a press release ready to say that it was all done through 
the most rigorous scientific method. Weʼve got all the evidence, it's all been 
collected and collated and so forth.ʼ But it just didn't get any coverage at all. I 
mean partly because there's no highly quotable stuff in there. Thereʼs nothing 
that lends itself to that, is there? There's nothing that makes it tabloid or even 
Inside Housing kind of stuff. I think she was ill when it came out to tell you the 
truth. I think she just didn't have the energy or the wherewithal to do it and it 
just passed by” (Interview Harvey, 2009).  
The exact publication date is unclear but Coleman recalls it as being early summer 1997 
(Interview Coleman, 2013). The press purdah period prior to the general election in May that 
year would have restricted publication of DoE reports during the spring and as soon as the 
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election had been announced, there would have been fierce internal competition to prioritize 
those projects with the most political support. Post the election and following the switch from 
a Conservative to a Labour government, the report might also have been tainted with 
negative connections to the previous regime. Surprisingly, only one article in the construction 
press during 1997 mentioned the evaluation. The Building article from November 1997, 
featured a revisit to the Ranwell East estate, evaluating the design changes and reported the 
headline figures from the Price Waterhouse evaluation (Spring, 1997). The housing press 
(Inside Housing included) and architectural journals, even those that had sustained earlier 
disputes into the mid 1990s were silent about the evaluation.   
In private Coleman was as displeased as Harvey had expected. Sanford reported that:  
“Alice was furious at that report.  Really livid.  It was just trumped up by DoE to say 
that they'd done something” (Interview Stanford, 2011). 
In the light of this Colemanʼs public silence is surprising. Having been such a dynamic force 
and so capable and tireless in her promotion of Utopia on Trial it seems odd that she took so 
little involvement in promoting or countering the evaluation. Colemanʼs alleged illness may 
have been an opportune reality or a convenient excuse, but it would have been more in 
character for her to fearlessly and outspokenly defend her opinions if she disagreed with the 
evaluationʼs findings88. Silver recalled the timing of the launch coincided with two other 
events that greatly concerned Coleman: confirmation that the funding for the consultancy 
was not going to continue – “the plug was to be pulled”; and that her chair at KCL was 
ending. He felt that following the lack of external interest in the DICE findings, Coleman was 
beginning to spend time working on her other eclectic interests; graphology, childrenʼs 
education and teaching reading and spelling (Interviews Macaskill and Silver, 2013).  
Coleman herself confirms this.  On her retirement from the Geography Department in 1995 
her intention had been to continue to work on the DICE research in an emeritus position with 
                                                      
88 Colemanʼs failure to comment on the evaluation is particularly unexpected, as during this period she 
maintained a recognizable media profile being mentioned both in the mainstream and construction 
press. In 1996 and 1997 Coleman had a letter published in The Times (1996), was cited as a ʻhousing 
guruʼ in the Evening Standard (1997) and advised the London Planning Advisory Committee to 
increase residential density (Building Design, 1997). 
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a desk in College for a further five years.  This reduced to two years and with working 
conditions consisting of a small desk in a shared room, Coleman found it easier to drop the 
ʻThatcher projectʼ and to turn her attention to other projects (Interview Coleman, 2013). 
Despite Colemanʼs advancing age during the project (she was 61 when Utopia on Trial was 
launched and had reached her 70ʼs when the evaluation was finally published), she was 
described as full of energy and enthusiasm (Interviews McKeown and Macaskill, 2013).  
7.4 Colemanʼs own evaluation of DICE  
Coleman viewed the Price Waterhouse evaluation as unscientific and intended to undermine 
her research. She had reached a state of exhaustion with the process and the DoE:   
“They slowed it down.  It was to have been a five-year project.  In fact, it 
was nearly six, but they kept slowing it down and we never were able to 
look at these 70 other estates that we wanted to survey. Then they said, 
ʻYes, weʼll give you some extra money for that… no, we wonʼt…ʼ And it 
was just such a mess.  Finally, I just wanted to get out of the whole thing” 
(Interview Coleman, 2013).  
Her own reports state that the KCL team was “denied scope for systematic assessment of 
the results of our work” (Coleman and Cross, 1994, p.3). Coleman was devastated that 
money for monitoring was unavailable from the DoE and the Local Authorities were unwilling 
to pay (Interview Silver, 2013).  Despite this lack of funding the KCL DICE team undertook 
their own parallel evaluation of the project. They planned to map ʻenvironmental abuseʼ 
scores four times. First, through a survey of design features during the selection of potential 
sites, before residents on the estate were aware of the possibility of an improvement 
scheme. Second, once the estate had been selected and a conversation with the residents 
started, but before any works began. This second mapping was to test whether engaging 
with residents had any effect on levels of graffiti etc.  Coleman claimed that she found very 
little change following the initial conversation with residents. Third, a mapping immediately 
after the refurbishment scheme finished; with fourth, a final survey a year after completion, to 
assess whether there was any lasting impact. However this plan was severely hampered by 
the lack of resources. The Design Improvement Reports for Rogers and Ranwell East, show 
that both estates were assessed only three times (see Table 6.2). Although Coleman 
interviewed some residents informally to gather their views on the changes these werenʼt 
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written up or systematically included in the final reports (Coleman and Cross, 1994: Coleman 
Cross and Silver, 1994). 
The mapping recorded the occurrence of litter and graffiti (scored either as ʻabsentʼ, ʻslightʼ 
or ʻsevereʼ), urine and faeces (scored as ʻabsentʼ or ʻpresentʼ).  Occurrence of vandalism was 
noted on ten locations (fences, sheds, windows, doors, stairs, lifts, electrical fittings, refuse 
facilities, garages, building fabric) and scored as ʻundamagedʼ, ʻdamagedʼ or ʻtarget not 
presentʼ.  The total abuse score was reported on a scale of 0-16 regardless of whether 10 or 
less vandalism targets were present. Thus a small-walk up block with no associated lifts, 
garages, sheds, or fences would still be reported on the same 0-16 scale as a large multi-
story slab block raised above a row of disused garages with a far greater potential area for 
damage. Calling this process ʻa mappingʼ overstates the geographical granularity achieved 
as, unlike Wilsonʼs vandalism research (Sturman and Wilson, 1976, Wilson, 1978b), the 
location of damage was not recorded. Other influential factors were overlooked, such as 
whether damage occurred in an occupied space, or the proximity of void flats (Wilson (1978) 
found that ground floor empty flats were most likely to be subject to vandalism).  This means 
one occurrence of a damaged rain water pipe, a single broken light fitting and one broken 
garden gate would give the same abuse score as a block where every door-entryphone had 
been systematically broken, several lifts had been maliciously damaged, or with frequent 
instances of arson in refuse bins89. Colemanʼs evaluation method aimed to make 
comparisons at a block level. To do this she hoped to alter the design of 100 blocks across 
the seven DICE estates. She then planned to calculate a disadvantagement score for each 
block, and compare a large number of blocks with similar scores to unaltered ones. Crime 
levels distinguished by block would be essential to compare altered and non-altered blocks. 
This was a fundamental different use of ʻcontrolsʼ to the Price Waterhouse approach who 
believed it was important to try to match both built form and social-economic factors, within a 
                                                      
89 The Price Waterhouse (1995) report mentioned the flimsy internal light fittings in communal areas at 
the Rogers scheme. So the increase in abuse scores that the KCL unit evaluation notes for the Rogers 
North block, which rose from an average of 1.4 in 1992 to 3.4 in 1993, could be explained by the 3 
instances of damage of electrical fittings that are recorded in the KCL report tables (Coleman and 
Cross 1994, Table 9, p.26, Tables 10 & 11, p.27) 
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tight geographical location; hopefully still identifying the fluid and mobile neighbourhood 
component of crimes and displacement. The inability to obtain crime statistics was a serious 
difficulty and undermined Colemanʼs aspirations to replicate the detail of Newmanʼs New 
York research.  
The architect for the Rogers Estate, Barry Stanford, was keenly aware of the insufficient data 
available to Coleman. Interestingly, he blames the delivery pressures of a large regeneration 
programme and government payment cycles, as much as the lack of resources.   
“There should have been baselines created on the estates we were looking 
at in terms of the behaviour of the people, in terms of the crime statistics 
and so forth.  Not enough of that was done before we started. That was 
due to the fact that we had a fairly substantial chunk of money and we had 
to spend it.  The department wouldnʼt let us go on year in, year out, holding 
it. They were going to take it away.  So we had to get on spending it.  I 
think that we concentrated more on spending it and persuading the people 
that we were doing the work for it was the right way to go, than we did on 
setting up a base for research” (Interview Stanford, 2011). 
When Colemanʼs DICE Improvement reports were drafted in 1994, Ranwell East was still 
onsite, and while the Rogers works were complete, the team had moved on to a similar 
project at nearby Greenways Estate.  Given the financial criticism contained within the Price 
Waterhouse report and the DoEʼs concern that DICE did not constitute value for money, it is 
particularly surprising that these teams, many with a professional interest in the financial 
lessons from the project, as they were subsequently implementing lessons from DICE, were 
oblivious of either evaluation (Interviews McCarthy, Stride and Wright, 2011).  
Colemanʼs evaluations were not made publicly available, which she felt demonstrated the 
DoEʼs dismissive attitude to the project: 
“I think they did that [the Price Waterhouse evaluation] afterwards because 
we were supposed to be producing a report, which of course, we did, but 
they didnʼt want to publish it.  They didnʼt want to know what we thought 
about it. They thought it would be more objective if they had their own 
kooky thinking instead” (Interview Coleman, 2013). 
7.4.1 Comparing the evaluations  
The SNU Crime Prevention of Council Estates report identified the “tensions between 
scientific and pragmatic approaches to evaluation” (SNU 1993, p.15) and as Stanfordʼs 
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quote above shows, as a practitioner he was looking for direct persuasive evidence of a 
permanent positive effect. As the table in Appendix G (which applies the SNU evidence 
framework to both evaluations) shows, the Price Waterhouse evaluation provides the 
majority of the evidence that the SNU recommend, while Colemanʼs evaluation lacked 
important material. Assessed against the SNU framework the Price Waterhouse evaluation 
can be considered to have taken a detailed, professional approach to data gathering and 
analysis. It covered the full range of evidence types recommended, with instances of 
meticulously applied methodological best practice. The DICE residents survey was 
comprehensive with extremely detailed, thorough questions, some of which formed the basis 
for future national housing surveys. As a census it gathered a representative view, not only 
that of the vocal minority of typically engaged tenants (Interview Taper, 2013). Far weaker 
were the thin accounts of external influencing factors (changes in management routines, or 
policing approaches), poor descriptions of the implementation process or any consideration 
of alternative explanations.  The evaluation assumed that all the building alterations were 
equivalent and that their conformity to the DICE principles implied comparability. However as 
Chapter Six showed, at a detailed level Colemanʼs DICE vision was achieved in a variety of 
practical ways, with the principles interpreted differently to address the context on each 
estate; reducing corridor length using either openable metal gates or constructing solid walls; 
segmenting vertical circulation with additional external staircases leading only to the first 
floor, or constructing separate stair towers. At a micro-level these apparently minor 
differences would have had greatly variable impacts.  In contrast, the quality of evidence 
gathered for Colemanʼs evaluation measures up poorly against the SNU framework.  The 
crime data gathered was poor or non-existent. The reports were highly dependent on 
subjective assessments and relied on unsupported statements from the evaluation team 
such as highly partial reports of residents meetings90.  No data was gathered to establish 
whether the estate population or demographics had changed.  
                                                      
90  The Ranwell East report contains accounts of tenants meetings “plagued by disruptive behaviour by 
left-wing Militants who were rigidly against design improvements on principle. These did not hesitate to 
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The SNUʼs final form of evidence (evidence of replicability) is relevant to this thesis by 
exploring how selected evidence influences the mobility of a concept.   Yet the framework 
suggested that only two factors - discussion of local circumstances and cost benefit analysis 
- are required to assess replicability. Neither evaluation provided detailed accounts of the 
implementation process. Colemanʼs accounts were limited to the physical design alterations 
with little descriptive comparison to the other DICE estates plus speculation on applying the 
DICE principles in future. However other than a short summary of capital costs no cost 
benefit analysis was attempted. The Price Waterhouse evaluation has an equally weak 
qualitative consideration of external factors, but the value for money analysis carefully tried 
to identify any additionality attributable to the DICE intervention rather than background 
changes. So both evaluations provided, unbalanced, partial pictures, but it is less clear 
whether the Price Waterhouse assessment was a reasonable presentation of the findings, or 
the extent that it was subject to political and ideological pressures.  Assessed against the 
SNU framework, Price Waterhouse had the opportunity to gather the right sort of data to 
make a solid evaluation that Coleman was denied. This is not to imply that they would have 
reached the same conclusions contained in the report even if the answers hadnʼt been pre-
ordained for political reasons.  
Comparing the costs of each evaluation explains the imbalance in data collection. The DICE 
evaluation was a prestigious and potentially lucrative commission for Price Waterhouse to 
have won. Sporle recalls:  
“At the time, it was a big, big project.  It was a million pound evaluation 
project.  In those days, that got you noticed by partners, working on a 
million pound project” (Interview Sporle, 2011). 
The Permanent Under Secretaryʼs undertaking to properly and fully evaluate DICE meant 
that the resources for the evaluation were extremely generous. Ridley recalls the resources 
                                                                                                                                                        
tell any lies they felt might influence the residents to vote against DICE”.  Coleman however believed 
that “their unpleasantness proved useful” in persuading the Ranwell West residents to vote against the 
scheme. As there was insufficient money to fund both parts of the estate “the Militantsʼ influence was a 
fairly painless way of getting the tenants themselves to decide against it instead of feeling DICE had 
deprived them” (Coleman Cross and Silver, 1994, p.2). 
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“weren't artificially constrained, because he [Heiser] was as interested in killing this off as 
anyone else” (Interview Riley, 2011).  Eventually the total payment to Price Waterhouse was 
over £1.5M, with about £600,000 of this going to MORI (Interviews Harvey and Taper, 2009). 
However both organisations were using consultants charging high consultancy rates in 
comparison to university research staff.  Ironically for an evaluation with value of money at its 
heart, and despite Sporleʼs memory of the “extraordinary degree of micro-management” 
(Interview Sporle, 2011) by Price Waterhouse and the DoE, the evaluation itself increased in 
cost. It quickly exceeded the set budget and became apparent to Price Waterhouse that it 
was a loss-making project. This lack of resources impacted on the practicalities of data 
collection: 
“We were told that the budget wasnʼt enough for this job. Next time you're 
in Preston for another job go and take your camera and count dog turds on 
the estate. Because of the rigour, it had to be done at the same time of 
year, more or less.  It had to be matching comparisons. It was matching 
thousands of items” (Interview Harvey, 2009). 
Coleman was aghast at the amount paid to Price Waterhouse for the evaluation (Interview  
Coleman, 2013). In comparison the research costs for the KCL DICE unit were extremely 
modest. Coleman reported that her salary was twice as much as sheʼd ever been paid 
before, but still the total salary bill for the team (which at its largest consisted of Coleman, 
five staff (not all full time) plus part-time students) would have been moderate. Silver 
remembered:  
“I don't know how Alice paid for all the hours that she did.  Nobody was 
being paid a huge amount.  It was all run on students. I was on a four-year 
research associate contract, which is slightly lower than a research 
assistantʼs wage” (Interview Silver, 2013). 
Overheads for travel, office space and other expenses such as computers were low. It is 
unclear if any of Colemanʼs salary was being paid for by KCL as she was not teaching in the 
Geography Department at this point. Yet the output of the team over five years (40 initial 
reports, numerous site visits and at least seven detailed evaluations), constituted a 
substantial body of work.  
The incompatibility of ʻcommercialʼ consultancy evaluation with academic ʻobjectiveʼ research 
influenced all aspects of the two evaluations. Colemanʼs ambition was that the KCL DICE 
 - 243 - 
team would continue after the DoE money ceased, funded via design consultancy activity.  
Awareness of the potential brand strength is visible soon after the publication of Utopia on 
Trial with references to The Coleman Design Disadvantage Survey almost as a trademark 
process (Bar-Hillel, 1986b). The KCL Unit is referred to as the DICE consultancy in press 
articles from 1994 onwards. Promotional leaflets summarizing the DICE principles, the seven 
schemes and initial cost analysis were written by Silver  (Coleman and Silver 1995?a, 
1995?b 1995?c). A number of Local Authorities and Housing Associations commissioned the 
KCL Unit to provide design briefs for estate improvement schemes and the consultancy work 
on the Mozart estate undertaken for Westminster City Council suggested that this might be 
the basis for a plausible business model (Interview Silver, 1995). Yet, in academic circles, 
more than designation separates a ʻresearch unitʼ from a consultancy.  This prompts 
comparisons between the KCL DICE unit and the Space Syntax consultancy that Coleman is 
likely to have been aware of.  The Space Syntax design assessment of the Mozart Estate 
described in Chapter Eight was undertaken by Hillier and Penn in 1986 when they were part 
of the (still academic) Unit for Architectural Studies but three years later in July 1989 
University College London established Space Syntax Limited as a separate commercial 
entity.   
In terms of recognition, Alice Coleman and DICE was a memorable brand, used in numerous 
headlines such as An unlucky throw for the DICE projects (Baillieu, 1991b).  Coleman 
commented on the potentially negative associations associated to the DICE acronym for 
Design Improvement Control Experiment: “Most words beginning with DI have bad 
connotations such as dismal, dire or dim” (Guest, 1990, p.21). She reportedly (Interview 
McKeown, 2013) became uncomfortable about using the term  ʻexperimentʼ after residents at 
a consultation meeting complained that they were being used as guinea-pigs (Kaniuk, 1991). 
There is evidence of several attempts to replace both ʻexperimentʼ and ʻcontrolʼ and to tone 
down the scientific emphasis, while retaining an established, snappy acronym. Building 
magazine refers to the DICE consultancy (Design Improvement Concern for the 
Environment) (Spring, 1994). This version is repeated in a paper by Coleman and Cross 
(1995) on applying DICE principles in Canada, which refers to Coleman director of DICE 
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Design.  Coleman herself referred to DICE as Design Improvement Care for the Environment 
(Coleman, 2009). 
Conclusion  
The Price Waterhouse evaluation was beset with difficulties. Unpopular from the outset with 
those who had commissioned it, accused of lack of transparency or objectivity, the 
evaluation was impeded by the fundamental challenges of urban policy evaluation. Located 
within an ontology of hard ʻscientificʼ assessment, it ambitiously attempted a quantitative 
assessment of the physical environment. The evaluators were inundated by the bewildering 
quantity of information gathered and confused by the growing complexity of the analysis to 
try to address these methodological constraints.  As the costs of the evaluation grew, the 
staff resources to deliver it reduced.  The final drafting of the report passed from author to 
author as staff moved on to other jobs.  The Price Waterhouse report accused Coleman of 
ambitious aspirations for her principles, but falls into the same trap itself.  A vast amount of 
data was gathered, but only a small proportion analyzed or released to a wider audience. 
Riley and Wiles stated that the slender provisional conclusions are the only ones that the 
team could deduce (Interviews Wiles and Riley, 2011), but even a cursory reading of the 
report must notice omissions in the report. One could ask who gained from such a slight 
discussion? Interviewees provide two alternative explanations: that the evaluation had run its 
course, “it just ran out of steam” (Interview Riley, 2011), or a more  premeditated political 
reason that the DoE “smothered it to death by over-evaluating it” (Interview Sporle, 2011). 
Flyvbjerg warns that this form of political obscuring/concealment is a frequently problematical 
obstacle to objective social science research into policy, describing how in his study of the 
Aalborg project “the evaluations became mere rationalizations of a political decision made in 
advance” (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p.19). Despite endeavouring to professionalize evaluation 
processes, and the mass of theoretical literature justifying it as worthy of intellectual and 
academic concern, evaluation is still treated as “a servant and not an equal of politicians” 
(Palfrey, Thomas et al., 2012a, p.29).  The Price Waterhouse evaluation was subject to the 
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same pre-judgment Flyvbjerg warned against, with the unspoken, but keenly felt political 
direction to kill the DICE project91. As Riley succinctly recalled, the aim of the evaluation was:  
“putting the lid on the coffin and nailing it shut” (Interview Riley, 2011). 
Yet, the reportʼs cautious almost tentative tone fails to do this definitively.  Even more 
cynically than Flyvbjerg, Suchman (1967, p.168) identified a typology of ʻpseudo-evaluationsʼ 
explaining the failure of some evaluations to have any lasting impact.  He distinguishes 
superficial and shallow ʻeyewashʼ evaluations from ʻwhitewashʼ ones intended to cover up 
programme failures, or those which are merely posturing lip-service or a diversion to 
postpone any practical action.  His final typology  (which it is not too harsh to suggest 
occurred with DICE) is the ʻsubmarineʼ evaluation undertaken with the predetermined aim of 
undermining and sinking a project.  
In comparison, the KCL DICE team evaluation may seem lightweight, but suffered from 
constrained resources and methodological weaknesses as well as the critical lack of access 
to crime data. The central survey technique relied on a visually subjective mapping of the 
occurrence environmental ʻabusesʼ which has been roundly discredited. There is no 
discussion of the sensitivity of the abuse or design thresholds that the scores were derived 
from.  With such approximate quantitative measures anything more than the basic analysis 
undertaken (weighted adjusted averages) would have been a spurious attempt at statistical 
accuracy. But a more fundamental flaw was the way in that the evaluation was approached; 
relying on a positivist scientific methodology to reveal facts. The KCL evaluation was setting 
out, not to openly evaluate the success or impact of the DICE schemes, but to continue the 
process of ʻprovingʻ Colemanʼs theories.  
Evaluation theorists such as Pawson and Tilly (1997) argue that current schools of ʻrealist 
evaluationʼ dismiss the possibility of theory-driven evaluations which presume to generate or 
                                                      
91 Tellingly the Price Waterhouse report (1997a) only refers to the first, extremely uncomplimentary to 
the DoE, 1985 edition of Utopia on Trial.  
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confirm theories, except at an individual project or programme level. They claim the prospect 
of building a larger theory, that is applicable to multiple projects and could be used to assess 
large–scale national policy or public reforms, is unlikely.  Yet, perhaps this Government 
suppression of unfavourable outcomes on the one hand, and promotional simplification of 
evaluation on the other, should not be unexpected. The SNU report concluded that the 
nature of evaluation is defined by not just the availability of data, but evaluatorsʼ 
professionalism and awareness of multiple interpretations.  
“In fact, as a general rule, the best evaluated initiatives produced the worse 
results and vice versa. This in itself is not surprising. The more thorough 
evaluations are often carried out by researchers who, as we have said, 
tend to err on the side of caution. The least thorough evaluations tend to be 
carried out by practitioners, who may not have the time or inclination to 
search for further evidence and for whom least is often best” (SNU 1993, 
p.99).  
The two alternative evaluations of the DICE project illustrate these circumstances well.  One 
evaluation was overcome by excess data and analysis, one evaluation limited by incomplete 
sketchy data and the evaluatorʼs one-dimensional intent. With these constraints any 
assessments will always be partial and simplistic, yet often the harder you look for clear 
solutions, the more murky and confused the picture may seem.  
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Chapter 8: Defensible space mutates into Secured by Design 
and beyond 
Introduction 
Preceding chapters described ways that the concept of ʻdefensible spaceʼ was  mobilised into 
research, policy and practice, and demonstrated that the mechanisms used to affect this 
transfer (texts, press, individual interactions, formal and informal encounters) affected its 
reach and lasting impact.  This final empirical chapter concentrates on my third key research 
question, addressing what this mobility of defensible space can tell us about how the 
participating communities of practice use evidence. Aristotleʼs three forms of knowledge are 
applied as a structuring framework with his concepts of episteme, the universal knowledge 
derived from “analytic rationality”; phronesis, experiential knowledge; and techne, the 
“technical knowledge and skills…[derived from] pragmatic instrumental rationality” (Flyvbjerg, 
2001, p.56) illustrating the preferences for evidence/Aristotelian knowledge form shown by 
the academic, practice and policy communities respectively.   
This chapter addresses how each of these communities appropriate and apply evidence in 
turn; starting with Colemanʼs episteme-derived DICE principles being incorporated into 
construction industry advice in the form of a British Standard (an example of techne) only for 
later revised versions of the Standard to revert to a broader (less prescriptive) version of 
defensible space.  It traces the responsibility for residential crime prevention advice shifting 
between the DoE, the Home Office (HO), then back to the DoE, and how despite finally 
becoming fixed into planning policy, it was the HO who practically operationalised defensible 
space principles into the Secured By Design (SBD) award scheme. The importance of 
phronesis (professional judgment) in a specific context is reinforced by the practice-based 
views of an Architectural Liaison Officer (ALO), which echo the more theoretical criticisms of 
SBD. 
The interaction of episteme, techne and phronesis is explored as researchers, architects and 
crime prevention advisors promoted often-contradictory views of how design shapes 
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behaviour and its causal relationship to crime. The weaknesses and limitations of episteme 
(particularly Colemanʼs positivist, scientific construction of evidence) in selecting suitable 
solutions for poorly designed insecure housing estates emerge, empirically showing that 
practice and professional judgment deal with spatial and territorial ambiguity in a more 
incremental and pragmatic way than the research or policy communities. This emphasizes 
that phronesis moves beyond both analytic scientific evidence and technical know-how, 
merging skill with questions of value.  
Following McCannʼs (2011) identification of policy mobilities as a process of assemblage, a 
final case study of the Mozart Estate in Westminster acts as a landing site, bringing together 
many of the issues discussed earlier. It is also a location where all of the communities 
considered in this thesis - researchers, architects, crime reduction specialists (and indirectly 
policy makers) - have tried out their ideas and theories. As such it illustrates the divergence 
between theoretical and practical modes of hypothesizing and deriving guidance. The Mozart 
can also be considered one of Flyvbjergʼs (2006) paradigmatic cases, selected to establish 
characteristics for a school of similar cases, but also playing a significant role highlighting 
more general characteristics of society. The Mozart exemplifies many themes explored in 
this thesis (it was subject to conflicting academic investigation, politically motivated 
evaluation and waves of practical design changes common to the ʻschoolʼ of estate 
regeneration projects) as well as illustrating wider lessons about societyʼs expectations for 
remaking housing estates (for example the mediaʼs demonisation of ghettoized estates, 
regeneration fashions for physical alteration versus community management, or the 
unrealistically rapid policy responses required by governmental election cycles).  
The narrative of the Mozart Estate regeneration started in the early 1970s and continues to 
the present day, ʻbookendingʼ the story of DICE told in earlier chapters. This not only brings 
this research up to date, it also reflects on the declining role of evidence in the current 
Governmentʼs deregulatory strategies (Jacobs and Manzi, 2013), considering the removal of 
support for SBD (amongst other housing design standards), despite the evidence base that 
has been gathered on its positive impact. Reflecting on this cyclical growth and decline of 
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policy support, I conclude that the application of defensible space functions as a ʻsoft theoryʼ 
sitting more easily with the practice of designers, housing managers and those who are able 
to contextualize and locate generic guidance, situating theoretical analysis in the 
particularities of a place. 
8.1 Episteme, techne and phronesis 
Academic science (social scientists included) asserts that epistemic knowledge is the most 
fixed, pure and valuable of Aristotleʼs three forms of knowledge (Flyvbjerg, 2001). Yet earlier 
Chapters showed that within academic circles, defensible space was not a universally 
agreed set of principles, but influenced by disciplinary or epistemic positionality.  This over-
reliance on the epistemic view also underrates the significance of the two forms of 
knowledge that direct action: techne, knowing how to do something and phronesis, knowing 
what to do in particular circumstances. Phronesis, the blend of knowledge, judgment, 
experience and reasoning that forms the basis for practice, relies on immersion in the 
decision-making context;  “Knowledge claims arise out of actions, situations and 
consequences rather than antecedent conditions” (Cresswell, 2003, p.11).  This essential 
step to becoming an experienced practitioner requires the individual to carefully separate the 
application of heuristics, the rules of thumb used as professional shortcuts, from an 
interpretive process of hermeneutics, a more recursive deciphering of what 
principle/approach might work on this occasion (Schön, 1983).  Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) 
believe phronesis is best able to handle conflicting values but “evolves slowly, often 
tentatively and haltingly, through mutual inquiry and mutual discourse” (ibid., p.23). 
Nonetheless, this hesitant exchange is a corrective to institutional assumptions that policy 
works by exerting a top-down, one-way effect on actors.  
8.1.1 The limits of episteme: Over generalization of research into theory. 
An important question emerging from the literature was defensible spaceʼs status as ʻtheoryʼ. 
Theories and theorizing can be perceived either as a way of loosely gathering and 
formulating concepts into plausible patterns, or a rigorous technical model for explanation, 
then prediction. Thomas and James (2006) distinguish the latter as the formal, positivist, 
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functionalist mode of theorizing common to the physical sciences. These ʻhardʼ theories 
should be distinguished from ʻsoftʼ theories (often associated with induction arising out of 
empirical field work).  At first sight defensible space only accords to the term ʻtheoryʼ in its 
loosest meaning of theory as an idea, account or description. It is clearly ʻsoftʼ theory, if it can 
be considered a theory at all.  It fails to attain Kuhnʼs (1970) premise of theory as a testable 
model of the interactions and effects capable of predicting future observations.  And it 
certainly does not conform to the Popperian tradition (Popper, 1963) of a refutable, falsifiable 
unified theory (Thomas and James, 2006). As Chapter Seven demonstrated, the ʻtheoryʼ of 
defensible space could only be evaluated inconsistently, failing to predict outcomes or repeat 
occurrences over time. Causal links between weak observations and multiple explanations 
were attempted to account for the observations made. Early criticisms of defensible space 
honed in on this lack of internal consistence and theoretical rigour, but while critics referred 
to its ontological and epistemological basis only indirectly (Hillier, 1973; Bottoms, 1974; Ley, 
1974b; Baldassare, 1975; Mawby, 1977; Poyner, 1983; Ekblom, 2011), it is not an issue that 
has been directly addressed until this thesis.  
The significant distinctions that exist between theories, hypotheses and models can be 
dictated by epistemological positions. To positivists like Coleman, a theory is explanatory as 
well as descriptive.  More generally a hypothesis is held to be a provisional statement that 
requires testing. But the epistemological position of the investigator will dictate how this 
testing is undertaken. So for positivists a hypothesis is an unaccepted truth which they strive 
to validate through empirical research, yet for critical rationalists hypotheses must either be 
refuted or falsified  (Gregory, 2000, cited in Hoggart, Lees et al., 2002, p.309). An example of 
Colemanʼs positivism was devising DICE as an empirical programme to test the many 
hypotheses she held about Design Disadvantagement. These multiple hypotheses extended 
beyond fundamental individual responses to social or collective interactions. For example, 
she held that the absence of contained gardens for children to ʻinvite friends to play under 
supervisionʼ encouraged delinquency, while the lack of external buffer spaces such as front 
gardens, denoting owned territory but where one could observe and interact with neighbours, 
stifled community (Coleman, 1985a). All of these assumptions imply a particular world view, 
 - 251 - 
of mothers at home watching over their children playing safely in the front garden, either 
through windows unobscured by net curtains, or while chatting to people passing by in the 
street. Architects and urban designers promulgate this equally  idealised vision of community 
(Talen, 2000; Ely, 2005), but the more reflective practitioner  recognises the many constraints 
to desired outcomes (Schön, 1983). Colemanʼs positivist determinism led her to make 
stronger, more forceful claims. 
 
While several hypotheses can be bound together into a theory (so dealing with broader 
issues and unifying hypotheses), Coleman, like Newman before her, relied on defensible 
space as the main explanation for how the design of homes and the spaces around them 
influenced inhabitantsʼ behaviour. The case studies show that Colemanʼs ʻtheoryʼ of 
defensible space might explain some of the positive improvements that residents 
experienced, but equally so might other actions (better management practices, improved 
employment opportunities, changes in tenure or housing allocation). Interviewees believed 
that the design interventions themselves might prove sensible, regardless of whether the 
effects claimed for them could be demonstrated (Interviews with McCarthy, Stride and Smith, 
2011, Darbyshire, 2012). So it became less pertinent to this thesis that defensible space, 
particularly in the format of DICE, could not be deemed a theory in scientific terms.  It 
became apparent that an inaccurate ʻsoftʼ theory could still be applied; hence the success of 
defensible space over more complex (but equally tentative) explanations for how space 
affects crime levels.  And while there is no reliable universally agreed predictive model for 
how defensible space works, it has proved a helpful diagnostic model for explaining failure in 
existing situations (Pasco, 1992; Armitage, 2004; Kitchen and Schneider, 2005).  
8.1.2 The limits of techne: Codifying learning into guidance or policy 
Another issue explored in the literature was the extent that defensible space could be 
considered ʻpolicyʼ, regardless of its inclusion in guidance documents such as British 
Standards and Secured by Design.  The term ʻpolicyʼ is even more loosely and broadly 
applied than the term ʻtheoryʼ. To contain this a little, this thesis followed Fischer and 
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Foresterʼs advice (cited in Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003, p.13, p.19) to locate the “policy 
argument within the context of practice”. The nature of practice has been at the heart of this 
research, which has specifically searched out the views of practitioners, the defining 
characteristics and views that distinguish communities of practice and mechanisms used for 
passing on ʻbestʼ practice. Best practice itself is an extensive topic (see Moore, 2005); a 
crucial mechanism of policy transfer/mobilities (Stone, 2012) and source for evidence based 
policy (Davies, Laycock et al., 2000), able to provide a useful agreed upon orthodoxy to bind 
a group together (Wenger, 1998).  Yet it cannot be assumed to be inherently benign or value 
free. Price Waterhouseʼs evaluation in Chapter Seven followed ʻbest practiceʼ, but with the 
intent of stifling the implementation of DICE. Best practice is at risk of being perceived as 
only ʻwhat workedʼ in the past (the polar opposite from adaptive innovation) fossilizing it into 
the belief that there is one right way to do things. Colemanʼs absolute certainty that her 
single approach was the only route to delivering defensible space was a terminal weakness 
in  maximizing its application. Concepts may become ʻpopular or common practiceʼ rather 
than ʻbest practiceʼ. While the DICE programme was underway, numerous other architects 
were making similar design changes (building additional stair-towers, remodeling entrances 
to blocks) to estates for very different reasons.  Hillier and Shu (2000) concluded from this 
rapid reproduction of such design changes that Newmanʼs version of defensible space was 
merely a “ʻfashionable consensusʼ rather than a set of empirically robust concepts that 
effectively prevent crime” (ibid, p.27). The reproduction of design features will always involve 
an element of copying but labeling this as unthinking ʻfashionʼ not only limits the relevance 
and popularity to a particular period, but implies expendability which undermines the piece-
by-piece way that shared practice builds up within a discipline. It is informative to quote Hajer 
and Wagenaarʼs (2003) description of this practitioner experience in full. Worldviews and 
individual agendas are;  
“shaped incrementally and painfully, in the struggles of everyday people 
with concrete, ambiguous, tenacious, practical problems and 
questions…People in such situations tell stories and formulate arguments 
to get a handle on this world of complexity and uncertainty…Their validity 
and feasibility are assessed in communities of people who are 
knowledgeable about the problem in hand, and who are all too conscious 
of the political, financial and practical constraints that define the situation 
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for which they bear responsibility. These are people who realize that 
stories and arguments are always provisional, never the last word on the 
situation” (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003, p.14 paraphrasing Fisher and 
Forester 1993, pp.1-3). 
This promotes a model of practice arising from the shared creation and evaluation of 
knowledge, depending on the context, available resources or values.  The challenge is 
codifying and communicating the learning extracted as a shared corpus of knowledge that is 
replicable and usable in practice. Architectural practice also promotes a model of collective 
learning where the professional context is structured by codes of conduct intended to 
improve individual judgment. This is a long way from the individualistic experimental theories 
and hypothesis testing of the academic researcher and accentuates the obvious “gap 
between the theoretical rationality of the policy sciences and the practical rationality of the 
practitioner” (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003, p.19).  
 8.2 Defensible space codified into British Standards and Secured by 
Design 
The abstract concept of defensible space has managed to jump this gap between theoretical 
and practical knowledge and successfully embed itself into British construction industry 
guidance. Chapter Four described the HO and the DoE research interests underpinning 
housing and crime policy and Chapter Six the prominent role of the Safe Neighbourhoods 
Unit (SNU) as researcher–practitioners gathering lessons from their practical interventions to 
influence policymakers in both departments. The policy context for built environment crime 
prevention during the DICE period was shaped by growing inter-departmental exchange, 
reassigning the HOʼs promotion of crime prevention as detection of offenders, towards a 
preventative deterrent outcome of housing/planning policy at the DoE. Yet the primary policy 
instrument for embedding crime reduction in housing, the Secured by Design (SBD) initiative, 
emerged from the HOʼs Crime Prevention Unit and it was the HO who initiated the longest 
lasting form of ʻpseudo-policyʼ which still remains the most current codification of defensible 
space - the British Standards (BS).  
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The British Standards Institute (BSI) is an independent national standards body, so while not 
a formal governmental policy-making agency, nonetheless BSI exerts considerable influence 
on government thinking as well as shaping industry activities. The BS form a normative 
corpus of quality standards for products or services, referred to by the majority of architects 
using the National Building Specification (NBS) and thus can be considered an highly familiar 
form of policy advice. Following the inner city riots in the early 1980s, the HO asked the BSI 
to form a new committee to write a standard for securing homes against crime (Anson, 
1986). As justification, it cited HO crime statistics on homes as most subject to burglaries, 
criminal damage and vandalism (BSI, 1986). Given the extensive debate over her research, 
it was unsurprising that the committee considered Colemanʼs findings92.  In the conclusion of 
Utopia on Trial, Coleman positively reports the inclusion of ten of her twelve design 
recommendations for houses within the British Standard BS8220-1:1986 Guide for security 
of buildings against crime (Coleman, revised 1990 edition). This overstated the case. A close 
reading of the BS finds several general points corresponding to the DICE principles and only 
selected principles for houses and communal blocks, without the quantified parameters 
dictated by Coleman.   
The intended audience was unusually broad for a technical document, targeting residents as 
well as architects, builders and crime specialists. Despite this accessibility, the guide 
emphasized the need to consult experts, including insurers, locksmiths, fire prevention 
officers or police officers with crime prevention experience (this was just prior to the formal 
designation of Architectural Liaison Officers within police forces). It stressed that judgment 
was required to interpret the guidance and to assess acceptable levels of risk against cost 
effectiveness and whether the measures might impact negatively on residentsʼ quality of life. 
Balancing all these concerns made a simple generic solution unlikely:  
                                                      
92 The Audit Commissionʼs (1986) report Managing the crisis in council housing which incorporated the 
DICE principles was also published in the same year, and it was highly likely that two high profile 
government supported committees would have had common participants. 
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“Often there will not be a single clear cut answer to a security problem, 
because many of the factors involved in the assessment of the risk are 
themselves known imprecisely” (BSI, 1986, p.1).  
Local contextualization of advice was critical, with all “measures chosen according to local 
circumstances” (BSI, 1986, p.4).  
As well as guidance on the layout of new estates and multiple dwelling blocks (such as 
avoiding communal entrances concealed from public view), the BS advised on improving the 
security of existing estates. The standard endorsed the general principle of defensible space 
providing territorial control for residents,  
“as a general principle space in communal areas, whether inside blocks of 
flats, or around groups of dwellings, should have its purpose defined and 
allocated, so that residents may supervise and exercise some control over 
their environment” (BSI, 1986, p.4).  
It reiterated that physical security measures alone were an ineffective solution on existing 
estates and that good locally-based management, improved staffing and maintenance were 
an essential component of estate security. The BS was concerned with construction and 
product specification, the fixing of doors, locks and security shutters, but critically also 
emphasized the detailed design of elements that the DICE principles failed to mention such 
as: location of car parking; external lighting, (particularly to entrances, garages and 
communal areas); access controls or entry phones; vandalism targets other than lifts or door 
closures; rainwater pipes, fences, or sheds which might aid unauthorised access to windows; 
and the detailed design of open spaces, particularly planting and  fencing.   
Between 1986 and 2000, when it was heavily revised (see later in this chapter), this BS 
provided the technical background for all practical decisions for the DICE schemes. Further 
construction and design guidance emerged 3 years later with the launch of the Secured by 
Design (SBD) standard in 1989. SBD was a secure property labelling system for homes 
encouraging the building industry to consider designing-out-crime at the earliest planning 
stage. The SBD concept was owned by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) but 
was delivered on the ground by a network of local police Architectural Liaison Officers (ALO) 
or Crime Prevention Design Advisors (CPDA) located in local police or planning authorities. 
New housing developments that followed the guidance were awarded SBD approval and 
 - 256 - 
allowed to use the logo in promotional literature. While not a mandatory regulation, SBD had 
status as a frequently used, well-respected tool by architects, planners, builders and housing 
managers. SBD was administered by ACPO who operated a two-tier financial franchise 
model where money raised from the certification of security products (door locks, alarms, 
windows, etc) was used to pay for ALOs.   
In terms of achieving a rapid dissemination the wide application of SBD can be considered a 
successful policy initiative. The SNU report (1993) mentioned SBD as an example of how 
widespread and accepted design–led crime reduction interventions had become. By 1994 
almost all British police forces had ALOs, or CPDAs. A HO manual described their role, 
reinforcing the physical environmentʼs significant influence on criminal behaviour, via an 
offenderʼs reliance on opportunity, anonymity, easy access and quick escape routes (Home 
Office Crime Prevention Centre, 1994). DoE circular 5/94 recognised the planning 
component of the role, being the first planning guidance that cited crime prevention as a 
material consideration in determining planning applications.  The circular set out four 
principles for designing-out-crime: considering crime prevention from the outset; providing 
mixed uses while avoiding those that could cause conflict; careful layout design to reduce the 
risk of criminal activity; and encouraging consultation with trained specialists - the ALOs.  
The concept of police providing advice on housing design was not novel. In fact earlier in 
1985, Coleman had recommended to the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Sir 
Kenneth Newman, that police officers should give design advice to planners and housing 
developers to aid crime prevention.  
“The second practical application of the research results would be the 
introduction of a right for the police to vet plans for new housing similar to 
that exercised by the Fire Brigade. Unlike fire vetting, however, crime 
vetting could be exercised in a preventative sense. Objections could be 
raised to any and every design variable that breaches its threshold, so that 
disadvantagement scores are kept down to zero, at a level where crime is 
absent or very low” (Coleman and Brown, 1985, p.54). 
On the basis of her report and this recommendation, Sir Kenneth Newman asked Coleman 
to provide training on mitigating crime through design to a group of police officers who would 
become an early version of the ALOs. Coleman gave 28 training sessions across England 
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and Scotland, but recalled “the moment Thatcher had gone, they stopped.  It was a pity 
because they [the police officers] quite liked them” (Interview Coleman, 2013). So Colemanʼs 
version of defensible space was a foundational premise for the establishment of SBD and 
the ALO taskforce.  
Although robbery and violent attacks on individuals often have a environmental component, 
both Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design  (CPTED) and Secured by Design 
(SBD) concentrate on burglary, vandalism and crimes against property, promoting both 
physical solutions such as target hardening (fitting locks, alley gating) or neighbourhood 
watch schemes. The literature review established CPTEDʼs origins in Newmanʼs defensible 
space (Jeffrey, 1999; Ekblom, 2011) and similarly Newmanʼs principles underpin SBD 
(Armitage, 2000). The five main themes of the SBD award scheme are: physical security, 
surveillance, territoriality, access/egress, management and maintenance.  However SBDʼs 
primary focus on the physical security of individual properties reduces the scale of 
intervention below the design of estates. The second and third themes more closely follow 
Newman, aiming to achieve social control by optimizing natural surveillance and territoriality 
and maximizing private and minimizing public space (Armitage, 2013). The final two themes 
reiterate Colemanʼs concerns: limiting the number of access points onto estates, deterring 
non-residents and potential offenders and requiring a programmed management system to 
maintain a clean and orderly environment as a signal to offenders that crime will be noticed 
and not tolerated.  
 
Secured by Design was devised for new dwellings and updated several times since 1989, 
with the latest version published in 2014 (ACPO and Secured by Design 1989; 2004; 2010; 
2014) The first explicit guidance for refurbishment was a scant page and a half published in 
2004. This extremely high-level summary acknowledged the difficulty of retrofitting the SBD 
principles to existing buildings, estates or listed buildings. The final paragraph (quoted in full 
below) describes applying SBD to major refurbishment projects (such as DICE on Rogers, 
Ranwell East, or the Mozart Estates).  
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“The involvement of existing residents should feature in the 
implementation of SBD guidelines. The residents will have first-hand 
experience of the crime risks and the practicality of any proposed security 
improvements. Also, their approval and co-operation is crucial in ensuring 
newly installed security hardware is properly used when the project is 
completed. Where such property improvements involve central 
government funding, the ALO's report for SBD approval (which may 
include a crime profile of the area) can be used to support a local authority 
bid for resources” (ACPO and Secured by Design, 2004, p.2). 
Regardless of this brevity SBD was, and still is, universally referred to in refurbishment 
specifications93.  It would have been the required criteria for the Form B submission to the 
DoE, the application for central government regeneration funding for the Mozart Estate 
described later in this chapter.   
8.2.1 Criticisms and limitations of Secured by Design  
Several studies assessing the effectiveness of SBD (Brown, 1999; Pascoe, 1999; Armitage, 
2000, 2004; Armitage and Monchuk, 2011), concluded that the scheme provided a cost-
effective (or at least cost neutral) way to reduce crime in housing.  Yet Cozens et al. (2001a) 
argued that the advice SBD practitioners were passing on was not based on unequivocal 
evidence. An early evaluation of SBD by the Building Research Establishment (BRE) found 
that it was already highly proscribed, recommending  "returning to the greater flexibility 
shown by some of the designers at the creation of the scheme” (Pasco, 1992, p.114).  This 
detailed critique of SBD mentioned several issues familiar from the critiques of DICE, 
including: the fixed format of SBD; that SBDs foundational rationality assumed universal 
behaviour in specific places despite the unpredictability of individuals; that SBD paid little 
attention to who lived in the housing development, needing greater consideration of socio-
economic context; and that there were fundamental uncertainties about the criminal or social 
problems SBD was trying to address, for example whether it targeted preventing burglary, 
auto theft, or youths hanging around estates. Like DICE, SBD attempted to address too 
diverse a breadth of problems. Pasco (1992) questioned the theoretical basis of SBD, as 
                                                      
93 This is hard to confirm empirically as SBD is not mandatory, and comprehensive records are not 
maintained by DCLG of numbers of new homes that use the SBD standard let alone for refurbishment 
projects (HC Deb, 21 Jan 2013, col.76W). 
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recent criminological models of offender perspective differed substantially from the SBD 
fixation on simple layout and target hardening measures. Planners were accused of 
endorsing a simplistic concept of SBD as cul-de-sacs surrounded by high fences. Practically 
there was uncertainty over the target ʻcustomersʼ for SBD: planners, developers, purchasers, 
tenants, or their neighbours, each of these groups wanting distinct outcomes rather than a 
generic desire for ʻfeeling saferʼ. The timing of ALOʼs engagement providing advice was 
found to be critical; and most significantly, the inconsistency in the interpretation and 
application of SBD principles resulted in an uncertain appraisal process.  
An unpredictable appraisal process may result from erroneous formative principles or more 
practically, poor training of those implementing it.  Despite her involvement in the training of 
the early version of ALOs, Coleman disapproved of SBD as it emerged.  In the 2nd edition of 
Utopia on Trial, Colemanʼs criticism of the DoE was transferred to the HO.  
“When Utopia on Trial was written the DoE was the villain of the piece; its 
powerful bureaucracy had subsidized and dragooned public housing into 
a monolithic Utopian conformity which it refused to recognise as a 
disaster. Secretary of State Nicolas Ridley changed that when he set up 
the DICE project specifically to undo some of the damage perpetrated by 
the DoEʼs design misguides…Just as the DoE is moving away from 
counter-productive design dictatorship, the Home Office has stepped in to 
reinforce it with an advisory video and seal of approval system [Secured 
by Design] urging all the design defects. These are to be offset by locks, 
bolts and other security devices” (Coleman, 1990, p.183). 
In her opinion SBD “shows up the things that cause crime and makes them secure by 
locking them in place rather than designing them out…People may feel happier but theyʼre 
just imprisoned” (Coleman quoted in Baillieu, 1991a, p.24).  In the same article Coleman 
argued that any resultant crime reduction would be temporary and by following SBD, 
Government money was being wasted displacing crime rather than curing it.  
SBD was promoted as design for community safety, yet it downplayed the role of the 
community in creating a safe environment, ignoring the idea that active inhabited public 
places create natural surveillance and ownership. Target hardening and CCTV was seen as 
a panacea, placing too great a reliance on technology for surveillance. Other non-physical 
interventions such as shared maintenance, concierges or Neighbourhood Watch schemes 
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could address these issues more successfully.  Community architect Ben Darbyshire94 
concluded that the contribution of these social mechanisms outweighed those of physical 
design, particularly when remaking existing places. 
“The basic rules of defensible space are robust and sensible to apply but 
itʼs not always possible to retrofit estates successfully. [One should] 
acknowledge that more often a sensitively managed relationship of 
residents and community with the estate managers is needed to 
overcome some shortcomings of the physical surroundings” (Interview 
Darbyshire, 2012). 
8.2.2 Expert opinion based on experience rather than evidence  
Darbyshireʼs questioning of the design supremacy within SBD reinforces the importance of 
considering on-the-ground practitionersʼ opinions to validate or counter Colemanʼs and 
others more academic criticisms.  The Building article (Spring, 1997) on the DICE changes 
to Ranwell East Estate extensively quotes Mark Jones, then Local Crime Prevention Officer 
for Tower Hamlets Council. He suggested that social mix and intergenerational conflict 
remain a problem post-DICE despite improvements to the physical layout.  Jones, who at 
that point had worked in crime prevention for 15 years, continues to work as a CPDA based 
in the Borough. Over this 30-year period his personal definition of defensible space has 
evolved:  
“Initially, for me, defensible space would have been very rigid; railings, tall 
fences, grilles on windows, barbed wire, perhaps, very naively thinking 
that big is beautiful and will solve a problem. Over the years, what's 
changed, partly because of working with planners or architects, is the 
realisation that you have to look at who's going to live there, what impact it 
has on them.  It's becoming more socially aware.  Now it's the smaller 
things like putting up a row of prickly bushes or a little knee high fence to 
designate private, semi-private, semi-public space” (Interview Jones, 
2011). 
Jonesʼ critique of SBD echoes the academic ones of excessive fixity and overall rigidity. He 
notes that he was prepared to compromise or to depart from the official line on elements 
where his experience had taught him an alternative response was workable; 
                                                      
94 The architect Ben Darbyshire has worked on many regeneration schemes including the Mozart 
Estate.    
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“If you showed me an estate 15 years ago, and said whatʼs your opinion?  
I would have said do this, do this.  Now I would say well, you could do this 
and this, but you could also do this, this and this…Secured by Design is 
like that as well, it can be very black and white.  There are certain things I 
won't compromise on, but most of the things in Secured by Design are up 
for compromise…It has to be local. You can't legislate in any way, shape 
or form, for everything. And you need to be able to say to the local 
representative, whether it's a planner or a Secured by Design officer or a 
builder, you're local, you know the area, what is appropriate for you? 
We've got the principles, but we need to be able to adjust and change 
depending on where that estate is” (Interview Jones, 2011). 
Jonesʼ perception is that sites which incorporate SBD principles generally have lower crime 
than non-SBD sites, but this is based on experience not empirical evidence. His own 
analysis of sites he has advised on, suggested a 4% reduction in crime, which he 
acknowledges is a small improvement, but sufficient to make a difference to residentsʼ lives: 
“But we just know in our hearts and our heads that Secured by Design 
does work, even if it's just putting the right doors and glass in and 
nothing else” (Interview Jones, 2011).  
He sees improved crime statistics as only one measure of success. Jones described his 
“flowerpot test” as an indicator of multiple effects: whether a crime prevention intervention 
was working, or the cycle of regeneration and decline was moving in a positive direction; or 
the way that the least expensive regeneration aspects that were easily repeated could make 
a worthwhile contribution to feelings of ownership:  
“When additional money became available, the cheaper, easier to do 
parts of what happened at Rogers and Ranwell were used in other 
estates.  It didnʼt give as big an impact, because it wasn't all shiny, new, 
instant. I donʼt know that it helped with a marked reduction in crime or 
anti-social behaviour, but it certainly improved what was there, which is 
really important.  If you give something a fresh coat of paint, then some 
people will react differently.  I always use the flowerpots as a measure.  If 
you make somewhere nice, then flowerpots and all the deckchairs start to 
appear and people start taking ownership. Iʼm on estates all the time. I 
walk down the corridor to visit somebody whoʼs reported a crime and I 
think ʻflowerpot, some nice mats, someoneʼs got a bead curtain up which 
is actually still thereʼ.  And then you walk down another corridor and it 
doesn't smell very nice and thereʼs marks on the wall and bits of old string 
where someoneʼs put a washing line up and you think ʻpeople don't really 
want to live hereʼ.  Yet, you could do something minor to that and it would 
make it different” (Interview Jones, 2011). 
 
The immediacy of this qualitative feeling for what makes a good place to live suggests that 
Colemanʼs attempts at visually assessing environmental quality were not too far from the 
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mark. Colemanʼs mistake was to believe that she could quantify this effect to such an extent 
that it could become a predictive indicator; to interpret his flowerpot test Jones is relying on 
his 30 years of experience as an ALO (Interview Jones, 2011). This illustrates experience 
being applied to overcome the limits of episteme and techne. 
8.3 Defensible space practised on the Mozart Estate.  
When completed in 1974, the Mozart Estate was a large estate of 25 medium rise blocks of 
737 houses and flats. Designed by the Westminster City Councilʼs Architects Department, it 
was heavily influenced by Darbourne and Darkʼs award winning Lillington Gardens in 
Pimlico, with similar dark red bricks set within concrete frames and tightly packed blocks 
connected by high-level walkways and ʻpicturesqueʼ pedestrian routes segregating people 
from vehicles. It followed the design criteria of the time with block orientation dictated by 
solar paths, departing radically from the adjacent historical street patterns. Phase 1 received 
a DoE Good Design in Housing award and the Mozart was considered an exemplar of 
modern social housing, a more human and accessible residential response than the high-
rise tower blocks of the preceding decade.  Yet where its precursor Lillington Gardens was 
designated as a conservation area in 1990 and continues to be held up as a desirable place 
to live, the Mozart Estate has had a less positive history, itʼs reputation declining from a 
design exemplar to a problem estate in less than a decade.  
Despite this common perception of it as a failed scheme, or ʻbad design practiceʼ, the Mozart 
Estate is worth considering as a site where diverse urban and housing theories for remaking 
estates were played out. The Mozart was where Coleman piloted her DICE approaches prior 
to receiving funding from Thatcher, seeing the estate “first as a theoretical example and later 
as a laboratory” (Lowenfeld, 2008), but also the DoEʼs first national Estate Action 
improvement scheme.  It has subsequently become an influential example of practical 
community architecture regeneration, subject to rolling waves of rebuilding led by the 
community architects Hunt Thomson Architects (HTA) and Abbey Hansom Rowe (now 
AEDAS) and recently an exemplar for community participation in estate management 
(Queen's Park Forum, 2008). 
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Figure 8.1 Mozart Estate Walkways 1982 
 
8.3.1 Colemanization versus community architecture  
A recurrent theme has been communitiesʼ ownership of design changes, estate 
management, crime prevention or the spaces on their estates.  During the 1980s the Estate 
Action and Priority Estates Programme were the principal public funding routes for council 
housing renewal delivered through collaborations between Local Authority 
architecture/housing departments and architectural practices, including a growing number of 
community architects.  Community architecture was becoming a formalized movement in 
Britain following Charles Knevittʼs early use of the term in the early 1970s. The premise was 
for community members (estate residents) to take control of decision-making and the design 
process, as those most familiar with the neighbourhoodʼs specific problems and potentially 
which solutions were likely to succeed. The architectʼs role was one of listener and facilitator, 
guiding a design process that evolved from community consensus and residentsʼ shared 
vision for the design of a place. 
“Our role as community architects was responding to what people wanted 
…and people wanted things they knew, streets and perimeter blocks” 
(Interview Darbyshire, 2012).   
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This rationale for community architecture was discussed during the Rehumanizing Housing 
conference, with its emergence from the rise in local tenantsʼ management of estates 
establishing a more natural alignment to the theoretical position of Anne Power than Alice 
Coleman, whose engagement  with tenants was less in-depth participatory collaboration than 
perfunctory consultation (see Chapter Six). 
Figure 8.2 Coleman vs. the community architects  
 
As early promoters of community participation in designing-out-crime, Hunt Thompson 
Architects (HTA) relied on evidence gathered through community consultation, making novel 
use of opinion research to uncover the causes of residentsʼ dissatisfaction with their estate, 
then incorporating responses into design solutions. Their remodeling of Lea View Estate, 
Hackney, became a template for working with residents, with architects living on the estate, 
with estate coordinators ensuring co-operation between the architects, residents, builders 
and the local authority. HTA applied these approaches during their later project at Mozart. 
Stylistically, community architecture was as anti-modernist as Coleman (Interview 
Darbyshire, 2012), but this is an insufficient argument for why they came up with a 
comparable version of Defensible Space. Both were proposing a more traditional street 
format, more legible routes signposted by more easily identifiable, distinctive looking blocks, 
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better street lighting and landscaping creating safer paths to individual front doors. This 
suggests that the disparity was not about design as style, but more about design as process. 
The two processes were very different: Colemanʼs radical surgical intervention in the 
external physical form, versus the architectsʼ community-led exploration of design solutions 
resulting in a gradual reworking of the buildings and spaces.95  
Darbyshire acknowledged architectsʼ and plannersʼ tendencies to over-promote the catalytic 
effect of altering buildings and spaces to achieve social outcomes such as increased 
community cohesion.  Despite describing defensible space as a straightforward robust 
orthodoxy he played down the ability of physical redesigns to reduce the rate of serious 
crime such as substance abuse, believing the problems to be as much social as technical 
and environmental and as such needing a multi-agency approach (Interview Darbyshire, 
2012). But coordinated approaches were hard to achieve despite early attempts at ʻsingle 
potʼ funding such as the Single Regeneration Budget programme (see Figure 4.3). It was not 
until New Labourʼs strategy to join-up both policies and agencies within a targeted focus on 
local neighbourhood renewal via the Social Exclusion Unit that the wider regeneration 
benefits were recognized (Wells, 2007).  So during the period of both DICE and the earlier 
stages of the Mozart renewal, physical and spatial interventions tended to be perceived as 
separate activities from social ones, with separate central and local departments allocating 
budgets to individual outcomes despite implementation being delivered by multi-disciplinary 
teams.  
The estateʼs 30-year regeneration story is complicated; some decisions and design changes 
appeared contradictory; piece-meal interventions were trialled and alterations resulted in 
unexpected consequences that before long required remedial work. At several points there 
were calls to rethink the whole design strategy.   There were also consequences from the 
                                                      
95 The overlap of Colemanʼs approach with that of community architects and how these commonalities 
fuelled the contention over the design/crime link is explored in greater detail in Warwick  (Forthcoming 
2014).  
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allocations policy. Intended to house the displaced population from slum clearances caused 
by the construction of the Westway motorway, delays meant that the motorway was 
completed before the Estate which became home for people with few links to the 
surrounding area (City of Westminster Council, 1993). The glowing praise for the 
architectural design quickly faded, as complaints increased, initially about the environmental 
quality and construction; flats suffered from damp and poor heating, requiring structural 
repairs within five years (Paddington Times, 1977). Reports of vandalism, neglectful 
management and criminal activity increased.  Within seven years of being built, the Mozart 
had become an undesirable and unpopular ‘sink estate’ (Lowenfeld, 2008), a reputation 
which deteriorated still further during the early 1980s. Media reporting of growing crime 
levels exacerbated the poor perception of the estate. Much of this was sensationalized and 
exaggerated accounts of drug dealing, with the architectural press dubbing the estate ‘Crack 
City’ (Spring, 1994). The vigorous Residents Association complained to the Press 
Commission on the grounds that these articles stigmatized the families who lived there, but 
by 1993 residents’ rejection of the estate was demonstrated by the high turnover and 
number of void properties and by the fact that 63% of residents were on the transfer list to 
move away from the estate (City of Westminster Council, 1993, p.ii).  
A maze of overhead walkways led to interconnecting entrance lobbies and dark stair towers. 
Unrestricted access to the blocks and extremely poor levels of natural surveillance resulted 
in ad-hoc retrofitted attempts to control access. Ground level garages below the walkways 
were poorly used despite inadequate car parking spaces. The external spaces were harsh 
and unwelcoming, neglected and litter strewn, with shadowy stairways, hidden corners and 
confusing dead ends. Alan Blyth and Peter Oborn from AEDAS Architects recall the estate’s 
notorious reputation when they started work there in 1994, it was “virtually a no-go zone” 
(Interviews with Oborn and Blyth, 2011).  
8.3.2 Testing Coleman's solutions 
Initiatives to improve living conditions on the estate began in 1983 when the Council, 
Residentsʼ Association and police set up a working group.  In 1984 Patricia Kirwan, the 
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Conservative chair of housing at Westminster City Council, asked Coleman to apply her 
concept of design modification to the Mozart Estate (Coleman, 1985c). Coleman was then 
drafting Utopia on Trial  (which subsequently included a chapter on the Mozart Estate) and 
from her Design Disadvantage research devised a design brief. Colemanʼs brief 
recommended: removing the walkways; reinstating continuous streets with pavements and 
waist height walls creating private gardens; providing individual access to most flats and 
subdividing blocks by blocking corridors; separating blocks with boundary fences around 
each one; and removing green spaces and childrenʼs play areas to outside the estate. 
Colemanʼs analysis focused blame on the circulation routes:  
“The walkways are the most vicious ʻopen sesameʼ making the block 
vulnerable to outsiders… All these things add up to the undesirability of 
anthill designs riddled with walkways, passages with exits, lifts, staircases 
and ramps. Fortunately, however the worst excesses of all these variables 
can be cut by a single solution; the removal of overhead walkways” (ibid., 
pp.137-138). 
The Mozart walkways provided multiple escape routes for muggers and groups of youths on 
mopeds, raising fears that the separated circulation might encourage other dangerous 
confrontations. During the riots on the Broadwater Farm Estate in October 1985, missiles 
were thrown from the high-level walkways to ambush the police and emergency services  
(Knevitt, 1986). Oborn recalled similar attacks at the Mozart:  “there were people being shot, 
there were fridges being dropped on people from walkways” (Interview Oborn, 2011). The 
Council used Colemanʼs recommendations to plan a five-year reconstruction project and in 
1986 spent £4M to demolish four of the high-level walkways. Kirwen also wrote to the Home 
Secretary, Douglas Hurd, suggesting the removal of walkways from all similar modernist 
estates (Coleman, 1986c). 
Coleman was adamant that the demolition of all remaining walkways was essential. However 
in 1986, a group of Mozart residents asked Bill Hillier and Alan Penn of University College 
London to assess the effects of their removal96. Hillier and Penn (1986) believed removing 
                                                      
96 From the mid-1980ʼs Hillier, Penn and other researchers at UCLʼs Institute of Advanced Architectural 
Studies used the newly evolving Space Syntax method to undertake analyses of the relationship 
between crime and spatial layout of housing estates for both the Home Office Crime Prevention Unit 
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the walkways would have a negative impact, diverting residents to less overseen, more 
insecure routes.  
“Colemanʼs design proposals would create a labyrinthine villagey layout 
with a number of cul-de-sacs which would force pedestrians to use routes 
adjacent to garages rather than adjacent to the front doors of dwellings. 
The proposals would divide the estate into isolated, segregated areas 
which are cut off from the surrounding area” (SNU, 1993, p.45). 
Unlike Hillierʼs earlier condemnation of Colemanʼs research methods (see Chapter Five), this 
critique was based on his essay Against Enclosure (1988) and the detrimental effects of 
limiting accessibility and restricting pedestrian movement patterns by removing the 
walkways. Overhead walkways were not characteristic to the New York housing projects 
studied by Newman, and while his eight design variables contributing to poor defensible 
space included the presence of multiple alternative escape routes, it was Coleman who 
identified elevated walkways as one of her ʻdesign suspectsʼ of architectural features (along 
with flats raised on pilotti or above garages) that contributed directly to crime.  But the 
evidence for and against walkways was undecided. Evaluating the demolition of seven 
walkways from the nearby Lisson Green Estate three years earlier, Poyner (1986) found that 
removing them did have a positive but limited effect on crime, but that similar improvements 
in burglary levels did not materialize. Poyner suggested that other alterations, such as the 
installation of entry phones, might have had a similar effect.  When the Council 
commissioned the SNU to survey households on the estate they found support evenly split 
for removing or retaining the walkways with 42% of tenants believing removal was positive 
and 47% believing that it was a bad idea or had made little difference. The main cause of 
dissatisfaction had little to do with the alterations but with the Council’s poor maintenance 
and clearing regimes (SNU 1988b). 
                                                                                                                                                        
and SNU.  These included Studley Estate and Stockwell Park Estate in Lambeth, and Maiden Lane 
Estate in Camden (SNU 1993).  
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Figure 8.3 Demolishing the walkways 
 
Despite the debate about the walkways and unpopularity of some of the design changes97, in 
1993 Westminster Council decided to roll-out ʻColemanisationʼ (AJ, 1990) across the rest of 
the estate. The strategy document for the second phase demonstrates the extent that 
Colemanʼs version of defensible space had been accepted, stating its main aim was: 
“to design out crime and provide a safer, more congenial environment for 
the residents of Mozart Estate…By creating defensible space for 
individuals, restoring traditional vehicular and pedestrian circulation to 
street level, removing the dark, secluded areas which assist criminals; 
and limiting movement from block to block through the estate” (City of 
Westminster Council, 1993, p.7). 
This was to be achieved by removing the remaining walkways, converting garages to flats 
and providing private front gardens bringing activity to formerly isolated routes. Following 
residents consultation the scheme was further modified to meet the DICE principles. Internal 
circulation was reconfigured, subdividing blocks to accommodate Colemanʼs threshold 
number of flats sharing entrances.  
                                                      
97 On an estate with little green space, Colemanʼs insistence on building over the only football pitch to 
stop local youths congregating was unpopular. Coleman claimed childrensʼ playgrounds were “schools 
for vandalism” that “erode controllability by attracting hooligans who vandalize them and make them 
unsafe for neighbouring tenants” (Coleman, Faith et al. 1992, p.2).  
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Colemanʼs appointment for the second phase was justified by her claim that the initial 
interventions “according to the beat police, resulted in a sudden 55% drop in the burglary 
rate, which has remained low ever since” (Coleman, 1990, p.144) This unsubstantiated 
figure was widely used in the press (Franks, 1990; Hawkes, 1991), in architectsʼ handouts 
about the estate (AEDAS, 2004) and by Coleman herself in the proposals for Phase 3 
(Coleman et al., 1992). The local Metropolitan Police had been enthusiastic about the initial 
changes:  
“The first phase of development has from a police perspective made our 
job easier. It appears to have reduced all aspects of crime and rowdyism 
and removed the escape routes for rovers. The buildings have taken on a 
more individual appearance, provided residents with defensible space and 
encouraged a greater community spirit” (City of Westminster Council, 
1993, p.4). 
Yet a second SNU survey in 1993 found that burglary had doubled since 1988, with 74% of 
estate residents believing that crime remained an extremely serious problem (SNU, 1993). 
Compared to other Westminster estates the Mozart suffered the greatest incidence of all 
types of reported crime with endemic drug dealing and substance abuse (Floyd Slaski 
Partnership, 1993)  
8.3.3 Applying the DoEʼs version of Defensible Space and Secured by Design  
Mozartsʼ £27M regeneration cost was partially funded through £12.6M of Estate Action 
grants with cross subsidy from the houses built for sale. Application for the Estate Action 
programme required completion of Form B, a mandatory option appraisal process which 
Darbyshire scathingly recalled “purported to be an analytical process” (Interview Darbyshire, 
2012).  Similar to Coleman summarizing a complex series of design factors into a Design 
Disadvantagement Score for each block, the whole of an estate masterplan was evaluated 
against ten variables: the numbers of units each option would provide and how it performed 
against nine, mainly quantitative, criteria.  The order of this standard set of criteria, opening 
with safety and concluding with defensible space as a separate measure, again 
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demonstrates that defensible space was now integrated into mainstream DoE practices98.  
For the Form B appraisal, defensible space was defined as providing homes in a defensible 
environment. This was assessed by counting the number of homes/or routes where the 
following criteria had been achieved: pedestrian only routes were closed off, ground floor 
entrances faced a house or a public through road; homes had a private front garden and/or a 
private rear garden; garden abutting a garden without rear alleys; blocks were separated 
from other blocks; reduced dwellings per staircase; parking was overlooked; and public and 
private spaces were defined.  The appraisal counted as positive the number of units 
experiencing each criteria with no qualitative assessment. Unlike Colemanʼs design 
disadvantagement score, no thresholds for desirable levels were set. So where Colemanʼs 
Design Disadvantagement Score recommended a maximum of six dwellings per secure 
entrance or stair, Form B counted as positive any reduction on the number of flats per stair.  
Yet it was neither the academic argument about the impact of walkway removal, nor the 
conflicts between fire regulations and Colemanʼs tightly quantified thresholds for dwellings 
per corridor/entrance that finally resulted in her removal from the project. As the Price 
Waterhouse DICE evaluation report was eventually to warn, Colemanʼs proposals were 
expensive and as Lowenfeld notes in his essay on the Mozart, the increasing costs of the 
physical changes to the estates were becoming unpalatable.  
“From 1993 to mid-95 you got a developing sense that applying 
Colemanʼs principles in their undiluted entirety to the development was 
unworkable” (Mozart Housing Manager Dave Bowler quoted in Lowenfeld, 
2008, p.170).  
The per-unit refurbishment costs were now comparable to the cost of building anew, but with 
residents experiencing the discomfort of living through disruptive onsite works, without the 
final outcome of improved internal living accommodation.  
                                                      
98 The nine criteria in addition to numbers of dwellings were (in order): Improve safety and security; 
More suitable family accommodation; Better located family accommodation; Diverse tenure and 
management; More traditional living environment; Reduced number of one bed dwellings; Reduced 
management and maintenances; Numbers of permanent decant; Defensible space (Floyd Saski 
Partnership 1993). 
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8.3.4 A gradual community-led solution 
In 1997, with Coleman now taking only a minor advisory role, the scheme was again re-
evaluated. Alan Blyth of AEDAS was part of the team assessing the effect of Colemanʼs 
alterations, deciding which should be repeated and how to engage residents more in the 
design process: 
“The early phases brought some lessons learned in practice, so our 
briefing process involved reconsidering some of the physical measures 
which had proved to be disproportionately disruptive to residents in 
occupation or were undiscussed [with residents] or designed by 
professionals, like the Secured by Design measures” (Interview Blyth, 
2011). 
Figure 8.4 Community consultation 
  
As part of a long process of resident consultation on a new masterplan, AEDAS were 
commissioned to review the estate layout with HTA designing the homes and spaces. The 
key concepts behind the revised masterplan were a further attempt to recreate traditional 
streets patterns with more legible routes, reintroduction of local shops on the estate, as well 
as application of the Lifetime Homes and SBD standards. This altered street layout followed 
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Hillierʼs broad approach, creating a series of smaller through roads, tied back into the 
surrounding street network, providing on-street parking overlooked by the refurbished blocks.   
Figure 8.5 The remodelled Mozart estate 
 
On completion of the final new homes in 2004 the architects reported that tenants showed 
guarded optimism about the improvements:  
“I think Iʼm going to feel safe when the new door entry system is fully 
functional.” (Mozart Resident cited in AEDAS Architects, 2004). 
“People round here are really pleased with the way the place has 
changed. … The whole mood of the area has changed - thereʼs definitely 
less crime and it has quietened down a lot” (Queenʼs Park Resident cited 
in AEDAS, 2004). 
However, eight years on, a resurgence in drug related crime, including raids on crack-houses 
and cannabis factories on the Mozart estate, was reported in the London press (Hunter-
Tilney, 2012, Davenport, 2012).  It is questionable if this indicated a recurrence of the 
serious problems of the 1990s, or was merely salacious reporting. An alternative corrective 
view was provided by the estate newsletter, which covers more prosaic and less dramatic 
headline-grabbing issues, such as parking restrictions, the planned redecoration of the 
estate office and community events.  The newsletter depicted a strong partnership between 
the Residentsʼ Association and the local Safer Neighbourhood police team.  Community 
safety, ASB and crime are mentioned, but amongst news of childrenʼs art competitions, 
advice on housing services or dog training events (CityWest Homes, 2012). A visitor to the 
estate today will see no indication of the estateʼs violent past. It no longer feels like a failing 
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place, but is tidy and carefully maintained, with maturing well-looked after landscaping and a 
diversity of residents enjoying the open spaces. 
8.4 Post DICE deliberations on evidence in policy 
The Mozart Estate was a continuous building site for two decades between 1986 and 2004, 
at an overall cost of over £30M. Some alterations to the estate were extremely invasive to 
the residents and when the changes failed to deliver the promised sustained improvement, 
their effectiveness was questioned. Yet research evaluation into why these failures occurred 
was sporadic and far from impartial; for example Colemanʼs own evaluation used to support 
her proposal for Phase 3 (Coleman, Faith, et al. 1992), the data used in the Form Bʼs which 
unsurprisingly portrayed the Estate in a poor light requiring further investment (Floyd Slaski 
Partnership, 1993), or SNUʼs critical commentary on Hillier and Colemanʼs investigations 
(SNU 1988a; 1993).  During the long regeneration timeframe, crime on the Mozart evolved 
and new forms of antisocial behaviour emerged. The social malaise that Coleman and 
subsequent design teams were trying to address was a constantly shifting target and the 
crimes that the design changes were responding to adapted faster than the far slower 
process of consultation and the even slower process of redesigning and rebuilding a housing 
estate. 
The crime reduction and urban policy context also evolved with the rise of community–
centred over design-led intervention strategies (McLaughlin and Muncie, 1996).  This filtered 
through into the technical guidance.  In 2000 a dramatically rewritten BS 8220-1:2000 Guide 
for security of buildings against crime: Dwellings was published, again at the request of the 
HO. The revised BS opened with the following realistic, if pessimistic, statement.  
“Crime problems are caused by a multiplicity of factors, family, social 
groups, education, moral culture, drug and alcohol abuse etc. The 
influence of the layout of neighbourhoods and the design of buildings on 
these factors is limited” (BSI, 2000, p.1). 
This indicates a swing away from physical determinism and towards the HOʼs model of crime 
being caused by opportunistic individuals, with the built environment influencing guardians, 
victims and offendersʼ behaviour. Illustrating the growing professionalisation of crime 
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prevention in the intervening 14 years, residents were no longer an intended audience with 
the BS reiterating the standard should not be regarded as a substitute for expert advice (BSI, 
2000). Design tactics such as small, defined clusters of homes were expected to maximize 
territoriality to such a tangible extent that occupants would be encouraged to challenge 
potential offenders: 
“One common method of achieving this [territoriality] is by the application 
of ʻdefensible spaceʼ concepts i.e. classifying space into four different 
kinds of spatial areas, public space, semi-public space, semi-private 
space and private space ” (BSI, 2000, p.4). 
It highlighted the blurred boundaries between semi-public/private spaces in multi-occupier 
developments and the BS warned against offendersʼ practiced familiarity assessing the 
deterrent quality not only of physical barriers such as fences and gates, but also of symbolic 
ones (signage, archways, textured surfaces). A section titled Defensible space for ground 
floor dwellings was limited to the use of plants to screen windows without blocking natural 
surveillance, with no indication how to achieve these sometimes contradictory design 
requirements in practice. However the overall message was that design, either of the layout, 
or of the security products specified, was not a sufficient solution on its own.  
Post DICE, under the New Labour Government, planning policy started to take a more 
holistic assessment of what made a good place and what was required to create “safe, 
sustainable, liveable and mixed communities” (ODPM, 2005, para 5.). Policy, which had until 
then focused on housing provision as a separate entity, started to portray housing as a way 
to establish communities and social cohesion. Kitchen and Schneider (2005) attribute this 
broadening interconnectedness of crime to other urban policy issues as a response to the 
perceived failure of more traditional isolated approaches to crime reduction.  They describe 
the extensive policy agenda and “plethora of initiatives at both national and local level” (ibid., 
p.276) but with politics and ʻpolitical reactionʼ distorting the interaction of the factors (recall 
Flyvbjergʼs (1998, 2001) comments in Chapter Two and Seven on this).  
Armitage, Colquhoun et alʼs. (2010) meta-review of post 2000 national and international 
crime reduction and housing design policy found conflicting issues as well as areas of 
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commonality. A foundational tenet was that the design of homes and surrounding spaces 
influenced crime levels.  The basic principles behind defensible space (appropriate levels of 
surveillance, clearly defined ownership of spaces, comprehensible layouts and maximizing 
the presence of individuals) were recommended in all of the documents.  Two areas of policy 
disagreement covered issues that Coleman omitted from her DICE principles: parking and 
ease of through movement.  Unlike earlier guidance, policy since By Design (DETR and 
CABE, 2000) placed greater emphasis on the impact of cars in a domestic setting. There 
was agreement that certain car parking solutions attracted crime, but less concurrence on 
the appropriate location for parking.99 There was significant variation in guidance documents 
around desirable levels of through movement and connectivity.  This ranged from 
encouraging high levels of connection, emphasizing the benefits of walking and cycling 
networks and integration to the surrounding areas (ODPM and Home Office, 2004; DfT and 
DCLG, 2007; CABE, 2009) to limiting excessive permeability from layouts based on through 
routes (ACPO, 2010). “The desire for connectivity should not compromise the ability of 
householders to exert ownership over private or communal ʻdefensible spaceʼ” (DfT and 
DCLG, 2007, p.47). The difference here is one of emphasis rather than significance; all the 
guidance acknowledged that through movement was an important factor, requiring localized 
decisions on appropriate levels of permeability dependent on the context. What constitutes 
excessive permeability remains unquantified. This need to consider specific circumstances, 
using professional judgment to assess appropriate levels of movement, is an example of 
policy and guidanceʼs reliance on phronesic knowledge to decide suitable actions on a case-
by-case basis.  
In another example of the transience of policy fashions (for evidence-based policy, as well as 
guidance derived from evidence), the current status of design and security guidance in 
British planning and housing policy is uncertain. Two recent Government reviews of housing 
and planning policy indicate that the present Coalition Government view design and planning 
                                                      
99 The Manual for Streets (DfT and DCLG, 2007) criticizes parking spaces directly in front of the 
property as it breaks up frontages and reduces surveillance, while SBD favours this type of in-curtilage 
parking wherever a secure garage cannot be provided (ACPO and Secured by Design 2010). 
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guidance as an unnecessary hindrance on the housing market. Lord Taylorʼs (2012) External 
Review of Government Planning Practice Guidance recommended the deletion of a major 
proportion of DCLGʼs guidance, including planning statements, circulars and design guides. 
Taylor (2012) proposed that it was not the role of government to provide ʻbest practiceʼ 
guidance. He based this on two arguments: that practice is continually evolving and so 
guidance dates quickly (some of the 200 deleted documents were over 50 years old) and 
that the various ʻpractitioner bodiesʼ or industry organisations were better placed to provide 
more relevant and accessible web-based research and resources (Carmona, 2013). Taylor 
(2012) believed that the urban design advice contained in cancelled guidance such as Safer 
Places: The Planning System and Crime Prevention (ODPM and Home Office, 2004) or 
Better Places to Live By Design: A Companion Guide to PPG3 (DETR and CABE, 2001) 
were now part and parcel of mainstream planning, urban design and architecture practice.  
In Taylorʼs view phronesis had incorporated techne to the extent that only the high-level 
designing for security principles needed to be retained in government guidance.  
The Housing Standards Review underway in the autumn of 2014 leaves the future of 
national housing standards in doubt. The principles of housing standards such as the Code 
for Sustainable Homes, the Merton Rule and Secured by Design are to be incorporated into 
a simplified compliance regime for the Building Regulations100 (DCLG, 2014a; Williams, 
2014). These two reviews, amongst other outcomes of the Governmentʼs Red Tape 
Challenge such as the National Planning Policy Framework (DCLG, 2012) have resulted in 
the most comprehensive review (some say upheaval) in planning/urban/housing policy since 
the 1948 Town and Country Planning Act. This has been justified by the requirement to 
stimulate construction of greater numbers of new homes, but as the history of SBD has 
                                                      
100 The expectation is for security to be covered by a new two-tier standard with Level 1 equivalent to 
current industry practice (NHBC PAS 23 – PAS being Publicly Available Specifications, an industry 
sponsored version of a BS published by BSI) and Level 2 (for crime sensitive locations) equivalent to 
part 2 (the technical section) of SBD, implying that the current SBD is too onerous. 
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shown there is policy read-across from the expected quality of new housing to refurbishment 
direct and regeneration standards.   
Following Governmental cuts in the 2010 Budget the capacity for departments to provide the 
analytical or research evidence for policy formation was decimated. DCLGʼs budget was 
reduced more severely than other departments and in 2011/12 their budget for external 
research and consulting was 64% smaller than for 2008/09. Between March 2009 and March 
2011, DCLGʼs headcount of all research professionals reduced by 30-40%, losing 25-32% of 
its statisticians (Fenton, 2012). The expectation is that under devolved Localism powers, 
Local Authorities or even industry will step in to fill the void by gathering their own data and 
evidence. But reductions in budgets have affected industry capacity as well. Use of SBD has 
only ever been voluntary, but its former inclusion in the Homes and Community Agencyʼs 
housing design standards (HCA, 2007), or the GLAʼs London Housing Design Guide (2010) 
exerted extensive pressure for its application. At its most popular, mandatory SBD use and a 
national ALO service had been suggested (most recently in September 2008) making the 
comparison to CPTED establishing itself as an international professional discipline (CABE, 
2008).  However resource intensity was used as an argument against this, as with only 13% 
of ALOs in 2008 working fulltime, the police service would have been under-resourced to 
address the number of compulsory assessments (Armitage, 2013). Yet as a parallel 
consequence of the budget cuts, Police ALOs/CPDAs have reduced in number from 347 
across England and Wales in January 2009 to approximately 196 in 2012 (ibid., p.208). So 
regardless of any need to maintain, or extend the existing evidence base, the numbers of 
experienced professionals able to interpret the guidance has plummeted.  
The era of DICE with its interdepartmental cooperation and collaborating crime reduction and 
housing research units now seems to have been a golden age for evidence-based policy. 
Occasional research studies appear (HOʼs (2014) Creating Safe Places to Live by Design for 
example101) but future government-led research on the topic from either DCLG or the HO 
                                                      
101 Tellingly the research was undertaken in 2009-2010 but publication and dissemination was drawn 
out and delayed due to reduced resources and disinterest from the HO. 
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looks unlikely. Barnes (2004) described the struggles to incorporate research into 
government policy formation, but these difficulties increase as departments no longer look to 
their internal research units to provide an evidence base, but to industry, commentators or 
compliant academics in line with Young, Ashby et al.ʼs (2002) elective affinity model of 
influence. In a situation where the research and policy interaction divide has become 
impassable, the result can only be ideology-driven policy.  
Conclusion  
This chapter shows how defensible space was mobilised via (repeatedly questioned) 
research into (provisional/transitory) policy to be firmly embedded into practice, with the 
Mozart Estate acting as a canvas for the range of individuals and communities of practice 
(industry groups and standards committees, community architects/activists, professional 
advisors) to implement their individual conceptualization based on a variety of ʻevidenceʼ for 
defensible space in their own fields. Even within the academic field similar evidence was 
used to promote a common practical approach but justified divergent explanations of 
causality.  At the Mozart Estate, Lowenfeld (2008) identified that:  
“Hillier and Coleman proposed the same general means – architectural 
modification – to achieve the same general end - reducing social malaise 
and crime. The methodological and ideological differences between them 
– Hillier was an architectural scholar with a modern sensibility, Coleman 
was a social scientist with a radically conservative bent – are clear” 
(Lowenfeld, 2008, p.167).   
This is perhaps unsurprising, as Coleman and Hillierʼs shared concern for similar issues 
resulted in a common palette of solutions to draw from (described in Chapter Five, see 
Appendix D).  Where Hillier and Coleman disagreed was the extent of the physical changes 
necessary and in predicting the resultant outcomes. Coleman felt it was sufficient to change 
the external form of the blocks and remove walkways to fundamentally alter the behaviour of 
the inhabitants, whereas Hillier believed this would unhelpfully reduce the 
permeability/accessibility and numbers of people legitimately walking through the estate and 
that radical surgery was needed to reintegrate the estate back into the grain and scale of the 
surrounding urban fabric. This lack of dependable predictability undermined any claim for a 
universal theory of defensible space.  Coleman also took the uncompromising position that 
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all aspects of her design solutions needed to be implemented together to be effective as an 
example of her theoryʼs consistency. The DICE programme was set up to demonstrate the 
experimental rigour of Colemanʼs theories, yet it only reached ambiguous and tentative 
conclusions. One explanation may be that Colemanʼs design rules and thresholds were too 
prescriptive and operated at too high a level of abstraction.  
This illustrates the risk that episteme generalizes or simplifies too much in the pressure to 
formulate theory. The high level principles of defensible space which are now embedded in 
SBD and the BS remain at an abstract theoretical level and require interpretation to a 
specific physical and social context.  
“Once turned into that epitome of certainty, a standard or guideline, the 
rationale, the reasoning and the careful qualifications tend to get lost” 
(Jenks, 1988, p.55). 
This codification of understanding into guidance, omitting the more fluid and emergent 
uncertainties may reduce practitionersʼ confusion, but insufficiently reinforces the necessary 
contribution of professional judgment. As Jones explains, reliance on techne stifles 
experience.  
“We're going back to black and white again, aren't we?  It isn't black and 
white, it's grey.  It's grey and it's cream and it's silver.  And I think that we 
do tend to have a problem with writing things down and saying this is the 
way to do it” (Interview Jones, 2011). 
The debate over the exact effect of the walkway removal on reducing crime showed the 
extent that outcomes from the design interventions were uncertain. So Defensible Space is 
not a ʻhard theoryʼ because while it starts to explain a situation, the experience of the Mozart 
shows it fails to predict future behavior. Perhaps its usefulness is as a ʻsoft theoryʼ and in 
testing propositions or hypotheses. And testing sits more easily with the practice of 
designers, or housing managers, who seem more relaxed about taking a ʻpick and mixʼ 
approach, selecting and trying a range of changes, even if this means undertaking work that 
needs to be adapted or revised at a later stage. The nature of large scale, long drawn-out 
regeneration and rebuilding programmes provides the opportunity for later phases to reflect 
on and learn from what was successful (sustained, cost effective, popular, etc) in a particular 
context. This is a far more evolutionary ʻtrial and errorʼ approach than it is a single 
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transformative controlled experiment.   Another benefit of this pragmatic approach is the 
ability to start small, start cheap and start local. The ALO Mark Jones recommends small-
scale interventions, sensitively selected and applied as needed, if necessary returning time 
and again with alternative remedies, until a satisfactory solution is achieved; suggesting that 
experienced practitioners, with a wide repertoire of techniques, still favour a bit-by-bit 
approach.  
“We are hung up on the idea that you need big sums of money and big 
projects to make a difference.  Making wholesale design changes, the big 
transformations, can be a way of catalysing residents support, but there is 
an alternative approach, a ʻsense of small nurturingʼ.  Itʼs much more 
effective if youʼre doing lots of little things, it means that youʼve got to be 
there long term and be committed to a place” (Interview Jones, 2011). 
The failure or success of the various design changes to improve the Mozart Estate can be 
seen as either compromised responses or opportune reactions, that fitted a particular time 
and set of circumstances. Both Coleman and the community architects shared a utopian 
vision and faith that the changes they were proposing would benefit residents.  Both 
promoted a series of practical actions based on varied evidence and practical experience. 
But praxis knowledge can be gained in a number of ways. It can be learnt through analytical 
experimentation, reflection on experience, or (more uncomfortably in a professional context) 
through trial and error.  Architectural education emphasizes an incremental evolution of rules 
of thumb, based on what has been seen to work before. ALOs follow a similar professional 
process of deriving rules through experience. These both rely on a clear-sighted 
understanding of what actually worked, unpacking the causality of complex social and 
physical variables.  
“I give the advice that I know works. The practical; itʼs been done, itʼs 
worked, we know it's going to work” (Interview Jones, 2011). 
The consequences of these interactions are far from simple and the application of best 
practice or heuristics (be it in housing design, management or resident consultation) sits 
uneasily as part of an evolutionary learning process. So not only may the historical, social or 
political context have altered, but also the evolution of a solution may make it an 
inappropriate response to the altered context.  Itʼs instructive that many of the design 
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solutions proposed to remodel Mozart were responding to failures of earlier design ideas - 
high rise housing, or segregated pedestrians and vehicle movement. The story of the Mozart 
attempted to balance physical and social interventions, but became mired in a debate about 
walkways and early academic attempts to understand the impact of permeable estate 
layouts on crime. This essential professional judgment of appropriate levels of permeability is 
an example of the extent that policy and guidance still rely on professional knowledge and 
expertise to assess solutions on a case-by-case basis rather than ʻhardʼ predictive theory, or 
explicit policy guidance.   
Yet the Mozart provided the opportunity for each community of practice to reflect and learn.  
For researchers, the Mozart was a chance to explore the robustness of a complex theory, 
particularly how that theory responded to the pragmatic constraints of design interventions. 
For policy makers it was an instructive example of an estate subject to waves of 
regeneration policy - an illustration in concrete of policy and guidance. For the community 
architects, the Mozart was an iterative learning process testing heuristics for designing-out-
crime and a chance to implement their localized particular version of defensible space 
principles. This chapter has used the Mozart case study and the shifts in the policy guidance 
that informed the rebuilding of the estate to show that in the search for understanding and 
evidence to inform decision and action, phronesis wins out over techne and episteme. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions - Valuing experience  
Introduction  
“The important thing about housing is not what it is but what it does in 
peopleʼs lives” (Colin Ward, 1976, in Coleman 1985a, p.182, italics by 
Coleman). 
As this quote reminds us, housing is far too often reduced to a homogeneous ideal, rather 
than an assemblage of numerous complex interwoven influences, experienced by its 
inhabitants in diverse ways. Similarly, defensible space embodies a series of contested 
propositions about social processes and behaviours, explaining only one partial aspect of 
what housing ʻdoes in peopleʼs livesʼ. An alternative thesis might have examined the social 
processes or behaviour changes that residents experience when defensible space design 
principles are applied on their housing estate (echoing if not fully repeating the experimental 
testing of DICE or the social analysis within the Price Waterhouse evaluation). However, the 
social processes my empirical research has followed are those of doing research, making 
policy, practising estate regeneration and undertaking policy/research evaluation. In 
attempting to understand these processes, the intent was to re-normatise defensible space 
as an academic and a practical concept, by unpicking the debate that surrounded both it, the 
personalities, politics and views of the participants; delving deeply to uncover their value 
systems and the obscured agendas behind their actions.  
In spite of extensive re-examination, defensible space and the explanatory models for how it 
works are still only partially understood (Poyner, 1983; Cozens, 2005; Ekblom, 2011).  
Multiple investigations have tested the concept to an extent that the constituent elements are 
taken as a given (Merry, 1981; Moran and Dolphin, 1986; Cozens, Hillier et al., 2001a), 
strengthening its hold on the imagination of the various disciplines who have adopted it. This 
resilience, despite the doubt and controversy surrounding it, argues for the continuing 
salience and pertinence of the topic, echoing Bill Hillierʼs (1973) and othersʼ (Ley, 1974b; 
Reynald and Elffers, 2009) belief that defensible space was, and remains, a very important 
issue. Thus the gap this study tried to fill was not merely what is known about defensible 
space, but more the gap in understanding how this knowledge was/can be used and applied. 
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So asking whether the DICE programme was a success or failure became more a question 
of policy analysis than scientific proof of theory.  Yet, while not aiming to definitively refute or 
verify defensible space as a theory, investigation of theory was still important; in tracing the 
movement from theory to evidence-based practice, and how theories can provide 
frameworks for action for the communities and individuals that I interviewed. I was unusually 
fortunate to be part of all three communities of practice under investigation102. This research 
provided a unique opportunity to reflect on the contrasting modes of enquiry, the 
practitionerʼs value-laden culture of certainty and professional decision-making that I 
encounter/ed day-to-day within my usual professional operating environment.  
9.1  An evolving conceptual framework  
By using policy mobility to frame this thesis I followed a disciplinary tradition of policy 
analysis/evaluation as much as a geographical one. Chapter Two noted that both bodies of 
knowledge have shortcomings; particularly in how the mobility of policies might differ from 
the movement of concepts into research or into practice. So, to consider how research was 
called on to provide ʻevidenceʼ for both policy formation and practical action, I focused on the 
use of evidence to support the five policy roles described by Hogwood and Gunn (1984) as: 
i) an aspiration or mission statement, ii) a set of proposals, iii) formal authorisation that 
legitimises proposals, iv) a funded programme and v) a process or field of activity. That DICE 
- and by inference defensible space - fitted this multifaceted definition of policy, justified 
treating it as mutating pseudo-policy103. Uncovering this more nuanced idea of what 
constituted policy and the resultant more fluid relationship between policy and evidence 
altered the initial conceptual framework. 
                                                      
102 Many of my insights have emerged from an instinctive form of deep ethnography, with all the 
attendant challenges of oblique participant observation over an extended period (rather than overt 
study with consent), or the experimental detachment described in the methodological chapter.  
103 In Gustaffssonʼs (1983) definition, pseudo-policy lacks the key knowledge needed to implement it. I 
am arguing that knowledge about defensible space is not as much missing as used in such a fluid way 
as to undermine its ability to form what Gustaffsson would consider real policy rather than symbolic or 
pseudo-policy. 
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Figure 9.1 shows that I intended to look at the interaction of research and policy and their 
respective impacts on practice, through the lens of policy, assuming (with the policy 
mobilities literature in mind) that all three positions shared a partial viewpoint on defensible 
space.  However, examining the material gathered has yielded insights on the contrast 
between design as an emergent process against the fixed nature of policymaking. So 
although this common ground did exist, it was less defined; each position having their own 
subtly different reading of the concept.  This meant that the relationships were more implied 
and less direct than the notion of evidence-based policy might suggest, and that the 
interaction with practice (particularly when considering phronesis) was only partially 
permeable, resisting or accepting evidence and policy pressures depending on opportunity 
and circumstance.  
 
Figure 9.1 Initial and revised conceptual interrelationship between research, policy 
and practice  
This definitional framework clarified the certainty, strength and directional nature of the 
tripartite relationship when answering the three research questions: How did defensible 
space move, what was the role of transfer mechanisms, and what were the varied 
disciplinary opinions on the value of evidence?   
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9.1.1 How was defensible space mobilised into research, policy and practice?   
The narrative curve of the story of DICE opened with the foundation myths created by 
Newmanʼs research taken up by Coleman; then the struggle to obtain funding to 
experimentally test Colemanʼs redevelopment ideas, showing the problematic translation 
from academic research into policy influencing research. As both research and policy 
formation DICE reached a disappointing conclusion following the Price Waterhouse 
evaluation which attempted to close down the avenues for defensible space within national 
housing regeneration policy. Defensible space (or Colemanʼs version of it) was described as 
an idea out of time, too anti-modernist and outmoded (Lipman and Harris, 1988; Interview 
Wiles, 2011). Yet it resiliently re-emerged, exploiting not one, but multiple policy windows. 
Colemanʼs principles were temporarily more successful in other pseudo-policy formats such 
as the British Standards or Secured by Design (SBD) with elements still appearing in policy 
documents today104 (GLA, 2014). However, as shown, the movement of defensible space 
into practice had a longer, more erratic trajectory. Starting with Newmanʼs relatively simple 
recommendations for architects, the practical application mutated as it spread, via the DICE 
Design Guides for Housing Associations (Coleman, Cross et al., 1995?) or Sheena Wilsonʼs 
advice for housing managers, evolving into the form recognisable in SBD, or many policies of 
local planners (LB Tower Hamlets, 2009). Yet more than written documents, the movement 
of the concept into practice is visible in the constructed examples; the growing numbers of 
buildings by community architects and others applying and reapplying the approach (such as 
                                                      
104 It is worthwhile quoting the GLAʼs Policy 7.3 Designing-out Crime from the 2014 Draft Alterations to 
the London Plan in full to show that selected defensible space principles are incorporated alongside 
generic recommendations on permeability into Londonʼs current planning policy. “Planning decisions: 
Developments should reduce the opportunities for criminal behaviour and contribute to a sense of 
security without being overbearing or intimidating. In particular: a) routes and spaces should be legible 
and well maintained, providing for convenient movement without compromising security, b) there 
should be a clear indication of whether a space is private, semi-public or public, with natural 
surveillance of publicly accessible spaces from buildings at their lower floors, c) design should 
encourage a level of human activity that is appropriate to the location, incorporating a mix of uses 
where appropriate, to maximize activity throughout the day and night, creating a reduced risk of crime 
and a sense of safety at all times, d) places should be well designed to promote an appropriate sense 
of ownership over communal spaces” (GLA 2014, p.239 emphasis added).  The detailed policy refers 
to the deleted Safer Places as well as the soon to be cancelled Secured by Design. 
 
 - 287 - 
Lea View in Hackney, or the estate regeneration schemes of Poplar HARCA during the 
2000s). Colemanʼs DICE schemes - particularly the Rogers Estate - did play a part here, 
leaving a concrete legacy that was visited by professionals and written about in trade 
journals.    
9.1.2 Did the way in which the concept was mobilised affect its impact?  
Unsurprisingly, considering the extensive discussion of impact in the policy mobilities and the 
idea-to-policy literature, I found that the impact of defensible space was affected by the 
mobilisation mechanisms applied. These mechanisms, particularly transfer agents, can act 
and influence uptake of a concept in positive or negative ways. Concepts can follow 
convoluted routes and may mutate or alter during translation. The receptiveness of 
practitioners is a critical aspect of successful embedding, as much as the adaptation or 
alignment of the policy to the new context. Alignment implies not just a single process, but 
that several favourable co-existing conditions are needed: persuasive mechanisms, 
unobstructed routes, timeliness and potential to fit.  
Freedom for a concept to move is controlled by the nature of the transfer mechanism; be that 
an individual, a book or an event.  The opinions of individual transfer agents (or policy 
entrepreneurs) often coalesce into ʻboundary objectsʼ (artefacts, documents, policy ideas or 
terms) whose historical emergence and take-up are occasionally easier to trace than the 
concepts themselves (Wenger, 1998). Alice Coleman finding Oscar Newmanʼs book in 
Canada reveals the book as a boundary object standing in for and transferring his opinions.  
More anonymous objects, such as the National Audit Report on Council Housing (which 
should have synthesized a range of stakeholders viewpoints and hence a rounded view of 
what defensible space might be) relied on their organisational (or legislative) weight for their 
convincing influence.    
Chapters Four and Five have described the diversity of transfer mechanisms, international 
and intra-national leaps and  degrees of influence on the intervention sites. The parallel 
attempts to transfer defensible space from America to Britain demonstrated multiple routes 
towards adjacent locations and audiences. At the governmental level, Newmanʻs version 
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moved (via his meetings with Wilson and others) from an American housing agency (HUD) 
to a British security department, the Home Office.  Coleman similarly acted as an 
international carrying agent105 to the DoE, whose broader urban and housing concerns 
should have been more receptive than the Home Office. Yet her timing was inoportune as 
the suitable DoE niche was already filled with an alternative response to the problem: the 
Priority Estates Programme. The practical and political conditions within the Home Office 
and DoE acted to constrain rather than stimulate collaborative inter-departmental research. It 
took two transfer agents (Sheena Wilson and David Riley) moving between departments to 
fully mobilise information within these disparate organisations. Notwithstanding that Riley 
acted as a resistive agent/barrier, it was the practice of interpersonal connections that 
produced a network of relations conducive to information flow, not just geographical co-
location. This practice of connections and flows, with mechanisms following pre-activated 
networks, was repeated in the Tower Hamlets case studies. The conditions at the sites and 
within the teams working on the estates were more (Rogers) or less (Ranwell East) receptive 
to Colemanʼs version of defensible space. These examples suggest that mobile policies and 
concepts need more than an empty niche to move into and that the ʻreadinessʼ of the landing 
place and the adopters is as critical as the mechanism.  
There is a high risk of failure from trying to mechanistically impose or translate an idea onto 
a misunderstood site. Kitchen and Schneider (2005) summarise this insight:  
“When looking at ideas from other places that may appear to be attractive, 
it is important to understand the context in which they have been applied 
and also whether or not robust evaluation has taken place. The failure to 
study both context and outcome can all too easily lead to ideas being 
imported which are imperfectly understood from the outset, and as a 
consequence can increase significantly the likelihood of failure when they 
are attempted elsewhere. In a world where knowledge in all its forms is not 
only constantly growing but is able to be moved around ever more rapidly, 
the risk of this is probably growing, especially where a ʻquick fixʼ or 
ʻsomething differentʼ is being sought” (ibid., p.279). 
This identifies two further issues to consider: first the implications of looking for ʻsomething 
differentʼ to transfer and second the speed of transfer.  Healy (2010) noted the importance of 
                                                      
105 Subsequently re-exporting her version of the concept at many international conferences. 
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novelty of practice as a stimulus to transfer, over reinterpreting a familiar idea, but by the 
1990s defensible space could not be considered a novel concept.  An alternative explanation 
is that it was upheld by its strength as a common sense idea: 
“The language of broken windows, CPTED and defensible space has 
become so prevalent as to appear commonsensical…this may be because 
it has at its roots in certain taken-for-granted notions of space and 
property” (Blomley, 2004, p.633). 
 
The term policy mobilities also implies a swiftness of transfer. Societal context has shifted 
rapidly from the 1970s when the idea of defensible space gained credence with planners and 
policy makers.  Equally trends and ʻfashionsʼ in crime have evolved rapidly, far faster than 
the policing response and certainly faster than the slow adaptation of the built environment.  
Housing and urban regeneration programmes are extremely long drawn-out processes, 
hindering a speedy evaluation of the policies that initiated the changes. A persistent problem 
is the mis-match of timeframes for cause, intervention and impact. Decision makers have 
notoriously short attention spans, looking for rapid policy effect rather than sustained long 
term assessments of impact. Unlike housing initiatives such as Decent Homes, which began 
with modernizing the interior of flats, Coleman was trying to work from the outside in. DICE 
relatively rapidly improved the exterior of the estates, transforming them in a highly visible 
way.  Such obvious physical alterations may be politically desirable, principally by benefiting 
the wider neighbourhood and ʻtiding upʼ undesirable estates. However, as the Mozart Estate 
shows, building the community capacity to deal with social problems takes time, and slow 
steady phases of incremental change provide the time to ensure a sustained improvement. 
Yet the failure of defensible space to evolve from a diverse and loosely defined concept to 
ʻhardʼ theory was as much about how the concept was constructed as how it was 
communicated. Understanding defensible space as a cluster of concepts explained the 
positive and negative consequences; the fluid toolbox of concepts provided resilience for the 
overall idea but the lack of any integrated model meant it became easy to unpick each 
fragment. The transfer mechanisms applied to each concept fragment altered that piece, 
helping it to align better into the unique context: 
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“Approaches need to be tailored to specific circumstances and to the people 
whose daily lives are framed by these circumstances, because the likelihood 
that there are standard formulae that can be universally applied with a 
guarantee of success is remote. The role of theoretical ideas and of 
experiences from elsewhere is to prove some starting points for this process, 
rather than to predetermine it” (Kitchen and Schneider, 2005, p.278).  
This is a key insight that the theory or borrowed concept is the beginning of a process of 
local contextualisation.   
Further constraints on impact were identified from Colemanʼs role as a researcher attempting 
to influence evidence-based policymaking.  Research often needs to be mediated in some 
way to gain traction and influence, for example in this case the National Audit committee 
report. It is essential to take a realistic view of the capacity of research to influence policy 
directly. Successful policy influencing is all about timing, being in the right place, catching the 
eye of the powerful and having a zeitgeist-matching proposal. Influencing can take time and 
be achieved via unexpected routes. It is possible that Coleman had greater impact through 
her pithy, but timely suggestion to Sir Kenneth Newman that the police could provide a 
crime-preventive assessment of proposed housing designs (Coleman and Brown 1985).  
Establishing the idea of advisors (proto-ALOʼs) proactively considering planning applications 
may have improved housing quality more significantly than all her other research and writing.  
9.1.3 What does this mobility of defensible space tell us about how these different 
communities of practice use evidence?   
An informative excerpt from the 1993 Safe Neighbourhoods Unit (SNU) report Crime 
prevention on council estates summarised the fundamentally different kinds of information 
needed to generate action by those researching crime prevention from those implementing 
the advice in practice.  
“Research into the relationship between design and crime is rooted in 
ideological assumptions and has often led to tentative conclusions with 
numerous qualifications attached. Unfortunately, when practitioners are 
considering design changes on estates, or in areas with high crime levels, 
the assumptions and qualifications are often forgotten. Publicity can turn 
specific research conclusions into an accepted common sense quite 
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removed from a single study or drawing from a number of different, if not 
contradictory, theories” (SNU 1993, pp.157-158).106 
What a researcher finds to be tentative contingent evidence, a policymaker may precipitately 
present as persuasive implementable facts, or a practitioner generalise into ʻcommon senseʻ 
accepted principles. 
The diverse responses across disciplines (see Chapters Two and Five) highlighted a 
challenge inherent to a multi-disciplinary concept like defensible space; that it is exposed to 
unbalanced professional scrutiny focused on specific areas of expertise. Criminologists 
welcomed the introduction of novel (to them) spatial thinking but attacked Colemanʼs 
analysis of crime data, while architects dismissed the same spatial understanding as crude, 
revealing the distinctive ways that researchers, policy-makers and practitioners interpret 
evidence.  It is important not to consider these communities of practice as homogeneous or 
fixed, but to note that individuals move between disciplines and connect networks.  Like 
myself, the main protagonists played several roles: Newman was an architect, planner and 
researcher; Wilson, a psychologist, criminologist and policymaker; and Coleman a 
geographer with aspirations to influence both policy and practice.  
The case studies of the Rogers, Ranwell East and Mozart estates illustrated how the 
practitioner community is better than academia or policy circles at dealing with ambiguity in 
spite of the daily pressure for clear-cut decision making107. This shows that phronesis is 
more than a superior form of practical knowledge, but is able to account for the choice 
between ends (the value rationality) and interests (power).  Particularly illuminating here 
were the examples of ALO Mark Jones applying expert experience to interpret the codified 
Secured by Design guidance, or Steve Stride108 tailoring regeneration approaches to local 
                                                      
106 The SNU, then the foremost practice-focused crime reduction research team, were commissioned 
by the DoEʼs David Riley, who was simultaneously managing the DICE evaluation so it is reasonable to 
take this quote as reflecting the departmentʼs position. 
107 Familiar as Schönʼs (1983) ʻwickedʼ problems in the swampy lowlands of practical decision-
making.  
108 Having been neighbourhood manager for Globe Town Neighbourhood during DICE, Stride became 
CEO of Poplar HARCA and is currently President of the Chartered Institute of Housing.  
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circumstances  (the local contextualisation of a national policy) by cherry picking those 
approaches which might work based on practical knowledge and local familiarity. 
The case studies also show that selected defensible space principles might work in some 
places, but that design can only ever offer a partial answer. The ability of even a 
straightforward design to consistently deliver the solution promised is highly variable and 
subject to limitations; the management and maintenance of estates are now acknowledged 
to have an equal role to design in the process of sustained regeneration. The suspicion of 
design determinism demonstrates the widely-held view that design alone is unable to provide 
definitive solutions, however good or careful the designer. Despite Colemanʼs faith in 
permanent design changes, just as design can not be seen as the only cause of housing 
problems, it can not provide the only solution.  Colemanʼs design primacy has been 
reassessed to a more realistic formulation: that some housing problems are intractable and 
can only be managed over time. Consequently, as there is no such thing as a permanent, 
generic solution to retrofitting housing, any proposed interventions need to evolve to match 
the shifting problems and situations.  
The vocabulary of design problems and solutions is itself deeply problematic, implying the 
ability to identify and implement an optimal one-off, permanent answer rather than a complex 
contingent response to the dynamic situation that exists. As Ravetz (1988) suggests: “the 
remedy of the problem estates is political and dynamic, rather than physical and 
mechanistic” (ibid., p.162). Roberts (1988) ascribes the conditions that Coleman attributes to 
the breakdown of society and social malaise as merely failures of “municipal housekeeping” 
(ibid., p.123). The inability to keep an estate clean, in good repair and rubbish or disturbance 
free, points more to poor management than failed design or ʻproblemʼ tenants. There is a 
role for sensitive design interventions, yet a recent study has shown that urban design 
characteristics such as integrated parking, a coherent street layout and well-structured 
wayfinding are not good predictors of crime levels (Armitage, Colquhoun et al., 2010). Pease 
and Gill (2011) conclude, that as well as contributing to the overall quality of the housing 
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development, design does influence security, but designing-out-crime cannot be reduced to 
good design.  
9.2 Mobile concepts: Lessons for academia and policy 
If the case studies illustrate architectsʼ, plannersʼ and housing professionalsʼ tactical ability to 
function within a fluid local context, McCann and Wardʼs (2013) criticisms of current 
geography policy mobilities writings argue that academia is less adept at the multi-
perspective, detailed immersion in localist policies that this requires.  Contemporary policy 
mobilities literatures remain very abstract and theoretical. This methodological immaturity is 
hampered by the weak interest shown in how to apply these ideas in practice and the lack of 
experience within academia in how policy making works. Policy mobilities thinking provides a 
helpful model to track the movement of ideas and concepts, but is far too weak an 
explanation to establish any predictable model. The literature concentrates on specific 
issues, such as neo-liberal globalisation, which limits their reapplication (see Jacobs and 
Lees 2013). Stone (2012) complains that to date policy mobilities studies have concentrated 
on the accessible, formal high-level state actors and ʻhardʼ transfer mechanisms of policy 
statements and less on the slippery intangible processes, the informal meetings and 
interactions (Freeman 2012).  This reiterates Stoneʼs (2012) belief that policy mobility merely 
repackages the ideas of policy transfer. I found that policy mobility thinking shares many of 
the criticisms directed at evidence-based policymaking.  The discussion of evidence-based 
policymaking similarly concentrates on what constitutes sound evidence; creating tools or 
models of ʻwhat worksʼ rather than understanding ʻwhy this worksʼ (or doesnʼt work) in this 
particular case.  Rather than ignoring the softer value-led conditions required for evidence to 
influence and persuade, policymaking needs to be recognised as malleable and 
interpretative. Other gaps in policy mobilities thinking for further consideration include: 
• Writings on policy mobilities usually look to examples of successful transfer (Ward, 
2007; Healey, 2010; Peck and Theodore, 2010). In this thesis I have learnt from the 
occasionally unsuccessful transfer of defensible space, reinforcing the value of 
looking at ʻpoor practiceʼ not just ʻbest practiceʼ. 
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• Existing policy mobilities studies often lack long-term temporal analyses. Here I have 
tracked the evolution and application of defensible space over 40 years.   
• Processes of mobility and transfer are not simple linear progressions, but messy and 
contingent with multiple routes.  Therefore rather than focusing only on single routes 
for mobility I have examined competing transfer mechanisms and how they are used 
in combination. Similarly it was important to look at interlocking networks and to 
track how mobility is affected as it traverses these domains (Larner and Laurie, 
2010). 
• Policies move as sub-policy fragments, or as pre-policy pieces (Peck and Theodore, 
2010; Jacobs and Lees, 2013). Practitioners are practiced at identifying, taking and 
reusing only those pieces that work. So it is unsurprising that these were the pieces 
that moved.  These fragments get translated only in situ, reinforcing the importance 
of the landing site.  
My contribution (in addition to re-constructing the story of DICE) is extending this critique of 
policy mobilities to suggest new practical approaches derived from policy mobility/transfer 
mechanisms. This starts from the multiple mechanisms, routes, and interpretations of 
defensible space that exist, noting how practitioners deal with these diverse versions of a 
concept within a particular context.  These insights have traditional theoretical implications 
(questioning whether positivist scientific theoretical unity is achievable in practice) but also I 
argue, useful practical implications towards greater trust in practitioner experience based on 
a looser form of middle-range theory building.  
9.3 Practitioners develop a ʻmiddle-range theoryʼ about defensible 
space 
Stephen Marshall (2012) criticises Urban Design theoristsʼ inability to scientifically test their 
ideas, identifying four ways that a theory can be pseudo-scientific. Colemanʼs fiercest critics 
accused her of the first two ways: being disingenuously fraudulent, deliberatively 
manipulative (Lipman and Harris, 1988; Hillier, 1986b) or fundamentally implausible (Hillier, 
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1986a). Even her less vociferous critics (Ravetz, 1986; Herbert, 1986) would agree that 
Colemanʼs positivism accords to Marshallʼs third situation: 
“where the treatment appears to be scientific, where it may involve a 
method, approach or general mindset that ʻappeals to observation and 
experimentʼ but which nevertheless does not come up to scientific 
standards” (Popper 1963 p.4; cited in Marshall 2012, p.259). 
Yet most relevant to understanding how practitioners theorise defensible space is Marshallʼs 
fourth way of acting pseudo-scientifically “as a sort of post-hoc justification for a form of 
practice that could proceed even without the theory” (Marshall 2012, p.259).  This post-hoc 
justification is visible in the DICE-like design changes applied to other estates (for example 
the ʻcontrolʼ estates described in Chapter Six) and which were seen to work regardless of the 
theories associated with them. Marshall continues that while urban designers do recognise 
and use evidence, the sectorʼs inability to ensure that the “scientific empirical evidential 
bases for its theories underpinning assumptions are correct, consistent and up-to-date” 
(ibid., p.246) undermines the extent that evidence is valued. This failure is as true for 
housing design and management as a sector, as it is for urban design. So it should be not 
surprising that the practitioners interviewed repeatedly reported that whilst they valued 
evidence, they placed greater trust in experience (Interviews Jones and Stanford, 2011, 
Darbyshire and Hammill, 2012).  
9.3.1 Practitioners recognise the concept: academics dismantle it   
The SNU quote in Section 9.1.3 reinforces how practitioners create a recognised ʻcommon 
senseʼ whole from separate (occasionally opposing) theories, with elements valued because 
of their communal acceptance – that they are ʻheld in commonʼ (Wenger, 1998). To 
practitioners, a fragment of the concept seemed valid if it chimed with their experiences, 
regardless of its source. Despite not having encountered defensible space during their 
studies, architects Mary McKeown and Peter Silver attributed their pre-knowledge of its 
principles to their practical housing experience109. So when they eventually read Utopia on 
                                                      
109 Un-acknowledged ideas pre-existing is similar to Mertonʼs scientific “pre-discoveries”. 
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Trial, their reaction was one of recognition and that the book articulated familiar aspects of 
their practice within housing. Pragmatically they tended to agree with the points of greatest 
overlap with their practical experience, even if this alignment of ideas was only partial. Both 
were less concerned with the political implications (or theoretical explanation) of Colemanʼs 
arguments. As a young community architect working on the Mozart, looking for practical 
guidance, Alan Blyth was tolerantly open to the advice in Utopia on Trial (which he had 
“lapped up” as a student, unconcerned by any controversy). He incorporated those of 
Colemanʼs principles that his clients and residents responded to, alongside other 
approaches such as Bill Hillierʼs, fitting them into the SBD framework as required (Interview 
Blyth, 2011).   
This openness to selected aspects of Colemanʼs theories by practitioners contrasts with how 
many of the academics interviewed remembered their introduction to her research 
(Interviews Cooper and Woolley, 2013).  By the time they encountered Utopia on Trial they 
were highly familiar with (or had contributed to) the debate around Newman and 
determinism, and were aware of the established enmity towards her (or at least the gulf 
between the popular reception and that of the academy). The academics came to the work to 
critique or analyze, so rightly their focus was on the internal rigour of Colemanʼs ideas, the 
legitimacy of her use of data, as well as interpreting Colemanʼs overall propositions and 
political stance. Their interpretations were also more overtly shaped by how this matched 
their own professed position and disciplines.  As academics they were less tolerant of 
Colemanʼs inconsistent thinking.   Academic critique can be seen as more black and white, 
and less compromised than the views of practice who can accept the grey, cream and silver 
spectrum that ALO Jones perceived.  As Schön (1983) recognised, academic novelty is 
valued more than utility with “those who create new theory thought to be higher in status than 
those who apply it” (ibid., p.37). If theories are to be seen as boundary objects (transfer 
mechanisms) crossing the boundaries between researchers and communities of 
practitioners, Green and Schweber (2008) suggest that to be useful and to bridge the gap 
between these groups, theories need to have “some degree of face validity, or a recognition 
by all of the potential utility of the theory” (ibid., p.625). Middle-range theory building aims for 
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just this practical utility; examining the local processes and problems, and explaining the 
significant dynamics within a particular system, but with a relaxed acceptance of multiple and 
hybrid viewpoints (Green and Schweber, 2008).  
9.3.2 Accepting conflicting interpretations 
Marshall (2012) described the simplification of urban design theories as a process of 
declining scientific clarity and influence: “the original theories have ʻworn smoothʼ with time, 
losing some of their original nuance and purchase” (ibid., p.268). The opposite happened 
with defensible space, which became more baroque and convoluted as it was called on to 
solve more and more complex problems. Clarity was lost due to this growing complexity 
resulting in a “rats nest of intertwining hypotheses” (Rubenstein, 1980, p.6). As a conceptual 
framework, defensible space was based on several unresolved debates: territoriality as a 
positive or negative, open or closed layouts and resultant permeability, residential spaces as 
distinct from other types of public realm and the degree to which environment influences 
behaviour. As a theory (if it can be considered one) it is inherently contradictory, with 
inconsistent effects dependent on context and inter-dependence of other features. A design 
may reduce crime levels but also reduce contact between neighbours; private gardens with 
stout fences may create defended buffer zones, but also provide shelter for potential 
burglars. Yet this thesis shows that situated ambiguity can be a positive.  Defensible space 
retains its resilience because it is so fluid and ambiguous:  
“It is useless to try to excise all ambiguity; it is more productive to look for 
social arrangements that put history and ambiguity to work” (Wenger 1998, 
p.84).   
Anyone encountering such a loosely defined concept can find some element they recognise, 
accept and apply, and can manipulate it to reflect their worldview. Thus the idea becomes 
more complicated, incorporating later understanding and alternative interpretations. So Peter 
Silverʼs view of defensible space was highly influenced by Bill Hillierʼs principles for 
movement through spaces. Silver sees spaces not as something that can be statically 
mapped (or definitely defined as semi-private, semi-public etc), but as a fluid and relative 
condition, affected by permeability (Interview Silver, 2013). Regardless of any theoretical 
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difficulties this presents, Herbert (1983) and later Reynald and Elffers (2009) questioned if 
the multiple versions of the concept are really a problem. Does it matter that the process of 
how defensible space operates is not well understood, if it appears to work? This is what 
seems to occur outside academic and policy circles. Co-existing conflicting interpretations of 
defensible space are accepted by practitioners, who are more prepared to follow the ʻforce of 
exampleʼ without much explanatory rigour.  
9.3.3 Purity of theory is pointless in practice 
With such a confused and ambiguous concept as defensible space, beginning with the 
points of alignment and correspondence is perhaps more helpful than restating where they 
conflict. The conceptual basis of Newmanʼs and Colemanʼs enclosed residential “defensible 
enclaves” policed by occupants recognising and excluding strangers is far from Hillierʼs 
shared residential spaces integrated within wider movement networks where strangers 
represent safety and opportunity for positive encounters (see also Jacobs, 1961).  
Nonetheless, these contradict each other less than their authors might argue, and there are 
common characteristics where the detailed operational recommendations could potentially 
co-exist (see Appendix D). 
All saw physical design as a method of fostering urban civility, even if devising the design 
features to combine vitality, sustainability and security is challenging.  A harder theoretical 
challenge is unpicking the deeply held assumptions beneath each of these versions. So 
Hillierʼs ʻsafety in numbersʼ findings undermine assumptions that a large-scale high density 
residential development is inherently more crime prone, or that community formation is an 
essential intermediary step in the creation of safe environments. He argues that “simple 
human co-presence, coupled to such features as the presence of entrances opening on to a 
space, are enough to create the sense that space is civilised and safe” (Hillier and Sahbaz, 
2008, p.27). Hillier and Sahbaz (2008) observe that the divergent principles that each side 
hold to be certain are all part of a larger more complex picture.  And as the complexity of a 
concept like defensible space is revealed, these principles need to be rethought. The 
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ongoing arguments around defensible space provide another example that theoretical 
principles can only be the building blocks in constructing a stable concept110.    
9.3.4 The role of experience interpreting guidance 
In Chapter Eight, the Mozart is described as an example of phronesis winning out over 
techne and episteme. To paraphrase the ALO Mark Jones, practitioners are adept at taking 
what they need from a theory. They “start small, start cheap, start local and consider the 
context” (Interview Jones, 2011).  But sensitivity to context can coexist with weakly 
evidenced decision-making based on heuristics or rules of thumb: 
“Context-dependence does not just mean a more complex form of 
determinism. It is an open ended, contingent relation between context and 
action and interpretation. The rules of a ritual are not the ritual, a grammar 
is not the language, the rules for chess are not chess, as traditions are not 
social behaviour” (Flyjvbjerg, 2001, p.43). 
This thesis found that failures often arose from unquestioningly following defensible space, 
DICE, or SBD principles; potentially undermining confidence that learning can be codified 
into best practice guidance applicable by expert or lay person alike (Wenger, 1998). Jones 
pointedly distanced himself from sources of guidance believing his experience as an expert 
ALO held more power to convince than referring to others, regardless of their credibility.  
“You have planners and policy and you have the ideas people, the gurus, 
the people whose books everyone reads. Realistically I think most 
practitioners of crime prevention and designing-out-crime would say they 
ignore those.  They may read them initially when theyʼre learning, but they 
don't go back and say ʻAlice Coleman said.ʼ And I donʼt say ʻthis is what 
Alice Coleman didʼ or anything to do with DICE or with anybody else when 
Iʼm giving practical advice.  I give the advice that I know works” (Interview 
Jones, 2011). 
                                                      
110 Echoing here Forscher’s metaphor for accumulating scientific knowledge as a wall constructed from 
the interlocking blocks of individual studies. In Chaos in the Brickyard Forscher (1963) warned that 
concentrating on amassing these building blocks was not enough, paraphrasing Henri Poincaré 
“Science is built up of facts as a house is built of bricks; but an accumulation of facts is no more a 
science than a heap of bricks is a house” (ibid.,p.339).  I would extend this metaphor further, with 
academic theory building being seen as a form of knitting, interlinking interdependent facts in an 
additive and highly controlled process weaving in new strands into a useful theory. Whereas 
practitioner theory building is closer to a game of Jenga; constructing an edifice of all the currently 
accessible knowledge, then applying experience to dismantle this piece by piece, discarding those 
elements that are deemed unnecessary, inappropriate, or unlikely to succeed in these circumstances. 
The skill here is knowing when to stop. 
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The same is true of policy. It is only in its interpretation and its application that its power is 
manifested. So we need to carefully distinguish between policymaking acts (the persuasive 
power needed in the moment of its writing and agreement) and the actions arising from the 
implementation of that policy (with their own convincing justifications) (see Freedman 2012). 
A strength of this research is my attempt to examine the gulf/space/tension between a 
statement of policy and its physical, embodied manifestation - the physical remnant that 
actually remains on a housing estate. 
Conclusion  
Throughout this research, the strongest transfer mechanism for defensible space has been 
individuals, accentuating the power of personality.  Chapter Four introduced Colemanʼs role 
as anti-guru to counter Peck and Theodoreʼs (2010) idea of persuasive gurus.  Yet the strong 
and polarized memories of Coleman, a response to her ʻmarmiteʼ personality, belie the 
impact and influence she had.  Many interviewees commented on the force and 
abrasiveness of Colemanʼs personality, but Steve Stride identified the organisational 
challenge that she and her ʻcountercultural ideasʼ represented to the DoE establishment: 
“There are these vested interests that will try and crush innovation.  Thatʼs 
what happened with her.  And Alice, they couldn't crush her because she 
was Alice Coleman and she had Thatcher backing her and she had £50 
million and she had willing players like us.  But directly they got the chance 
to snipe at it, they did” (Interview Stride, 2011). 
Ideas generated by outsiders are frequently ignored or suppressed by the establishment 
either through fear of novelty or because of the threat they represent. Although aligning to 
the political Right establishment then in power, Coleman can be characterised as a 
disruptive, maverick outsider as much as a welcome innovator with privileged access to 
decision-makers.  This unprecedented access (plus being foisted on DoE as an interloper) 
undermined the established expertsʼ organisational authority. 
Coleman was not alone in questioning the emerging evidence base on the interaction of 
housing design and behaviour.  Bill Hillier, described as “challenging conventional thinking 
since the late seventies” (Hillier, 1998, p.1) was also perceived as a pioneering yet 
disquieting influence. In 1987 Newman petulantly criticized Hillierʼs attacks on Colemanʼs 
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and his own books as ʻself–aggrandisementʼ, accusing Hillierʼs dismantling of the concept of 
defensible space as a professionally irresponsible act. By encouraging housing 
professionals to disregard the concept, he felt Hillier facilitated the construction of many 
substandard and crime riddled estates over the subsequent 15 years (Heck, 1987)111. This is 
a sharp accusation, and blaming Hillier not only for the de-stabilising of a theory, but also the 
subsequent poor decision-making, is harsh, while emphasising that the cut and thrust of 
academic debates have long-term practical consequences.  In contrast, Anne Powerʼs work, 
being located closer within Government, and perceived to have a broader social-economic 
coverage and wider effect has had a more sustained impact.  
Considering the whole story, one striking observation is the extent to which the debate 
around defensible space and DICE stimulated the searching out of alternative 
interpretations. Kuhn (1970) argued that the continuing evolution of knowledge is reliant on 
periods of scientific revolution and paradigm shifts overturning existing theories. Flyvbjerg 
(2001, p.27) optimistically saw this theoretical disagreement as a prompt for alternative 
action, with divergent opinions pushing debate forward faster than agreement, ensuring that 
the field develops in a knowledge driven manner.  
So Colemanʼs success was to maintain interest in defensible space under immense critical 
scrutiny and attempts to discredit it. Her abrasive persistence promoting the concept was the 
ʻgrit in the oysterʼ that stimulates it to make the pearl.  Tom Woolley, one of the conveners of 
the Rehumanising Housing conference, reflected on her usefulness as a catalyst for forming 
consensus and agreement in a fragmented and argumentative sector. He gratefully recalls 
her acting as a cross-disciplinary rallying point for housing researchers, theorists and 
practitioners stimulating a united response against the rise of the New Right: 
“In a way, Alice Coleman was helpful. If she hadnʼt existed, we would have 
had to invent her” (Interview Woolley, 2013). 
                                                      
111 Newmanʼs low opinion of housing professionalsʼ critical facilities might be countered by Marshallʼs 
(2012) dream of urban design professionals with the scientific training and skills to interrogate the 
validity of academic evidence for themselves. 
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Other historical examples exist of thinkers who initiated or reinvigorated a paradigm 
changing debate, despite it later becoming clear that their views were almost certainly 
incorrect or perverse112. Coleman and DICE should be included in this category. 
 
The strongest cross-disciplinary consensus was a shared distrust of Colemanʼs design 
determinism - a charge she refuted (Jacobs and Lees, 2013).  Arguments over the 
relationship of design to behaviour (specifically here antisocial behaviour and crime) have 
been extensive and, as yet, inconclusive. Defensible space remains an ambiguous slippery 
concept, with Coleman and DICE one heated tributary of this discussion. Whether or not her 
participation has long-term impact, Colemanʼs contribution to the debate was valuable, at 
least as a provocation to others; predominantly her belief that it provided a universal 
panacea to many trying symptoms of “social malaise”.  That defensible space has moved 
into the mainstream, without definitive proof or consistent Government support, is due in no 
small part to Colemanʼs research.  And for all the uncertainty surrounding it, defensible 
space continues to be a powerful and influential way of salvaging problem estates, making 
good failed housing designs and mistakes of the past. 
                                                      
112 For example the biologist Lamarck who in 1809 developed the concept of evolution as the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics.  At the time this raised controversy and disagreement from 
clerics and geologists as well as biologists.  It was however taken seriously and was discussed and 
refuted within the scientific community. Nonetheless, by 1857 Darwin and Wallace had devised what is 
accepted as the correct theory of evolution by natural selection.    
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Appendix A: Timeline of individualsʼ stories, key events and 
political/policy context 
Timeline of activities, events, and particapants roles
Activities Participants 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Oscar Newman Defensible Space published US Horizon TV programme / vists UK ON dies
Alice Coleman at KCL AC joins KCL Geography  Dept in 1987 awarded professorship AC very busy AC retires when 71 Spends a couple of years at KCL 'semi-retired' Ac's 90th Birthday
Coleman in Canada AC on secondment AC finds Newman's Defensible Space  in Canada AC invited to Toronto conference by Jane Jacobs Paper on Canadian / Toronto projects
Coleman and Newman AC and ON meet at KCL 
Second Land Use Evaluation Study  KCL Land Use Research Unit started in 1960 Starts second study? 
Design Disadvantagement Study  Data gathering for UoT  started in 1979
Hilary Shipman LTD publishers set up 
Utopia on Trial Editing UoT 1st Edition UoT  published revisions to UoT 2nd Edition UoT published
Response to Utopia on trial City of Alice's Dreams RIBA lecture
Rehumanizing Housing Conference / Book RH Conference RH Book published
Home Office (HO)
Sheena Wilson's story SW joined HO SW meets Newman SW Vandalism research SW left HO Housing Research Unit > DOE SW left DoE
Paul Wiles's story
Housing Security "policy" First British Crime survey Planning out Crime: circular 5/94 DoE HO PPG1 1997
Home Office 'Safer Cities programme' Safer Cities programme £30M
Secured by Design Secured by Design video mentioned in BD 1994 SBD initiated by DOE Section 17 1998 Crime and Disorder Act SBD Guidance Safer Places ODPM / HO SBD New Homes Housing Standards Review
British Standards BS 8220-1:1986 BS 8220-1:2000
Safer Neighbourhoods Unit Reports SNU Report Crime Prevention on Council Estates 
Department of the Environment (DoE)
Terry Himes Permanent Under Secretary for housing  1988- 1992 
Sir George Young Under-Secretary of State at DoE 1981-1986 Minister for Housing and Planning 1990-1994
Michael Heseltine Heseltine Sec of State for Environment May 79 - Jan83 Sec for Defence 83-86 Heseltine on riots Heseltine resigns from Cabinet Jan 86 Sec of State for the Environment Nov 1990  to April 92 Deputy Prime Minster 1995- 1997
Nicholas Ridley Sec of State for Environment May 86 - July 89 
Chris Patten Sec of State for Environment  July 89 -Nov 90
Housing Policy 1980 Housing act RTB 1988 Housing Act - Private Landlords Capital receipts from RTB no longer ring fenced for  council housing  
DoE research teams Enquiry into difficult to let housing...became PEP HDD disbanded URUH  set up Aug 1985 Hall
Priority Estates Programme (PEP) PEP 81-85
Estates Action (EA) Webb EA 85-97 EA from 87 - to 95
Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) 1994/95 SRB bids took over 
Decent Homes Decent Homes starts
HO PEP evaluation research data gathering Hull and London 1993 HO PEP Impact on Crime report 
Audit Comission Report 1986 The Crisis in Housing 
DICE programme Grant Freeze for DICE 
Coleman meeting with Margeret Thatcher  Thatcher and AC meet Jan 88
David Riley's story DR at HO with SW in 1970s DoE / Lockwood / Riley briefing Permanent Sec against DICE
John Harvey's story JH moves into housing policy in 1970s JH moves to PW JH to Hong Kong for 3 months on return DR informs contract novated to PA consulting JH starts own research consultancy 
KCL DICE unit
Selecting Sites JH - HIP  LA's invited to take part in DICE 
Mary McKowen's story MM  finishes architecture training at Kingston MM working at NIHE AC visits Divis AC lecture and NIHE MM interviewed MM KCL DICE team Jan 89- ?90
Pete Silver's story PS Qualifies AA part 2PS KCL DICE Unit  1991-1996 PS passes RIBA Part III
Design Disdvantagement reports Design Disadvantagement Reports dated May 89- Nov 91
Rogers Estate, Tower Hamlets
DICE works SOS?  completed Sept '92
Steve Stride's story SS 2 years trainee Southwark SS moves to Tower Hamlets SS Globe Town Neighbourhood set up contractors appointed 23rd Nov 90  SS moves to Poplar HARCA
Sam McCarthy's story 
Barry Stanford's story BS old hand by now … building high rise towers in the 1960s BS Works remodlelling  Lisson Grove esates, Westminster  BS appointed Architect for Rogers 
Works to Rogers' Control estates
Bancroft - precursor Estate Action scheme Bancroft EA scheme? 
Greenways Estate Action scheme Greenways £6.5 m EA bid 
Wellington Estate Action scheme Wellington Estate last EA  SOS 93/94
Ranwell East Estate, Tower Hamlets
Safer Neighbourhoods Unit (SNU)  project SNU estate improvement projects on Ranwell '88 SNU London report 
DICE works SOS ???? completed April 1994
Oct 89 Architect thrown off the Ranwell project
Price Watehouse evaluation DoE / PW Evaluation begins data collection analysis DoE PW Evaluation published 
Katrine Sporle's story KS Tendering for the evaluation /  JH writes bid KS to Basingstoke
Toby Taper's story TT working at SRD DoE  1973- 1976 TT working at Islington Counicl  TT  Housing research at MORI 
MORI DICE reports DICE Technical report  November 1990 - September 1991
Pre- DICE surveys DICE 1(Rogers) 1991 Computer Tables
DICE 4 (Ranwell) 1991  Computer tables
Post-DICE surveys DICE  Stage Two technical report Jan 1994- June 1995
DICE 1 (Rogers) 1994 Computer tables 16 months after completion 
DICE 4 (Ranwell East) 1995 Computer tables 12 months after completion
KCL DICE Unit evaluation
Rogers mapping 1st abuse score 2nd abuse resurvey 3rd abuse resurvey 13 months after completion
Ranwell mapping 1st abuse score 1988 2nd abuse resurvey
Reports May-94
Lea View Estate, Hackney
John Thompson's story 
Prince of Wales' visit to Lee View with JA and AC Mar-86
Mozart Estate,  Westminster Mozart  Estate completed LA, Mozart Residents Ass & Police working group 
Coleman's  initial advice AC asked for advice  Chapter on Mozart in UoT Stage 3 proposal report 
Works on site WCC propose 5 year refurb programme Phase 1 4 walkways demolished AC scheme accepted by WCC
SOS with demolition of walkways Phase 2 design improvements  to two blocks
Colamanization of esate Colmanization of whole estate 1st Master plan
SNU report on Mozart Hillier / Penn Report April 95 3 blocks plans with Building control 
AEDAS new masterplan AEDAS 2nd master plan
Last new homes completed new Homes finished 2004
Urban Riots Brixton riots Broadwater Farm riots BlackBird Leys Riots
Evidence Based Policy  1999 Modernising Government White paper
Rise and fall decline from social policy research high point in 1960s Concern by academics on the fate of policy -orientated research Blunkett "what works" speech 
Political context 
Local Government LIB DEMS in Tower Hamlets 
Central Governments / Prime Ministers Heath 70-74 Wilson  74-76 Callaghan 76-79 Thatcher May 79 - 90 Major  Nov 90 - 97 Blair may 97 - 2007 Brown June 2007 - June 2010 Cameron June 2010 - 
Key
Research activities
Books, Papers, Conferences (research mechanisms)




Housing policy, legislation  
Funding programmes
Practitioner activities
Estate regeneration schemes  
Key meetings / events 
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Appendix B: Examples of the mechanisms of policy transfer 






Literature DICE example, and how the 
mechanism promoted the idea 
Who? Key actors / 
persuasive gurus 
 
Rydin, 2003  
Stone, 2004  
McCann, 2010  
Peck and Theodore, 
2010  




• Alice Coleman – promoting  
defensible space  (but an anti-
guru) 
• Bill Hiller – against defensible 
space, but recognizing design 
significance.  
• Anne Power  - promoting 
management over design  
• Judith Littlewood  at  DoE against 
DICE 
• PW Evaluation team and DOE 
advisory committee – against  
• Sheena Wilson moving from HO 
to DoE promoting defensible 
space  
 
Books  • Defensible Space Newman, 1972 
• Utopia  on Trial Coleman, 1985 






 • Criminology papers more 
fulsome,  
• some Architecture / Planning  
including Against Enclosure  
• DoE Difficult to let estates 
research 




Palfrey, Thomas et 
al., 2012 
• PW DICE evaluation report  
• MORI interim reports 





Hogwood and Gunn, 
1984 
• Secure by Design  guidance  




Hogwood and Gunn, 
1984 
• Mozart Option Appraisal 
Documents 1997 
• Estate Action guidance 
documents - ʻForm Bʼ 
 
What? 
Case studies / 
site visits 
Flyvbjerg, 2006 
 Ekblom, 2011 
 
• Mozart Estate, Westminster 
Iconic, well known 
• Rogers Estate, Tower Hamlets, 
used post -DICE as example of 
neighbourhood planning, bringing 
ministers / local politicians  
• Professional use of comparative 
case studies 





press, Television  
 • Extensive coverage in 
mainstream press  
• Mixed support or criticism in trade 
press 
• Horizon  ʻWriting on the Wallʼ 






 • Rehumanizing Housing  
Conference  
• RIBA / RGS lectures  
• International conferences such as 




McCann and Ward, 
2010 
 
• Academic institutions (AA, UCL, 
LSE, KCL) 
• Professional training / peer 
learning  










• ALOs (also an example of a 
model of practice) 
• Planning or architecture networks   
• Community Architecture groups  
• Housing management 
professionals 
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Appendix C: List of Interviewees 
Note: Where indicated with an* interviewees were interviewed more than once. All 
individuals named signed an ethics consent form agreeing to the use of their name and job 
title in the thesis.   
Interview 
number  
 Role during 1980s / 1990s Current Role /  Role when 
Interviewed 
1 John Harvey* Head of the Estate Action 
Team at the DoE. 
Management Consultant, 
Price Waterhouse 
Director, IRIS Consulting  
2 Professor 
Toby Taper* 
Housing researcher, MORI  Visiting Professor, University 
of Bristol 
3 Dr David Riley Research Manager / Team 
Leader at the DoE Housing 
Directorate 
Chief Social Researcher, 
Head of Analytical Services 
Division, Health and Safety 
Executive. 
4 Professor Paul 
Wiles CB 
Professor of Criminology at 
the University of Sheffield 
Chief Government Social 
Scientist and Head of 
Government Social Research 
Service 





Chief Executive  , Planning 
Inspectorate for England and 
Wales 
6 Keith Kirby Researcher,  Social Research 
Division DoE 
Research Directorate, DCLG 
7 Robert 
Williams  
 Regeneration Manager ,Old 
Ford Housing Association 
8 Michelle Smith Housing Assistant Ranwell 
Estate, London Borough of 
Tower Hamlets 
Housing Manager, Ranwell 
Estate,  Old Ford Housing 
Association 
9 Barry Stanford  Architect for DICE projects, 
Stanford Eatwell and 
Associates   
Director, Stanford Eatwell and 
Associates 
10 Peter Oborn  Architect for Mozart Estate, 
Abbey Hanson Roe 
Deputy Chairman, Aedas 
Architects LTD 
11 Alan Blyth* Architect for Mozart Estate, 
Abbey Hanson Roe 
Regional Director  , Aedas 
Architects LTD 
12 Sam McCarthy Project manager for the 
Rogers DICE scheme, 
London Borough of Tower 
Hamlets 
Project manager, Breyers 
LTD 
13 Steve Stride Neighbourhood  Manager, Chief Executive, Poplar 
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Globe Town Neighbourhood HARCA 
14 Kevin Wright Technical Manager, Globe 
Town Neighbourhood 
Director of Technical 
Resources, Poplar HARCA 
15 Jamie 
Carswell 




 Neighbourhood Housing 
Officer for Rogers Estate, 
Tower Hamlets Homes 
17 David 
Thompson 
 Head of Housing Investment, 
Tower Hamlets Homes 
18 Mark Jones Police Architectural Liaison 
Officer London Borough of 
Tower Hamlets 
Crime Prevention Design 




Architect at Levitt Bernstein Divisional Director Urban 
Renewal Levitt Bernstein 
20 Ben 
Derbyshire 
Architect at Hunt Thompson 
Associates  





Senior Research Officer at the 
Home Office and the DoE 
Housing Directorate  
Retired 
22 Ian Cooper Attendee of the Rehumanising 
Housing Conference 
Eclipse Research Consultants 
23 Tom Wolley Convener of the 
Rehumanising Housing 
Conference 




Architect in KCL DICE Unit Architect (Retired) 




Architect / Director at Hunt 
Thompson Associates 
Chairman, John Thompson 
and Partners, Honorary 




Partner, Hilary Shipman Ltd Partner, Hilary Shipman Ltd 
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31 Ranwell East 
resident A  
  
32 Ranwell East 
resident B 
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Appendix D: Table comparing Newmanʼs and Colemanʼs design variables, Hillierʼs rules of thumb and 
Powerʼs list of design and construction issues that make living conditions for residents difficult 
Guidance which is contradictory is marked in italics  
Theme  Newman (1972) Coleman (1990, p.33, p.179) Hillier (1987, p.86) Power (1998, Table 5.7 p.96)  
Number of dwellings per block (size and scale of the block)   The collective structure of the estates 
made individuals and families feel 
overwhelmed; (scale) 
Number of dwellings using the same entrances 
 
 Common entrances to blocks used by 
many households made it hard to keep 
out strangers or feel secure; (design, 
surveillance) 
Number of stories in a block (significant effect being the large 
number of neighbours rather than additional height) 
  
Block size 
 Stories per dwelling (flats being 
preferable to maisonettes which 
Coleman perceived as a proxy for 
children living above ground level) 





   Shared services( rubbish disposal, 
postal delivery boxes, entrance bells, 
access routes), could be damaged 
thorough irresponsible behaviour and 
difficult to control due to their communal 
location; (design, territoriality) 
 - 310 - 
 
Avoid interconnected vertical routes, with each block or 
section of block served by only one stair or lifts. 
  






Limit the number of dwellings on a corridor. Provide open 
visible balconies, or single loaded corridors  rather than 
enclosed internal corridors.  
 Lack of sense of privacy arose from 
noise transmission, shared corridors and 




Avoid all overhead walkways  Corridors, decks, and landings on many 
levels led to a strong dilution of numbers 




 Avoid blocks raised up on pilotti 
or above garages where 
entrances arenʼt visible  
  
Entrance position location and form of the entrance (flush 
entrances on the street preferable to those set back or 
entrances facing away from the street 
Orientation of facades and 
entrances to clarity the lines of 
sight and to ʻmark important 
moments in the spatial structureʼ 
 Entrance 
characteristics  
 Type of entrance. Individual 
entrance to ground floor 
preferable, then communal 
entrances to separate parts of 
block rather than a single 
communal entrance 
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  All spaces, however small should 
have building entrances opening 
on to them. 
  
  Avoid clustering too many 
entrances on too few spaces, 
distribute them throughout the 
scheme 
 
Spatial organisatio: reduce the degree that grounds and 
common areas are shared by different families. Infill or 
enclose leftover pieces of confused space 
Avoid over enclosing spaces, 
except where this reflects the 
place of the space in the over 
spatial syntax of the scheme 
Open spaces were too exposed for 
small groups of residents to control 
 
  Avoid spaces too small to have 
entrances 
 
Features of the 
grounds 
  Avoid over-hierarchization of 
space; provide a range of more 
integrated (busier) or more 
segregated (quieter) zones. Avoid 
creating space that is empty most 
of the time 
Dark and secluded areas created a 
sense of fear and anonymity; (design, 
surveillance) 
 
 Each of block should have its own 
grounds, enclosed by a wall or a 
fence 
Avoid over enclosing spaces, 
except where this reflects the 
place of the space in the overall 
spatial syntax of the scheme 
 Connection to 
the 
surroundings 
 Number of access points onto the 
site should be limited to one. If 
more required for fire reasons, 
The scheme should be linked 
visually and directly to its 
The clear physical separation of the 
estates from the surrounding areas by 
virtue of their location, construction and 
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entrance/exit not located opposite 
each avoiding a cut through.   
surroundings. tenure evoked the notion of a ghetto; 
(milieu) 
  Access routes shouldnʼt be too 
deep into the scheme (more than 
two steps deep from the outside 
or an integrating core) 
 
 
  Access routes should lead to an 





  Encourage local differences in 
wayfinding, avoid repetition  
 
   Different types of households shared 
intensely communal buildings; 
 Removal or restricted access to 
play areas. 
  
  Analyse surroundings for existing 
patterns of space use, movement, 
and encounter rates. Use this to 
generate schemes that relate to 
the wider spatial structure. 
 
Social mix  
  Preparatory studies should 
involve a cyclical process of 
design generation and systematic 
evaluation. 
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Appendix E: Reported costs for DICE 
 
Capital costs  reported by 
Coleman 
 
Retained houses flats, 
maisonettes  






































Tower Hamlets Rogers Estate 120 36,933 4.4 8 35,000 0.30 128  4.7 
Tower Hamlets Ranwell Estate 350 29,431 10.3 129 55,550 7.20 479  17.5 
Preston  Avenham Estate 136 16,397 2.2 15 48,066 0.07 151  2.3 
Manchester Bennett Street Estate 372 18,941 7.1 15 23,533 0.35 387  7.5 
Nottingham Kingsthorpe Close  Estate 185    22,502 4.2 21 33,904 0.71 206  4.9 
Total / Average cost per unit for five 
estates      28.2     8.6 1,351 27,261 36.8 
DICE Estates excluded from Price 
Waterhouse Evaluation             
Birmingham Nazareth 121 21,149 2.6 32 46,466 1.50 153  4.1 
Sandwell Durham  257 5,778 1.5 14 20,285 0.30 271  1.8 
       4.1   1.8   5.9 
Total / Average cost per unit for 
seven  estates  1541 21,590 32.3 234 37,543 10.4     42.7 
 
(Adapted from Coleman and Silver, 1995?, p.1) 
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spend  per 
estate 
(£M) 
          
Tower Hamlets Rogers Estate 124 3.7 0.6 34,000 4.3 
Tower Hamlets Ranwell Estate 474 18.4 1.3 41,500 19.7 
Preston  Avenham Estate 139 1.5 0.3 13,200 1.8 
Manchester Bennett Street Estate 399 6.8 0.9 19,250 7.7 
Nottingham Kingsthorpe Close Estate 206 4.9 3.0 38,600 7.9 
Total / Average cost per unit for five 
estates  1342 35.3 6.1 30,849 41.4 
  
(Adapted from  Price Waterhouse 1997a Table 2.1  p. 7) 
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Appendix F  The experimental impact of resident churn  
Introduction  
As the methodology chapter subsection 3.3.3. described, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with four long-term residents on the two Tower Hamlets Estates, plus more 
informal conversations with a variety of occupants during site visits. From these pilot 
interviews the main research moved away from gathering material related to residents and 
their responses to the alterations to their estates, to focus on the views of academics and 
professionals. 
The purpose of this appendix is therefore to outline related lines of enquiry beyond the scope 
of the main body of the thesis.  One criticism that there was not space to explore fully, was 
that defensible space is insufficiently sensitive to individual and cultural perceptions of 
space, territoriality and ownership (Hillier, 1973; Smith, 1986a; Malpass, 1988; Ravetz, 
1988). Yanceyʼs (1971) paper on Pruitt-Igoe which introduced the term ʻdefensible spaceʼ 
discussed the varied relationship between social class and social networks, and in particular 
levels of informal social control. He found that stability of economic occupation and social 
interaction were key determinants of lifestyles amongst lower and working classes. Similarly, 
the British Crime Survey highlighted ethnicity and income as indicators of high crime risk 
residential areas, singling out inner city multi-racial areas and the poorest council estates 
(BCS, 1984). Ravetz (1988) also highlighted the mistaken gender and class assumptions 
operating in the design of post-war mass housing that defensible space principles were 
attempting to counter; misplaced attempts to recreate working-class neighbourliness through 
ʻstreets in the airʼ or placing play space out of sight of the home (Ravetz, 1988, p.160). She 
noted the difficulties of separating design from tenure factors in housing satisfaction arguing 
for consideration of two significant further factors; allocation policies, plus appraising the 
functioning of an estate within the context of its wider neighbourhood. Neighbourhoods that 
grow up over time will have differing dynamics than large estates where tenants may have 
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moved in together en mass, with less mobility or opportunities to move, or with cohorts of 
children of similar ages.  
F.1 Population characteristics pre- and post- DICE. 
An unanswered question in the original Price Waterhouse DICE evaluation was the impact of 
population difference on the outcomes. Colemanʼs scientific premise was based on the 
estate populations remaining the same pre- and post- DICE, but she was less interested in 
the actual make-up of these populations. Population changes were monitored, but the 
published evaluation report contains little analysis by population segment, or commentary on 
the impact of population changes, other than finding only a weak relationship between tenant 
turnover and changing levels of crime (Price Waterhouse, 1997, p.57). However archive 
resources consulted included the original MORI survey reports and data sets (MORI 1990, 
1991a, 1991b, 1994, 1995a, 1995b) which record significant shifts in age, child density and 
ethnicity on both the Rogers and Ranwell East Estates.  This suggests that Price 
Waterhouseʼs shallow consideration of the effects of these changes in their published report 
was a telling omission.  
F.1.1 Ethnicity and employment  
One noticeable variation between these two DICE estates was ethnicity and inward 
migration. However, the respective ethnic mix was echoed in the control estates, suggesting 
this difference was a neighbourhood effect rather than an anomaly of the individual estates. 
The 1991 census recorded the population of the surrounding Globe Town neighbourhood as 
about 20% Bangladeshi and 10% other-non-white (Price Waterhouse, 1995). Rogers had a 
majority (48%) of Bangladeshi residents (recorded by MORI as Indian/Asian), rising slightly 
to 52% after DICE, with a similar slight reduction of white residents (38% dropping to 33%).  
On Ranwell East the changes were far greater. Prior to DICE, Ranwell East was 
overwhelming white (82%) with small percentages of Indian/Asian or African/Caribbean 
families (4% and 9%). Both of these groups increased substantially after the works, 
measuring 10% and 14% respectively. A similar growth in Indian/Asian residents was 
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reflected in the control estates, but not for African/Caribbean residents whose numbers in the 
surrounding areas dropped slightly (Price Waterhouse, 1995, p.32, 1996, p.34). 
An unsurprising effect of the 1990s recession was that post-DICE there was a noticeable 
drop in the number of residents in full-time employment on both estates, with the proportion 
of Rogers residents in work falling by almost half (from 21% to 12%), echoed on the control 
estates. A similar drop was also seen at Ranwell East with employment dropping from 24% 
to 15%. Conversely, the Ranwell East control estates fared better with a smaller reduction 
(from 26% to 20%) of those working (Price Waterhouse, 1995, 1996). 
F.1.2  High child densities mixed with older residents.  
The age profiles at Rogers and Ranwell East were also similar to the surrounding control 
estates.  Of the 360 Rogers residents in 1991, 14% were over 60 and 37% under 16 years 
old. This proportion stayed static during and after the DICE works, and while the eight new 
bungalows at Rogers were allocated to older residents, this did not alter the percentage 
overall.  On Ranwell East, there was a slightly smaller proportion (25%) of school children. 
The percentage of children rose to 31% after DICE, due to the number of new family sized 
houses built. Both estates had more than a third of their population under 16, greatly 
exceeding Wilsonʼs (1980) desirable child density threshold  where more than three children 
per ten dwellings signified ʻhigh child densityʼ blocks.  
Data for older Ranwell East residents was categorized slightly differently from the Rogers 
esate, clustering the population into 45-64 year olds and over 65ʼs. At 16% pre- and 14% 
post-DICE the proportion of over 65ʼs was close to the proportion of over 60ʼs at Rogers 
(Price Waterhouse, 1995, 1996). Nonetheless, the unspecified number of additional 60-64 
year olds, and their physical concentration in a few blocks, had a perceptible impact. During 
the 1980s Ranwell East was unusual in having an allocations policy segregated by age, with 
six blocks designated for elderly people. This policy ceased in the 2000s, with the removal of 
the resident warden, but continued to have a legacy effect, and Ranwell is still characterized 
as having a preponderance of elderly residents (Interviews Smith and Williams, 2011). Post- 
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DICE the local Crime Prevention Officer Mark Jones suggested that this demographic mix at 
Ranwell East was as much as a problem as the design, and that the combination of a large 
number of elderly residents and noisy young people would inevitably lead to conflict (Spring, 
1997).    
F.1.3 Shifting Tenures 
Coleman (1985a) had a simplistic ideological belief in the free-market, the positive impact of 
housing ownership, and the perceived autonomy and responsibility provided under Right to 
Buy (RTB):  
“Dweller satisfaction is not necessarily related to the imposition of 
standards, and people find deficiencies in housing infinitely more 
tolerable if they are their own responsibility than if they are someone 
elseʼs” (ibid., p.182).   
This naively and restricted perception of public housing as a flawed alternative to owner-
occupancy illustrated Colemanʼs poor understanding of the restructuring of the post-war 
housing markets, implying as Malpass notes, “a great disservice to both council tenants and 
large numbers of hard pressed home owners” (Malpass, 1988, p.152). She expected that the 
DICE improvements would encourage residents to want to buy their homes (Coleman and 
Silver, 1995?a). In 1991, leasehold numbers on the Rogers blocks were very low, with only 4 
of the 120 flats not owned by the council. There was some interest in RTB as the project 
progressed and a further four properties were sold by 1994. Rogers project manager Sam 
McCarthy attributed the large scale demand for the eight Rogers Bungalows, either to rent or 
buy, to the minimal amount of new homes being built in Tower Hamlets in the early 1990s, 
let alone those specifically for elderly residents (Interview McCarthy, 2011).  After the DICE 
works there were increased enquiries about moving onto the Rogers Estate, although these 
did not always convert into realised moves as the internal conditions of the flats were still 
perceived as poor (Price Waterhouse, 1995).  At Ranwell East, pre-DICE, 40 of the 470 
residents were leaseholders - almost three times as many as at Rogers. Post-DICE 16 
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further sales under RTB occurred at Ranwell East, with sales concentrated amongst the new 
houses built as part of DICE (Price Waterhouse, 1996). This would suggest that the image of 
the estate had improved, but whether this contributed to the tenure diversification was not 
explored in either of the DICE evaluations. 
F.2 Significance of these changes and implications for further research 
Colemanʼs determination to discount environmental and social factors was balanced to some 
extent in the qualitative data gathered by the MORI residentsʼ surveys. This extensive 
evidence was surprisingly underplayed as part of the policy argument, although the housing 
staff and practitioners interviewed repeatedly referred to the social mix and the gentrification 
of the surrounding neighbourhoods. This thesis was not able to unpick this issue further, but 
the following points would be worth investigating (possibly based on a re-examination of the 
historic baseline data that the MORI surveys provided): 
• During DICE, the ethnicity of residents on the two estates altered inline with their 
local areas. This change was more distinct with Ranwell East becoming more mixed 
which may have impacted on the popularity of the estate.  While the varied cultural 
usage of public and shared spaces in multi-ethnic areas such as Roman Road have 
been investigated (see Dines, Cattell et al. 2006), how this impacts on the 
perception of defensible space is yet to be explored.     
• At Rogers, the age profile stayed relatively static, while at Ranwell East numbers of 
school children rose through the construction of new family sized housing, 
increasing already high child densities. There has been general acceptance of 
Wilsonʼs (1979) concerns over child density, but the distinction between 
concentrations of children and young people, the inter-generational consequence of 
defensible space principles and ways of ensuring ʻchild and young person friendly 
environmentsʼ (see GLA,  2008) could be extended to residential  areas.  
• A significant number (23%) of Globe Town residents have had tenancies longer than 
20 years, with a large proportion of residents from the early 1990s still living on the  
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Rogers estate (Interviews Carswell, Choudrey and Thompson, 2011). This stable 
and ageing group continues to exert a disproportionate impact on the estateʼs 
character and its Tenants Association. Resident consultation processes should be 
sensitive to these population biases and the dominant voice of established 
populations, yet Colemanʼs theoretical approaches inevitably  overrode the residents 
wishes. The role of participatory processes during regeneration projects, or the 
stability/churn of resident populations on establishing Newmanʼs communities of 
participationʼ or Sampsonʼs (1997) residentsʼ collective efficacy in enabling/limiting 
defensible space effects could be investigated. 
• At Ranwell East, tensions were reported between leaseholders and Council tenants 
and continue to date (Interviews Ranwell East Residents B & C, 2011). The long-
term impact of policies such as Right to Buy are under consideration (see Meek, 
2014) and a related research area would be the role of tenure mix on residents 
expectations of the management, and maintenance of large housing developments.  
Conclusions  
Defensible space has been shown to impact on residents lives in many complex and 
interacting ways.  Factors such as levels of occupation, cultural norms/expectations for the 
use of private and public spaces, as well as social networks interrelate to influence  
territoriality, and may interact in alternate ways for other three Newmanʼs dimensions. These 
factors in addition to the transient and dynamic changes to the resident populations during 
the five years of DICE. Residentsʼ satisfaction with changes to their estate is a combination 
of their experience of the process (how effectively the works programme was managed, how 
disruptive it was, how much they were involved in the decision-making process) as much as 
the outcomes from the changes themselves. These process-influenced perceptions can be 
long lasting and dominant; residentsʼ memories are long when they are disappointed, but 
they rapidly accept and become accustomed to positive improvements.  
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Appendix G: Table applying the SNU framework for evaluation of crime initiatives to the Price 
Waterhouse and the KCL DICE Unit evaluation reports 
Evidence required to show: Types of data: Comments from SNU  Price Waterhouse 
Evaluation 
KCL DICE Unit 
Evaluation 
Subjective assessments Should only be used as 
supporting data. 
Acceptable. Subjective 
assessments by evaluation 
team and local authority, on 
the post evaluation 
conditions and sustainability 
of the effects.   
Poor. Reports occasionally 
contain short unsupported 
statements from the 
evaluation team.   
Recorded crime statistics Needs to be supported by 
other crime related data – so 
has the initiative displaced 
crime or encouraged other 
forms of crime? 
Acceptable. Crime statistics 
recorded in two ways; 
Residentsʼ reporting 
incidents of crime, and 
police / fire service recorded 
incidents. Impossible to 
trace whether crime was 
displaced even to control 
estates.    
Crime statistics not 
available. 
Crime survey data Altered severity and impact 
on different groups. 
Excellent. Residentsʼ 
surveys asked about impact 
of a range of crimes. 
Findings controlled for age, 
gender and social class. 
Poor. Visual survey of 
vandalism damage 
(approximating to crimes 
against property) used as a 
proxy for other crimes. 
Evidence of reduced crime, 
plus confirmation that this 
means a reduced problem.  
What is a suitable way to 
measure whether crime has 
reduced? Surveys, crime 
statistics or Local Authority 
data on vandalism? 
Cost of crime data Funders usually mainly 
concerned with this issue. 
Good. Police / fire incident 
data related to standardised 
policing costs to calculate 
None gathered 
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cost of police response to 
crime. Costs of the 
incidences of crime based 
on data from residents 
surveys.  
 
Qualitative data including on 
fear of crime 
Survey residents asked 
whether crime reduced. 
Excellent. MORI residents 
surveys covered a range of 
crime incidents: crime 
experienced or witnessed, 
fear of crime and incivilities. 
Asked if crime had reduced, 
and if crime was less on 
their estate than elsewhere 
in the area.  
Poor. Opinions gathered 
from occasional informal 
conversations with 
residents, and from 
residents consultation 
meetings. 
Control group data Was the same information 
gathered from control areas? 
Good. Three estates 
identified per DICE Estate, 
slightly smaller survey 
population in controls, but 
same data collected.  
None gathered 
Demographic data Evidence that the makeup of 
population not altered. 
Excellent.  Slight 
demographic changes 
inevitable, but decanting of 
residents avoided and 
controlling of data for slight 
changes judged 
unnecessary as pre-and 
post populations considered 
to be a good match.  
None gathered. Evaluation 
methodologies hoped that 
estate population should 
remain the same, but no 
data gathered to verify this 
Evidence of initiativeʼs effect 
Was the initiative responsible 
for the changes? 
 
 
Sampling data Confirmation from surveys 
that difference not due to 
Good. MORI surveys careful 
to follow best practice for 
Poor Visual environmental 
abuse surveys taken pre 
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make up of two samples or 
response rate,  controlling 
for non-replies. 
census approach, with as 
high a follow up response 
rate as possible. Findings 
controlled for changes in 
population.   
and post works.  
Descriptive accounts of the 
implementation 
To show no external factors 
(including policy activities) 
could account for the 
change. 
Poor. Descriptions limited to 
physical changes.  Building 
changes described in terms 
of DICE principles, 
insufficiently detailed. 
External factors such as 
increased consultation, local 
policing or housing 
management services not 
noted. 
Poor. Descriptions only 
limited to physical changes.  
No external factors such as 




 Varied. The MORI survey 
data was subject to robust 
statistical analysis. Yet the 
evaluation acknowledges 
that other data was subject 
to ʻrelatively less challenging 
tests of simple net effectʼ  
(Price Waterhouse, 1997 
p.49) 
Poor No detailed statistical 
analysis undertaken of 
design values or 
environmental abuse 
scores.  
Continuous monitoring data When did the crime 
reduction take place? 
Poor. Crime reduction data 
gathered at two survey 
snapshot points.  
Poor.  Three to four 
snapshot surveys. 
Evidence of the effect of 
individual measures 
Which measure led to the 
change? Descriptions of 
implementation - when and 
how changes were made 
 Poor. Limited descriptions of 
timing of physical changes. 
Consultation and other 
Acceptable. Descriptions of 
implemented design 
changes and constraints 
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 management processes not 
described.  
arising from tenantsʼ 
consultation, staff and 
management changes or 
Fire officers intervention 
are listed. 
Evidence of permanence  
Does the effect last? 
 
Follow up study a minimum of 
12 ideally 36 months later. 
 Acceptable but variable 
depending on programme. 
Rogers revisited 16 months 
after completion of works, 
Ranwell East only 12 
months later.  
Variable. Follow up abuse 
survey for Rogers 
undertaken 13 months after 
completion of works.  
Ranwell Eastʼs final survey 
before works were finished.  
Descriptive accounts Identifying any specific local 
circumstances. 
Poor. Very short (3 page) 
general description on 
context, specific estates and 
their controls. Descriptive 
qualitative data gathered 
from residents but not used.  
Poor. Some descriptive 
comparison to other DICE 
estates, how the changes 
might be implemented 
differently in future.  
Evidence of replicability  
Is initiative replicable or 
generaliseable? 
Capital and revenue costs and 
cost benefit evidence 
 Excellent. Careful Value for 
Money analysis attempted to 
identify additionally 
attributable to DICE rather 
than background changes.  
None provided.  Short table 
of capital costs included in 
separate DICE leaflet.  
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